




THE EXPOSITOR

VOL. II.

THE EXPOSITOR

NINTH SERIES

Volume II



HODDER AND STOUGHTON, LIMITED
WARWICK SQUARE, LONDON, E.C.

MCMXXIV

set. 9

1/2

1924.2

Made and Printed in Great Britain.
Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London

19918
1961

CURRENT ISSUES.

ANOTHER symposium on *Immortality* (Putnam) has appeared; the book consists of nine papers by various writers, with an introduction by Lord Ernle, who remarks that the essays converge upon the conclusion that immortality "is not only a possible truth but the object of a reasonable faith such as that on which men act in all practical affairs, and the most adequate interpretation of the ethical and spiritual values of the life of mankind." The closing essay is slightly apart from the others; it is a short piece upon immortality as interpreted in poetry, and comes from the pen of Mr. Maurice H. Hewlett.

* * * * *

In English poetry Mr. Hewlett contrasts Shakespeare and Spenser. As he admits, there is no positive evidence that Shakespeare was personally interested or convinced. The well-known passages which voice the hope of life after the grave are upon the whole dramatic. What interested Shakespeare was the present life. To him "the world was less a stage than an inn. The guests came and went, ate, drank, ruffled, made merry, and paid the reckoning. Quietly he sat by, looking on, knowing all about the springs of their bustling, fervid commerce, concerning himself scarcely at all with their fate beyond the door." Whereas Spenser followed men beyond the door. He had a Platonist's intense conviction of the eternal order to which the soul belonged. Among English poets he is the first and finest expression of the idealistic Christian belief in immortality.

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Mr. Hewlett is scarcely fair to Cowper, among the later poets. Cowper, he declares, was one of those who, under the stress of a narrow evangelical theology, "thought dreadfully of Immortality," one of the unfortunate religionists who allowed

their sense of eternal bliss to be overpowered by their fear of its opposite. But Cowper never ceased to believe in eternal bliss. He lived in the steadfast conviction of a Christian immortality, and this hope was for him a power and postulate, not a problem. Whether he himself was worthy to attain it, he sometimes doubted, in his moods of despair; but he never thought "dreadfully" of immortality, when he thought about what awaited the elect after death. He might be wrecked, but people like his father and mother were safe in God's harbour. As he says, addressing his mother's picture:

"Me howling blasts drive devious, tempest toss't,
Sails ripped, seams opening wide, and compass lost,
And day by day some current's thwarting force
Sets me more distant from a prosperous course.
Yet oh the thought that thou art safe, and he!
That thought is joy, arrive what may to me."

Cowper's morbid apprehensions were purely personal, and they were due to a belief which became weaker during last century, the belief in a final judgment.

* * * * *

This is what we miss in Tennyson's statement of immortality, and the omission is significant. *In Memoriam* argues that men live after death, but it is silent on the New Testament doctrine that "after death comes the judgment." The reaction against a crude, materialistic doctrine of hell was in full swing, and Tennyson faintly trusted "the larger hope." Nevertheless it is not fair to say, with Mr. Hewlett, that Tennyson and Browning "were optimists by temperament," as if that explained their passionate faith in immortality. Both had to fight doubts, and both worked out what was to them a reasonable basis for their faith. Why should "temperament" be used to disparage good features in a man's soul any more than to excuse inferior ones?

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Mr. Hewlett ends abruptly by maintaining that the only two living "poets" whose gifts correspond to these great names of the past are the poet-laureate and Mr. Housman, one a Stoic and the other an Epicurean. This is rank heresy. Mr. Hardy is not to be ignored, though he is agnostic on the question of immortality, and Mr. Herbert Trench has written a poem which

is deeper than anything ever penned by Mr. Bridges or Mr. Housman. There are few things in modern literature upon this subject more daunting and disheartening than "Apollo and the Seaman," with its plea for a naturalistic view of the world, and its description of how the barque of immortality has foundered on the high seas.

"I heard them calling in the streets
That the ship I serve upon—
The great ship Immortality—
Was gone down like the sun."

Only, never to rise again.

* * * *

The philosophers of to-day have done more than the poets to restate in a serious form the implications of the Christian doctrine of immortality. This is mainly due to the study of human personality. And, whatever may remain vague, there is little doubt that the older idea of past generations being used up as materials for a richer race has been abandoned. In the symposium it falls to Professor R. G. Macintyre of Sydney University to expound the Christian idea of immortality, and in the course of his argument he makes this point. "Love is never *singular*, it implies a social universe of personalities; 'we love because He first loved us.' It is a divine lesson by God who is love, carrying with it a new commandment, 'even as I have loved you that ye also love one another.' Now, such a relationship, once established, must, if true to itself, go on, and *go on as individual* relationship. The idea of countless generations as mere stepping-stones to the attainment of an ultimate few, the last stage of an evolutionary process, may be true in the other and lower stages of organic life, but cannot be so for man as spirit, self-conscious and morally capable. That quality lifts him, not merely in type, but as an individual, to a higher life where values cannot remain except as inhering in the individual personality, though never wholly for himself."

* * * *

This is the Christian theologian. But he is only stating in prose what a poet had already sung in verse. F. W. H. Myers was the laureate of immortality for last generation, and he protests passionately against this evolutionary perversion of the idea of eternal life. Myers wrote fluently. But now

and then he concentrates his convictions, as in the following lines :

“Oh dreadful thought, if all our sires and we
 Are but foundations of a race to be—
 Stones which one thrusts in earth, and builds thereon
 A white delight, a Parian Parthenon,
 And thither, long thereafter, youth and maid
 Seek with glad brows the alabaster shade,
 And in procession's pomp together bent
 Still interchange their sweet words innocent—
 Not caring that those mighty columns rest
 Each on the ruin of a human breast—
 That to the shrine the victor's chariot rolls
 Across the anguish of ten thousand souls.”

This is not selfishness. It is not the soul grasping what belongs to itself against the demands of posterity. Those who are most unselfish in serving their age and in taking thought for the next generation are at the same time sensible that human life, theirs and that of others, is too valuable to be used as mere material for a future in which they have no part. It is inherent in love, the supreme expression of personality, to affirm itself. Even in this world there are sacrifices of honour and purity and truth which love cannot make, for the sake of its own essence. Similarly, it cannot consent to any view of the future in which it ceases to be itself. It cannot believe that a just God would make such a demand upon personality.

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Belief in immortality of a really Christian quality is one of the acid tests which reveal the weakness of Tolstoy's theories. Mr. Janko Lavrin has just published a study of *Tolstoy and Modern Consciousness*, in which he fastens acutely upon Tolstoy's travesty of the doctrine. He shows how Tolstoy was from the first haunted by the fear of death. He had a perfect horror of it. Indeed, he was driven to long for a kind of self-extinction, “in order to get rid of the horror itself.” This Buddhistic refuge would have been logical. But then, as Mr. Lavrin shows, he tried illogically to push it into his adaptation of the New Testament religion. Tolstoy was far more interested in a few precepts of Christ than in Christ Himself. And he reveals his entire misconception of the gospels by arguing that Christ

meant by eternal life not any personal immortality but participation in a sort of consciousness of humanity.

* * * * *

Christ, says Tolstoy, summoned men away from themselves to a "common life bound up with the past, present, and future life of the whole of humanity, the life of the Son of Man." Christ never did anything of the kind. He did not identify personality, as Tolstoy does, with mere selfish individualism. Mr. Lavrin points out how Tolstoy was driven along this line of error to adopt a sort of Nirvana or vague world-consciousness of humanity as the ocean into which the little drop of personal life would be glad to fall. "While Dostoevsky with his dynamic religious temperament was driven nearly mad by the mere possibility of personal extinction after death, the converted Tolstoy accepts it with Buddhistic placidity. He even welcomes it as a boon which may rid us from the burden of our self for ever and ever." Dostoevsky's position at least provides the opportunity for a Christian gospel of eternal life. Tolstoy's does not. He evades the issue characteristically. The truth is, outside one or two ethical axioms, he had no thought-out message; he felt strongly, but he is weak when he comes to reflect upon the issues of religion. His literary genius cannot blind us to his failures in the interpretation of Christianity. Psychologically, says Mr. Lavrin, "he is not so much a real Christian as a weary Eastern Nihilist in pseudo-Christian garb."

* * * * *

It is three hundred years, this month, since George Fox, the Quaker, was born in Leicestershire. His remarkable personality is revealed in his Journal, though it has never had the popularity of Wesley's Journal, partly owing to its restricted range of interest, partly on account of the rather conscious and self-righteous traits which lie side by side with better qualities in the writer's character. But Fox was a phenomenon and force in the seventeenth century. A just historical estimate of his work has been arrived at long ago. The pendulum of judgment swung for a while between two violent extremes of depreciation and eulogy. Now, thanks in the main to Dr. Hodgkin's biography and Dr. Gardiner's pages in the second volume of his *History of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate*, the verdict upon Fox is fixed. Unconciliatory and narrow as he often

was, he did vital service in exposing not only formal hypocrisy but the intellectual and religious limitations of current Calvinistic theology, particularly in connexion with the Bible. Mr. W. D. Niven's article is a fresh effort to bring the exact value of Fox's theories before the mind of our age, and to appreciate his limitations as well as his courageous pioneering intuitions.

* * * * *

Fox was, for good and bad, a man of one book. The Bible was his textbook for life, and the Bible read by the inner light. As Dr. Hodgkin points out in his biography, "the Bible seems to have been his only literature, and it may safely be said that Amos, the herdsman of Tekoa, who was separated from him by an interval of twenty-four centuries, had infinitely more influence on his mind than William Shakespeare, who died but eight years before he came into the world." Hence his ultra-puritanic attitude to the innocent pleasures of life, for example. But one prefers to dwell on the service he did in calling Christians to pass through the letter to the spirit. The call was not always wisely put, but it was a call of inner wisdom, and Fox voiced it with mystical intensity, for all his exaggerations and one-sided attacks upon other Christians.

* * * * *

His Journal has nearly as many thorns as flowers in it. Among the finer passages, that upon his mystical experience in the Vale of Beavor is best known. But there is another, which anticipates the lines in F. W. Faber's passion-hymn :

"O break, O break, hard heart of mine!

Thy weak self-love and guilty pride

His Pilate and His Judas were."

It is the extract from his diary of 1648, which begins : "I saw the state of those, both priests and people, who in reading the Scriptures cry out much against Cain, Esau, and Judas, and other wicked men of former times, mentioned in the Holy Scriptures ; but do not see the nature of Cain, of Esau, of Judas, and those others in themselves. These said, it was they, they, they that were the bad people ; putting it off from themselves : but when some of these came, with the light and the Spirit of truth, to see into themselves, then they came to say, I, I, I, it is I myself that have been the Ishmael, and the Esau, etc." This is Fox in a better moment. Had he written more often

in this vein, instead of filling his diary with rather stupid and petty attacks on churches as "steeple-houses," and on church-people as either hypocrites or deluded creatures, he would have left a more permanent contribution to religious literature. Still, historically, he was a stimulus, and it is worth while to ask whether his message may not have some permanent elements of value.

* * * * *

A correspondent writes kindly: "*Reddite ergo omnibus debita . . . cui honorem, honorem.*" In the January issue of the *EXPOSITOR* (p. 23) Dr. Robinson refers with real appreciation to the late Rev. C. L. Marson's *The Psalms at Work*, but unintentionally gives the impression that Marson followed Prothero, whereas the opposite was the case. In the quaint preface to the fourth edition of his book, Mr. Marson, apologising for the delay (it was published in 1909), refers to 'another author' who 'by a daring piece of free trade has incorporated almost the whole of the second edition into a work of his own and cried it freely before the public.' " Another slight correction may be offered, apropos of Professor Stevenson's allusion to Dr. Peake's book on *The Bible*, in the June issue (p. 410). The publishers, Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton, report, I am glad to say, that it is not "out of print" (price 7s. 6d.) This may reassure those who have expressed their disappointment that a work of this rank was inaccessible.

"TEN" TREATISES ON THE "TEN" COMMANDMENTS.

So much of the best work on the Decalogue is to be found in articles in magazines and in dictionaries that it would not be well to make "books" the main subject of this paper. The short Bibliography which follows illustrates and justifies this statement.

(A Bibliography containing twenty entries, German and Dutch, is given by W. Nowack in the *Baudissin-festschrift* (1918), p. 381. I am indebted to Nowack for several of the entries given below.)

- (a) Philo, *de Decalogo*.
Josephus, *Archæologia*, III. V. §§ 4-8 (ed. Niese III. §§ 89-101).
- (b) Augustine, *Quaestiones de Exodo*, LXXI. (vol. xxviii. Part 3, pp. 135-140, ed. J. Zycha, Vienna Corpus).
Catechismus ex decreto Concilii Tridentini ad Parochos (1566).
Pars 3^a, *De Dei praeceptis in Decalogo contentis*. (Contains much interesting casuistical matter.)
- A. Kuenen, *Religion of Israel* (E.T. 1874), vol. i. pp. 282-290.
- (c) C. G. Montefiore, "Recent Criticism upon Moses and the Pentateuchal Narratives of the Decalogue" in *Jewish Quarterly Review*, iii. 251-291 (Jan. 1891).
- J. Wellhausen, *Composition des Hexateuch*³ (1899), Nachträge, pp. 329-335.
- B. D. Eerdmans, "Oorsprong en Beteekenis van de 'Tien Woorden'" (Dutch, 1903) in *Theol. Tijdschrift*, xxxvii. 19-35.
- (d) Eduard König and Rabbi E. G. Hirsch, "Decalogue," in *Jewish Encyclopedia* (1903), iv. 492-496.
- (e) Stanley A. Cook, "A pre-Massoretic Biblical Papyrus" in Proceedings of the *Society for Biblical Archæology* for Jan. 14, 1903. An early Hebrew text of the Ten Commandments.
- (f) E. Kautzsch, "Religion of Israel," in the extra volume (1904) of Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, pp. 633-4 (on the Decalogue).
- J. C. Matthes (Amsterdam), "Der Decalog," in *ZATW* (1904), xxiv. 17-41.
- W. Emery Barnes, "The Ten Words of Exodus xxxiv.," in *Journal of Theological Studies* (1905), vi. 557.
- (g) B. D. Eerdmans, *Alttestamentliche Studien* (German, 1910), iii. 85-91; 131-146.
- (h) J. E. McFadyen, "Mosaic Origin of the Decalogue," seven articles in the *EXPOSITOR* for Feb.-May and July-September, 1916, under the following headings:
- "The Ritual Decalogue" (see Exod. xxxiv.);
 - "Egyptian and Babylonian Parallels to the Ethical Decalogue" (Exod. xx. 1-17);
 - "The Original Form of the Decalogue";
 - "Can the Original Form of the Decalogue be Mosaic?";
 - "The Fourth Commandment";
 - "The Second Commandment ('the real crux')";
 - "The Relation of the Decalogue to Prophecy";
 - "The Decalogue and Individualism";
 - "The Unique Distinction of the Decalogue."

W. Nowack, "Der erste Dekalog," in the *Baudissin-festschrift* (1918), Beihefte 33 of *ZATW*, pp. 381-397.

(i) R. H. Charles, *The Decalogue* (Warburton Lectures 1919-1923). Edinburgh, 1923.

Beside the usual Commentaries may be specially mentioned the following:—A. H. McNeile, *Exodus* (1908, Westminster Commentaries) *in loco* and Introduction LVI.-LXIV.; S. R. Driver, *Exodus* (1911, Cambridge Bible) *in loco* and Appendix II., "Date of the Decalogue."

(a) PHILO AND JOSEPHUS.

What Josephus tells us is hardly worthy of notice except in two particulars. He lays stress on the statement that all the people, men, women and children, heard at Sinai God discoursing to them. Secondly, he declares that it is not lawful to publish the text of the Decalogue. Accordingly he confines himself to a brief summary of the contents. (I have not found in my reading any confirmation of this second statement of Josephus.)

Philo is greater and more interesting, but somewhat in love with symbolism. He tells us of the excellence of the number Ten. He indignantly repudiates (*ἀπαγγε*) the suggestion that the Father of All revealed the Decalogue by making Himself audible (*φωνῆς τροχόν*); "God is not as man, needing a mouth." On the form in the singular, "Thou shalt not kill," etc., he remarks that the man who is obedient to God is equivalent to (*ἰσοδύναμος*) a whole populous nation. On the Fifth commandment he says that the nature of parents is akin both to the immortal and the mortal essence. Further, while the first four commandments have respect to the Divine and the immortal, the last five have respect to the Human and mortal. So the command to honour parents coming at the end of the First Table fitly connects it with the Second. One other of Philo's sayings may be noted. "Why are no penalties attached for the breach of these commands?" Because God is a Lord who is

simply good, the author of good things only, but of no evil at all.

(b) FROM ST. AUGUSTINE TO DR. W. NOWACK.

It is a far cry from St. Augustine's *Quæstiones de Exodo* to Professor McFadyen in the *EXPOSITOR* or to Dr. Nowack in the *Festschrift*. The acute mind of the African Father asked questions somewhat different from those which are raised by modern men. Some numerical Typology must needs enter into his commenting. How, he asks, are the *decem præcepta* to be divided? Certainly between our duty to God and our duty to man. Some, he says, reckon the first *four* commandments under the first head, and the remaining *six* under the second. In substance Augustine agrees with them, but in the numbering he has a view of his own. Commandments i.-iv., he holds, are rather to be numbered as i.-iii., for commandments i. and ii. are really one, so that the "Sabbath" commandment with St. Augustine becomes the Third. "*Trinitatem videntur illa quæ ad deum pertinent insinuare diligentius intuentibus.*"

The commandments which follow, beginning with that of Obedience to parents, are reckoned by St. Augustine as *seven* in number, the Tenth counting as *two*. "*Concupiscentia . . . uxoris alienæ et concupiscentia domus . . . in peccando differunt,*" he writes. The Tenth commandment (it is to be noted) forms two *Sedarim* ("sections") even in MT both of Exodus xx. and of Deuteronomy v.

St. Augustine's other questions are of matter, not of form. He is at pains to show that the command, *Thou shalt not covet*, is not covered by the two commandments, *Thou shalt not steal*, and *Thou shalt not commit adultery*. A man may desire to sin, and yet abstain through fear of the immediate consequences. Such a man has broken the Tenth Commandment. Again, Augustine, while he con-

fesses that he cannot prove the point, urges that our Seventh Commandment condemns under the name of adultery all fornication also. Of the Eighth, he says, answering in advance some modern criticisms of this commandment, “*Non rapinam permisit qui furtum prohibuit.*” In other words, the prohibition applies to the rich oppressor as well as to the poor pilferer. The Sixth, according to St. Augustine, does not apply “*quando occidi aliquem deus iubet*”; he is probably thinking of the order to exterminate the Canaanites. Finally, against the vice of lying the Father quotes Psalm v. 7, “*perdis omnes qui loquuntur mendacium,*” but he hesitates to say that a lie which does not hurt one’s neighbour is a breach of the Ninth commandment.

The questions which claim the attention of a modern scholar are more numerous and more difficult to solve than those which St. Augustine answered. They include the following :

(1) Is there a rival Decalogue, one of a ritual character, in Exodus xxxiv. 10-28 ?

(2) If the moral Decalogue be the only true one, does Exodus xx. 2-17 or Deuteronomy v. 6-18 (6-21, E.V.) give the more original text ?

(3) Does a third form, older and quite brief, underlie these two texts ?

(4) Does this brief form go back to Moses, or are only seven Commandments Mosaic ?

(5) Is the word “Ten” in Exodus xxxiv. 28 and Deuteronomy iv. 13 to be understood in the strict numerical sense ? Or, does the phrase, “The Ten Words” mean simply “The Few Words” (“the Moral Shorter Catechism”) ?

(6) If the Decalogue is post-Mosaic, is its composition to be attributed to the influence of the Prophets of the eighth century, and is it to be dated in the seventh century B.C. ?

(7) Two additional questions are: (a) What is the meaning of the Third Commandment? (b) What is the meaning of the word "covet" (Heb. חָסַד) in the Tenth Commandment?

(c) C. G. MONTEFIORE ON KUENEN AND WELLHAUSEN.

This interesting essay ("Recent Criticism upon Moses") was published in January 1891, when the reputations of Kuenen and Wellhausen were at their height. Substantially it is an article on the Decalogue. It is divided into two parts. The second, the less important, is concerned with the literary history of Exodus xix.-xxiv. and of Exodus xxxiv., the former including the "moral" Decalogue (xx. 2-17), the latter its "ritual" rival (xxxiv. 10-28). Montefiore holds that we shall never come to a satisfactory literary analysis of these passages. Herein he is to be followed rather than Kuenen or Wellhausen, who, though in general agreement in critical sympathies, failed to agree in their analysis of Exodus xix.-xxiv., xxxiv. Both indeed changed their own minds over this difficult analysis.

The more important part of Montefiore's article deals with the place of the Decalogue in the history of Israelite religion. He begins with a consideration of the views of Kuenen in the *Religion of Israel*. In this early work Kuenen accepted the Mosaic origin of the Ten Words in their original form, reckoning the opening exordium as the first Word, and omitting as an interpolation the reference to image worship in the Second. So he writes, "The great merit of Moses lies in the fact that he connected the religious idea with the moral life. Yahveh comes before His people with moral demands and commandments." But if the religion of Moses had already reached an ethical level, how are we to account for the low religious ideas of Jephthah in *Judges* or of David in the book of *Samuel*? Kuenen

answered that Moses was able to interpret his higher conception of the nature of Yahveh only to a few chosen spirits. Later, however, in the Hibbert Lectures (III.) Kuenen took a different position: the ethical conception of Yahveh's being was claimed as the creation of the canonical prophets of the eighth century.

Wellhausen's account of the beginning of Israelite religion is more open to criticism than Kuenen's in the *Religion of Israel*. "The religious starting point," Wellhausen writes, "of the history of Israel was remarkable, not for its novelty, but for its normal character. In all ancient peoples there exists a relation between God and the affairs of the nation, and religion is employed as a motive for law and customary morality; in none, however, did the relation exist, or was the motive employed, in such purity and power as in Israel." On this Montefiore pertinently asks, "Now what influences were there to develop the religion of Amos and of the author of Exodus xx. out of the religion of Deborah and of David?" And he adds, "Between the pre-prophetic religion of Israel, as [Wellhausen] conceives it, and the religious teaching of Amos there yawns a chasm which all the charm and brilliancy of [Wellhausen's] narrative has not been able to bridge over." So Montefiore refuses to follow him, when the brilliant German maintains the view that the "ritual" Decalogue of Exodus xxxiv. 10-28 (J) is far more ancient than the moral Decalogue of Exodus xx. 2-17 (E). We may gather rather that Montefiore believes that our familiar Ten Commandments have their true root and origin in the creative teaching of Moses. "No one," he writes, "would assert that the religion of Moses equalled the religion of Amos in moral consistency and spiritual depth. But what our rough analysis of the latest criticism seems to prove is that every element in the religion of the eighth century prophets has its true

root and origin in the creative teaching of the founder."

Here may be appropriately noted two of Montefiore's dicta in his latest book, *The Old Testament and After*, London, 1923. "The six ethical commands of the Decalogue do with much tact single out six of the great ethical pillars upon which society rests. We honour and value them for their literal meaning. . . . But beyond the literal meaning they stand in our minds and hearts for what they have been made to include . . . Jesus and the Rabbis made murder include anger; Jesus and the Rabbis made adultery include lustful desire. And we, following in their footsteps, can make stealing include much at which our ancestors would, perhaps, stare." "The date of the Decalogue is disputed, and even if it be (as I am inclined to believe it is) pre-prophetic, it was the prophet's work which gave it special place and dignity. The author of Deuteronomy v. was the product of prophecy."

(d) E. KÖNIG AND E. G. HIRSCH.

The article in *The Jewish Encyclopedia* is interesting as the joint production of a Christian and a Jew. "Exodus on the whole presents an earlier text than Deuteronomy." On the other hand in the prohibition of idolatry the "laxer wording" of Deuteronomy has the priority in time. Again, in the Fourth commandment "the introduction of the theological motive in Exodus, where Deuteronomy has the historical-economic," suggests the higher antiquity of the Deuteronomic form.

Saadia ascribed verbal inspiration to the Deuteronomic Decalogue and to that of Exodus equally. While Exodus presents the reading of "the first tables," Deuteronomy contains that of the second (Exod. xxxiv. 1). Aben Ezra (on Exod. xx. 1) dissents from him, and says

that the variants are of the nature of linguistic differences.

The Midrashic statement (given in Mechilta and elsewhere) is that both versions of the Decalogue were spoken (by miracle) on Sinai at one and the same time.

The Feast of Weeks (Pentecost) is observed among the Jews as the day of the giving of the Commandments. On that occasion the Decalogue is recited in the Synagogue according to the supralinear accentuation. On other days the ordinary accentuation is followed.

(A further article in the Encyclopedia, “The Decalogue in Jewish Theology” by Hirsch, contains much interesting matter.)

(e) STANLEY A. COOK.

Dr. Cook’s paper in the *P.S.B.A.* is important as a very careful description of the Nash papyrus. Even if the text of the papyrus prove to be no more than a school exercise, its age gives it real importance. Moreover it is interesting that (like Rom. xiii. 9) it transposes the Sixth and Seventh commandments, and has some other variations from M.T. Dr. Cook gives a full palæographical account of the fragments and adds a photograph of them, which is taken from a skilful drawing by Prof. Burkitt. (The fragments themselves, owing to their condition, could not be successfully photographed.) The photograph is reproduced in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* to illustrate E. König’s article, DECALOGUE.

(f) E. KAUTZSCH.

The contribution of E. KAUTZSCH (Professor at Halle) to the subject, though brief, is of importance because of the ripe scholarship and general good judgment of the writer. He devotes rather more than two columns to a discussion of the question whether the Decalogue can be attributed to Moses. At one time it was supposed that

the “unanimity of the tradition” obliged us to accept the Decalogue as Mosaic. The Elohist in Exodus xx. and the Deuteronomist in Deuteronomy v. agreed in attributing the same text of the Ten Commandments—apart from a few variants—to Israel’s great Lawgiver. But such a statement of the case was impugned from two directions. Some, e.g., B. Baentsch in Nowack’s *Handkommentar* (Exodus), maintained that the Decalogue in Exodus xx. is taken from Deuteronomy v., and consequently that the Deuteronomist is the sole authority for its Mosaic origin. On the other hand the poet Goethe urged as early as 1773 that another tradition—coming from J—testified to a totally different form of the Decalogue, preserved in Exodus xxxiv. 10–26. This latter form, owing to its character, is sometimes called the “ritual” Decalogue to distinguish it from the “moral” Decalogue given in Exodus xx. 2–17. Goethe’s view has been accepted by many modern scholars, though Kautzsch rejects it. Next Kautzsch, believing that Exodus xx. 2–17 (= Deut. v. 6–21, E.V.) is “the” Decalogue, asks whether it can in any form be traced back to Moses. Such a form must have been very brief. The contrast between the length of the first five commandments (146 words) and the second five (26 words) suggests the conclusion that the reasons given for obedience in the first five are a later addition. In such a shortened form two difficulties of Mosaic authorship are removed, i.e., *first*, the general Deuteronomic colouring vanishes, and *secondly*, the great difference of motive urged in the Fourth commandment is lost likewise.

But it may still be asked, Is it possible that so fully developed an ethical system stands at the head of the whole development of Israel’s religion? To this enquiry Kautzsch answers that the use of the Commandments in the instruction of our childhood blinds us to their real

character. Their standpoint is not the high ethical one which we commonly attribute to them. Their original meaning referred to rights rather than morals. The Seventh commandment, for instance, Kautzsch tells us, had a non-ethical aspect: it forbids *not* impurity, but interference with the rights of a husband. So there is no valid reason for refusing to attribute a concise form of the Decalogue to Moses, but for the prohibition of the *use of images*. Did some other Commandment stand once in the place of this? or were there originally *seven* commandments only and not ten? Kautzsch refuses to give a decisive answer. Some rudimentary form of the Decalogue (apart from the prohibition of images) may possibly be Mosaic.¹

(g) B. D. EERDMANS.

Eerdmans is well known for the severity with which he has criticised the usual analysis which divides Genesis between P, E, and J. He has certainly shown a healthy independence in his study of the Old Testament; and not least in his treatment of the Decalogue. He starts from the position that Exodus xx. 1-17 does not form part of the original tradition in Exodus. What signs then does the passage itself afford of its origin? Eerdmans reminds us first how strongly Deuteronomic is the language of the passage. But it was not composed by the Deuteronomist. This appears at once from the true text of Exodus xx. 5, 6 (= Deut. v. 9, 10). The two qualifying words לְשֹׂנְאָי “of them that hate me” (E.V.) and לְאַהֲבָי, “of them that love me,” come awkwardly into the text, and can best be explained as glosses introduced by the Deutero-

¹ I call attention to my own paper in the *J.T.S.* because it suggests that “Ten” in the title “Ten Commandments” is to be taken as a “round” number. Both in Exod. xx. and in Exod. xxxiv. there is some uncertainty in making out just the number “Ten,” neither less nor more.

nomist in order to soften expressions which were strongly opposed to his own gentler spirit. JEHOVAH is described as "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, upon the third generation, and upon the fourth." But it is written in Deuteronomy vii. 10, "[JEHOVAH] will repay him that hateth Him *in his own person* (אֵל פָּנָיו)," and in Deuteronomy xxiv. 16 occurs the precept, "The children shall not be put to death for the fathers." So the Deuteronomist added לְשֹׂנְאֵי to the text of the commandment to modify its original harshness, לְשֹׂנְאֵי being a qualification of the *children*, not of the fathers: JEHOVAH will visit iniquity upon the descendants, if the descendants show themselves haters of the LORD. So it appears that the Deuteronomist did not himself compose the Commandments, but glossed a text which he found already enjoying a position of authority.

On the Fourth commandment Eerdmans argues that D may have been acquainted with the sanction for Sabbath observance given in Exodus xx. 11. D is conscious at least that the Sabbath-command is pre-Sinaitic, for he adds the words, "as JEHOVAH thy God commanded thee" (Deut. v. 12). (The Fifth commandment receives the same addition, but then D may very well have regarded the Fifth also as pre-Sinaitic, and even primitive.) Accordingly Eerdmans is not convinced that the original Sabbath-commandment was of no great length ("sehr kurz"). The "pre-Deuteronomic" text, according to Eerdmans, consisted of Exodus xx. 2a, 3, 5 (without לְשֹׂנְאֵי), 6a, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17a.

On the Tenth commandment Eerdmans raises an interesting discussion on the meaning of "covet" (חָמַד). "To covet" meant with the Israelite, "to covet *and* to take steps to obtain." Thus in Exodus xxxiv. 24 the promise is made, that when the Israelite is absent from his land

on a visit to the sanctuary, “No one shall *covet* (חמד) thy land.” The Tenth word was not taken into the series of the Commandments because of a mere feeling, but because of the act bound up with the feeling.

Equally interesting is Eerdmans’ criticism of the suggestion that the Ten Words are a summary of the moral teaching of the Prophets of the eighth century. He remarks truly enough that the *Hauptmerkmal*, the chief note, of the prophetic teaching is absent from the Decalogue. The prophets preached that the rich should not oppress the poor, but on the contrary that mercy and judgment should be shown to them. Of this teaching there is no trace in the Decalogue. Eerdmans’ final conclusion on the date of the Ten Words is cautiously expressed as follows : “The refusal to assign the Decalogue to the Mosaic age does not appear to be justified (*berechtigt*).” Even the Second commandment may be Mosaic. Exodus xx. 4 is an interpolation which breaks the close connexion between verses 3 and 5. Verse 5 forbids nothing but worship paid to “other gods” set up in JEHOVAH’S presence, i.e., in His sanctuary. Worship paid to household gods (*teraphim*) is not forbidden. So the prohibition of Exodus xx. 5 may have been known to David and Michal (1 Sam. xix. 13) and to Hosea (Hos. iii. 4) without arousing any religious scruple in them. This view is ingenious, but not to be hastily rejected.

Finally Eerdmans raises the question, whether the last five commandments have an absolute or a relative application ? He has no hesitation in rejecting the first alternative. The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth commandments were not recognised as absolute commands by any Old Testament Prophet or Priest. Samuel, in the name of JEHOVAH, commanded Saul to put the Amalekites, man, woman, and child, to the sword. The law of Deuteronomy

allows an Israelite to make spoil of women and children in war (Deut. xx. 14 ; xxi. 10-13). It is difficult to reconcile this last permission with any belief in the absolute authority of the Eighth commandment.

(h) PROF. MCFADYEN.

Extremely interesting is the series of articles contributed by Prof. J. E. MCFADYEN to the EXPOSITOR. The first appeared in February, 1916. Dr. McFadyen will have nothing to do with the plausible attempt which has been made to secure a very early and possibly Mosaic origin for the "ritual" Decalogue. "Most improbable" is his verdict. Legislation, he points out, accompanies and does not anticipate experience ; so the ritual Decalogue finds its most natural place after Israel's occupation and settlement of Canaan. The later reputation of Moses as Israel's greatest prophet (Deut. xxxiv. 10) would be hard to explain, if his supreme achievement had been to devise such a ritual Decalogue. When, moreover, it is claimed that emphasis on ritual points to an early date, it is to be remembered that such emphasis is a characteristic of the later literature, Ezekiel, P, Ezra and Chronicles.

McFadyen next points out that the "ethical" Decalogue is not so deeply ethical that it must be placed at a late stage in the religious development of Israel. It is not "a practically exhaustive compendium of human duty." On the whole it is negative rather than positive : it does not rise to the height of the precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Lev. xix. 18). The writer then proceeds to point out that centuries before Moses moral obligations similar to those of the Decalogue were recognised in the religious literatures of Egypt and Babylon.

McFadyen next clears from the path a lion which Prof. Matthes of Amsterdam placed there. Matthes in *ZATW*

(1904, pp. 17-41) denied that there ever was a shorter form of the Decalogue. But if, says McFadyen, the longer form is primary, "then we cannot claim an earlier date for the Decalogue than the seventh century, as Deuteronomic influence is obvious in more than one commandment." But McFadyen "with practically no hesitation" rejects Matthes's position.

But can the original (shorter) form be Mosaic? "The difficulties centre chiefly round the second, fourth, and tenth commandments." Taking the Fourth first, McFadyen remarks truly, "The Sabbath may just as well be very early as very late. The Book of the Covenant and the ritual Decalogue, besides enjoining the observance of the seventh day (Exod. xxiii. 12; xxxiv. 21) also prescribed the observance of " the Three Yearly Feasts. But the non-mention of these feasts in the ethical Decalogue may point away to the nomadic days, when there was less reason for observing these feasts. McFadyen adds some interesting remarks on the possibly great antiquity of the Sabbath in Israel. He inclines to the view that the Fourth commandment originally had the short and negative form, "Thou shalt not do any work (מלאכה) on the seventh day," the term "Sabbath" not being used. The "work" would be chiefly *plowing* or *sowing* (cp. Exod. xxxiv. 21). Such a form would apply to Israel in the wilderness, for Israel, he urges rightly, was partly agricultural, and only semi-nomadic. Thus, in essence, the Fourth commandment may date back to Moses.

Dr. McFadyen acknowledges that the real difficulty in the way of Mosaic authorship lies in the Second commandment. "Acknowledged champions of the Jehovah worship," we are told, practised image-worship. So McFadyen examines the instances put forward in support of this assertion—Ephod, Teraphim, Calf-worship, Ark, Brazen

Serpent, Moses' rod—and finds them wanting. His conclusion is, "There is good reason to believe that the official worship of Jahweh in the time of the Judges at Shiloh was imageless, and that an early protest was delivered against the calf-worship. There is therefore no adequate reason for denying, and there is some ground for affirming, that the prohibition of images enjoined by the Second commandment goes back to Moses."

McFadyen's concluding article is devoted to a consideration of the Unique Distinction of the Decalogue. He acknowledges the moral quality found in the Babylonian Shurpu texts and in the Egyptian Book of the Dead. But he gives the Ten Commandments a higher place than either of these. Is there "any real analogy between documents like these, on the one hand, which throw the moral and the ceremonial upon the same level of importance and, above all, which pre-suppose a world dominated by . . . demons whose power can be broken by magic; and the Decalogue on the other hand, with its sublime simplicity, its insistence upon morality as the inevitable issue . . . its stern refusal to recognise any supernatural presence but Jehovah's?" This is well put. Probably Dr. McFadyen's articles form, on the whole, the best treatment of the Decalogue which we possess in English.

(i) R. H. CHARLES.

Dr. Charles's book is divided into two parts, (1) a critical introduction discussing the text of the Commandments, (2) a full interpretation of them on the spiritual and ethical lines laid down in the New Testament. The main part of the work is in the form of sermons, and consequently full scope is given to the practical exposition of the commandments. Thus, under the Sixth commandment, several kinds of guilt are discussed, e.g., that of the man who

erects dangerous buildings, who sells dangerous commodities (e.g., alcohol), or who owns insanitary houses. The Eighth commandment is made to condemn the Unions which exact higher wages and then proceed to limit output. And so on. If there is nothing strikingly new in Dr. Charles's comment, there is much that is worthy of careful attention.

On the critical side Dr. Charles ventures far. The Decalogue, as we have it in Exodus xx. 2-17, has a long and intricate history. At the top of its genealogical tree stands the Mosaic Decalogue, each commandment consisting of one short clause (c. 1320-1300 B.C.) This form received some small additions in the Fourth, Tenth, and perhaps Third commandment before it was incorporated in E (c. 800-750 B.C.). From E two separate forms were developed. The earlier, found in Deuteronomy, received a large addition in the Second commandment (i.e. Deut. v. 8-10), in the Fourth (i.e. Deut. v. 15), and in the Fifth. The later form, now found in Exodus, took over several of these "Deuteronomic" additions in (about) the fifth century B.C. Next a mixture of these two forms arose in Egypt, to which the Hebrew archetype used by LXX. c. 300 B.C. was due. From a further mixture of this archetype with the "Exodus" text arose the text of the Nash papyrus.

W. EMERY BARNES.

THE SECRET EXPERIENCES OF THE PROPHETS.¹

18. IN what precedes we have looked at the inward experiences of the prophets as all on one level. To prevent our picture showing distorted features, let us look at their *history*.

¹ By Professor Hermann Gunkel, being the second of three introductory essays in Prof. Hans Schmidt's *Die Grossen Propheten*, Göttingen, 1923.

The oldest grade of prophecy was that which meets us in the story of Saul and Samuel. Groups of prophets were settled here and there throughout the country, practising ecstasy amongst themselves with all manner of exercises. Such prophets, objects of wonder to the people, but not always highly esteemed by them, are very similar to the ecstasies of other nations. That this ecstasy was taken over from the Canaanites, as has been suggested, is improbable, as the phenomena at all times manifested a distinctively Israelite spirit.

19. It was out of these circles, of course through a long development, that there came forth the best that is contained in the Old Testament. The greatest figures that ancient Israel ever produced were prophets. In many ways they resembled the *nebiim* of the old time, greatly as they differ from them in other respects. (The similarity is in the form of the psychical processes. From the outside, the conditions seem the same, although their violence is diminished. The difference lies in the intellectual content. It is the highest thoughts that fill the ecstasy of the later prophets. And it is this supremely valuable content, though it took this form, that should warn the present day student not to estimate too lightly these strange phenomena. It was not ordinary men, but strong enthusiastic personalities who underwent these experiences. It was not an accident that it was just a man like Saul, of powerful passionate nature, that came "among the prophets": not an accident, that it was young men, with blood still warm, who were called to the prophetic office (Amos ii. 11; Jer. i. 6; Dan. i.). In particular, it was men of religion, in whom faith burned, not with a cheerful homely glow, but with mighty destroying flame—who experienced these conditions. In such men, these psychical processes may be the accompaniments of profound religious convictions, of great

strength and highest originality. And it was just in the hours when the New Thing burst upon these men, that they had these experiences. That is why the history of religion is full of such phenomena. The first disciples became certain that Jesus had risen, when they saw the Risen One in vision. It was by a vision that Saul was changed into Paul. The enthusiasm of the first Christian communities found expression in "speaking with tongues." Luther fought with the devil. Out of the ranks of the *nebiim* men came forth, in whom two things met—powerful religious excitation, which threw them into amaze, and noble religious thoughts which took entire possession of them. In the words of these men these two things were intimately combined—it was the thoughts that kindled the fire in their hearts.

20. We can still to some extent follow the stages of this evolution. The first onward step was when the *nebiim* were applied to for oracles and gave them. The earliest tradition knows nothing of this. The prophets whom Saul meets coming from the highplace are in ecstasy—nothing more is said. We must not ask what sort of oracles they uttered. Such ecstasy had originally no purpose beyond itself: it was in itself regarded as the work of Jahveh. But the oracle-giving, which was later attributed to them, added greatly to the importance and influence of the prophets among the people. They now became the counsellors of their nation in all their difficulties, great and small.) In how many homes in Israel may the prophet have been the honoured family friend, helpful in word and deed (1 Kings xvii. 7; 2 Kings iv. 8). They were also skilled in healing disease, but they proudly disdained the round-about methods of heathen sorcerers (2 Kings v. 12). They cure by means of a bath (2 Kings v. 10) or a plaster (2 Kings xx. 7) or by the virtue of their body (1 Kings xvii.

21 ; 2 Kings iv. 34), but they always use prayer. Even leprosy comes and goes at their word (2 Kings v.). We must take it that the cures were due to the absolute confidence reposed in these men. Even the state consulted them (1 Kings xxii. 6). This type of activity was bound to become a trade, and thus it seemed natural that those consulting them should bring a small offering (1 Kings xiv. 3). The king's prophets ate at the king's table (1 Kings xviii. 19). This trade was not always highly esteemed (1 Sam. x. 12), for of many of them Micah's words would be true (iii. 5), "*When they get somewhat to eat, they cry Peace ; if nothing is put into their mouths, they declare war.*" There were many prophets of this kind in Israel. Visions were no rarity (Hosea xii. 11). One king assembled four hundred prophets and consulted them before undertaking a campaign. But we also read how such a crowd of *nebiim* could be abashed by the strong personality of one man (1 Kings xxii. 10). Most of these prophets were of no importance in history. Their oracles are forgotten and would concern us little even if we knew them. This type lasted down to the latest time in Israel's history and only died out when it had fallen into contempt. Zechariah xiii. 2 mentions it for the last time and with contumely as the outflow of an "unclean spirit."

21. But out of the ranks of such "prophets" there arose men of a nobler stamp, men of a loftier flight of thought and greater breadth of view. *These* great ones speak of the fates of peoples and kings, victories and defeats, the deliverance of a besieged capital, the downfall of a dynasty—the greatest things in the Israel of their time. And they dealt with them of their own accord. The ordinary sons of the prophets waited till they were consulted : these men came forward without such waiting. Hence their stoutheartedness ; conscious of being God's servants

they withstood kings to their face (1 Kings xviii. 17 ; xxi. 19 ; 1 Sam. xv. 14). Naturally they came forward specially when the matter was one of which they disapproved (1 Kings xvii. ; xx. 35). Then appeared the man of God unbidden and unwelcome and uttered the mind of God. Or when some great event is imminent, when Jahveh has resolved upon a new thing, the prophet's more delicate sense perceives what is about to happen. No great thing ever happened in Israel without the presence of a prophet to announce it (Amos iii. 7). A prophet like this, especially when he prophesies evil, need not look for reward. Persecution and insult are bound to be the lot of these men who speak their mind as no one ever spoke before (Jer. xxii. 19). Some indeed stand by the king, the most faithful pillars of the kingdom (Elisha 2 Kings v. : Jonah under Jeroboam II. 2 Kings xiv. 35). One true prophet is worth a whole army (2 Kings xiii. 14). But these great men are still among "the prophets." The prophets of a lower type may form a following, obedient to their commands—a kind of league constituting a great danger to the safety of the state. From amongst them came the worst revolution that ever devastated Israel (2 Kings ix. 1). (But even in the great men themselves the wild element is plainly perceptible, although its violence is somewhat less. In accordance with this we must take it that their speech was more rational than the "crying" of the prophets of the oldest time.

22. This stage of prophecy exhibits two different types—prophets of weal and prophets of woe—two types which can be traced through almost the entire after-history. The less important are the prophets of weal. With them, religion and patriotism are closely entwined: they work in the cause of Jahveh and of Israel together. Higher than these are the prophets of woe. They are more than patriots; they can be the enemies of the kings (1 Kings

xxi. 20), nay, they can be the enemies of their nation. It was they who instigated the great revolutions—Ahijah against the House of David, Elijah against the dynasty of Omri. Zeal for Jahveh absorbed them entirely. They were also zealous for the severe customs of patriarchal Israel as against the new luxurious manners, and for ancient justice as against the injustice of their own time. Samuel opposes Saul's attempt to set aside the *ban* of Jahveh (1 Sam. xv.) and Nathan vetoes David's desire to build a house for the ark (2 Sam. vii.). Ahijah protests against Solomon's excessive oppression of the people: Elijah and Elisha head the opposition to Omri's building of a temple for Tyrian Baal—an unbroken chain of zealots for Jahveh from the earliest to the latest. And these men could even see in the great misfortunes of the state Jahveh's judgments upon sin (1 Kings xix. 15; 2 Kings viii. 7), for to them Jahveh was more than a national God, and He would bring His people to destruction unless they obeyed Him.

23. Then came the last great turning in the history of prophecy in the eighth century, when the dread Assyrian danger was coming ever nearer. When the hearts of all the world were quaking before the coming destruction, the universal feeling found vent in the first of the literary prophets. In a day of prosperity and peace in Israel they announced in piercing tones their dread message of destruction for Israel, and they stated the reasons why their people, and just their people, must perish. Their ideals were lofty, and by these ideals they judged their people and recognised that they had come short. Therefore away with them from the earth. With indignation they thundered against Israel's sin. They spoke but little of repentance, because for that it was too late. They fulminated not only against the sins of the kings and the nobles: they felt themselves set against their own nation. What their con-

temporaries held to be the highest, they treated with scorn. Passionately they besought Jahveh, who glorified Himself in judgment upon sinners and who yet had no desire that any should perish, and would yet bring the Good to victory. The passion and strength of these men still awes and uplifts us who have come after them. Only rarely did they touch the notes of tenderness, although, of course, these are not wholly absent. It was they who welded together, as with bands of iron, religion and morality. Above all it is to them that we owe monotheism: to the feet of the God of their nation they brought all peoples and powers of the world and all the gods. From the eighth century onwards these prophetic voices never ceased: they accompanied the history of Israel and Judah and outlasted both.

24. When we compare the mighty figures of these prophets with the *nebiim* of early times, we are first struck by the great difference between them. Amos felt this difference strongly (Amos vii. 14). But this should not lead us to overlook the ecstatic element that was present in the later prophets also. Amos used the word *hithnabbe'* of himself (vii. 15). There was no other he could use, and his successors used it too.)

25. The really prophetic element present in these great men has already been referred to. We may here gather together the main features of it. The fundamental conviction common to them all is, that their thoughts are from God Himself. The prophet did not find them. "*They were found*" (Jer. xv. 16). He who speaks his own thoughts is a "lying prophet" (Jer. xxiii. 16). Left to themselves, they might perhaps have thought the contrary. Jeremiah agreed at heart with the patriotic desires which the prophet of weal announced as divine certainties, even although he considered their realisation impossible (Jer. xxviii. 6). Nor is it the prophet's personal resolve that causes him to speak

as he does. It was against his will that Jeremiah became a prophet (i. 6). Necessity was laid upon him: woe to him if he refused (1 Cor. ix. 16; Amos iii. 8). Even if he desired to desist, he found it impossible (Jer. xx. 9).

But when we ask the prophet, when and how Jahveh's word came to him, he tells us of certain hours when the Spirit fell upon him and he heard and saw secret things. Experiences such as these have their effects on body and soul, described by Jeremiah iv. 19, 21. Nor was it abstract thoughts, but concrete revelations, that came at such times. The prophet received superhuman knowledge of the future. If we are to understand aright a prophet, even of the highest type, we must always first ask, what event of the immediate future did he come forth to predict? They believed they were able to predict not only the fate of the people and the kings of their time, but also the varied fortunes of individuals (Amos vii. 17; Jer. xx. 3; xxviii. 15; xxix. 21; xxxii.; xlv. 3, etc.). And their contemporaries cherished the same belief and asked their counsel (Jer. xxi. 2; xxxvii. 3; xxxviii. 14; xlii. 1).

26. But in spite of the prominence which they themselves give to this side of their activity, we feel that their highest virtue does not lie in prediction. Were that all, the value of their words for us to-day, who have but little interest in by far the majority of their predictions, would be very small. Even their strange experiences, their phantastic visions and their strange symbols are but externals. There is more in them than that. They proclaimed to their day the thoughts of God. They even gave Jahveh's *reasons*; they know why their words are true. Jeremiah was able even to announce the law of God's government of the world (chap. xviii.). The new element in these men was that in their work prophecy assumed a spiritual and moral content.)

27. It is in this change of content that we find the reason why the vehement element in the outward form of their experiences subsides (although it never quite disappears), and is replaced by inward experiences which we can understand. They felt themselves dominated by emotions which they could not shake off, and sustained by an extraordinary confidence in the truth of their convictions. So confident are they, that they can bid defiance to kings and people. They care not for persecution, prison or death (Jer. xv. 16). It is clear that in their hearts they are on God's side, and approve of the message God sends them (Micah iii. 8). Such a man has not merely a few isolated moments in which God speaks to him ; his whole life is filled with revelations. It is not only one commission that he has from God : he is in God's service all through his life. At the outset of such a life-work he had, as a rule, to have experienced a vision—what we term his “call,” when his electrically charged soul found relief in a first great discharge. Later in life the forms in which revelations reached him were less arresting, and he nourished his soul all his life on that first great hour. When he grew uncertain whether he were really God's instrument, he called back to mind that decisive hour.

28. Thus we meet in the history of prophecy a steady transition from prophet to preacher and religious thinker. While, therefore, we must by no means overlook the strange element in Old Testament prophecy, we must be equally careful neither to exaggerate it nor unduly to admire it. Excessive admiration of it is forbidden by the knowledge that similar phenomena are found all over the world, even in religions of a low type, and by recognition of the fact that phenomena like clairvoyance and soothsaying have no necessary connexion at all with a higher conception of religion. Besides, many of the prophetic experiences have

a suspicious resemblance to mental ailments. A crude supernatural view of the phenomena finds even stronger contradiction in the fact that the prophets were not rarely in opposition to each other, and that their different personalities are still visible in their different methods and styles. They did sometimes in a marvellous manner foretell the future, but more often they were mistaken. The crude supernaturalistic view, in its desire to honour God, runs the risk of overlooking what God was really doing—making spiritually-minded men. To us the valuable element in prophecy is not the wonderful form of it, but its content; and God's revelation comes to us in those great, deep-hearted, spiritual men and in the eternal thoughts they gave to the world.

HERMANN GUNKEL.

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SIN.

WE read and hear much of the New Psychology to-day. It meets us in books learned and popular, newspapers and even in a certain type of novel. It can be recognised by its unfamiliar vocabulary, the use of words like "complex" and "libido," and frequent excursions into Greek mythology. It is distinguished from the older psychology also by its interest in instinct, emotion, and behaviour, the unconscious mind and pathological states, and its lack of interest in cognition. Mr. Tansley, in his book *The New Psychology and its Relation to Life*, has given us the main outlines of the new theories, combining in one composite photograph the ideas of so different men as Freud and McDougall. Our account will be based mainly on this book.

The fundamental basis of mental life is the instincts

that man has in common with animals. McDougall defines instincts as "certain innate specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of any one species,"¹ or, again, as "psycho-physical dispositions the activity of which involves an impulse to be interested in and attend to objects, situations, etc., of a more or less specific kind and to act with regard to them in a more or less specific way."² Such are, e.g., the instincts of combat, curiosity, food-seeking, sex, etc. These are all purposive though not necessarily purposeful. Each has its own feeling-tone or emotion, e.g., fear accompanies flight. Each, also, has a quantity of psychic force or driving power attached to it. But not all our psychic force or "libido" is rigidly attached to the instincts. Not only does it vary with different individuals, but also there is some loosely attached, and some free and unattached. These energy-charged instincts account for all our action. "The ends of human activity may probably all be traced to extensions, combinations, modifications, or perversions of the primitive instincts." "All actions and the conations leading to them are motivated by, and gain their energy from, instinctive sources."³ But in man at any rate the instincts are almost never met with in a pure state, unmodified by intelligence. They also tend to coagulate into groups. This process of coagulation is described by Shand, and McDougall following him, as the formation of sentiments. Certain instincts and emotions become grouped round an object, e.g., one's country, producing in this case the sentiment of patriotism. Here a difficulty appears. Tansley nowhere mentions sentiments, but much of what he says of complexes applies to them. So we may say that a sentiment and a complex are roughly the same. "In the broad sense . . . the term

¹ McDougall, *Social Psych.*, p. 22.

² McDougall, *Outline of Psych.*, p. 110.

³ Tansley, pp. 32, 170.

[complex] becomes almost identical with the sentiment.”⁴ But Tansley⁵ says, “A complex is a system of associated mental elements, the stimulation of any one of which tends to call the rest into consciousness through the medium of their common affect.” The effect, not the object, is here the common element.

Now it continually happens that the demands of different instincts and complexes conflict with one another, and “mental conflict is the struggle between two complexes whose conations would lead to incompatible actions.”⁶ But “it is impossible to overemphasise the overmastering desire of the human mind for unification.”⁷ The thwarting of an instinct is painful in itself, but the conflict between two instincts or complexes is acutely disturbing to the whole mind. All the libido is used up in this struggle, and the whole activity of the mind is impoverished and held up till the conflict is resolved. This can be done in several ways.

(1) Possibly the commonest, and certainly the most objectionable and even dangerous, is to let one complex have its way, and to repress the other. “The mechanism of repression involves the cutting off of the obnoxious complex from the rest of the mind, so that it no longer has normal access to consciousness and the conflict is automatically brought to an end. The process of repression is itself in most cases unconscious—the mental elements of the complex are simply forgotten—but the forgetting may sometimes follow a deliberate effort to banish the complex from the mind. The repressed complex is not destroyed, as is clearly shown by its subsequent vitality. It is not allowed to manifest itself directly in consciousness but finds its expression in indirect, symbolic, and often curiously

⁴ Rivers, *Instinct and the Unconscious*, p. 87.

⁵ P. 49, *op. cit.*

⁶ Tansley, p. 101.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

distorted forms.”⁸ Repressed complexes lead to various forms of mania and dementia, nightmares, obsessions, and even, as in many cases of war-neurosis, to apparent paralysis; and in extreme cases to disassociation or dual personality. They also drain away great quantities of the libido; so it may be seen that this is a most ineffective way of settling mental conflict.

(2) The complexes may also be segregated on the conscious level. The two complexes are simply held violently apart and not allowed to appear in consciousness together. The stock instance of this is the merchant who has one code of morality for his home and Church, and another for his business. This does not breed the same crop of mental evils as the method of repression, but it does prevent the proper growth of the personality; and besides, it is only possible with certain individuals, though no doubt commoner than some psychologists seem ready to admit. It is certainly morally fatal.

(3) A rather obscure solution is proposed. This is to allow the complexes to fight a pitched battle till one is broken or a truce is patched up. The conception of the personality that this involves we shall consider later. But it is allowed that this is a most painful process, and possible only to exceptionally strong-willed persons.

(4) Yet another solution of conflict, this time of the greatest importance, is thus described by Freud,⁹ though in relation to the particular instinct or major complex which completely monopolises his vision. “One amongst these processes . . . has reached a particular significance in the development of culture. It consists in the abandonment on the part of the sexual impulse of an aim previously found either in the gratification of a component impulse or in the gratification incidental to reproduction and the

⁸ Tansley, p. 106. ⁹ *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 290.

adoption of a new aim—which new aim, though genetically related to the first, can no longer be regarded as sexual but must be called social in character. We call this process *SUBLIMATION*, by which we subscribe to the general standard which estimates social aims above sexual (ultimately selfish) aims.” That is, the instinct is gratified by the substitution of another and higher and social outlet for the libido than the natural one. Thus the sublimation of the sexual complex produces art; the sublimation of the ego-complex or self-regarding sentiment leads to science.

(5) Another *modus vivendi* between complexes, in some ways akin to (2) above, the segregation method, is rationalisation. So long as the conflict does not imply physical incompatibility, we may rationalise one or both complexes by finding reasons for acting along the lines proposed which appear perfectly good reasons, and reasons of which we have no cause to be ashamed, but which are not the real reasons of our action. The process is the same as that of finding excuses, but it takes place not in consciousness but in the unconscious. These “defence reactions” “are often ‘the homage which vice pays to virtue,’ that is to say, they are a concession to morality”; but “it is quite a mistake to suppose that they represent conscious hypocrisy.”¹⁰ This method is psychologically quite healthy, but it is obviously a very dangerous one for morality.

(6) Conflict is also responsible for the phenomenon known as projection. “Repressed complexes which we refuse to recognise tend to attach themselves to persons and objects of the outside world. Thus we condemn in others what we refuse to admit in ourselves.”¹¹ This is the very opposite of those of whom we read in *Hudibras*, who

“Compound for sins they are inclined to
By damning those they have no mind to.”

¹⁰ Tansley, p. 104.

¹¹ J. A. Hadfield, *Psych. and Morals*, p. 34.

We compound for sins we are inclined to by damning them in others. "Preachers are always preaching against the sins to which they are unconsciously most prone."¹² This process can go further, and we can even objectify our complexes—give them a fictitious reality. God, on this theory, is an objectification of the ethical or ideal self; the devil a projection of the anti-moral complexes. So the mind resolves its conflict by removing one combatant and refusing to acknowledge it as its own possession.

(7) The last method of dealing with conflict is not dealt with in many psychological textbooks. "Freedom," not only from conflict but from the tyranny of repressed complexes, "can be brought about . . . by the presentation of an "inspiring" ideal able to produce such a revolution of soul that not only the sentiments, but those emotions that we attached to morbid things are aroused to attach themselves to the new ideal. This is what normally takes place in religious conversion."¹³ The centre of the new sentiment must itself have the power of moving the mind and causing this frequently violent break-up of old complexes and readjustment of the instincts and emotions.

The part of the new psychology that has aroused most popular interest is the cure of neuroses by analysis. The repressed complex has first to be discovered, either by hypnotic methods, by free association, or by interpretation of dreams. This is a difficult business, as the patient is exceedingly liable to receive the complexes by suggestion from the analyst, and then project them back into the past. But when the complex is brought up, it has to be got rid of in some other way, and the most common way is sublimation, i.e., directing it into useful social channels.

The bearing of these theories on the Christian idea of

¹² Hadfield, p. 35.

¹³ Hadfield, p. 82.

sin we may discuss under three headings—the nature of sin, the origin of sin, and the remedy for sin.

We have already noted the tendency of the individual to achieve unification and avoid conflict. This points to a distinct type of ethical theory. “The Ideal . . . is the idea or object which leads to the complete realisation of the whole individual. . . . Psychologically the right ideal is one that can bring harmony to the soul and . . . secure self-realisation or happiness.”¹⁴ This conception of goodness as being, formally considered, a harmonious system of all the impulses of the individual, and, in a wider sphere, the harmony of all the impulses of all individuals, is Plato’s view, and it is in entire agreement with the Christian teaching about love, which is the emotional counterpart of such a harmony. Sin, on this theory, is any wilful opposition to this harmony. So far as this goes, we are in entire agreement with the theory. But there are other questions involved, for the New Psychology launches out into metaphysics and makes quite unwarranted deductions. We offer the following criticisms.

1. The question of moral obligation is not explained. We are told “it has long been our contention that dread of society [soziale Angst] is the essence of what is called conscience,”¹⁵ and Tansley¹⁶ derives it from the herd instinct—which, by the way, is not an instinct but a sentiment. Apart from the fact that this reduces morality to benevolence, which alone is an idea long abandoned by most moralists, we believe that moral obligation cannot be found within human nature. “It takes two,” said Martineau, “to establish an obligation. . . . It is impossible to be at once the upper and the nether millstone.” We believe that a personal God must be postulated to account

¹⁴ Hadfield, pp. 76, 85.

¹⁵ Freud, *Group Ps. and Analysis of the Ego*, p. 10.

¹⁶ P. 198.

for moral obligation or this unifying tendency. But most of these psychologists believe that God is only a projection; not that He comes to be known by projection, which is of course partly true, but that He is created by projection, a quite illegitimate inference. Even those who admit that sin is against God then destroy the reality of sin by making God a fiction.

2. The whole discussion moves on a metaphysical plane that ought to have perished with Kant's answer to Hume. There is no real personality involved, but all the time we have nothing but the old "bundle of ideas" over again, under the more dignified name of complexes. The unity of the ego, in spite of references to ego-complexes, is denied, at least implicitly. The whole personality is analysed into component parts. But morality is personal, in the fullest sense, and so, as we said, implies a personal God. Here again psychology is set up as metaphysics.

3. For the most part, this psychology is determinist. Jung is a notable exception, for he held to vitalism for a time. Now with determinism you can have morality and moral imperfection, but sin is questionable, and guilt impossible. Freud tells us that "the sense of guilt . . . can be understood as an expression of tension between the ego and the ego-ideal."¹⁷ Surely Dr. Adams Brown is nearer the truth when he says, "Guilt is the personal blameworthiness which results from wilful disobedience."¹⁸ In fact, we cannot really deal with the question apart from Christian experience. Guilt is essentially the consciousness of having sinned, and sin means sin against God. This a deterministic and naturalistic psychology can never account for.

It will be seen by the above criticisms that the New

¹⁷ *Group Ps. and Analysis of Ego*, p. 106.

¹⁸ *Christian Theology in Outline*, p. 284.

Psychology does not radically conflict with Christianity, except where it exceeds its limits or goes on assumptions otherwise untenable. But we believe that whether it is or is not justified by later thought, it is capable of re-statement and alteration in such a way as to leave nothing incompatible with Christianity, always provided that it is remembered that it is a science, and not a philosophy.

Of the origin of sin the New Psychology offers no explanation. The most it can do is to give a new description of the fact. It lends itself, however, to an interpretation along the evolutionary view, and it is perhaps not unfair to deal with that as being probably the explanation that would be given, if one were offered. This theory is that sin is the assertion of our instincts, coming in conflict with a higher law. We have already seen that moral imperfection is regarded as a lack of harmony among our instincts, or at least among our volitions. It has been urged against this that man has many impulses to sin that are not relics of his brute inheritance, are not over-indulgence of primitive instincts. While this may well be true, it is hardly possible to prove it. Every action is traced by the New Psychology to some development of some instinct, however far-fetched the derivation may be ; and if an action cannot be accounted for conveniently by the given instincts, a new instinct is invented or postulated to account for it. So to refute this line of argument would lead us into a detailed discussion of all the known books on the subject and a detailed examination of what the instincts are, and what are their developments. But fortunately there is a simpler attack. We know that on the whole the instincts in animals do function fairly efficiently. They are co-ordinated and controlled in some way that provides very effectively for the well-being of the individual and of the species. Self-abuse is extremely rare, though not quite

unknown. But in man the instincts are not so controlled, for an instinctive life for man is not only morally but biologically harmful. We are therefore forced to conclude that in man there is a radical derangement of the instinctive life. Man is given reason to control these instincts, and the former control is removed; and the consequence is, though not total depravity, very great imperfection. While we must admit that mental characteristics are not inherited, and much of the nature of a man's character depends on his earliest environment, it remains true nevertheless that all men are born with a greater or less derangement of the balance of their instincts. This is what we would put forward as the truth of original sin.

This fact is overlooked or denied by Dr. Tennant, to whom the instincts are merely the material for sin, so that he makes sin coextensive with guilt; so that " 'original sin' must mean merely the solicitations of the lower nature, conceived of proleptically as sin because they constitute its potentiality."¹⁹ This conception of sin confines it to particular sins, and ignores the fact of the sinful nature of man; and further, it is too individualistic. Is it not much truer to say that "the sense of sin is consciousness of moral incompatibility with God"?²⁰ Too little emphasis seems to be laid on "want of conformity to the law of God," and too much on "transgression" of it. Further, it is a fair criticism of Tennant to say²¹ that he occupies himself too exclusively with the moral side of sin, and too little with the religious aspect, though his avowed purpose is directly contrary to this.

We see then that the New Psychology tells us little of the origin of sin, unless that the springs of it are to be

¹⁹ Art. "Original Sin," *ERE*, vol. 9, p. 564b.

²⁰ Bicknell, *The Christian Idea of Sin and Original Sin*, p. 48.

²¹ With Bicknell, p. 32.

found within man himself. It does give us certain light on temptation, though not always definite enough for practical guidance. Repressed complexes we would rather consider under the subject of moral disease, for they are something different from the derangement of instincts which we have spoken of, and only come into existence when better and more effective methods of dealing with conflict have failed. We have now to consider the remedies for sin offered by the New Psychology.

It is obvious that there is nothing said on the forgiveness of sins. If "forgiveness is a matter of personal relationship, to forgive any one is to restore him to his place in our confidence."²² There can be no forgiveness of a man by the projection of his ethical self. We may pretty safely say that the whole conception of the cure of sin is therefore forward-looking; there need be no regret for the past. There is truth in this, but it is not the whole truth. It is true that Coué more or less repeats the teaching of St. Paul, who says, "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things." And his teaching is in a sense a development of James's ideo-motor theory of action, and that "to think is the only moral act." But how far short does this come of the Christian idea of forgiveness! It is not even the whole truth about sanctification, let alone justification. The sense of guilt will, on the psychologist's own finding, become a repressed complex and breed all manner of ills. But "if we truly regret the past, we have strong motives for doing better hereafter. . . . Why cut the pair of scissors into halves under the pretence that it will do better work?"²³

²² R. Mackintosh, *Christianity and Sin*, p. 185. ²³ R. Mackintosh, p. 183.

First get rid of the sense of guilt, and then apply Couéism. Or, to put it another way, before new sentiments can be formed, the old ones have to be broken up. The power to do this depends largely on the inherent value and power of the centre of the new sentiment. On the value and effectiveness of the centre of the religious sentiment psychology has nothing to say. "The problem of sin is concerned with the general direction of the tendencies of life. Psychology does not deal with this issue."²⁴ But even granting that psychology can give us some light on the nature of the process of forming sentiments, it describes the cure of sin from the purely human point of view. For religion this must always be inadequate. The Holy Spirit is a living force to Christian experience, not merely an inspiring idea.

Something must be said here of moral disease. There is a tendency among certain people to treat all sin as disease, to be cured by psychotherapy. The people of Erewhon sent for the "straightener" when they had committed a crime, though they compensated for this eccentricity by imprisoning the sick and diseased. But there is such a thing as moral disease—e.g., kleptomania, dipsomania. Hadfield²⁵ would distinguish complexes from sentiments by saying that the former are unacceptable to the self, and there is a tendency to limit the word to repressed complexes (e.g., Rivers). It is these involuntarily repressed complexes that give rise to moral disease. "Sin is due to wrong sentiments, moral disease is due to morbid complexes giving rise to uncontrollable impulses."²⁶ This reads rather like Tennant's view of sin, as being entirely volitional, but it does not really conflict with our view of original sin. What we have to remember about the morally diseased

²⁴ Grensted, *Ch. Quarterly Review*, Jan., 1923, p. 300.

²⁵ P. 24.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

man is that he cannot be rid of the impulse to sin. No efforts of his own can rid him of the temptation; though he may be able to control the actions to which his disease drives him. At any rate, he is subjected to temptation that no man should or need have to endure. It has been suggested that "‘repressed complexes’ hold much the same place in the thought of to-day that was given to evil spirits by the early Christians."²⁷ If that is so, Christianity has a remedy to offer, now as then. But even so, it cannot but welcome the aid of psychology in identifying and in curing such cases. The cure psychology offers is to revive the complex into consciousness, and then dispose of the conflict which caused its repression by sublimation, if, as it does with most fear-complexes and war-neuroses, the conflict does not simply disappear.

We may conclude by summing up the criticisms we have to make on the New Psychology, and the points of value we find in it. Like all other forms of psychology in the past, and probably all that ever will be, this one has continually sinned by exceeding its bounds and giving judgments on ultimate problems of philosophy and theology. Whether psychology is to remain a part of philosophy, or to pass over to science, it cannot be too often repeated that, like science, it has never the last word on these questions. We make no claim to be able to judge it as a psychology, the more so that all its supporters, except the extreme right wing, such as McDougall and Shand, never deign to put forward the slightest proof of their assumptions. Some of the phenomena that Freud explains, e.g., slips of the tongue, are, even to the amateur, capable of much simpler and more natural explanation. But we must leave it to others to criticise the movement as a psychology. Yet we do claim the right to criticise the metaphysical assump-

²⁷ Leonard Hodgson, *Hibbert Journal*, Oct., 1923, p. 69, and July, 1922.

tions made. The general assumption of determinism ; the purely empirical view of the ego ; the conception of God as a projection ; these are ideas we must reject. Other shortcomings, such as the omission of the ideas of value and forgiveness, are only shortcomings if we take the psychology at its own valuation, for they do not properly find a place in psychology.

On the other hand, there is very much in the new theories that we must welcome, if they turn out to be in the main true. If it is the case that "in cases of defence reaction the mind may be unconscious of the real motive of the action defended,"²⁸ i.e., in rationalisation of instinctive impulses, we must be grateful for a means of discovering what the real motives are. We can then deal with our real enemies, not the women and children whom they put forward as a screen in the battle. This was possible to some by intuition, but these people were exceptional. The emphasis on early environment and education is also valuable, for the mischief worked by complexes repressed in infancy seems to be incalculable. The idea of sentiments is not of so great practical value, but it reinforces Christian teaching and experience. There are, Grensted says,²⁹ three main cores for sentiments, the self, other people, and God, and to have the third right means automatic adjustment of the other two. The distinction between sin and moral disease should be of the very greatest moral, social and religious value.

Yet when all has been said, personality still has its mysterious core that denies investigation ; evil is not explained ; and sin remains sin. Sin as opposition to God's will, and carrying with it the inevitable estrangement from Him, will always be a mystery to those who know in their own

²⁸ Tansley, p. 104.

²⁹ *Church Quarterly Review*, Jan., 1923, p. 296.

experience what it is. And the remedy for sin will never be found in psychology alone. Christ will always remain the Way, the Truth and the Life.

G. J. R. MACAULAY.

GEORGE FOX AND THE SCRIPTURES.

(In references J means the Cambridge (1911) edition of Fox's *Journal*.)

WITH much truth "the apostate" Francis Bugg says in his Address to Parliament, "Your Honours will find it as difficult a thing to gain the true meaning of the Quakers touching the Divine authority of the Holy Scriptures . . . as the Emperor Constantius found it in the examination of Arius the Heretick to get his true meaning touching the Faith of one Substance." ¹ The obscurity of Fox's view is manifest when we try to frame a statement in which place may be found for all that he says, and for what seems logically to follow therefrom. In this, however, Fox is by no means alone. Whose expressed views on Scripture are quite free of difficulty? Any statement that is not vague enough to be ambiguous is likely to be unsatisfying. There is in practice for everybody a Scripture within the Scripture; and a perfectly satisfactory view as to how this regulative element is to be determined is still to seek. The general bearing of many views is plain and acceptable; but press them into details or to their logical conclusions, and seemingly unanswerable questions immediately emerge. Most men, too, especially in the sphere of religion and politics, are apt to demand in the views of their opponents a degree of explicitness and consistency which it would puzzle them to exhibit in their own. It would have saved a great deal of bitter controversy and prevented much

¹ *A Modest Defence of 'Quakerism Exposed'* (1700), Pref.

hollow boasting of "victories," had Fox himself and his opponents alike been mindful of that. Further, if we remember that Fox had no training in logical statement ; that he was burdened with manifold cares ; that he was harried and persecuted ; that his aim is always practical, and that he has usually in mind some particular adverse view¹ or is facing some specific situation, we shall make large allowance for seeming contradictions and obvious exaggerations.

I.

What a man constantly does is clearer evidence of his real beliefs than anything he may say, and it is specially needful in the case of Fox that we should ever bear in mind his practical use of the Bible. It is plain from all his writings and from what he tells of his practice that he was steeped in the Scriptures. One critic indeed asserted that Fox wrote nothing but a string of texts. This is very wide of the mark, as a mere glance at any of his writings will show. Yet the same glance will reveal that for every statement Fox makes, unless it be pure narrative, he adduces support from the Scriptures. He uses throughout Biblical language. He read the Bible diligently before he came to the light. He used it as constantly afterward. Whatever else the Spirit revealed, He certainly gave Fox "great openings in the Scriptures." When in early days Fox withdrew into solitude, it was with the Bible. When he came forth in the power of the Spirit, the glowing language of Prophets and Apostles was on his lips. His encouragement of Friends, his warning of sinners, his denunciations of enemies of the Truth, his criticisms of "priests" and their "worships,"

¹ While Fox contended with all sorts of religionists, it is Presbyterian views that he has most often in mind. This is still more true of Barclay the "Apologist."

were all based on Scripture, and expressed in the very terms of Scripture.

Further, in all disputes it is to the Bible that he turns for support of his contentions, and to it he demands that his opponent shall appeal likewise. "We laid it upon him to prove all his charges against us by Scripture." "If the Scriptures of Truth would not bear us out in our principles, doctrines and practices, then let us fall with shame." (J. ii. 217, 218.) Those are typical passages. His refutation of the opinion of some that women had no souls is to turn them to Mary's words, "My soul doth magnify the Lord."¹ It is curious that they did not claim that this was flagrant *petitio principii*.

Quotations might be adduced in vast number to show how highly Fox and his coadjutors esteemed the Scriptures, and how diligent was their use of them. That they should be read and studied privately, in home and in school, has been enjoined upon members of the Society all through its history.

It is clear, too, that, as Barclay says, Fox and the early Friends in their propaganda work preached "Bible in hand."² In Quaker worship, however, reading of Scripture had a very uncertain place. That Fox did not agree with the Seekers, who held that the reading of Scripture to a mixed congregation is dangerous,³ is proved by the existence of a Bible chained to the ministers' gallery in his meeting-house at Swarthmore.⁴ But to what extent it was used is not clear. What we do know is that shortly after the time of Fox reading of Scripture in meetings fell rapidly into disuse; it was not encouraged,⁵ and this is not intelli-

¹ Sewel, *Hist. of Quakers* (1799), i. 19.

² R. Barclay, *Inner Life of Relig. Soc. of the Commonwealth* (1877), p. 401.

³ R. M. Jones, *Stud. in Mystical Religion* (1908), p. 457.

⁴ Barclay, *op. cit.*, p. 401.

⁵ D. Phillips, *Vindiciae Veritatis* (1703), pp. 203-206.

gible had Fox given a definite lead in the opposite direction. Friends feared that even the stated reading of Scripture in their meetings might savour of a form¹ and prove a fettering of the Spirit. Why systematic reading in home and school should be right while it is a limitation of the Spirit in the meeting, it is not for us to explain. Preaching from a text was exceptional, and he who did it had to be careful that it was not premeditated.² Expository preaching is to Fox a vanity of the priests.³

II.

For Fox, as for the rest of us, there is "a Bible within the Bible." He takes from any part of Scripture a text that lends support to his views, and finds reasons for setting aside any that seems to contradict them. He recognises clearly that there is a progress in the Bible. Not only has the Old Testament to be used in light of the New Testament; he sees that in the New Testament itself Apostles changed their practices, if not their views (J. i. 251). Christ is supreme, and if He says "Swear not," it is a small matter that an Angel swears in Revelation (J. ii. 77).⁴ But Fox draws a distinction when he needs it, even in the sayings of Christ, according as they are uttered before or after His death, which ended the Law (J. i. 250). Both this and his argument that some things were spoken to Jews, not to Gentiles, (J. ii. 98) may well strike us as perilous. The latter would take us far, even unto Marcion.

Unlike Marcion, Fox did not deem unprofitable any part

¹ See Barclay's *Apology*, Exposition of Prop. xi.

² *Idem.*

³ J. i. 73; cf. the curious passage about preaching to people once, J. i. 321.

⁴ Would that Fox had given the same weight to Christ's injunction "Judge not." In his vituperative passages he is not speaking in the spirit of Christ, as Baxter complains (*One Sheet against the Quakers*, 1657, p. 4).

of the Scriptures. Ceremonial apparatus and all narratives are types and parables. In his typology Fox is neither wiser nor more foolish than most explorers of that dubious field. He found lessons in Aaron's bells and breeches (J. ii. 379), and beguiled the tedium of a voyage with an enquiry as to the spiritual signification of the four rivers of Eden (J. ii. 180). With a pride in his work such as many authors feel but few express, he tells that he wrote a "very good" book on typology, "such a teaching book as was hardly ever given forth." (J. ii.7.) Alas it never saw the light, so we cannot judge.

That the externalism of the prophetic ministry of the Old Testament had passed away, Fox and his circle did not hold. Those filled with the Spirit might teach by "signs." Thus a Quakeress tells how "her dear friend not only stripped himself naked, but blackened his face, and thus appeared to the edification of many."¹ Many such "signs" were given. Fox quite approved of them. He himself had his barefoot mission with visions of blood to Lichfield (J. i. 15). The crowning folly of the Nayler episode revealed to the Friends that they were on the brink of a precipice. They were saved as by fire from sheer fanaticism and blasphemous delirium.² It took all Fox's common sense to escape, and that with difficulty, from the snare for human nature constituted by a conviction that men have the same spirit and power as Prophets and Apostles, and that Christ speaks in them.³

¹ Quoted in *Hist. of Quakers*, J. Cunningham, D.D., 1868, p. 60.

² For Nayler episode and its relation to early Quaker convictions see W. C. Braithwaite, *The Beginnings of Quakerism*, 1912, chap. xi.

³ Margaret Fell's language when writing to or of Fox is far beyond what wifely devotion can explain, dangerously near to the kind of flattery that undid Nayler. Fox gave hesitating and ambiguous replies to the charge of blasphemy at Lancaster assizes (J. i. 65 f.). How Friends learned the Nayler lesson is shown by the fact that Ellwood, in preparing Fox's *Journal* for the press, toned down and often suppressed the more fanatical incidents and megalomaniac expressions (see J. introd.).

In the literary criticism of Scripture, Samuel Fisher, with whom Fox was closely associated, was far in advance of his time. He had a glimmer of the Synoptic problem; he recognised duplicate narratives and their divergences; he cast doubt on the "integrity" of Scripture as Owen maintained it; he raised awkward questions as to canonicity; from Luke's preface he disproved the "dictation" theory of inspiration.¹ How far Fox adopted such views we cannot tell. But if Fox had disapproved of Fisher, Penn would not have praised Fisher as he did.² It is all but certain that the paper on errors of translation appended to Fox's *Great Mystery* is by Fisher. His connexion with a scholar like Fisher makes all the more unreasonable Fox's inclusion of the dividing of Scripture into chapter and verse among *gravamina* against "priests" (J. i. 44), and his unintelligible girding at languages (J. i. 178, 311; ii. 29).

III.

From what has been set forth in I. we might infer that for Fox the Bible was the Word of God and the Rule of Faith. Most emphatically he denies that it is either. The first need not detain us. Fox holds that Christ is the *Word*, the Bible the *words*, of God (J. i. 105; ii. 200). Very literally this is a mere *logo-machy*, of no more importance than his protest against calling a building a church (J. i. 57; ii. 99). On the second point we come to the real crux of his view of the Scripture. Let it be premised that Fox and his able expounder Barclay, the "apologist," seem to misunderstand what Presbyterians meant by a Rule of Faith. If, as we have seen, Fox supports every statement from the Bible and requires all his opponents to base their case on it; if, as Barclay holds, immediate revelation conveys not new truth but imparts anew the old truth set forth in

¹ Braithwaite, *op. cit.*, pp. 288-292.

² *Id.* p. 289.

Scripture, and whatever contradicts that is false ; then that is surely just what Presbyterians meant by saying " Scripture is the Rule of Faith." By the " Rule of Faith," however, Fox and Barclay seem to mean something individual and subjective ; the Presbyterian conception of a Rule has a social and objective reference. Hence in disputes about the Rule, Fox and his opponents were considerably at cross purposes.

Further, in depreciating as he does the mere " Letter," Fox is simply saying what no sane person ever denied, though he expresses himself in extreme ways. The " Letter," he holds, is " carnal," " husks," " earth " (J. i. 69, 73, 250, 172). The Puritans knew as well as he that one may know the Scriptures from Genesis to Revelation and yet not be a Christian, and that many had the Bible in their hands and yet did not live in accordance with it. But they might have said that the circumstance that in many cases the Bible is not the Rule *de facto*, does not affect its position *de jure*.

Fox's contention, however, was not unneeded. There was doubtless at the time a tendency to turn from an infallible Church to an equally external infallible book, resulting in an exaggerated intellectualism. It was attempted to save men by a syllogism. Confessions set forth the " sense " of Scripture, acceptance of the Confession was the sole test of orthodoxy, and orthodoxy was practically of supreme importance. The " sufficiency " and " efficacy " of Scripture were proclaimed as though men needed nothing but to read the Bible. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit as teacher was inadequately set forth, and the people had not our " Hymns of the Holy Spirit " to remind them of it.

Not the Scriptures but the Spirit is the teacher ; unless we have within us the Spirit who inspired the Scriptures

we cannot understand them but are likely to invent many errors from the dead "Letter"; God has not withdrawn into silence since the last canonical Book was penned, but is speaking in every heart by His Spirit, who will, if obeyed, lead men into all truth, taking the things of Christ and showing them unto them; that is Fox's position, that is what he meant by denying that the Bible is the Rule of Faith.

Had Fox said no more than this, that there is something of God in every man; that spiritual understanding is proportionate to its development; and that unless we have the same spirit as they had who gave forth the Scriptures, we cannot profit from them, as Savonarola and many others had said long previously; then on psychological, epistemological, and Scriptural grounds his position would have been inexpugnable. For there can be no religion unless consciousness is a religious consciousness; knowledge cannot be impressed on the mind purely *ab extra*, and spiritual things are spiritually discerned. Unfortunately he went on to say some things which not only are false from all those view-points, but render his view of Scripture incoherent.

IV.

Fox arrived at his position by a special avenue. His peculiar psychical experiences led him to his doctrine of the inner light independently, as he thought, of the Scriptures. Only afterwards did he find it in the Scriptures.¹ He was convinced that God spoke to him immediately, and by direct revelations² led him from point to point

¹ *Journal*, 1891 ed., p. 11.

² Those revelations raise difficult psychological and historical problems, for apart from the use of "thou" and the disuse of "hat-honour" they revealed nothing that was not perfectly familiar in the circles in which Fox mingled. Fox, perhaps, was unaware of direct borrowing (see Jones, *Spiritual Reformers* (1914), chap. xviii.).

into the whole system of divine Truth. He ignored the fact that the whole system was in his mind already from his reading of Scripture, and that the Spirit merely illumined his mind and revealed the real significance of what he had read. Forgetting thus that the "matter" was supplied by Scripture, he expressed himself in perilous fashion, maintaining, on the basis of John i. 9, that every man had within himself a light sufficient, if he followed it, to lead him to all Truth and to Salvation.

That Fox really held this has been denied; but it is useless to deny that a man holds what he repeatedly professes to hold. Take this:—

"I told them the Gospel was the power of God, which was preached before Matthew, Mark, Luke and John was printed or written, and was preached to every creature who might never see nor hear of the four books aforesaid. . . . So I directed them to their teacher, the Grace of God, and showed them the sufficiency of it, which would teach them how to live and what to deny, and would bring them their salvation" (J. ii. 28).¹

Even more decisive is this. The Church of Scotland, with Quaker teaching mainly in view, drew up a list of errors to be publicly repudiated. The first anathema ran, "Cursed is he that sayeth every man hath a light within him sufficient to lead him to salvation." Of this Fox does *not* say, as Dr. Butler does,² that it is a misrepresentation of the Quaker position. He characterises as "blasphemous and dark" the "principle" which could anathematise this view. He then goes on to repeat the view at fuller length, only substituting "day-star" for "salvation." (J. i. 295.)

It is surely clear that Fox did really maintain that the inner light, life, grace, spirit, or whatever else he designates it, is in every man, and is sufficient if obeyed to lead to truth and to salvation.

¹ Cf. J. i. 12, 48, 50, 258; ii. 130, *et al.*

² D. Butler, *George Fox in Scotland* (1913), p. 35.

Men may learn "immediately from the mouth of the Lord" (J. i. 85), and if they love the light they "need never look at man more" (J. i. 75).

The error of this could be shown in many ways. Suffice it to confront it with Romans x. 13-15.

Did Fox then hold that Scripture might be "scrapped" without serious loss? By no means. We remember how he used and esteemed it. Besides, there are numerous passages¹ in which he says that the light, if followed, will lead men into fellowship with God, *with the Scriptures*, and with one another. This implies that "fellowship with Scripture" is as necessary as fellowship with God and the brethren. And though he has so severely criticised the efficacy of the "Letter," he still holds that the Scriptures "are able to make wise unto salvation" and "are to be read and believed, and fulfilled" (J. ii. 200).

We find, then, those two apparently incompatible views held together by no other bond than that Fox's mind entertained both, and could cross easily from one to the other according to no ascertainable rule. All we can say is that in opposing Presbyterian views of the sufficiency and efficacy of Scripture, he went to an extreme. Every teacher of new or neglected truths must be allowed a certain right to exaggerate, and let us remember there are antinomies in the thought of us all.

From the incoherence of Fox's view, which we may observe in passing Barclay in his *Apology* does not overcome,² it resulted in later days that Quakers who adopted "infidel" views of the Bible (in Ireland and America), they who regarded Scripture as the Rule of Faith (Beaconites), and the main body who rejected both extremes, all claimed to represent Fox's real position.

¹ E.g. J. i. 44, 45, 256, 258; ii. 317, 320, *et al.*

² The coherence of the "Propositions" vanishes in his exposition of them.

V.

Let us briefly remark in closing that while Fox's view makes the conception of a unique revelation in Scripture exceedingly dubious, it involves an understandable view of "inspiration." God speaks to men still as He spoke to prophets and Apostles, hence the mechanical "dictation" theory of inspiration is untenable. It is the writers who are "inspired," not the writings. God spoke to them in their silence before they wrote. (J. i. 344.)

To evaluate an incoherent doctrine such as we have found that of Fox on the Scriptures to be, is impossible. Let us acknowledge, however, what was of value in his view. A religion not solely of the head but mainly of the heart; an experimental, not a bookish, knowledge of Christ; the indwelling Spirit, without whom we can think nothing that is true; the God who has not been silent for centuries, but is speaking in every heart; these are now the common beliefs of most Christians, but many in Fox's time had forgotten, if indeed they ever knew them. W. D. NIVEN.

NOTES AND NOTICES OF RECENT CRITICISM.

THE PRODIGAL SON.

I.

IT is the custom in some quarters to see in S. Luke xv. 11 ff. the quintessence of our Lord's teaching on forgiveness, and to contrast the simplicity of the Gospel with the elaborate theories of the Atonement as propounded by theologians from S. Paul onwards.

The following note is by way of protest against what I feel to be a misuse of the parable due to misinterpretation. In fact it might almost be called an attempt to show that the parable has nothing to do with forgiveness or its conditions.¹

¹ What are the grounds for the current identification of "forgiveness" with "salvation"? The Rev. C. J. Shebbeare, for example, in the

II.

Now all the publicans and sinners were drawing near unto him for to hear him. And both the Pharisees and the scribes murmured, saying, This man receiveth sinners and eateth with them. And he spake unto them. . . . (S. Luke xv. 1, 2.)

Spake unto whom? Obviously the Pharisees and scribes, in answer to their murmurings—a fact which ought to determine our line of interpretation of what follows. We will start off then expecting to find that the three parables have a special bearing on the circumstances which called them forth, and contain a justification of our Lord's action, together, it may be, with a rebuke or appeal to the murmurers, and not *merely* such general teaching as might equally well have been given to a different audience upon some other occasion.

III.

In the "Lost Sheep" and the "Lost Coin" we have two simple and straightforward similitudes,¹ explained in verses 7 and 10 as referring to the *joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth*. There is no room here for allegory. The thoughts of the hearers are lifted at once above national and social prejudices; the discussion, if such it can be called, is placed at the outset on the highest plane. Having done this, the way is clear for a more direct and personal appeal in what follows.

When we turn to the parable of the Prodigal Son we are faced

October (1923) number of *Theology*, page 188, argues that the statements in the Church of England's Catechism that the two Sacraments are "generally necessary to salvation," if strictly interpreted, contradicts the evangelical teaching that repentance is the sole condition of pardon. Surely salvation is the larger conception, including repentance and forgiveness as the first step (Acts ii. 38, 47, xvi. 30; cp. xx. 21, Mark i. 15). If it is urged that "salvation" is a later idea which supplanted the simple and primitive "forgiveness," we can point to Mark xiii. 13, Luke xiii. 23 for the phraseology, and further argue that the background is sufficiently eschatological for us to link it up with "membership of the kingdom."

¹ A similitude, as an extension of a simile, deals with the comparison of relationships. In an allegory we work as it were with counters, the meaning of which has been fixed by the narrator. The Rev. L. E. Browne, in *The Parables of the Gospels in the Light of Modern Criticism*, pp. 5-8, illustrates the difference thus:—

A/a, B/b, C/c, D/d = an allegory, where wishing to write about A, B, C, D, the author substitutes a, b, c, d. The formula for a similitude, however, will be $A : B : C : D = a : b : c : d$.

with at least two problems :—(A) The nature of the story. Is it a similitude or an allegory ? Or is it a mixture of both ? ¹

(B) The Elder Son. Is he an essential figure, or merely a secondary feature which could have been very well omitted without any real loss to the parable ?

Let us consider (B) first. It is true the elder son only comes on the stage at the close of the story, and then almost as an anticlimax ; but he was mentioned at the very beginning, and the attentive listener who realised this at the outset would, as he listened to the story of the prodigal, be anxious to learn what further part the second son had in the little drama. This fact, taken in conjunction with the uncertainty in which the parable leaves us as to his ultimate attitude towards his brother, makes it morally certain that he is really essential to the story—in fact, we might go further and say that the story is intended to lead up to him.

Now we are told that a similitude is intended to lead the hearers to a decision upon a point with regard to which they are in doubt or have formed a wrong opinion, and that this is done by comparing a situation wherein the relationships are the same, but where there is no room for uncertainty. Several relationships may be compared in the course of the similitude, but the aim will be to compel a decision on *one* point.²

Now if I am right in looking to Luke xv. 1, 2 as giving the clue to the correct interpretation of the parable, there can be no doubt that the one point upon which our Lord wished the Pharisees and the scribes to come to a right judgment was their lack of charity in condemning Him for welcoming the publicans and sinners and eating with them. Assuming this to be correct, the first question (A) raised above almost answers itself—at any rate so far as it involves the simple alternative of similitude or allegory—for clearly the relationships compared are (*a*) the father's readiness to receive back the prodigal and our Lord's desire to welcome the sinners and outcasts, and (*b*) the elder

¹ It seems to be recognised that Rabbinic and other parallels justify the interpretation of some of the Gospel Parables as admixtures of similitude and allegory. See Browne, *op. cit.*, pp. 10 ff.; Buzy, *Introduction aux Paraboles Évangéliques*, pp. 39 ff., and an article by the Rev. J. W. Hunkin in the *J.Th.St.* for April, 1915.

² See Browne, *op. cit.* pp. 5 ff., and Hunkin, *op. cit.*

brother's surly jealousy and the Pharisee's murmuring superiority. So can we appreciate the uncertainty in the parable as to the final attitude of the elder brother to the prodigal. Only so was the relationship to be made strictly parallel to that of the Pharisees to the sinners. Our Lord still hoped that they would relent and rejoice with Him over the restored penitents.

IV.

There remains the possibility that allegorical traits have crept into the parable, so that although it is essentially a similitude, yet it ought to be classed as a "mixture." This is the opinion of L. E. Browne, who however only goes to the preceding similitudes for the context. But it does not particularly matter for the purpose of this note whether this is the case or not, for even if there are allegorical features, they will have to be interpreted in line with the rest. We cannot, that is, say that the father's love for the prodigal is an allegory of God the Father's love for sinful and repentant humanity, and at the same time claim to see in the relationship a parallel to our Lord's relationship to the outcasts intended to lead the Pharisees and scribes to a right decision as to their attitude towards Him and His work.¹ A choice must be made, and I feel a careful attention to the context and the requirements of the situation leave little room for doubt.

To sum up, I suggest that the parable is essentially a similitude intended to lead the Pharisees and the scribes to a right decision as regards the attitude they should take up towards our Lord's

¹ A passage from Lagrange, quoted by Browne from *Revue Biblique Internationale*, 1909, p. 212, in connexion with accidental traces of allegory in similitudes, is of interest (Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 16; *cp.* p. 46):—

"... one more willingly compares two situations when the principal object of one has something analogous with the principal object of the other."

If it is urged that the interpretation proposed above empties the parable of all that gives it permanent value for us to-day, I would reply that our final ground for belief in the love of God is what our Lord was and is: not merely what He said. It is our belief in Him that gives His words and teaching their authority for us. In so far as we "hold the Catholic Faith" we can still use the parable for present needs. But we must not confuse the meaning our Lord intended it to have for the original hearers with the fuller meaning it may have for us in the light of Christian experience of Him through the Spirit in the Church.

action in welcoming the sinners and publicans. The comparisons are between the father's attitude to the prodigal and our Lord's "receiving sinners and eating with them," and between the elder brother's jealousy and the Pharisee's sneering aloofness. The question of Atonement or Forgiveness does not enter in at all.

MAURICE FROST.

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REVIEWS.

The Holy Spirit and the Church. By Charles Gore, D.D. London : John Murray, 1924. Pp. xi, 366. Price 7s. 6d. net.

DR. GORE, to the Church's gain, has been able to complete his project of restating the Christian doctrines. This is the third and last of the volumes in which he has sought to give a " deliberate reconstruction of belief from its foundations, inspired by a fearless trust in real freedom of thought." He is convinced that all essential doctrine has its root in the New Testament, and that it is never enough to say " the Church teaches " so and so. The contents of the book are perhaps more varied than the title might seem to indicate, but all are relevant, and we are drawn back at every point to the religious and moral significance of the issues so carefully set out. It is easy to understand why Dr. Gore's books leave a deep mark. Most people know when they have been in contact with a noble mind.

It goes without saying that what are usually called Evangelical thinkers will agree in the main with three-fourths of Bishop Gore's argument about " the sum and substance " of the Christian faith. They will believe him in the right as against the Modernism of scholars like Loisy or Professor Kirsopp Lake. They will assent to his contention that the Eucharist is not to be explained by the Mystery-Religions, simply because Christ is in an order of being by Himself. They will subscribe to his repudiation of mere individualism in religion, which is no more *typical* of Protestantism than the hermit, conceived as the " perfect " Christian, is of the early undivided Church. They will welcome and be grateful for his new and powerful statement of the rights of Biblical criticism and the real meaning of the authority of Holy Scripture. They will read with sympathy

the strong words in which he has again exposed the Roman view of ecclesiastical authority, by which that Church has "made itself incapable of 'receiving' some of those whom Christ would certainly have received." And they will draw strength for their own faith out of the deep and subduing conviction underlying his argument that life in Christ and in the Spirit covers everything that is meant by Christian religion. They will accept for themselves the just rebuke contained in his grave words, regarding the Church in our own country, that "it has been content, flatly contrary to the spirit of our Lord, to draw a marked distinction between respectable and disreputable sins."

On these great matters there is no need to dwell. But Dr. Gore has written a very argumentative book, and on one or two of the problems handled by him one must speak critically if at all. It appears to me that the treatment of the Spirit in the first four chapters might have been enriched by a fuller use of the materials gathered by such writers as Weinelt, Gunkel, Denney, Lewis Humphries, and Scott. These, it is not too much to say, have opened vistas in the subject to which we must give heed if we are to make headway. Again, is there anything in the New Testament corresponding to the distribution of accent in the following sentence: "The unity of the community . . . we found to be secured by three main links: the apostolic ministry to which all must adhere, the sacraments of the society in which all must participate, and the faith or 'Word of God' which all must hold in common" (p. 342)? The order here is disconcerting. It may be paralleled by these words from chapter i. which I frankly find unhappy: "Nothing in Christianity could have kept believers in Christ together except the positive obligations of the one body—the obligation of membership by baptism, grace by sacraments, adherence to the apostolic ministry." This seems out of all perspective, even on Dr. Gore's own reading of Christianity. The supreme power to keep men together, then as now, lay in Christ Himself, who is greater than all forms which He may use. Believers were one, in St. Paul's words, "through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth."

This is not the place to argue the question of the monarchic episcopate, though it is clear that a certain view of that matter

will be taken by one who begins from Dr. Gore's starting-point. "There is no doubt," he writes, "that to St. Paul the Church is simply based on a message of authority." I do not think Dr. Gore holds fast to this—the principle which these words *seem* to express—for his interpretation of Church authority in later pages is exceedingly impressive, and, speaking broadly, convincing. But the purely external idea of authority does appear now and then. As I read on, I had hoped somewhere to come upon a clear statement of the basal truth, apart from which debates about authority in religion are apt to degenerate into legalities, that Christ authenticates Himself to those who will face Him, and that if He did not, the Church could give no help to a world of sin. It is through the moral experiences which He generates in the soul, and through nothing else, that the idea of authority in this sphere gains meaning. He is the true King whose people are His own creation.

On the question of the Eucharist, Bishop Gore repeatedly states his view in terms which we may readily accept. He speaks of "divine gifts ministered through earthly rites"; and again of sacraments "as channels or instruments of spiritual grace"; or once more, "He who was to inaugurate a new covenant with His people by the sacrifice of His life was also to be their spiritual food." All the Churches of the Reformation would say as much. I do not overlook the fact that differences of conviction lie behind these shared terms. But if "grace" means just the personal influence of the redeeming God, these differences cannot be ultimate.

In general, I am inclined to say that in this book too many things are affirmed as "certain" on which there has been, and still is, much discussion among competent writers. Nor do I feel that Dr. Gore has perfectly adjusted the relation which for him obtains between antiquity and Scripture as criteria of doctrine. The difficulty for his general position may be illustrated by the comparison of two passages. On p. 225 we read: "The touchstone of fidelity to the Spirit, the touchstone for true discrimination, is—boldly be it said—in the New Testament and nowhere else"; but on p. 144: "Nothing seems to me more certain than that the New Testament documents give no decisive indication of the precise form the ministry was to take."

In an appendix to one chapter Dr. Gore has dealt critically

with certain arguments which I made use of in my *Person of Jesus Christ*. He demurs to my rejection of the category "substance" as applied to the Deity of our Lord and also of the "two-nature" doctrine as such. He holds it an absurdity to say that in the theology of the Councils "substantial" can be opposed to "ethical." Yet on his own showing the opposition occurs in St. Cyril, who had much to do with one of the Councils. Dr. Raven's book on *Apollinarianism* has recently confirmed my general argument. The point is not whether "substance" as meaning "reality" may not be permissible, but whether it is not less luminous to speak of "the substance of Godhead" as existing in Christ than to say that God is "personally present" in Him. The word "substance" leads the mind off in a wrong direction. So, again, I should not dream of denying the "two-nature doctrine" if this meant simply that in Christ we behold both God and man. But that is not how the "two-nature" theory has functioned in traditional theology. There it has followed the line of Leo's *invicem*; it led Anselm to say that "whatever needed to be done for the restoration of men, if the human nature could not do it, the Divine nature might, and if there were anything incongruous to the Divine nature, it might be manifested by the human." The Westminster Confession reiterates the point: "Christ, in the work of mediation, acteth according to both natures; by each nature doing that which is proper to itself." This is the doctrine as it has helped to shape traditional Christology. It still appears to me dualistic; at times, indeed, it goes very near to cancel the truth of Incarnation.

H. R. MACKINTOSH.

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Eucharistérion: Studien zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, Hermann Gunkel zum 60. Geburtstage, dem 23. Mai, 1922, dargebracht von seinen Schülern und Freunden. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1923. Teil I.: Zur Religion und Literatur des Alten Testaments, M. 20. Teil II.: Zur Religion und Literatur des Neuen Testaments, M. 12. Complete price: bound, M. 33; unbound, M. 30.

THESE volumes form two parts of the *Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments*, a series which

Professor Gunkel himself opened in 1903. The pleasant custom of celebrating a great scholar's birthday by publishing a volume of essays in his honour has already led to the issue of some notable books. But none has been quite so large as this, none quite so important. Some of the essays, particularly in the first part, are small monographs, and several are of outstanding importance. It is a high tribute to Gunkel's influence and work that he has inspired scholars such as those who are proud in these pages to count him their master. We congratulate the editor and publisher upon producing so varied and significant a collection of essays and studies.

The first two essays in the Old Testament section are on a book which Gunkel himself has done much to explain, the book of Genesis. Gressmann's study (pp. 1-55) of the Joseph-saga in Genesis xxxvii.-l. (he omits xxxviii. and xlix.) starts by making Joseph an abbreviation of Joseph-el as a personal name. This hero was the historical ancestor of the Joseph-clans, which originally were Machir and Ephraim. Genesis xlviii. 22 implies the death of Jacob in Canaan (here Gressmann agrees with E. Meyer), and this is one primitive form of the saga; the episode of Jacob in Egypt blessing Ephraim and Manasseh is late, belonging to a tradition which had been preceded by the original saga. It was in the days of or after Gideon that the tale of Joseph as a royal vizier was circulated, to glorify the Joseph-clans at Shechem. Gressmann, by internal criticism, seeks to eliminate several features of the Joseph-saga as secondary. In Jeroboam's day (1 Kings xi. 40) Egyptian tales began to be applied to Israelite heroes of the past; Joseph, who in the original saga had been actually a king, is now made Egyptian prime minister, and so on. Otto Eissfeldt (pp. 56-77) similarly attempts to distinguish the genealogical and the romantic strata in the stories of Jacob and his family (Gen. xxv.-l.). He adheres to Gunkel's principle that literary and æsthetic criticism must push behind a mere dissection of the Old Testament text into sources; but he reproduces his own source-criticism to begin with. In addition to J, E, and P, he posits a fourth source L (so named because it smacks more of the laity); to L, e.g., he assigns sections like Genesis xxv. 21-26, 29-34, xxxv. 21, 22, and xxxviii. With regard to the Jacob-Joseph narratives, L differs widely from the later J and E; thus, after xxxi. 52, it

omits the dealings between Jacob and Esau, and inserts the story of Jacob and the dæmon (xxxii. 24–29). L's main interest is in tribal relations; J and E generally show more interest in the personalities of the story, though they too reproduce romantically, as in the case of Joseph, the older interests of the historical and political relations of the tribes. Eissfeldt does not invariably agree with Gunkel. His analysis of the sources is independent and precarious in parts. But he claims to prove that the primitive motive, as represented in his L, was that of justifying or explaining the relative positions of the tribes, and that it was only when the tribes began to lose something of their original importance under the kingdom that the tales of their early period were turned into literary products. Hans Schmidt contributes two essays. The study of the Decalogue (pp. 78–119) has been already noticed. The second (pp. 120–144) argues that the four cherubim in Ezekiel's vision support a table or throne; that this represents the temple-throne of Yahweh; that the description of the latter in 1 Kings vi. 23 f., which posits two cherubims, is a mistake; that the empty throne symbolised the invisible presence of the divine King; and that the ark was a chest, not a throne. The argument rests on some ingenious and intricate textual criticism. Thus in Exodus xxv. 10 f., Schmidt has naturally to omit (in ver. 20) "covering the mercy-seat with their wings" and "towards the mercy-seat shall the faces of the cherubim be," and (in v. 22) "from between the two cherubims which are upon the ark of the testimony." W. Baumgartner (pp. 145–157) contributes a short piece upon the methods of Hebrew narrative in describing orders or instructions, and in repeating details. Sometimes it is taken for granted that an order is obeyed. Thus, in Genesis xii. 13 f., it is assumed that Sara obeys Abram; "an Israelite wife could not do anything but obey her husband, and the story is meant to exalt her beauty and self-sacrifice as well as Abram's astuteness." This has a bearing on the criticism of the text. Thus Amos vii. 10–17 is not necessarily incomplete; Amos obeyed the order of the priest. Only if he had disobeyed it, would it have been necessary to mention the fact. Gustav Hölscher's elaborate essay (pp. 158–213) on the literary structure of the books of Kings begins by showing how some portions of J E, omitted by the original Deuteronomistic editor, were inserted later. Hölscher

carries through a running analysis, at length and in detail. He goes his own way. Thus, in 1 Kings, the editor compiled ii. 10-12, iii. 1, 3, to introduce the reign of Solomon; iii. 2 is a gloss, but, unlike most editors, he refuses to make iii. 1 a gloss, arguing that the LXX, which omits the first part and places the second part elsewhere, is too unsatisfactory evidence. Again, only the second part of iii. 4 is a later gloss (p. 159), like verse 14; otherwise the story of the king's dream is reproduced fairly fully from E. Probably iv. 1-6 goes back to J, like iv. 7-19, v. 7-8; v. 2-3 is late and legendary, and v. 4-5 a later doublet to iv. 20-v. 1. In viii. 14-61 Hölcher distinguishes three sources or strata, the oldest A (later than the Deuteronomic editor) = verses 14-26, 28-29, then a post-exilic interpolation (B = 27, 30-43, 52-61), and finally a third interpolation C = 44-51. Among the additions made subsequent to the Deuteronomic editor are the cycle of Elisha-legends in 2 Kings iii. 4-viii. 15 (p. 186), and also the story of xiii. 14-21; the editor's own order in the latter section was xiii. 10-11, 22, 24-25, xiv. 8-16, 1-7, 18-22. All the stories of Elijah and Elisha go back to a single source, belonging to E (pp. 192 f.); the Isaiah-legends are much later and have no connexion with E. Hölcher's article is crammed with keen criticism of the text, and concludes with an argument for the later date of E, i.e. later than 586 B.C. E. Balla's article on the problem of suffering in ancient Israel and Judaism (pp. 214-260) has little for English readers who know Professor Peake's Hartley Lecture on *The Problem of Suffering in the Old Testament*. Balla points out the recurring tendency to relapse upon the view that suffering was the penalty of sin, and holds that the deepest solution was that offered in the seventy-third psalm by the man who recognised that suffering was a mystery and yet confessed, "Nevertheless I am continually with thee." Max Haller writes on the Cyrus songs in the Second Isaiah (pp. 261-277), i.e. in Isaiah xlv. 24-28, xlv. 1-8, and xli. 1-13, 21-28, xlv. 9-13, xlviii. 12-16, with xlv. 1-13 and xlii. 5-9 (which, like Mowinkel, he connects with Cyrus), etc. He notes the semi-supernatural colouring of the figure of Cyrus in these sections, the acquaintance with his career, and the courtly style especially of a passage like xlv. 28 f. Such data indicate that the writer lived at the court of Cyrus, or at any rate addressed his oracles to the Persian king himself. Then,

as Cyrus failed to answer the poet's hopes, as he never rebuilt Jerusalem (xliv. 13), for example, the Israelite lost interest in him. Hence the new figure of the Servant of Yahweh emerges. Haller develops quite a little historical romance around the personality of the Second Isaiah. Fastening on a hint dropped by Duhm (on Isa. xlv. 26), he asks why this prophet may not have gone to the court of Cyrus? Why should he not have been a predecessor of Nehemiah? Mowinckel, in the next essay (pp. 278-322) on "die vorderasiatischen Königs- und Fürsten-inschriften," endeavours to prove that the style of the book of Nehemiah is often moulded on the Oriental court-style reproduced in these inscriptions. The parallels to Nehemiah xiii. 10-13, 28-31, are certainly striking; the consciousness of having deserved well of God is common to both, as is the emphasis on the religious motives for one's conduct. A number of such points are made, with ample quotations from the inscriptions. The last two articles lie outside the Old Testament. Paul Volz (pp. 323-345) discusses "the holy spirit in the Zoroastrian Gathas," and Paul Kahle (pp. 346-399) reproduces a number of dirges from Moslem Egypt. Volz shows how some of the religious instincts in Zoroastrianism led to a development of the doctrine of the Spirit such as occurs in the later Judaism. He regards the failure of Zoroastrian religion as being due to its preoccupation with eschatology; the triumph of early Christianity was due to the fact that in the Spirit the Church realised it had an immediate, present sense of life, which survived the disappointments of the eschatological hope.

The New Testament volume is smaller, and of less importance. Rudolf Bultmann ("der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund des Prologs zum Johannes-Evangelium," pp. 1-26), asks us to believe that the prologue (minus verses 6-8, 15, 17, and some later additions) originally came from the circle of John the Baptist's followers, who claimed for their hero that in him *the Word became flesh*. The prologue draws upon Oriental speculations about a Logos or God of revelation who incarnated himself on earth. This Wisdom or Logos deity is not suggested by Jewish speculations—here Bultmann differs from Dr. Rendel Harris. But in the circles of Alexandrian Judaism, under the influence of Egyptian Hellenism and Stoicism, the term Logos displaced that of Wisdom. According to Bultmann, no reader

who did not know the entire context could think of the historical Jesus in verses 4 f., and therefore we must not attribute this view to the writer. One can only ask, why not? The argument is too speculative; if it had taken account of Lagrange's recent studies on the pre-Christian Logos, or of Dr. Burney's theory about the prologue, it would have been more useful. There is another article (pp. 174-213) on the Fourth Gospel by Windisch, who discusses the narrative style of the Gospel, with its dramatic scenes (e.g. in iv., xi., and xxi.), its combination of narrative and controversy, and its separate incidents. He argues that this literary criticism of the Gospel serves to correct the undue pre-occupation with its sources and structure, and to revive in a reader's mind the great power and influence of the Fourth Gospel as a classic of religious literature. M. Dibelius (pp. 27-49) discusses some stylistic features in the book of Acts. He thinks that Luke shows far more literary power in Acts than in the Third Gospel, and even declares that the account of Paul's shipwreck is much more a literary composition than the outcome of personal observation (p. 33). The story about Lystra (xiv. 8-18) was interpolated in the journey-document which formed the basis of Acts; also xvi. 25-34 is a later insertion. But the net result of the essay is scanty; there are more conjectures than proofs in its pages. K. L. Schmidt's long essay (pp. 50-134) surveys the well-known data about the literary character of the Gospels, but arrives at no new conclusion. The Gospels are a new departure in literature, neither biographies nor edifying narratives; Schmidt does not take us beyond what previous scholars have said on this subject, though he covers a wide range of analogies in ancient literature. Bruno Violet (pp. 135-140) has a note on the Cursing of the Fig-tree in Mark xi. 12-14 = Matthew xxi. 18 f. He cannot accept the theory that the tale was originally a parable, which has become a miracle. But he is anxious to release the character of Jesus from a charge of wanton petulance, and therefore proposes to read, instead of "May no man eat fruit of thee hereafter," "the Son of Man will never eat fruit of thee in future"; the word originally meant this (a parallel to Mark xiv. 25 = Matt. xxvi. 29). Jesus was disappointed at not getting fruit, and murmured, *οὐ μὴ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκ σου καρπὸν φάγεται*. He did not curse it. But in the cause of later tradition it was

believed that He did, and hence the erroneous form of His saying came into existence. Finally, H. Weinel (pp. 141-173) surveys the later "apocryphal" apocalypses of the Church—a thorough and tidy piece of work. He arranges the material not chronologically but as (i.) apocalypses written under Christian names, (ii.) apocalypses written under Old Testament names, and (iii.) Christian apocalypses based on Jewish sources. Of all the six essays this is the most objective; it has little direct bearing upon the New Testament, but at the same time it is a convenient guide to a difficult piece of country in early church literature.

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The Journal of George Fox. A revised text, prepared and edited by Norman Penney, F.S.A. With an introduction by Rufus M. Jones, LL.D. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1924. Pp. xxii., 359. Price 5s. net.

HITHERTO the main access for the general reader to George Fox's Journal has been by way of a convenient abridgment published by Messrs. Isbister in 1903. It was a happy idea to issue this new edition in the tercentenary year of his birth, an edition which has three signal merits; it is scholarly, artistic, and cheap. The text has been carefully edited, on the basis of the Cambridge standard edition of 1911, and, although Mr. Penney has added very few notes, Dr. Rufus Jones supplies an introductory appreciation. Four photographs and six etchings are included. There is a full index. No reasonable person could desire a more handy and competent edition of the work. Mr. Penney, of course, has had to omit large slices of the original material, but he has preserved practically everything that is necessary for a full, vivid impression of the "man in leather," who played so disturbing a part in the religious world of seventeenth-century England. It was a century when the foundations of several movements and institutions were laid, in Britain. Quakerism was one of them, and, if Fox was not its founder, he did more than almost anyone else to build it up, under the eyes of an indignant, surprised generation.

William Penn's eulogy is prefixed to the Journal; or rather, some extracts from it. At one point Penn claims that his hero was "neither touchy nor critical; what fell from him was very inoffensive if not very edifying" (the last clause being an awkward attempt to express what Penn really meant, "even when

it was not very edifying"). This is not borne out by Fox's account of himself in the *Journal*. He could be extremely offensive. Indeed one of his rudest answers to the Presbyterian minister of his birthplace, the Rev. Nathaniel Stevens, is omitted by Mr. Penney. Stevens was a Calvinist and a man of high principle, and it was to him that Fox arrogantly said, "It seems thou dost not know whether thou art in the right way or not : neither dost thou know whether I am in the right way or not : but I know that I am in the everlasting way, Christ Jesus, which thou art out of." In 1659, writing from London, he notes "a great pother made about the image or effigy of Oliver Cromwell lying in state ; men standing and sounding with trumpets over his image, when he was dead. At this my spirit was greatly grieved, and the Lord, I found, was highly offended." The tone of this is not pleasant. "I found"! The truth seems to be that Fox never did proper justice to the ability of Oliver Cromwell, just as he did more than justice to the Stuarts.

Where Fox is more attractive is in his keen religious individualism and in his sympathy for weak and wronged people. He was sensitive to many a social abuse of the day, in prison-life and elsewhere, which his contemporaries had failed to realise. And he had indomitable courage. Wherever he went, up and down England, or in Scotland ("the Scots being a dark, carnal people"), Ireland, America, and Holland, he tenaciously proclaimed his principles. Dr. Rufus Jones happily sums up these principles by saying that "from his own first-hand experience there emerged a profound conviction which lasted all his life that God and man are essentially related because their spiritual frontiers are continuous and undivided. There is something in man that is not of dust, or earth, or flesh, or time, but of God. Fox has many ways of saying this in his seventeenth-century phrases, but of the fact itself he had no more doubt than he had of the hills and fields of Leicestershire, and that faith gave him an exalted sense of the infinite worth and preciousness of man, of every man of every type and degree." It requires some historical imagination to do justice to his work, for it was inevitably mixed up with a great deal of negative polemic, which either attracts or repels a modern reader with an equal lack of balance. But his *Journal* is one of the minor religious classics of that century. It is a document rather than a piece of literature, and to study

it is to watch an eddy in the swirling tide of English religion during the second half of the seventeenth century. The Journal cannot be understood apart from the broader politics and ecclesiastical movements of the age. But these in turn become more real as they are connected with this or that personality, and Quakerism at that period meant George Fox.

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The Apocryphal New Testament, being the apocryphal gospels, acts, epistles, and apocalypses, with other narratives and fragments. Newly translated by M. R. James. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924. Pp. xxxi., 584. Price 10s.

DR. M. R. JAMES has collected in this useful and competent volume a large number of the early Christian writings which are technically called "apocryphal." He designs it to supersede Hone's "Apocryphal New Testament," which was published more than a hundred years ago, but his book is far too good to be mentioned in the same breath as that production. Dr. James is a scholar, and he has provided students with a capital collection of the religious fiction upon which the early Church nourished its faith or satisfied its appetite for stories. Every literary form in the New Testament was imitated. The epistolary form was the least popular, perhaps because it was the most difficult. On the other hand, gospels abounded. Dr. James begins by printing versions of the early gospels, mainly fragmentary; he then classifies the remainder as "Infancy" and "Passion" gospels. But, while this is partly adequate to the extant material, there can be little doubt that some of these gospels originally covered the whole of the life of Jesus. It is particularly useful to have some account of the various types of the gospel of St. Bartholomew, which readers of literature first meet in Victor Hugo's *Quatrevingt-Treize*, without learning very much about it. But probably Hugo knew as little about it himself. The few pages upon the apocryphal epistles are enriched by a version of the recently edited *Epistle of the Apostles*; this is the first English translation of a document which appears to have been almost entirely lost sight of since its origin in the second half of the second century. Three or four of the apocalypses are translated, together with an extract from the Sibylline Oracles. The apocalypse was in some cases an easy transition from the gospel, as many of the gospel-visions were supposed to be revealed by

Christ after the resurrection. It is remarkable how some early Christian descriptions of hell realised the usefulness of making the punishment fit the crime, and how the visions of hell are much more interesting than those of heaven.

Dr. James explains why even so comprehensive a collection as his must leave out literature like the Gnostic treatises and the Clementine tractates. For some reason he has included abstracts of late, dreary documents about the Virgin Mary, and even (pp. 68 f.) an extract from an Anglo-Saxon tale about Jesus. Not all the texts are fully printed, but Dr. James has been careful to show the various strata and traditions which underlie them. In translating he has "employed a style meant to remind the reader of the Authorised Version of the Bible," but he has not reproduced the verse-form e.g. in the infancy-gospels, where some quaint songs and verses occur (in the "*Protevangelium Jacobi*" iii. and elsewhere), and the renderings are sometimes ultra-biblical, as e.g., in the famous description of Paul preserved in the *Acts of Paul* (ch. iii.), where he is "a man little of stature, thin-haired upon the head, crooked in the legs, of good state of body, with eyebrows joining, and nose somewhat hooked, full of grace: for sometimes he appeared like a man, and sometimes he had the face of an angel." The Greek phrase *χάριτος πλήρη*, rendered "full of grace," means "full of charm."

For the most part it is an unhealthy atmosphere that this literature breathes. Some of the infancy-gospels are charged with crude superstition, and the child Jesus is a pert, mischievous creature. The so-called "Acts" represent the Apostles as engaged generally in separating husbands and wives, and in advocating a morbid sexlessness. It is rarely that we come across any pleasant or profitable reflection of human nature. But the book, for this very reason, has the merit of dispelling the idea that the early Church was a pure society of saints. And now and then we come across a passage which reminds us that what we sometimes call "modern" is very old. Take, for example, the literary trick of representing a romance as having been found in an old manuscript. Novelists during the last generation worked this method to death. But it was known in the fourth century, for a pious author, desiring to write an "Apocalypse of Paul," explained how a man who happened to be staying in Paul's house at Tarsus was ordered by an angel to dig under the foundations,

where he discovered a marble box containing not only the apostle's shoes but a manuscript ! This manuscript contained the " unspeakable words " (2 Cor. xii. 4) which the apostle heard in his rapture.

Dr. James has catered for the general reader, but his occasional notes and brief introductions will often put the student upon the track of modern researches into this literature, which, as he observes, contains books that have exercised an influence upon later thought and art " wholly disproportionate to their intrinsic merits. To the lover and student of mediæval literature and art they reveal the source of no inconsiderable part of his material and the solution of many a puzzle."

CURRENT LITERATURE.

As Pants the Hart. And other devotional addresses. By J. Rendel Harris. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 6s.

SOME of us can remember the publication of *Memoranda Sacra*, which revealed a touch of genius in the composition of devotional literature. It was a book which was welcome for its own sake, and it had the additional distinction of being written by a scholar. Since then *The Guiding Hand of God*, among all the similar works by Dr. Harris, has been the favourite of many. Now we add this delightful volume; alas! it is to be the last, so Dr. Harris declares. The quality of the book is high. It has variety and unexpectedness, with the singular charm which attaches to the personality of the writer. He draws on his scholarship and knowledge of literature, on his humour and human interests, to set out spiritual wisdom and encouragement. And every page has a freshness in it. He recollects "how Disraeli once caricatured his political opponents as people who were mumbling the dry bones and munching the dry remainder-biscuit of an effete Liberalism; well, the dry bones of an exhausted Evangelicalism would be worse still." Such is not the Evangelicalism of this volume; its twenty-three addresses breathe a spirit of youth in everything, the "youth" that means hope and courage. We are grateful to Dr. Harris for allowing himself to be persuaded to print these papers for the greater good of those who could not hear him speak the words.

The Kingdom of God in the Apostolic Writings. By A. M. F. MacInnes. James Clarke & Co. 6s.

Dr. MacInnes publishes the contents of a thesis for a doctorate degree, but he means the book to aid and instruct "those intelligently and actively engaged in seeking to lift their fellow-men to higher and moral and spiritual levels," by means of the teaching of the Bible. The book is written out of a careful study of the New Testament, and also out of a prolonged and varied experience of the Christian ministry. Dr. MacInnes realises that Christ was not tied to even a phrase like the "kingdom of God." He practically identifies the term with religion, and works out a programme for the Church, arguing that "the best interests of man can only be sought and furthered under the magnetic and elevating influence of the personality of humanity's Elder Brother, Jesus Christ, and within the range of the gracious influence of the Kingdom of God. Here is the Church's work; here its opportunity." Dr. John Douglas Adam contributes a foreword to this useful and popular study of a vital subject.

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Light from Ancient Letters. By H. G. Meecham. George Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d.

Mr. Meecham studies freshly and carefully "the private correspondence in the non-literary papyri of Oxyrhynchus" during the first four centuries, in order to discover what light they throw upon the ideas and the language of the New Testament. It is nearly thirty years since these papyri began to be discovered, and many investigators have worked at them in order to gain light upon the New Testament. Mr. Meecham has gleaned after the reapers, and he brings back a well-arranged collection of results, bearing on the vocabulary, the grammar, the form, and even the ideas of the New Testament epistles. The book is well indexed, and it would prove a serviceable handbook for students who cannot consult the larger volumes on the subject.

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Twelve Tests of Character. By Harry Emerson Fosdick, D.D. Hodder & Stoughton. 5s.

Dr. Fosdick was asked by the editor of the *Ladies' Home Journal* to write a series of articles, and he bethought himself of the need to stress the vital importance of character in an age

noisy with "many overhead schemes for the world's salvation." The twelve articles are printed here. Dr. Fosdick has a great public, but this book shows him in touch with an even larger audience than that which crowds his church. He deals with central subjects brightly and sensibly. He has the knack of catching the reader's interest. He writes here as an American for Americans, but his illustrations will carry far and wide, and the book is a most attractive specimen of its class, an up-to-date series of comments upon life as it is and as it ought to be. Now and then Dr. Fosdick sounds a deeper note, as in this passage. "Three crosses stood on Calvary—on two of them hung robbers, on the third hung Christ. The Roman government, like all organised forms of human life, disliked two classes of people—outlaws, who were below the level and would not live up to it, and saviours, who were above the level and would not live down to it."

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The World's Living Religions. By Robert Ernest Hume, Ph.D.
New York: Scribners. One dollar, seventy-five cents.

Dr. Hume is professor of the History of Religions in Union Seminary, New York, which is probably the best equipped college of theology in the world. He has had special connexions with India, and this lends weight to his treatment of Hinduism, the first of the eleven religions included in his survey. The others are Jainism, Buddhism, Sikhism, then Confucianism and Taoism and Shintoism, and finally Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Islam and Christianity. The book is a triumph of compression and usefulness. Each religion is analysed, its principles and contribution to the world are discussed without prejudice, and then its elements of strength and weakness are tabulated. There is no handbook of its size which is so reliable and interesting. It definitely concludes by indicating how Christianity is superior and distinctive. We miss an index, but otherwise the book is excellently equipped for its purpose of enlightening the public. Dr. Hume is too good a scholar to drop into easy generalisations, and his ability is revealed by the remarkable power of disentangling the cardinal features of each religion. A handbook of this kind is a boon indeed, particularly for colleges and study-circles. Among the elements of weakness in the various religions, Dr. Hume mentions, for Hinduism, "No outstanding admirable

historic figure recorded in the Hinduism scriptures," for Judaism, "The abandonment of effort for the conversion of the world," and for Islam, "The arbitrariness of its deity." The five questions which he regards as decisive for the purpose of measuring a religion are: "How extensive is evil? Who is responsible for evil? What really is evil? How may an individual attain salvation? What is the programme for social salvation?"

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How to Read History. By H. Watkin Davies, M.A., F.R.H.S.
Hodder & Stoughton. 2s. 6d.

A capital book of advice for the ordinary reader who wishes to read history. Mr. Watkins goes through the various periods, marking the best books, explaining their merits and demerits, and generally putting the reader on the right lines. He stresses the use of maps. Perhaps also a word might have been said upon the value of historical tables. He properly praises Professor Myres' little book on *The Dawn of History* to begin with; depreciates Grote ("intolerably longwinded"), but thinks that "the reader will be well advised to read every book by J. R. Green"; judges Dr. Lindsay's *History of the Reformation* undoubtedly the best book on the subject, and praises Carlyle for having followed up Macaulay in exploding the "pestiferous and mendacious legend" that Cromwell was a canting hypocrite. The line of history is lucidly traced, and the information upon the best books is laced on to it with skill. Mr. Davies rarely mentions historical novels. They are naturally suspect in the eyes of the historian. But, read with care, they often help the reader to enter into the inner life of the period. It is pleasant to read a hearty tribute to *Westward Ho!* "So excellent in its rendering of the English spirit of adventure that only the stupidest of pedants would fail to recommend it." Mr. Davies might have gone on to mention some of Sir Walter Scott's novels, and a book like *The Cloister and the Hearth*, or Merejowski's romances. However, he has been cautious in this respect. His route has lain across difficult country, but he is a sure guide, and the way is never dull.

CURRENT ISSUES.

IN a recent number of *The Canadian Journal of Religious Thought*, Professor Ernest F. Scott, of Union Seminary, New York, has been moved to deliver his soul upon the value of psychology. He evidently thinks that the vogue of psychology in some quarters to-day might be added to the three or four things by which, according to Agur of old, "the earth is disquieted." One of these things is "a servant when he is king," and another "an handmaid that is heir to her mistress." So with psychology, Professor Scott finds that the exaggerated value attached to it is intolerable.

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Its recent vogue is remarkable. In 1890 Professor William James wrote to Sully that "psychology is like physics before Galileo's time—not a single elementary law yet caught sight of." This could not be said to-day. Much has been done in the way of discovering how the human mind works, especially in the field of religion. As Professor Scott admits frankly, we owe much to psychology. "Many things were put down," for example, "to supernatural agency which we can now account for by the operation of the mind itself." Also we now analyse the religious emotions more accurately, and appreciate their historical expressions more justly.

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But, just as some years ago there was a danger that the new science of anthropology would swamp the science of comparative religion, so there is a risk of psychology being allowed to claim too much in the sphere of theology and religious thought. This is what leads Professor Scott to issue his warning. Psychologists can tell you how the mind works, but not what it is. Psychology is not sufficient for all things, least of all in religion. Modern investigators, for example, will show you that the religious sentiment is closely connected with certain bodily

functions, but they are wrong if they imagine that this explains the spiritual facts. The idea of the Spirit, in early Christianity, is explained as "nothing but a primitive attempt to account for phenomena which we can now define psychologically on the ground of auto-suggestion, or mass-excitement, or over-charged emotion. This may be, but the fact remains that the man who feels himself moved by the Spirit has come into contact with a higher world of reality. A power is working in him, by what machinery it does not much matter, and the psychological explanation does not explain everything. It leaves you worse off than before, since you imagine that you now understand what is still a mystery."

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Professor Scott has some acute warnings upon the mischief which is being done by the devotees of this psychological cult in the universities, and particularly upon the obsession that it is needful to teach students for the ministry the intricate methods of the science. The first business of the theological student is to know Christianity, not to learn dodges about how to apply it. These are no more vital than the knack of a bedside manner is to a student of medicine. But the words he uses, in the sentence just quoted, about mystery, are particularly worth pondering.

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The working of God in human life is still a mystery, always a mystery. Religion is based on revelation, but revelation carries a mysterious element with it. What has discredited this truth has been the spurious mystifications in religion, the attempts to conceal or to darken facts. Men have come to resent that, as they resent less reasonably secret diplomacy, feeling that there is something unwholesome about anything that cannot bear the light. But this does not affect the fact that the highest truths have a fringe and a centre of true mystery. "The sphinx in our modern politics," said Lord Morley, "is usually something of a charlatan." So is the sphinx in our theologies. Yet this proper suspicion ought not to exclude the admission that the relations of God and man are a high mystery.

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A writer in the *Times Literary Supplement*, the other week, put this admirably. "God," he wrote, "has nothing to hide from man; and if He seems to move mysteriously in the per-

formance of His wonders, it is not because He is casting a haze about them to tantalize or to dazzle the superstitious worshipper, but because His acts, proceeding directly from His nature, have the unfathomable, the infinite quality which belongs to that."

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The allusion is to Cowper's verse :

"God moves in a mysterious way
His wonders to perform :
He plants His footsteps on the sea,
And rides upon the storm."

Even, Cowper meant, upon the storm of insanity, one of the most perplexing of providences. But Cowper felt rightly where the clue lay to the mystery of God. "God moves." Mystery besets man, but it is the mystery of a God who really has a purpose in the world. And He moves "to perform wonders." That is, His purpose is kindly at heart. Once that can be believed, it is more easy to bear the mysteries of life. The intolerable mystery would be that of a God who did not move at all, a God who did nothing, a God who said nothing, or of a God who worked blindly and cruelly.

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The experience of religion suggests that there is still another word to be said, however, about mystery. It is not enough to admit the presence of a mysterious element. That does not make people necessarily religious. They may be rendered merely curious. Whereas the true impression made by mystery ought to be awe, a mental and a moral humility. Carlyle noted this in connexion with his friend John Sterling. Carlyle had at any rate the emotion of awe, and he missed this in the Christianity of his friend ; he noted that while Sterling was more orthodox than himself, he did not feel awed by the mystery of the faith. Sterling was merely fascinated.

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The same truth was observed by Mr. R. H. Hutton in the case of young Goethe. Goethe, he declared, "was a reflective, old-fashioned, calmly-imaginative child, always fascinated by a mystery, but never, properly speaking, *awed* by it. It kindled his imagination ; it never subdued him. He was full of wonder, and quite without veneration." This is a type of the religious nature. But it is never the highest type. And the appreciation

of mystery in any department of religion, either in the inspiration of the Bible or in the phenomena of the human experience, ought to create a sense of awe, if the attitude of the enquirer is to be profitable—profitable to himself or to anyone else.

THE TEN BEST BOOKS ON THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.

UNTIL the Fourth Gospel can be prevailed upon to yield up its secret with a more convincing clarity than investigators have yet been able to feel with regard to it, we shall remain wholly dependent, or very nearly so, on the Synoptic Gospels for our knowledge of the earthly life of our Lord. In spite of the great quantity of literature that has been and is being produced on the problems connected with the study of that life, it may be doubted whether the task which a reverent and at the same time courageous criticism has still to perform in the reconstruction of it, is recognised to-day among the teachers and preachers of the Christian Church as widely as it deserves to be. One still hears in too many quarters the plea put forward that, in view of Paul's version of Christianity, in view of our belief in the spiritual indwelling of the Living Christ, in view of the scantiness and doubtfulness of the records, in view of the changed conditions of life, or in view of something else, the historical details of what the real human Jesus did and taught, however interesting, are not a matter of prime concern for the modern Christian. But it has to be remembered that it was precisely what the real human Jesus did and taught—His impact on the lives of men about Him, mediated through those normal channels of sense through which we know one another—it was precisely this which set those forces in motion that produced Christianity, including the Pauline and Johannine experiences and all

that the Church has stood for from the beginning until now. The more completely and exactly we can recover those historical details, the better chance shall we be giving to the Spirit of Christ to operate within us, and the more purely and powerfully shall we feel the pressure of that Divine stream which took its rise from our Saviour's earthly life.

The critical study of the Synoptic Gospels remains, therefore, one of the principal tasks of the Christian teacher: and it is the purpose of this article to gather together, for the use of those who are not free to roam at their leisure through the very extensive literature on the subject, some hints on the most helpful and accessible books which that literature includes.

The first requisite is a good synopsis. Ever since Griesbach in 1774 printed the first three Gospels in parallel columns and called it a *Synopsis Evangeliorum* (whence the name "Synoptic Gospels"), the need has been felt of having the sections common to two or more of them placed side by side on the same page, so as to permit of easy and speedy comparison. The older synopses, like those of Tischendorf in Greek and Waddy in English, included all four Gospels. More recently the Fourth Gospel has been excluded as requiring quite separate treatment. Of Greek synopses, that of Rushbrooke (*Synopticon: an exposition of the common matter of the Synoptic Gospels*, London, Macmillan, 1880) is calculated to illustrate the oral hypothesis as to the origin of the Gospels rather than the more widely held theories of documentary dependence. It is a sumptuous publication; but its size and cost are such as to discourage many from using it. Another good synopsis is that of A. Wright (*A Synopsis of the Gospels in Greek*, London, Macmillan, 1896), himself a convinced believer in the oral hypothesis. For those who work with the Greek,

probably the most convenient synopsis is the well-known work of A. Huck, *Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien*, published by Mohr, Tübingen. The first edition appeared in 1893, the sixth in 1922 (price, six Swiss francs), each successive edition being an improvement on the last. The last two editions were accompanied by the Johannine parallels printed in a separate booklet. Even those who know little or no German will find the book easily usable, in view of the simplicity of the paragraph-headings and the fulness of the indices. The work is admirably adapted to illustrate the "Two-Document Hypothesis" now widely accepted among New Testament scholars. In 1920 Burton and Goodspeed published in America *A Harmony of the Synoptic Gospels in Greek* (University of Chicago Press : three dollars), of which a competent reviewer has said : "In size, print, and paper, as well as arrangement, it will be found probably the most convenient form in which to study the Gospels." ¹ The same two authors, two years earlier, produced in English *A Harmony of the Synoptic Gospels for Historical and Critical Study*, which will be found useful by those who do not feel at home with the original Greek. ²

On the character of the first three Gospels in general, and on what is known as "the Synoptic Problem" in particular, mention may be made in passing of an excellent little manual by J. Estlin Carpenter, *The First Three Gospels : their origin and relations*, published in 1890 by the Sunday School Association, of Essex Hall. The last edition was the fourth, which appeared in 1906. The book may be recommended, not only for its scholarship, but also for the simplicity and readableness with which it presents its

¹ Prof. J. F. Bethune-Baker in *Journ. of Theol. Studies*, Oct. 1921, p. 108.

² For a full list of synopses, see Moffatt, *ILNT*, p. 179.

matter: but it is now a little out-of-date, and is purposely adapted to the needs of "the ordinary English reader." An admirable and naturally somewhat more technical introduction to the whole field is F. C. Burkitt's *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, a series of lectures first published in 1906, and reaching a third edition in 1911 and a fourth in 1920 (T. and T. Clark). The book contains a number of studies subsidiary to the Synoptic Problem proper, as well as a good deal of original and detailed criticism. On some points, e.g. on the dates to which the Gospels are assigned, a somewhat extreme position is taken up. One of the fullest and most learned volumes in English on the Synoptic Gospels is the second volume (published in 1909) of the late V. H. Stanton's *The Gospels as Historical Documents* (Camb. Univ. Press). The book is a good and typical specimen of English scholarship at its best—patient, thorough, and a trifle over-cautious. A great mass of philological statistics concerning the Gospels in question has been gathered and presented in handy form by Sir J. C. Hawkins in *Horæ Synopticæ: contributions to the study of the Synoptic Problem* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1898; second edition, 1909). Uniform with this volume is a work which no student of the Gospels can afford to ignore—*Studies in the Synoptic Problem, by Members of the University of Oxford* (Clarendon Press, 1911). It grew out of the leisurely deliberations of the late Dr. Sanday's long-lived Seminar, held during his tenure of the Lady Margaret Professorship of Divinity at Oxford. Seven authors contributed the various essays comprised in the book. Of these essays, those by Hawkins (on Luke's non-use of Mark in the "Great Interpolation," ix. 51–xviii. 14; Luke's omission of Mark vi. 45–viii. 26; and the contents of Q), and by Streeter (on the original order and extent of Q; Mark's use of Q; and the heightening of the eschatological

interest in the successive Gospel-documents) are perhaps the ones to which the most permanent value will attach : but the whole of the contents is of high quality and great interest. It would be alien from the purpose of this article, besides claiming disproportionate space, to attempt an enumeration of the many valuable works produced on the Continent in this branch of research. The more important German works of reference will be sufficiently well known to those able and likely to use them. But mention may be made here of two works as samples of the more important contributions of French and German scholarship, apart from commentaries and works on particular Gospels. In 1905 appeared Wellhausen's *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien* (Berlin, Reimer) ; a second edition followed in 1911. Wellhausen's booklet is useful chiefly for its exploration of the Aramaic background of the written narratives : but it also contains a study of the Synoptic Problem in the narrower sense, besides a discussion of some problems connected with the teaching of Jesus. And in 1923 Maurice Goguel published at Paris (Leroux, fr. 10) the first volume of his *Introduction au Nouveau Testament*, dealing with the Synoptic Gospels.¹ It is a work of over 500 pages, in which all the pertinent literary questions are treated with great fulness and a careful balance of judgment. One reviewer states : " Its fulness makes it a library in itself and any student who can read its simple and direct French cannot do better than to make it his chief synoptic reference manual." ²

Turning now to the commentaries, and considering first those that embrace all three Gospels, there are first of all two English works, one on the Greek text and one on the English, which certainly ought not to be passed over.

¹ Vol. iii., dealing with Acts, had appeared in 1922.

² C. R. Bowen in *Journal of Religion*, January 1924, p. 103.

A. B. Bruce's commentary appeared in 1897 as the major part of the volume devoted to the Gospels in the familiar *Expositor's Greek Testament* (Hodder and Stoughton; latest edition, 1919). It is probably the best single English commentary we have on the Greek text of the three Synoptics, though the notes do not give quite all that is desired, and the unfortunate decision to print the *Textus Receptus* necessitates, here as elsewhere in this series, the insertion of a good deal of *apparatus criticus* which otherwise could have been dispensed with. The other English work is that of the Liberal Jewish scholar, C. G. Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels edited with an introduction and a commentary* (two vols., Macmillan, 1909). Vol. i. contains about 100 pages of introductory matter, and the text of and commentary on Mark. Vol. ii. deals with Matthew and Luke. The text of each Gospel (A.V. with modifications) is printed twice—firstly, as a whole before each commentary, and secondly, in paragraphs before each section of the commentary. The value of the work lies in the delightfully fresh and readable way in which this reverent and sympathetic scholar, though not sharing those views of the Person of Jesus which are usually regarded as characteristically or essentially Christian, discusses from the Jewish point of view the content and meaning of the Gospels, and also in the abundant references that occur in the notes to the teaching of the Jewish Rabbis and also to the views of the most important English, French, and German commentators. On the title-pages of Montefiore's commentary there appear after the author's name the words "together with a series of Additional Notes, by I. Abrahams. In three volumes." The projected third volume, which was thus to consist of additional notes, has now appeared in the form of two series (1917 and 1924) of *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, by the Cambridge Reader in Talmudic

(Camb. Univ. Press). These *Studies* consist of two series of essays on particular topics connected with the life and teaching of Jesus, with special reference to the light to be obtained in regard to them from Jewish Rabbinical literature.

The most important commentaries on the three Synoptics by German and French scholars are those by H. J. Holtzmann, *Die Synoptiker* (third edition, 1901), being the first part of the first volume of the *Hand-Commentar zum Neuen Testament*; by Johannes Weiss, *Die drei älteren Evangelien*, being the first volume of *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments übersetzt und . . . erklärt* (second edition, 1907; third edition, 1917, edited by Bousset and Heitmüller); by H. Gressmann and E. Klostermann, *Die Synoptiker*, being Vol. ii. of Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament* (1919; the separate Gospels appeared earlier, Mark in 1907, Matthew in 1909); and by Alfred Loisy, *Les Évangiles Synoptiques* (two vols., 1907-1908). Of these, the commentary of J. Weiss is the most illuminating: those of Holtzmann and of Gressmann and Klostermann are good, but the former is getting a little old—they are on about the same scale: Loisy is lengthy, and critically a little extreme, but convenient as giving what may be called the German point of view for those who do not read German.

Of works dealing with individual Gospels, we may take first those concerned with Mark. H. B. Swete's *The Gospel according to St. Mark: the Greek Text, with Introduction, Notes and Indices* (Macmillan; first published in 1898; third edition, 1909, reprinted 1913) is in some ways a standard work, being specially valuable for its full study of the patristic evidence, textual criticism, biblical parallels, etc., but a little inadequate from the modern point of view, as it virtually ignores both the Synoptic Problem and the lexical evidence to be drawn from the papyri. Allan

Menzies' *The Earliest Gospel : a historical study of the Gospel according to Mark, with a text and English version* (Macmillan, 1901) does not attempt to rival Swete's commentary in the latter's own particular field, but is very much superior to it in the exegesis of the story, a feature which indeed renders Menzies' book quite invaluable for modern study. Unfortunately it has been out of print for some time. Wellhausen's *Das Evangelium Marci übersetzt und erklärt* (first edition, 1903 ; second, 1909) is very valuable as a supplement to other commentaries, especially in regard to the Aramaic background. In 1922 J. V. Bartlet re-edited the earlier volume on *St. Mark* in *The Century Bible*. Bartlet is an exception to the great majority of present-day Gospel critics, in that he rejects the "Two-Document-Hypothesis" (with its assumption of the existence of a *written* collection of Jesus' sayings—the so-called Q) ; ¹ but his Introduction and especially his notes are characterised by that delicacy of phrasing and keenness of interpretative insight which those who have known him, whether through the written or through the spoken word, have learned to associate with all his work, and to honour and enjoy as a very signal *χάρισμα*.

The best English commentary on Matthew is probably that of A. H. M'Neile, *The Gospel according to St. Matthew*, etc. (uniform with Swete's Mark, and published by Macmillan in 1915). The introduction is comparatively brief ; but the notes are full, and include a good deal of textual criticism and of Rabbinical parallels, besides being helpful in the strict exegetical sense. What Bartlet has done for Mark, G. H. Box has done for Matthew. Box is a master of Jewish lore, and his volume in *The Century Bible* (1922)

¹ He had previously explained his views on the Synoptic Problem in his article on "Matthew, Gospel of," in Hastings' *DB*, vol. iii., and in an essay included in the *Oxford Studies*, pp. 313-363.

contains a great deal of information not readily accessible elsewhere to the ordinary reader. Of Wellhausen's *Das Evangelium Matthæi* (Berlin, Reimer, 1904) the same may be said as of his little treatise on Mark.

In regard to Luke we are not quite so happily situated. The *Century Bible* volume has not been revised as have those on Mark and Matthew; and no volume on Luke has yet appeared in Macmillan's sumptuous series of New Testament commentaries. The *International Critical Commentary* by A. Plummer (T. and T. Clark, 1896; fourth edition, 1901, frequently reprinted) furnishes much valuable information on the same general lines as Swete's Mark, and is probably our best comprehensive English commentary on the Greek text, though it strikes most readers as heavy and uninspiring. There is a useful commentary on the English text by Garvie, in *The Westminster New Testament* (Melrose, 1911). Wellhausen brought out his *Das Evangelium Lucæ übersetzt und erklärt* in 1904: it follows the same lines as his volumes on Mark and Matthew.

In conclusion, there is one more publication which I should certainly include in my list, were it not for a rather serious objection, namely, that it is not yet in existence. But though not yet published, Streeter's *The Four Gospels* is well on its way to publication, and is expected to appear about October. I have not seen either an advance copy or any of the proofs: but I understand that it will be a volume of nearly 500 pages, about one-third of which will deal with the Synoptic Problem; and that, besides providing a general introduction to the subject, it will also embody the author's personal researches, particularly with reference to textual criticism, the contents of Q, and the growth of the Gospel of Luke. Those who are familiar with Streeter's earlier contributions to the subject in the *Oxford Studies*, in Peake's one-volume *Commentary on the Bible*

(pp. 672-680), and in his article on Luke in *The Hibbert Journal* (Oct. 1921, pp. 103-112), will realise that, in this new and substantial volume covering the whole field, we shall possess a treatise of the very first importance.

Our resultant list of "the ten best books" will therefore be made up somewhat as follows:—

1. A synopsis: for those who read Greek, Huck, or Burton-and-Goodspeed: for readers of the English only, Burton-and-Goodspeed.

2. F. C. Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission*.

3. V. H. Stanton, *The Gospels as Historical Documents*, vol. ii., or M. Goguel, *Introduction au Nouveau Testament*, Tome i.

4. The *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem* (as the title runs at the back of the book).

5. A. B. Bruce in *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, vol. i.

6. C. G. Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels* (including as supplement I. Abrahams' two series of *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*).

7. J. Weiss in *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, vol. i.

8. A. Menzies, *The Earliest Gospel* (or, on a smaller scale and on the English text, J. V. Bartlet's *St. Mark* in *The Century Bible*).

9. A. H. McNeile, *The Gospel according to St. Matthew* (or G. H. Box's *St. Matthew* in *The Century Bible*).

10. A. Plummer, *The Gospel according to St. Luke* (I.C.C.) (or A. E. Garvie's *St. Luke* in *The Westminster New Testament*).

C. J. CADOUX.

THE RELIABILITY OF THE GOSPELS.

DURING the last decade there has been a very marked and a very welcome stress upon Jesus as He was in the days of His flesh. Quite a number of most readable books have appeared the aim of which has been to show him to us as He was amongst men and to unlock more fully than before the wonderful treasures of His teaching. This seems entirely in line with His own emphasis upon "these sayings of mine," and ought to lead those who believe in Him to a clearer knowledge of God's will and a fuller loyalty to it.

But one cannot help wondering a little if the results of this study are as great as might be expected. Are those who read such books or those who hear them expounded really convinced themselves and able to convince others? Are they turning back to the sources themselves or do they just rely on such hearsay? And is the authority of Jesus becoming more widely acknowledged and are His commands more generally obeyed? I feel that much of this writing and preaching is ineffective because men are not sure it is historically true.

The picture drawn may be a beautiful one, but are we certain it can be called a portrait? Can we rely on the Gospels and do they give us a real account of Jesus? These are questions that perplex many, even if we do not often hear them asked. Belief in the Bible as literally inspired has been undermined and no new confidence in its general trustworthiness has been built up. Any attempt therefore to draw thought back again to Jesus and to find in Him an authoritative truth for modern life must be linked with an argument for the substantial accuracy of the Gospel portrait.

The fact that the oldest manuscripts of the Gospels cannot be dated earlier than sometime during the fourth century,

that is, at least 300 years after the death of Jesus, is just one of the points that, for the uninstructed, weakens the sense of certainty. It can be met in five ways.

(1) The earliest manuscripts of other books are in many cases separated from the events they narrate by longer periods still ; those of Cæsar's *Commentaries*, for example, dating from the ninth or tenth century.

(2) We must remember how perishable early writing materials were, and that during these first three centuries persecutions were frequent and books must very often have been destroyed. It is interesting to notice that the two earliest manuscripts are usually thought to date from the time of Constantine, when the perils of Christian profession ceased.

(3) Amongst the papyri unearthed in recent years in Egypt, in addition to the famous "New Sayings of Jesus," several pages of earlier manuscripts of the Gospels have been discovered, dating from at least the third century ; it is quite probable that other and earlier copies or extracts will yet be found.

(4) There are ample internal signs of a long previous history behind these manuscripts, as, for example, the obvious inter-relation of the Synoptic Gospels, the many variations between the earliest manuscripts, and their paragraph divisions which show in several ways that the writers were copying from earlier books.

(5) There is a strong and valuable chain of external evidence which shows that the first-century origin of the Gospels cannot easily be impugned. Before the end of the second century it was taught that the Gospel was necessarily "fourfold." From then back to Clement of Rome (c. 95) there are either references, quotations or echoes of the Gospels which satisfy most people that they were not only in existence but greatly honoured and widely used

at least from that date. The evidence is skilfully gathered and weighed by Stanton in volume i. of *The Gospels as Historical Documents*. For a popular and persuasive review of this argument Dale's *The Living Christ and the Four Gospels* is still well worth reading.

But allowing these lines of thought full weight, how far back do they carry us? Wade's *New Testament History* (1922) may be taken as fairly representing the generally accepted position to-day. He suggests 66 or 67 as the probable date of the composition of "Mark." And he adds a sentence which well expresses the feeling of uncertainty which such a conclusion causes. "There is an antecedent presumption that even the earliest Gospel does not afford a perfectly trustworthy narrative. . . . When the reminiscences of even an apostle were first recorded thirty-seven years afterwards by one who was himself an eye-witness of no more than one or two of the scenes recorded, it is reasonable to suppose that a report was produced in which honesty of intention did not keep the writer wholly free from errors due to defective information, judgment or insight." Similarly Burkitt, in *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, says that Mark represents "the way in which the disciples of the disciples of Jesus told to one another such stories of the earthly ministry of their Lord as they remembered in the light of all that had happened during the momentous thirty or forty years which succeeded the Crucifixion."

Now this interval of a generation between the ministry of Jesus and the date commonly assigned to the writing of the earliest narrative seems to me a real difficulty. We can feel it is partially but not completely met by the view that is usually now held of the First Gospel. Matthew, the disciple, is thought of as having compiled a book of our Lord's sayings in Aramaic, a Greek translation of which

is incorporated in our present "Matthew." Wade assigns 59 to 64 as the probable date of this Aramaic writing, accepting the statement of Irenæus that Matthew wrote "while Peter and Paul were preaching and founding the Church in Rome." He seeks to get a little further back still, however, by adding : "It is not likely that Matthew's collection of oracles was the first of its kind. It is most likely to have been composed out of earlier and briefer summaries of our Lord's utterances, such as would almost certainly be called for, and circulated, long before an account of His life was required." And he holds that Matthew was in a good position to authenticate the subject-matter which he reports.

But is this as far as we can go ? Does it not still leave in the mind an almost inevitable feeling of insecurity ? Surely we should seek for some considerations that may strengthen the argument at this its most important point. It is little use presenting a chain of tradition and evidence for 300 years, if the first vital link is weak.

Now, first of all, we must not forget that memory may give an essentially true report without being verbally accurate at all. There is, I shall suggest presently, good reason to believe that the Gospels are in the main verbally correct ; but I want to show now that it is not absolutely necessary for the sake of the argument to do so. Memory can seize, retain, and reproduce the heart of a speech or story, while failing to hold the actual words at all. In every biography, incidents are told, words quoted, and reminiscences given, which were never written down till the occasion demanded and which almost certainly are to be understood as giving the gist and general drift, not the details, of what was said. I remember, for example, a visit paid to me thirteen years ago by a minister with reference to a meeting that had taken place the evening before ; he had publicly

reproved a certain individual, and I thought had spoken too severely. But he defended himself in this way: "I've known him far longer than you have, and I'm sure I'm right in dealing with him like this. I've had trouble of this kind before, and it must be stopped." Now I am prepared to defend that as an entirely true account of what my friend said, but I cannot vouch for any single word. I have never mentioned the occurrence to anyone or written it down; had I done so last week it is quite probable it would have been phrased very differently, yet still with essentially the same significance. So, after long years memory may give a faithful report of teaching without preserving the *ipsissima verba*, and if we care for the spirit and not the letter this may often be sufficient. The chief importance of this is in connexion with the place of the Fourth Gospel in a historical presentation of Christianity, and Dr. Edwin Abbott's voluminous work on this question is of great importance. But the point is of value here as a first trench-line in defence of the accuracy of the Gospel narrative as a whole. If we were sure (as we are not) that there were no records made till thirty or forty years after the death of Jesus, we should still be entitled to hope that in essential matters our knowledge of Him was based soundly. We might doubt if many of His actual words had been retained, but not so easily that our portrait of Him was generally true.

Then, next, it must be definitely stated that the power of verbal memory could quite conceivably bridge this gulf between the events or teachings reported and the suggested dates of the reporting, if necessary. There may be something extraordinary but there is nothing impossible in the hypothesis. Good word-memories are too common even amongst us to allow us to rule out such a possibility. Pascal affirms that he never forgot anything he had read or thought, and of Joseph Scaliger it was said, "He read nothing which

he did not forthwith remember.” In the East, as has often been pointed out, exceptional powers of this kind are less uncommon, and it is altogether possible that amongst the disciples there were some who could accurately repeat the very words of Jesus or vouch for the details of an incident long years afterwards. The wonder of the happenings, the winsomeness of the words, and above all the strength and beauty of the character of Jesus would all tend to deepen the impression made upon the memory and so to fix it firmly. And the continual handing on of the information to others would of course act in the same way. It is considerations of this sort that lent some colour to the theory of Westcott and Wright that oral tradition was the cause of the common material in the Synoptics. And while this idea is generally abandoned now in favour of their literary inter-dependence, the above facts do suggest that it is perfectly reasonable to argue that if the earliest written accounts of the life and teaching of Jesus were not made till a generation after His death, they may yet be substantially and verbally accurate.

But we must now raise the question whether it is necessary for our argument to rely so greatly on the power of memory after a long space of years. In other words we have to consider carefully the probabilities regarding the period at which records of the deeds and words of Jesus were first made. If there were strong likelihood that the first reports were written at a much earlier date than those mentioned above, so that the gap between the events and the records were much less than has usually been supposed, the assurance of accuracy would clearly be vastly greater. I feel that the question of practically contemporaneous reports has not been sufficiently dealt with, and that there is at least a possibility that our present Gospels do incorporate sections written during the lifetime of Jesus.


As to the general possibility of contemporary writings having been made and preserved, it is interesting to notice that Sir George Adam Smith in his *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, speaks of the Song of Deborah as "without doubt a contemporary document." And the same view is commonly held about some other portions of the Old Testament. It is difficult, then, to see why it should be ruled out as impossible that some very early notes are embedded in the Gospels.

The difficulties usually felt about this possibility are probably those stated by Wade: "The actual spectators of the occurrences related are not likely to have had either the necessary motives or the necessary facilities for taking and preserving notes of all that they heard or saw." We can agree that they are very unlikely to have recorded *all* that happened, but does he imply that they did to some extent take notes? If so, he gives no evidence or argument in support of the idea, and it is not usually held. I want, however, to urge that it is very probably correct, and that while memory added much when later on the records assumed their final literary form, yet our Gospels do probably contain contemporary matter. We may not always be able to identify it or separate it from reminiscence, but we can be fairly confident that we do possess many passages that were written down very soon after the event and some perhaps actually in the presence of Jesus Himself.

As regards motives, it is generally assumed that the first Christians could have no adequate reason for writing of Him and recording His words till late in their lives, when the hope of His coming was dimmed, and it was necessary to hand on to the next generation their knowledge of the Gospel in permanent form. But three points claim attention.

(1) Even if this conventional view is correct, that the

Early Church looked for a rapid Parousia, the production of books might well take place. Various influences would suggest the use of writing, even though they believed that the end might come while they wrote. The pre-Christian Apocalyptists must have felt this; Paul wrote to meet immediate needs; and modern believers in an "any-moment" Second Advent do so too. The argument presumably is: "*It may* happen soon—to-day; but again, it may not, and if it is delayed somewhat, this writing will be of value for a temporary purpose." And in the case of the friends of Jesus the purpose is surely clear. Their aim was to win for Christ as many as possible as speedily as possible. "Repent, and be baptized, every one of you." Their words are full of the wonder of the Resurrection, and the urgency of the task of telling men of it in preparation for His return. But this does not mean that they preached that alone. The story of their Master's victory over death could not be separated from that of His life—their witness was not that a man had been raised from the dead, but that *this* Man, "approved of God among you by miracles and wonders and signs," and wickedly murdered, had conquered death and was still offering remission of sins and the gift of life. We see the two sides to their work in the frequent references to "teaching" as well as to "preaching" (Acts, ii. 42, iv. 2, v. 21, 42, xi. 26). Peter's address at Cæsarea almost reads like a summary of this primitive instruction, and it is interesting to notice that it follows closely the line of development in the Gospels (x. 36-43). Now the first few eye-witnesses could not themselves possibly cover the ground and impart widely that knowledge of the life and character of Jesus without which faith in His resurrection would be an anæmic thing. We should remember here the large ingathering at Pentecost and subsequently, and the rapid growth of the Church during the first decades. The value



of having some notes or records, roughly written no doubt but not from authentic memory, is obvious. In this connexion St. Luke's Preface is worthy of note, and especially the reference to "many."

(2) But, secondly, is it so certain that the whole of the Early Church expected the speedy return of their Lord, independently of the moral issues involved? A view of the life of Jesus is gradually winning its way to recognition which may be called the "moral-eschatological" view. Two of its clearest expressions recently are those of A. T. Cadoux in *Essays in Christian Thinking*, and of Lily Dougall and C. W. Emmet in *The Lord of Thought*. According to this view, Jesus did not anticipate either a speedy and supernatural destruction of the world (the usual eschatological view), nor a long and slow development through the ages (the conventional evolutionary idea), but He did expect that His moral challenge would be accepted, and that as a result there would rapidly take place "the termination of an order of society based on oppression." There is a strong mass of evidence and of argument in favour of this view, and that the coming of the Kingdom of God in this sense could and should have happened during that age. Now if this be a true reading of the mind of Jesus, it is surely probable that some at least understood Him and shared both His hope that men's response to God's appeal would be such as to make possible the consummation, and his realisation that this might not be so and that the glorious end might be indefinitely postponed by sin. We should notice especially Peter's address in Solomon's Porch, where the conditional nature of a speedy Parousia is made very clear. "Repent . . . that so there *may* come seasons of refreshing from the presence of the Lord, and that He *may* send the Christ . . ." (Acts iii. 19, 20, R.V.). Now, if even a few held this truth, the very early production of

records would be a likely precaution, especially remembering the chances of martyrdom.

(3) And, thirdly, there is a more important point still. May not records of the words and deeds of Jesus have been begun before the Parousia hope had ever arisen? Why is it so commonly assumed that His followers could not take pen in hand till He had passed from them? The doings of the old-time prophets had been noted down in the past, and in view of the widespread feeling about Jesus that "a great prophet is risen up among us" (Luke vii. 16, and cp. Mark vi. 15, viii. 28, Matthew xxi. 11), surely there is an *a priori* likelihood that some records would be made quite early in His public life. Before the hope of the Kingdom had been fully grasped, whether morally or apocalyptically, and therefore before it was disappointed—while it was still doubtful "whereunto this would grow"—fragmentary notes of what was happening would very probably be made. Various motives might contribute to this. Purely personal reasons—to refresh one's memory or for the use of friends—would enter into the matter. An imaginative "Diary of Judas Iscariot" was published some years ago, the verisimilitude of which made one feel how likely it would be that some such jottings would be made. And we have Burkitt's authority for thinking that Luke kept a "travel-diary" later on. If Luke, why not Matthew? But with the example of the literary prophets before them, surely we cannot rule out the probability that, at this early period, some of the disciples conceived the necessity both for permanent records and for their circulation. If we understood better the motives that led Baruch to report Jeremiah we should be in a better position to judge how Matthew would feel. And if started for any such reasons, the practice would probably be continued, in spite of whatever new thought of the future that developed presently.

We have next to consider the question of "facilities," using Wade's expression. Had the disciples the opportunities and necessary qualifications for such work? It is of interest that the one disciple whose name is definitely associated with Gospel-writing is the one whose occupation necessitated the rapid taking of notes and reporting of events. The question of memory arises again here. We have seen its importance for accurate reporting after long years. But now it is worth while to remember that it is perfectly possible for a practically verbatim report of a speech to be written after it has been heard. Many ministers have known some member of their congregation who could if he desired reproduce a sermon with hardly an error. Sully gives three remarkable instances of a parallel kind. Doré could paint a portrait from memory; Mozart wrote down the "Miserere" of the Sistine Chapel after hearing it twice; Menétrier could repeat three hundred disconnected words after hearing them once. It would therefore be difficult to argue that a disciple could not record quite accurately such a passage as Matthew xxiii. or the parables, writing quietly some hours or days after hearing them spoken. So that even if there were no use of shorthand in those days, we may still have verbatim accounts of what Jesus said. But yet even that possibility must also be included; it is not at all impossible that it was used. It is no modern invention. Plutarch says of Cato the Younger that his Senate speech against Catiline was reported in shorthand; Seneca, as quoted by Macaulay in his Essay on Lord Bacon, speaks of shorthand having been brought to such perfection at Rome that a writer could keep pace with the most rapid speaker. Amongst the Greeks, too, we find considerable evidence of its existence. There is, for example, the Oxyrhynchus contract (A.D. 155), by which a municipal officer apprenticed his slave for two years to be a shorthand

writer, to be taught his art. It cannot therefore be ruled out as beyond possibility that Matthew (or another) knew and used some such method of swift writing.

Some years ago the idea that contemporary records lie behind our Gospels was worked out with some fulness but not very scientifically by Joseph Palmer, of Sydney, in a book called *The Gospel Problems and Their Solution*. While the extreme view taken by him is no doubt untenable, the opposite extreme does also seem unconvincing. Moffatt, in his *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament* (p. 216), refers to the way some of Socrates' words were jotted down soon after they were spoken, and says: "None of the synoptic gospels can claim any such direct relation to Jesus. The earliest of the sources upon which they draw were not composed till about twenty years after He died, and no one took down the words of Jesus during His lifetime." I suggest that the definiteness of this statement, as though it were based on evidence, is unwise, especially in view of the fact that he calls Tertius (Romans xvi. 22) Paul's private secretary for the time being, and adds: "Such *notarii* were frequently stenographers" (p. 50). The real possibilities along the line argued above deserve at least more careful consideration than they have commonly received. Dr. Salmon hinted at this in *Some Thoughts on the Textual Criticism of the New Testament*, but did not work out the idea: "It must be remembered that official shorthand reporting was common at the time."

Reference was made in the EXPOSITOR, February 1922, to this line of thought in an article by Dr. A. T. Robertson. "Some scholars even hold that Matthew began to take notes of the Sayings of Jesus during the Master's ministry. If so, the Logia of Jesus by Matthew took shape some twenty years before the Gospel of Mark which reflects so faithfully the vivid pictures seen by Peter. The point is

made that Matthew's habits as a customs officer led him to jot down, perhaps at first in shorthand, notes of the wonderful words that fell from the lips of the great Teacher." This is so distinctly counter to most modern teaching about Gospel origins that it seems to demand more than this passing reference ; it is my conviction that it does probably approximate to the facts, and that a recognition of this very real possibility would do much to interest men and women again in the Gospel records.

One is tempted to believe that Epiphanius transmits a verbatim note in that remarkable quotation he makes from the "Gospel according to the Hebrews." The passage is as follows : "There came a certain man, by name Jesus, and He was about thirty years old, who chose us. And when He had come to Capernaum He came into the house of Simon, surnamed Peter, and He opened His mouth and said, As I passed by the Lake of Tiberias I chose John and James, sons of Zebedee, and Simon and Andrew . . . and I called thee Matthew, sitting at the receipt of custom, and thou didst follow me. You therefore I wish to be twelve apostles for a witness to Israel." This has an early look about it (notice the very odd order of the names, and the personal address to Matthew), and the esteem in which Jerome held the book is worth remembering. But probably we must resist this attractive idea, and seek rather for hints of early material within our own present Gospels.

We may notice that there are many little points which would be more easily understood if we could view them as contemporaneous matter incorporated in later writings. The unduly long account of Herod's feast always seems quite out of proportion to the rest of the narrative ; it reads like the record of a recent incident, not like a thirty-year-old reminiscence. The silence about the Bethany home and about the house of the "upper room" are significant, and

hardly seem to date from when there could be no reason for silence. The reference to "Peter, and James, and John the brother of James" (Mark v. 37) is strange if written years after James' death and when John was a prominent leader of the Church; and it is very interesting that Luke twice alters this order—places John second of the three, which is exactly what we should expect in any account written long after the event (viii. 51, R.V., ix. 28). The reference to the didrachma without explanation (Matt. xvii. 24) is much more appropriate to a very early report than to a narrative made by memory in a later generation when many who would read it would not be familiar with the custom. The same is true of the topical allusion in Luke xiii. 1, where "the" would surely be replaced by "some" in a reminiscence; such conflicts frequently took place. Again, we have a much fuller account than usual of a day or two (Mark iv., v.), almost as from a diary, and a detailed account of one day's table-talk (Luke xiv.); when so many days must have been equally well worth reporting, why were these and others such selected unless because someone had made jottings? It is noticeable too that but very scrappy records remain of what must surely have been fascinating conversations on the road, during those tramps out to Sidon and elsewhere; careful accounts of what was said are only found when the disciples were seated (cp. Mark xiii. 3) and note-taking was possible. The way in which the Master is referred to is interesting and important; it is always "Jesus," not "Christ" or any of the other forms that occur in "Acts" or the Epistles (with an occasional exception in Luke vii. 13, xi. 39, xiii. 15); either the writers had an unwonted sense of historical fitness or they are working over very early material. The absence from other parts of the New Testament of the phrase "Son of Man" is another example of the same kind.

I do not for a moment suggest that we can dissect the Gospels into their component parts and assign a proper date to each, or that if we could do so we should thereby settle the question of comparative accuracy. But I do think that the line of thought argued above may help many to feel that a higher authenticity attaches to very much of what is recorded about Jesus than the language of most modern critics would lead us to suppose. And I am confident that is a result much to be desired in religious circles just now. Bible reading is at a discount to-day, and is likely to remain so unless we can re-establish some measure of confidence in its essential value. Until that happens we cannot reasonably hope either to lead the Church to a real appreciation of Jesus and His message of the Kingdom, or to attract those who are at present right outside its life.

RODERIC DUNKERLEY.

*FAITH, HOPE AND KNOWLEDGE IN
1 CORINTHIANS XIII.*

As is sometimes the case with the utterances of the seer, the closing verses of 1 Corinthians xiii. contain truth of wider application than their author was in a position to know, and truth upon which more recent thought throws interesting light. For instance, the assertion of the relativity and fragmentariness of our knowledge is as applicable to that of the things which are seen and are temporal as to that of things spiritual and eternal, with which revelation is concerned. The latter sphere alone, however, is contemplated in the passage before us ; and on that account the apostle's admission will seem the more remarkable. One who is accounted somewhat of a mystic calls attention to the indirectness of our knowledge of God ; one who was pre-eminently a dogmatic theologian emphasises

the incompleteness, and apparently the obscure symbolicalness, of the revealed truth which was the light of his own life : and he contrasts these qualities of the knowledge that is accessible to us here with the immediacy and the clearness of the vision of God to which he confidently looked forward. Even the Christian, he observes, can as yet have sight of but an image reflected by a mirror. God, whom no man hath seen at any time, is knowable only through the mediation of things other than Himself.

One such means whereby the power and divinity of God may be perceived, the physical world, is elsewhere indicated by St. Paul when he refers to the natural theology within the reach of the gentile. Had the apostle been confronted with Plato's remark that God holds the human soul attached to Him by its roots, suggesting that by descending to its depths we may find Him there ; or with the kindred thought later to be expressed by Clement of Alexandria, " if a man knows himself, he will know God," he would doubtless have approved these assertions of another such medium in the individual self. But the human life of our Lord would, of course, be for him the outstanding example of mirror-reflection of deity.

Again, the figure of the mirror might have been intended to stand, as it does in Philo, for the instrument of all knowledge, the human mind. Involved as that is in the reception and assimilation, if not in the very construction, of truth of any kind and from any source, it must condition by its own specific nature the form of any revelation given and received. We can never eliminate this coefficient. We can never transcend the mind itself, or know truth otherwise than in relation to human minds. And if, as many philosophers have come with good reason to believe, the basal ideas involved in all our thinking (those, e.g., of identity, permanence and causality) are derived from the thinking

subject in relation with its environment and especially with its own body, we can never strain out from human rationality the last residuum of its intrinsic anthropomorphism. So much of truth, if also some error, is contained in the *homo mensura* doctrine, and in the ancient dictum that "like is known by like."

Thus far St. Paul's words state nothing for which we are unprepared. He has himself elsewhere pointed the difference between the perception of phenomenal things and the space-time-less intuition of beatific vision: "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard . . . the things prepared by God." But he goes on to say more than his mirror-analogy implies. That figure of speech may suggest diminished brightness, blurring and even some distortion: yet a certain veridicalness in the relation between reflection and original there always is, enabling us in some degree to see the original in the image. A different characteristic of divinely communicated truth is indicated by the words "in a riddle." This phrase, taken seriously, should mean that the very form and contents of the knowledge vouchsafed to us by God have in them something puzzling. The riddle, or the dark saying, does not explicitly affirm what it means. It merely hints at it and gives a clue to it, leaving the answer, or the veiled signification, to be tentatively guessed—sooner, or later, or perchance never. Something is offered to the mind's eye, but it at the same time eludes direct apprehension. Thus it seems to be implied that revelation conceals while it discloses; that clouds and darkness remain round about God, though righteousness and judgment are the habitation of His throne. The apostle's attitude to revelation is characterised by a vein of agnosticism as well as by phenomenalism. We know obscurely.

And this is different from knowing "in part." In advancing to that further assertion, St. Paul states what to

us has since become trite. He does but suggest that there well may be more things in heaven and earth than can be compassed by our science or disclosed and penetrated by our philosophy. And his observation may evoke the wholesome reflection that our ignorance, however learned, as to some parts of the whole may possibly partialise our knowledge of such other parts as we think we know about completely. But if one be not unduly squeezing his phrase "in a riddle" to elicit its meaning, St. Paul would seem to insinuate not only that revelation is partial or non-exhaustive; but that even so far as it goes it is, in a measure, obscure or problematical. And perhaps in the whole passage under consideration there lurks the suggestion that revelation is given both to illumine and to baffle: not to satisfy the intellectual curiosity, however reverent, of which man now can never divest himself, so much as to provoke it and at the same time to thwart it; thus removing all possibility of logical certainty, leaving room for, and even ministering to, the venture of faith and hope which, in the half-light of this world, are to abide with love.

Whether St. Paul, notwithstanding his definite interpretation, at least in some connexions, of the historical facts on which his own faith, teaching and life were based, really entertained a conception of revelation such as the foregoing exegesis discloses; a conception, that is to say, in which a vein of agnosticism as well as of phenomenism and relativism is implicit, is for us a matter chiefly of historical interest. Another order of interest, however, invests the subject which his somewhat incidental utterance introduces. And this subject can be pursued by considering whether the thought which during the last century or two was expressly directed to the relativity of our knowledge and to the relation of revelation to reason, has established any conclusions with regard to what may broadly be described as

the intellectual status of theological belief. From a comprehensive point of view this constitutes the fundamental theological issue.

With regard to the relativity of our knowledge, its phenomenality, or its falling short of yielding intellectual vision of things as they are in themselves, and in particular of God as He is, I would offer only one observation. Whenever the relativity of knowledge has been insisted on by philosophers, as by Mansel who worked out further the Hamiltonian development of one strand of Kant's theory of knowledge, it has generally been the case (though Lotze is a conspicuous exception) that something defective in knowledge has been insinuated, and knowledge has been disparaged for not coming up to the standard that could be expected or desired. It is a prejudice, however, which has led to the view that the phenomenal appearance of ultimate reality is a man-made caricature thereof, or is of less value than what we might compare to vision, through plate-glass, of the naked thing-per-se. What if the very *raison d'être* of things-per-se be to negotiate the meaning or significance which the phenomenal possesses? This is at least a possibility which cannot simply be ruled out. To illustrate by means of analogy, it does not matter that my map of lake-land fails to reproduce the scenery or the geological stratification of the country, if by its correspondence with reality it guides me correctly on my tour. Or again, if paint and tinsel, cardboard trees and houses, and shifting-machinery, would confront us on the theatre-stage as the real objects, this is beside the mark if, as visible from our seat in the balcony, their appearance-effects entertain us with a drama full of meaning. It is the drama that we go to see, not stage-mechanism. Similarly, the *nature* of the naked thing-per-se, which human knowledge, because of its own spectacles, can never see as it is, may be the least

significant thing about it. What matters is that our knowledge have *relevance* to reality. And when this much more appropriate term is substituted for "relativity," the insinuation of defect in knowledge is no longer suggested. In so far, then, as St. Paul concedes the relativity or phenomenality of revealed knowledge, he is making no damaging admission.

Several other points connected with our subject were raised in the deistic movement early in the eighteenth century. This movement has seldom received due appreciation from its historians. Mark Pattison overlooked much of its theological significance, and even the sympathetic Leslie Stephen failed to do it justice. It may fairly be described as the real renaissance, the emergence of modernity, in English theology. And one of the main contentions for which from the first it fought, is that natural theology—which we may take to mean rational theism—is presupposed by Christian revelation: that in order to be a rationally, and therefore (from the point of view of reason) a legitimately convinced Christian, one must first be a reasonably convinced theist. The truth of this assertion seems to emerge as soon as misunderstanding of its purport has been put away. The deist was but stating the plain fact that he who cometh to God must first believe that He is, along with the tautology that belief, in order to be rational, must be grounded on reasons, and not merely be the effect of causes. Thus, he who would rationally credit an ambassador professing to come from an hitherto unknown king, must first satisfy himself that there is such a king; only then can he listen to tidings of him. He who would rationally accept the messenger's miraculous works as evidence of his divine mission, must first be in a position to know that such works could not be brought about otherwise than through the direct, i.e. the cosmically unmediated, activity of God. He

who would trust to the unique spiritual dignity of the messenger as proof of his deity, must have learned beforehand that God is good. Applying this kind of reasoning to a question which hardly presented itself in the eighteenth century, but which is before us to-day, one might similarly argue that he who would look upon parts of his own mental life as "religious experience," or as inter-communion with the Divine Being, must not only attribute the peculiarity of that experience, in virtue of which it has been differentiated from other kinds (resolvable into the same psychological constituents) as "religious," to the fact that it is pervaded and coloured, co-ordinated and explained, by the concept of God : he must also have reasons for entertaining the idea of God at all ; and, further, reasons for his assurance that this idea, unlike some of his ideas, has its real counterpart in an actual Being.

But, to revert to two hundred years ago, it was then already anticipated that any kind of argument for the actuality of an historical revelation, whether setting out from external events, or from inward experiences, or from the spiritual value of either, presupposes beliefs and conceptions, the rationality of which can only be justified either by deduction from self-evident truth or else inductively from our presumptive knowledge of the world and man. Revealed theology presupposes rational or natural theology, whatever in its turn this may presuppose.

If on this question the deists pronounced the final word, then it may be said that so far they showed clearer insight than any of the founders of subsequent schools, such as regarded alleged historical facts or so-called "immediate" experience, as ultimate and presuppositionless data for theological science. That the discussion in recent years of the problem of the Person of Christ has resolved itself, as if by intrinsic inevitableness, into debate as to the sameness

or difference of divine and human nature, and as to immanence of deity in humanity, perhaps affords an illustration of the truth which the eighteenth century brought to light, but which throughout the following century was generally overlooked.

It was overlooked, largely because the true assertion that revealed theology presupposes natural, was unfortunately and gratuitously confounded with the different and false assumption, that religious belief is reducible to reasoned conviction ; as if faith could only be caused by processes of ratiocination. That, of course, is not the case. But that the deist often committed this error, is quite irrelevant to the soundness of his contention that revealed truth can only be known either to be truth or to be revealed, provided the being and nature of God have previously been ascertained. Coleridge and the Romanticists, Schleiermacher and Ritschl, Mansel and Maurice, to whatever truth they may severally have borne witness, all in their various ways evaded this apparently plain conclusion, or buried it out of sight beneath irrelevancies. So, indeed, also did the innumerable lesser teachers who insisted that religion is the activity of the "whole man," or appeals to the whole man, and so must be judged, as to its truth, by other faculties than the purely intellectual. Feeling, etc., cannot judge of truth, any more than the nose can estimate the genuineness of a painting ; and that various faculties are lodged in the same personality does not imply that any one of them can on occasion usurp the functions peculiar to the others. We shall presently see, however, that these humanists built more wisely than they knew, and in what sense they did so.

It was through evasion and confusion that during the nineteenth century the real foundations or presuppositions of theological science were generally ignored ; not only in the fashioning and refashioning of religious education, but

even in the theological curricula of universities. Ignorance as to the nature of these foundations was fostered just at the time when misgiving was beginning to be felt as to much that was mistakenly offered as fundamental in their stead ; and to that ignorance we may perhaps trace some of the aloofness of freely-thinking persons at the present day from any form of organised religion. This aloofness seems to be ceasing to distress the Church : as if it were humanly unavoidable, or as if we could afford to ignore it so long as a supply of the less intellectually alert as yet continues to be gathered into the Christian fold. Yet we have learned that difficulties such as at first may only be felt in academic circles filter down in little time to the half-educated. And it is no longer the case that such perplexities as find expression among the latter class belong always to the old order connected with this or that Old Testament text. We know how the vague suspicions of the deists, articulated at first in terms of crude and faulty learning, grew into researches which at many points and in many ways so affected theological teaching that the more unsympathetic students of nineteenth century religious thought have seen in its history only a record of how theology was being driven from pillar to post. The lesson, as we read it, rather is that the cure for error is not less knowledge, but more. And if the incipient distrust of beliefs pertaining to the sphere of natural theology, and concerned with matters scarcely dealt with in our catechisms, is likewise to be fashioned into a means of acquiring fuller or purer truth ; if we are to retain the barbarian, let alone try to gain the Greek, the necessity is laid upon us to devote more attention than we have hitherto accorded to the knowledge on which reasonable faith is grounded.

From the logical priority of natural theology we may now turn to the different question of its certainty or demon-

strability, or of such substitutes for those qualities that it may possess. As to this issue, we may again take it that the eighteenth century pronounced the last word. This time, however, the word was not spoken by the deists. In the present connexion, those free lances had the misfortune to live just a little too soon. The particular form of natural religion in which they thought they had something absolutely unquestionable on which to reunite divided Christendom, was not what "natural religion" nowadays denotes. It was not a theology derived from empirical study of Nature and man, but an *a priori* theology claiming to be implicit in pure reason. A system of this kind had been upheld shortly before, with some reservations, by Locke; and so morally certain did it appear to the careful and conscientious Bishop Butler that, though he—a truer Lockean than Locke—recognised that its guarantee was no more than probability, he regarded proof of its tenets as superfluous. Toland and Tindal, who were rationalists rather than disciples of Locke as to theory of knowledge, ascribed to such theology the rigorous demonstrability which is only enjoyed by pure sciences like mathematics. But argumentation as to whether or not this direct and unmirrored knowledge of God rendered superfluous any revelation subsequent to that imparted to mankind at its creation, was hardly spent, when Hume dealt the pseudo-science its death-blow, leaving little more for Kant to do than to administer the *coup-de-grâce*. The old "proofs" of the being of God were for ever disposed of; as may be seen from the fact that all professed restatements of them have really been substitutions of new arguments more or less resembling them. And if any lack of convincingness should seem to attach to the criticism of these two philosophers, it was subsequently made good by the discovery that the infallible *lumen naturale*, presupposed by all such rational theology, was a fiction; and

yet again by the convergence of philosophical schools, with scarce an exception, to the assurance that, neither in the sphere of theology nor in that of physical science, is there knowledge of unseen actualities, possessing that unconditional certainty which attaches to propositions concerning the relations between pure ideas such as lines without breadth. From the time of the two iconoclasts to the present, many systems of natural theology have been produced. But if some of them have lapsed into reassertion, by implication, of the old claim to logical coerciveness—and the ontological fallacy is still unconsciously committed in arguments for theism from “absolute values”—this is but unintentional. The claim is always explicitly renounced: and the renunciation is no more than is called for. We have learned for all time that there can be no such knowledge of the God whom eye hath not seen. We cannot by such searching find out God.

So our religious commonplace, that we walk by faith and not by sight, whether of eye or of mind, is confirmed by philosophers speaking for once with practical unanimity as well as confidence. And ministers of religion have been content to make use of this truth when concerned to tend faith already established. Perhaps they have not always shown the courage of their convictions, or willingness to abide by the consequences, when confronted with doubt. If our discretion in commending the faith that is in us had always been tempered with the valour to confess it to be faith, we should possibly have been more persuasive to the free-thinker. Asking less, we might have gained the more. At any rate, we should have disarmed the honest doubter of his readiest weapon. For the sceptic is apt to think that any belief which he sees to be incapable of what he takes to be proof, is scarcely worth further consideration. And that is to labour under a grave mistake. Probability is not

only the guide of life ; it is the basis of our most certain science as well as of commonsense prudence. Theology is, therefore, in no unique position calling for shame-facedness. It becomes it ill either to appear more dogmatic than it knows it has the right to be, or to flee panic-stricken to the refuge of non-rational certitude or "enthusiasm." It can claim to be matter of reasonable belief—neither more nor less.

And this brings us to the most important point connected with the intellectual status of religious belief. What are we to mean when we speak of rational theology or of reasonable belief ; or when we discuss the third great principle for which the deists of old bravely stood, viz., that reason is the sole instrument for the acquisition, appropriation and judging of truth, in religion as in any other field of thought ? That is a statement to which probably all people of commonsense will subscribe so long as the meaning of "reason" is left conveniently vague. And ambiguously enough has this word been used. It means several distinguishable things in Locke ; two with the deists ; one definite thing (if we ignore the broader usage) in Kant, and another in Coleridge. In most other theological and philosophical writers it has denoted nothing definite, but now one and now another thing, according to the purpose in hand. Its signification has varied from common shrewdness to a highly, if arbitrarily, differentiated faculty ; from infallible intuition of the self-evident or the axiomatic to the framing of a working-hypothesis ; from divine illumination or divine substance introduced into human nature from without to a development from within of inherited animal mentality ; from logical computation of agreement and difference between ideas, or between the forms of propositions, to the discovery of matter of fact for premisses or the weighing of probabilities ; from the kind of understanding that is

satisfied to regard Hamlet as an impression produced by some founts of type, to the interpretation which a man will put upon the world in order to feel at home in it ; from the scientific conceiving of identity everywhere we see diversity, to any activity having an end in view or a moral motive behind it. It has meant the fashioning of clear and distinct ideas, the apprehension of universals, the search for unity, the transcending of antinomies or contradictions ; and so forth. It is thus little wonder that discussion of the reasonableness of Christianity has hitherto been attended with some confusion.

Nevertheless, the last two hundred years of thought have resulted in the acquisition of knowledge which enables us to see what theology must not mean, and consequently to approximate towards what it should mean, when it would plead for its own reasonableness : when it would come to terms with the intellectualism that brands theology as superstition and perhaps undertakes to declare unto us the God whom we ignorantly worship. We have already had occasion to observe that the old claim to rationality in the severer logical sense needed to be abated. If reason is to include the means by which knowledge concerning actuality is attained and freed from error, it cannot consist exclusively in the comparison of ideas in the single respect in which formal logic compares them. But then at once the exercise of reason or understanding ceases to be sharply distinguished from faith. The supposed antithesis between them vanishes. This indeed was hidden from the eyes of Kant. Theology, he taught, can but employ the ideas which he called *regulative* : ideas that may guide belief but do not constitute knowledge. The ideas of the understanding, on the other hand, he regarded as supplying knowledge because they constitute knowledge : and such knowledge, Kant assumed, lay to hand in the physical science of Newton. We have

since been enabled to see how mistaken Kant was as to this latter point. The ideas of the understanding, which he thought yielded knowledge of Nature, as *a priori* and necessary as mathematics, are now seen to be as merely regulative as those which mediate theological belief. They are derived from life, not from logic ; they have similar anthropic origin in primitive credulity ; a like tentativeness of application, the same justification in the success (up-to-date) with which they have been used as detective clues, the same dependence on sense-experience. And, the Kantian distinction between knowledge and faith having dissolved, the Kantian criticism of teleology has lost all its sting. Theology, indeed, remains belief ; but belief infects all the so-called knowledge of actuality, with which faith has been wont to be contrasted.

In Kant's failure to entrench within science the rationalism that he expelled from theology, the eighteenth century confessed that the course of the world cannot be deduced from abstract ideas or self-evident axioms. The merely general is inadequate to account for the particular. In the nineteenth century the converse attempt was made, viz., to inflate empirical knowledge into an equivalent to universal and unconditional knowledge.

Mill's attempt, however, is likewise accounted to-day an evident failure. Throughout the last century, largely owing to the influence of Mill, inductive science professed to be based on the principle of uniformity as a major premiss ; and this principle was deemed axiomatic or else demonstrable. Meanwhile logicians were finding that this principle was vague even to uselessness, and withal no more than a postulate. The psychologist then stepped in to testify to its humble origin in man's primordial credulity. It was first hoped for, in piecemeal measure, and then became substantiated. *Credo ut intelligam*, or "nothing venture,

nothing have," is the attitude of mind in virtue of which the human mind, being what it is, alone did or could attain to either its science or its theology. Both of these, like Abraham, went forth "not knowing whither," and "by faith" obtained their first glimpse of the places they should afterwards receive as their inheritance.

The present century has made a further step. It has disclosed more completely than had been suspected before, how essentially like religious faith is the hope that has guided the quest of science for rationality in the physical world. We owe it to three Cambridge philosophers that we have at length, within the last few years, been enabled to replace the old vague principle of uniformity or causality by a definite number of independent specific postulates, relatively to which all the particular inductions or laws in the special sciences possess the logical relation of probability; and these postulates, in their turn, are acknowledged to be themselves but probable. The probability ascribed to them obviously must be of quite another kind than that which particular inductions possess relatively to them; and what exactly it consists in awaits detailed elucidation. This is a matter of high importance in connexion with the intellectual status of theological belief; partly because of the implication that there is in reason, if any significant sense is to be associated with that word, a distinctly alogical or non-rational factor. In fact, scientific rationality ultimately rests on persistent hope, inevitable expectation, human interest. We shall probably not glory in this discovery; it is somewhat humbling to ingrained and perhaps wholesome human pride. But whether we like it or not, we are compelled to acquiesce. We now see clearly and distinctly that we can only purchase rationality or reasonableness with the coin of belief which is indeed psychologically motivated but is not rationally demonstrable

or verifiable. The beliefs indispensable to all knowledge of actuality that is most worth having, and to all proving, are themselves incapable of proof; and the certainty of our most certain knowledge, the basis of all our scientific convictions, is but hypothetical or conditional. Our basal postulates are indeed suggested by Nature; and the more definite and precise our formulation of them has become, the more rigorously has Nature been found to conform to them. Science is thus, like religious faith, a substantiation or realisation of things hoped for—things to be desired to make it wise. It is further on a par with religious faith in that the limited number of substances or natural kinds which are assumed to constitute Nature's simple ground-plan (if scientific induction is to be justified) are, like the ultimate object of theistic belief, things that no man hath seen at any time.

Yet further consequences, or possible consequences, now come in view. We may ask whether we can reasonably retain the inevitable but alogical beliefs, without which science would become impossible and practical life would become imbecility, unless we are prepared to believe more. Certainly if what purports to be knowledge be really knowledge, something else remains to be known which science, as such, can never come to know. Science's extremity is thus theology's opportunity. If we explicate the faith-element, the quasi-religious hope, implicit in the whole method of science, it may well prove that the idea of God will be found to be involved, or at least to be the one which best rounds off our knowledge and its underlying beliefs.

Again, it is a question whether the inductive logician's modest demand for limited variety, or for the fewness, of ultimate natural substances, will suffice for scientific rationalisation or explanation as a whole. There is a lack of logical stringency, a touch of arbitrariness, in asking for

identity in any measure between all and none. The modesty in question is not logically justifiable ; it is suggestive of practical expediency and compromise, essential in order to avoid absurdity and to preserve sanity. Perhaps there is no logically assignable halting-place at which theoretical science, once started on her search for the particular kind of rationality which she hopes to discover in the world, can stop, short of the ideal limit to her rationalistic hope. Indeed, she has sometimes pressed on to this limit. She claims to have reduced all change to one kind only—change of motion or of configuration—in matter that is ultimately of one kind only ; but her very method has led her on to seek to geometrise space, and to eliminate time from her equations. Thus has her hope over-reached itself by relegating change to the realm of unreality. All this assuredly implies that the world is not through and through rational in science's particular sense of the term. At its ideal limit, this conception of rationality involves unreason or is self-stultifying. There could be no science were there no qualitative diversity in the world ; there cannot be complete rationality *with* diversity : for that involves the occult, the irrational surd. Still more startling, however, is the fact that physical Nature is actually patient of a method which should imply that there is no Nature at all ; and that to this absurd rationality we owe our physical science, our intellectual success. To the scientific rationalist, i.e. to one who would adore reason of the scientific type, this should be a thought too deep for tears, the acme of the pathos that invests the human drama.

The moral that seems to be pointed by these paradoxical results is that in the predominantly logical conception of reason as the finding of identity beneath diversity and permanence behind change, men have ascribed to reason in general what is probably a mere accident of the specific

mentality which characterises *homo sapiens* : viz., that man finds repose and satisfaction in contemplating identity and permanence ; that change and diversity are intellectually repugnant because æsthetically abhorrent or unpleasant to feeling, causing unrest till they are "explained." But possibly the angels may construe permanence in terms of change, seeing that "all things flow," and identity as a consequence of diversity ; yet they may have none the less rationality, and no less satisfactory a world-view, than have we. There is no accounting for tastes. And when we human beings insist on seeing the essence of reason in the discernment of identities, we do perhaps but illustrate the profoundness of the truth that man never realises how anthropomorphic he is.

We may now turn to that aspect of reason which is indicated in the derivative "reasonable" rather than in the derivative "rational." As to what is *ultimately* meant by "reasonable," we shall probably find ourselves perplexed when we look beneath the surface. Logical certainty having been put for ever out of its connotation, what is left ? What do we mean, e.g., when we say it is reasonable to believe a more probable rather than a less probable statement, when neither is demonstrably true ? We feel that we are urged, in such a choice, by a kind of categorical imperative. On the other hand, that of several alternative propositions which is most probable relatively to existing knowledge, may turn out to be the furthest from the truth ; so that reasonableness may conduce to actual error. There is a gulf, indeed, between reasonableness and rationality in its more stringent sense. We have lately been taught that probability, as described by the logicians, is the measure of the belief which it is reasonable, or morally right, to entertain ; and that assent to the probable is reasonable because (as distinguished from irrational belief due to mere associa-

tion, instinct, etc.) the probable has *some* grounds in knowledge. But it is then overlooked that the same logicians have insisted that we possess no knowledge of the actual world, worth calling knowledge, that is not founded on belief that is (in another sense) merely probable. And if probability is a logical relation to the "probable," of this latter kind, we do but move in a vicious circle. We have as yet been told nothing about this second kind of probability, which attaches to the new basal principles of induction, save that it does not admit of numerical computation ; but much more will need to be said of it than that. And it will be of far-reaching import. It will necessarily include assertion that in all our "reasonable" and morally sanctioned belief in the probable, and therefore in all our so-called knowledge, there is an ineradicable element of subjectivity or affectiveness, though not of mere caprice. Reasonableness, at bottom, is human interpretativeness. Here, assuredly, is a remarkable approachment between theology and science, faith and knowledge, transcending in significance any number of the old "reconciliations" as to specific fields of fact. This is the last word that we are as yet able to pronounce concerning the relation of religious belief to other departments of knowledge and thought : reason, whether in theology or in science, rests on belief, and belief on hope or some such non-logical functioning of the human mind.

With this new light, we can return to the inspired chapter from which we set out, and the better appreciate its author's insight. We can the better understand that the knowledge which is destined to vanish away, the reason that is baffled through all the stages of its education and is thwarted in every sphere of its activity, despite its superficial success, is even now but instrumental to something more exalted and God-like than logical rationality. In order now to come to God, and eventually to see Him as He is, other faculties

than the analytic understanding must be exercised. And further, it would seem that for the development of these, one condition is that the truth, even "revealed" truth, which we apprehend by faith, be "deadened of its absolute blaze." Just as it is the moralised man's burden that his acquisition of the moral status has involved his capacity for sin and shame, so it is the inevitable burden of the faithful that faith admits of being tried: that faith can reasonably be doubted just because it can be reasonably grounded; and doubted by those who would most keenly realise that they had lost the light of life and the spring of spiritual efficacy, were the foundations of their religious conviction weakened or removed. The formation, as contrasted with the fruition of character and of love, requires an invisible God, a world that images, a reason that analogises and interprets rather than reads off, a revelation that is not only partial, but also bafflingly obscure, through a mirror and in a riddle.

We are apt to chafe, indeed, at being shut up to mere belief. Hence the short cuts to certitude through what is miscalled "feeling" or "immediate" experience, or spiritualistic theosophy, which have become beaten tracks since probability rather than certainty was suspected of characterising historical tradition and natural theology alike. But we chafe because we practically misdoubt part of the content of our professed belief. The sting of that difficulty to faith which faith itself provides—that it is liable to trial—is removed by a whole-hearted confidence, like St. Paul's, that this life is not the whole of life. Failure, through overclouded faith, to achieve the purpose which inspires our earthly career, becomes then relatively insignificant. There is such a thing as success in failure. It conduces to faith, hope and charity alike, to bear in mind that even bereavement of faith, like bereavement of friends, is not

necessarily endless separation, but possibly only a phase : a receding wave of an incoming tide, a stage in a process that knows vicissitudes. Seeking, rather than finding, is the purpose of this life in the twilight : intercourse, question and counter-question ; hope, faith, exploring love, rather than acquisition of certainty. The risks that attend faith, then, are not necessarily fatal for men of goodwill ; and they seem to be conditions of God's fulfilling of us for ourselves or for Himself. It is enough for us that " we feel that we are greater than we know " ; and that it is just the trust of some such rationally unwarranted feeling as this, that, in all our knowledge, such as it is, and in all our reason, whatsoever it be, has actually guided intellectual search, giving it the zest of adventure and according it success : the substantiation of things hoped for, the evidencing of things not seen.

F. R. TENNANT.

EARLY CHRISTIANITY AND THE HELLENIC WORLD.

THE subject suggested by the title of this Paper has many aspects, which could only adequately be treated as a whole in a comprehensive work on a large scale, and by a band of competent scholars. All that is attempted in the following pages, and within the limits of a single article, is to touch on one or two phases of, and to emphasise the importance of some neglected factors in, a large and complicated problem.

I.

It is far from my desire to underestimate the importance of the fact that historical Christianity, though fundamentally Jewish in origin, was born into a world which had been

almost completely hellenised. The significance of this fact cannot be ignored. Greek culture, the Greek language, Greek institutions were all-pervasive. Judaism itself could not escape this atmosphere. In the first century of our era the number of Jews outside Palestine, who used the *κoinῆ* as their vernacular, was probably not less than the Jewish population of Palestine itself, including the province of Galilee. It may well have been substantially more. And even in Palestine there was a considerable leaven of Greek influence, down to A.D. 70 and even later, among the Jewish population. In Galilee, indeed, the population was, to some extent, bilingual. Sometimes the two languages, the vernacular Aramaic and the *κoinῆ*, existed side by side, as for instance in Bethsaida, which appears to have possessed a Greek quarter, where the upper classes mostly resided, and an Aramaic-speaking quarter, which was inhabited mostly by the humbler folk. It is interesting to note that Galileans often bore two names, one Greek and another Aramaic, a striking example being the Apostle Peter, whose Greek name (*Πέτρος*) is simply a translation of the Aramaic word which we know as *Cephas*, i.e. "rock." In Judæa, where the Jewish population was less mixed, and Jewish life and feeling were most intense, the Greek language was usually known to the educated classes; and, in fact, many Greek words had penetrated into the vernacular Aramaic, and even into the scholastic Hebrew which was used by the doctors of the Law for scholastic purposes.

But though Judaism, even in its central strongholds, had been profoundly influenced by its Greek environment, and in the first and second centuries of our era was immersed in a world of culture and ideas which were Hellenic—though it was subjected to the enormous and incessant pressure of these cultural forces—it never completely surrendered to

them. Its central fire still glowed and burnt defiantly in spite of the Hellenic flood. Once indeed in its chequered history it had seemed to be on the point of succumbing, when that ardent and over zealous apostle of Greek culture, Antiochus Epiphanes, in his impatience to be done with the barbarous obstinacy of an obscure tribal cult, as he regarded it, which was holding up his grandiose scheme for the complete cultural unification of his heterogeneous provinces, resorted to persecution and precipitated the Maccabean revolt. As the result Judaism became more solid and self-conscious, and incidentally Antiochus secured for himself a place in history which he would have been the last to desire. He figures in Daniel as the "little horn," and became the prototype of Antichrist and the Beast of the later Apocalypses. At the heart of Judaism there was something which resisted all the alluring and disintegrating effects of Greek culture. This something was its intense realisation of the personality of God as the God of righteousness. To the Jew, God—the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who was also the Creator of the world and the Ruler of the universe—was primarily a Person, who demanded ethical righteousness. This conception of God is fundamental, and was never completely obscured even by the *minutiae* of a legalistic religion. By the first century of our era Judaism, especially the Judaism of the Jewish communities who lived in various parts of the Græco-Roman Empire outside Palestine, had, in a sense, come to terms with Hellenism. But this by no means meant that the Jews of the Dispersion had become completely Hellenised. They used the Greek language, and had ceased to understand Hebrew (this, at least, is true of the mass of them). They read their sacred scriptures in Greek (the LXX.), and even used the Greek language in their synagogue services. But they were still acutely conscious of being Jews, and not Greeks, in religion. As Philo

puts it, the Jews (of the Dispersion) called themselves Palestinians in religion, but Hellenes in language.¹

The Jew of the Dispersion was fired with a burning enthusiasm to convert the heathen world to his own monotheistic faith. Philo proclaims that the Jewish people is the priestly nation, "one that has received the priesthood for the whole human race";² and this conviction animated the Jewish Diaspora as a whole. It found overt expression in an intense missionary propaganda which, in spite of fierce opposition in some quarters, was attended with immense success. It was largely among the proselytes who had been won over from the heathen world by the Jewish missionaries that St. Paul found his first converts to Christianity. The typical Jew of the Diaspora had been subjected to Greek influence on a large scale; but we must be on our guard against exaggerating the effects of this influence. At the heart of the Jew's religion was the unshakable belief in the One God and His ethical requirement; the ethical standpoint remained strictly Jewish, and made all the difference. This will account for the remarkable fact that the Jewish population in the Dispersion, though it assimilated so much of its environment, yet remained unmistakably distinct. The Jews lived mostly in the cities, and in a separate quarter; they enjoyed special privileges and exemptions under the law, and were allowed to organise themselves as autonomous communities.

Th. Reinach has described the situation well. He says: ³

"Speaking broadly the middle classes in the Greek cities were not favourably disposed towards the Jews. Their religious and racial peculiarities; their undisguised contempt of the Hellenic cults, pageants and gymnastic displays—in short of all that constitutes

¹ Cf. *Jewish Encycl.* vi. 337.

² *de Abrah.* ii. 15.

³ Art. "Diaspora" (*Jewish Encyclopædia*).

the essence of a Greek city . . . and finally the efficacy of the religious propagandism—all contributed to the unpopularity of these new-comers."

It is easy to overrate the extent to which Judaism was hellenised in the Græco-Roman world. In spite of all outside influence and pressure there was an element in Judaism that obstinately refused to be absorbed. This was fundamental, and, in the last resort, determinative.

What this core of conviction essentially was I have already indicated: it was the belief passionately held in *one* God, Lord of Heaven and Earth, as revealed in Moses and the Prophets. It was the ethical monotheism of the Hebrew Prophets, with its burning sense of Jehovah's righteousness, holiness, and ethical requirement, and its passionate hatred of idolatry in all its forms and associations that fired the Diaspora Jew with his intense missionary enthusiasm to convert the heathen world. Nothing could well be more Greek in form than the so-called Sibylline Oracles, which, in fact, are, as is well known, largely missionary tracts. When we examine the Jewish parts of these productions what do we find? The poems are full of exhortations to the heathen world to accept belief in the one God, whose chosen people is the Jews, and to lead moral lives in accordance with the ethical code of the divine Law.

In spite of their Greek form nothing could be more intensely Jewish. The fervent spirit of the Jewish missionary is on fire with the conviction that in preaching ethical monotheism he has something to offer the Gentile world which is infinitely precious, and which it cannot find elsewhere.

II.

At the time when Christianity came out into the world, the world that confronted it was a hellenised world. And this was true not only of Europe, but of Asia over a very

wide area. Everywhere both in the East and the West, in the countries included within the Roman Empire, the Greek language was spoken and read by the educated classes. Over a large area, of course, it was the language of every-day life. Everywhere, too, Greek institutions like the gymnasium and the theatre were in evidence. Mr. Edwyn Bevan, in his vivid and arresting way, brings the matter home when he remarks: "We are often told in popular books that 'the East never changes,' that Orientals have an invincible repugnance to western ideas, and so forth . . . Well, you would make a great mistake if you imagined, say, the Damascus of St. Paul's time like the Damascus of to-day. In St. Paul's time we should have found ourselves in a Greek city. Arabs from the desert in native dress would no doubt have appeared in the streets, and Jews with their fringes and phylacteries, but we should have seen the citizens of the upper class to all appearance Greek, we should continually have heard Greek talked around us, and the environment would be largely made up of Greek temples, and halls and colonnades."¹

Greek civilisation and Greek institutions had indeed transformed the world. Hellenism had filled life with new interests. There was something very alluring about Greek culture—it captivated and enthralled. Among other achievements it created a new tradition of education. When Christianity emerged into the wider world it came face to face with an *educated* world. Everywhere in the towns grammar schools were to be found, while at certain centres were great seats of learning, rather like the mediæval universities to which students of all classes resorted. Tarsus in St. Paul's time was a centre of this sort. Students then, as now, attended lectures, and sometimes showed by their manner that they were thinking of other things.

¹ *Jerusalem under the High Priests*, p. 39.

"Many persons," says Philo, "who come to a lecture do not bring their minds inside with them, but [let their minds] go wandering about outside, thinking ten thousand things about ten thousand different subjects—family affairs, other people's affairs . . . and the professor talks to an audience, as it were, not of men, but of statues."¹

Teachers and professors occupied positions of social distinction and were treated with special consideration by State and municipal authorities both in the matter of endowment and exemption from taxation.

The Hellenic world—or perhaps it would be more accurate to describe it as the "hellenised world"—was thus permeated with cultural forces which were all-powerful and all-absorbing. On its nobler side this Greek culture quickened and enriched human life generally. But it sometimes assumed base and degraded forms. Mr. Edwyn Bevan has noted how these effects were specially noticeable in the Province of Syria in the centuries both immediately before and after the Christian Era.²

When we ask ourselves, what was the moral state of the Græco-Roman world in the first two centuries of our era? it is perhaps not quite so easy to generalise as is sometimes assumed. Dr. Hatch, indeed, attempts to discount the evidence that has come down to us. He says:—

"It has been common to construct pictures of the state of morals in the first centuries of the Christian era from the statements of satirists who, like all satirists, had a large element of caricature, and from the denunciations of the Christian apologists, which, like all denunciations, have a large element of exaggeration. The pictures so constructed are mosaics of singular vices, and they have led to the not unnatural impression that these centuries constituted an era of exceptional wickedness."³

Dr. Hatch goes on to remark:—

"It is no doubt difficult to gauge the average morality of any

¹ *Quis rerum div. heres*, 31, cited by Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 37.

² Cf. *Op. cit.*, p. 41 f.

³ *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 139.

age. It is questionable whether the average morality of civilized ages has largely varied ; it is possible that if the satirists of our own time were equally outspoken, the vices of ancient Rome might be found to have a parallel in modern London ; and it is probable, not on merely *a priori* grounds, but from the nature of the evidence which remains, that there was in ancient Rome, as there is in modern London, a preponderating mass of those who loved their children and their homes, who were good neighbours and faithful friends, who conscientiously discharged their civil duties, and were in all the current senses of the word ' moral ' men." ¹

This statement puts the case in as persuasive a manner as is possible. Yet it seems to me not to allow for patent facts. It does not allow sufficiently for the fact that the age was one of disintegration—the old moral and religious sanctions had broken down ; the best spirits of the time were acutely conscious of this, and this fact will explain the movements towards moral reformation that had grown up. The world was desperately in need of a religion that would be adequate to the new needs ; there was a conflict of religions, and in the end Christianity emerged victorious as the world-religion ; but the conflict had not become decisive till well on towards the end of the second century of our era ; and in the interval there was, to a large extent, religious and moral chaos.

How can we explain the moral energy of the Jewish (and later the Christian) missionary propaganda unless there was present the conviction on both sides that paganism lacked the moral fibre that only Judaism or Christianity could give ?

In this connexion it is instructive to study the lines along which the Jewish indictment of paganism moves. To a large extent the early Christian polemic directed against pagan life and religion is parallel. The real mind of the Jewish teachers about these matters is revealed in the early Rabbinical literature which grew up in Palestine in the

¹ *Op. cit. ibid.*

first and second centuries A.D. The attitude of these teachers was, it is true, less "liberal" towards the Græco-Roman world than that of the earlier Diaspora Judaism, and became exacerbated when the disastrous war broke out under Hadrian (132-135 A.D.) with the tragic results that followed. We must make full allowance for the bitter feeling that grew up and estranged the Jewish from the outside world from this time. But after making full allowance for this the indictment is sufficiently formidable, and is remarkably confirmed by the early Christian apologists. In particular the idolatry of the heathen world is denounced. Not only is all direct recognition of idol-worship forbidden, but participation in anything that goes to the furtherance of such worship, even indirectly, is sternly reprehended. At the time of the Hadrianic persecution it was enacted by the Rabbis in Lydda that an Israelite should rather suffer martyrdom than be guilty of idolatry, fornication or murder. The luxury that was indulged in by heathen is equally abhorrent to the Jewish and Christian teachers (e.g. Tertullian). The money laid out upon luxuries would be better spent in charity. Sharp opposition was made to any participation in the spectacles at the theatre, circus and games, because of their deep implication in polytheism. This was the strict requirement both of the Jewish and Christian leaders, and it may seem, perhaps, to savour rather of an extreme form of Puritanism. But it must be remembered that both Judaism and early Christianity were face to face with a system which, in the mass, and over large sections of the population, exercised a degrading and demoralising influence. Anything short of this sharp protest would have been unavailing. And the protest was justified by the result. As Harnack remarks:¹ "When Constantine granted privileges to the Church, public opinion

¹ *The Expansion of Christianity* (E.T.), i. 380.

had developed to such an extent that the State immediately adopted measures for curtailing and restricting the public spectacles." Both Jewish and Christian teachers emphasise the fact that such things as the gladiatorial shows were not only implicated in idolatry, but were in themselves brutalising as spectacles. It may be added that such spectacles, in spite of prohibition, proved irresistibly attractive to many both of Jews and Christians.

The desperate need in which the age felt itself to be for moral amendment and reformation is reflected in certain developments of philosophy and religious movements within the pagan world itself. Dr. Hatch remarks justly that "the age in which Christianity grew was in reality an age of moral reformation."¹ This manifested itself especially in Stoicism and the growth of the religious guilds associated with certain "mystery" cults.

"In Stoicism"—to use Mr. Edwyn Bevan's words—"the mind of antiquity had not only reached in some respects its highest expression, but that expression had become popular in a way unparalleled in the history of any later school. The Stoic missionary, preaching the self-sufficiency of virtue in a threadbare cloak at the street corners, had been one of the typical figures of a Greek town many generations before St. Paul."²

Through these cynic preachers of righteousness Stoicism had made a profound impression upon the public conscience. Perhaps the most striking evidence of this is the fact that it had created a new set of ethical terms. Bishop Lightfoot, commenting on this fact, says :

"It is difficult to estimate, and perhaps not very easy to overrate the extent to which Stoic philosophy had leavened the moral vocabulary of the civilized world at the time of the Christian era. To take a single instance: the most important of moral terms, the

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 149 f.

² *Hellenism and Christianity*, p. 72 f.

crowning triumph of ethical nomenclature, *συνέλογος*, *conscientia*, the internal, absolute, supreme judge of individual action, if not struck in the mint of the Stoics, at all events became current coin through their influence. To a great extent, therefore, the general diffusion of Stoic language would lead to its adoption by the first teachers of Christianity.”¹

Stoicism was thus a real preparation for Christianity. It was governed by a great ideal, it was marked by high ethical power, and it produced a few great men of noble character. It impressed the conscience of the Greek and Roman world. But its ethics were not Christian—it was a creed of despair and acquiescence, and it despised all the Christian virtues that depend upon the affirmation “God is love.” It had no belief in progress, and its outlook on the world was dark and forbidding—removed poles asunder from that of the Christian. It totally lacked the dynamic which carried Christianity forward and made it a religion of moving power for mankind. If Christianity largely absorbed its ethical terminology, it invested the terms with an entirely new content, and new values. If we turn to the “mystery” cults we can see in these religious brotherhoods another indication of the pathetic yearning of the ancient world for regeneration and salvation. The vogue of these mystery cults in the Imperial Age is well known. One of the most influential, and one, moreover, that illustrates the syncretistic character of these later religious movements, is the cult of Isis, as described by Plutarch in his famous treatise. The Isis-Serapis worship was widely practised in the Hellenistic world. It can be traced at Athens, Pompeii and Rome, and it spread wherever Roman influence penetrated. The cult evidently made a wide appeal, with its splendid ceremonial and “contemplative devotion” ordered with all the precision characteristic of Egyptian liturgic tradition. It also embodied the elaborate precision

¹ “St. Paul and Seneca” (*Commentary on Philippians*, p. 303).

of the ancient Egyptian eschatology. Dr. H. A. A. Kennedy, speaking of its wide diffusion and influence, says :

“The Isis Mystery-Religion exercised a peculiar attraction just because of its syncretism. Isis could be identified with innumerable deities. As queen of heaven, as Selene, as goddess of the cultivated earth, as Demeter, as giver of crops, as mistress of the underworld and also of the sea, as goddess of women and beauty and love, as queen of the gods assimilated to Hera and Juno, as goddess of salvation, and also of magical arts, she could claim the adoration of a motley throng of worshippers.”¹

In Apuleius there is preserved a full account of initiation of Lucius at Cenchreæ into these Mysteries. The candidate, we are told, remained within the precincts of the Temple until summoned by the goddess. Otherwise he might incur the guilt of sacrilege and die. “For,” says the high priest, “the portals of the nether world and the guardianship of salvation are placed in the hand of the goddess, and the initiation itself is solemnised as the symbol of a voluntary death and a salvation given in answer to prayer, for the goddess is wont to choose such as, having fulfilled a course of life, stand at the very threshold of the departing light, to whom nevertheless the great mysteries of religion can be safely entrusted ; and after they have been by her providence, in a sense born again, she places them again on the course of a new life in salvation.”² Lucius awaited the will of the goddess, giving himself up to prayer and fasting. When at length the wished-for day arrived, he was escorted by a band of Isis-worshippers and bathed by the high-priest in the sacred laver. Thereafter, in presence of the goddess he receives mystic communications. Ten days of ascetic preparation follow, and then he is led into the innermost sanctuary. A mystic delineation is given of his culminating experience. “I penetrated to

¹ *St. Paul and the Mystery Religions*, p. 99 f.

² Cf. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 100 f.

the boundaries of death," he says. I trod the threshold of Proserpine, and after being borne through all the elements I returned to earth : at midnight I beheld the sun radiating white light. I came into the presence of the gods below and the gods above, and did them reverence close at hand."¹ Fortunately we have this sympathetic picture of some of the aspects of a typical Hellenistic Mystery Religion : the solemn external preparation in the prescribed abstinences, the solemn baptism, the communication of the mystic formulæ, culminating in the overpowering scenes which came at the last ; there is also the inward experience, a genuinely religious one, in the heart-preparation, the idea of cleansing, the conception of regeneration, and the final mystical rapture which unites the soul of the initiate with the deity.

These and the religious brotherhoods which made purity of life a condition of membership are genuine manifestations of the religious spirit, and may be regarded as a real preparation for Christianity. But it is very doubtful whether these cults entered so closely and intimately into the organic life of Pauline Christianity as is sometimes suggested. That St. Paul was ever really influenced in his thought by the mystery-religions is very unlikely. His thought and that of the mysteries move in two different worlds. As Professor Kennedy says :

"There is no real analogy between the New Testament idea of a fellowship in the sufferings of Christ and that ritual sympathy with the goddesses who mourned the loss of Osiris and Attis, or with the woes of those deified beings themselves. In the former self-sacrificing devotion which shrinks from no hardship is the core of the experience. The latter is the result of sensuous impressions more or less artificially produced."²

St. Paul's mysticism is thoroughly ethical in character. The Cross is central. The mystic death to sin of which

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 101 f.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 214 f.

the Apostle speaks is wholly different in conception from the mystical identification of the initiate in the Mystery cult with the death of the divine personage whose restoration to life was celebrated and depicted in the Mystery-ceremonial. To quote Dr. Kennedy again :

“The ceremonial dedication to a deity whose ritual, based on the revival of life in the world of nature, suggested the soul-kindling prospect of a life beyond the grave could very naturally be described as a dying to the ignorant past and the entrance on a new life of hope. But it requires an unusually daring imagination to fill these terms in the mystery cults with the profound ethical content which they held for St. Paul.”¹

St. Paul undoubtedly uses terms which are characteristic of the terminology of the Mystery-Religions, just as he uses occasionally short technical terms. But in both cases the language is charged with a new meaning and a new content. The truth is that behind St. Paul's language there is a fundamentally different conception of God. The Jewish conception of God could not make terms with the Greek idea at all. To the Jew God was one unique and Holy Being, supreme and transcendent, the Creator and Ruler of the world, whose majesty could not be shared. To the Jew the very idea of the deification of a man was utterly abhorrent. Not so to the Greek. Apparently in the earlier period of Greek religion heroic qualities or the possession of unusual powers, might lead to apotheosis. The mortal, as in the Mystery-cults, might achieve divinity. The extent to which this was carried in the Hellenistic world from the time of Alexander the Great and onwards, when divine honours were paid to living rulers, and legends grew up about their supernatural origin is well known. First the Seleucidæ and then the Ptolemies adopted the cult, and finally it was transferred to the Roman world and culmin-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 229.

ated in the state-worship of the Emperors. It may be possible to regard all this as the perversion of a true instinct in humanity, which leads men to regard supreme powers and endowments as god-like, and therefore to be invested with the halo of divinity. But to carry the process to the lengths reached in the Hellenistic period inevitably meant the frittering away of all worthy concepts of deity. To the Jew the State worship of the Emperor was the blasphemy of blasphemies.

III

When Christianity came face to face with this Hellenic world, it confronted it with a lofty conception of God which had its roots in the ethical monotheism of the Hebrew Prophets. It was the God revealed in Jesus Christ whom it preached, a lofty and exclusive conception that would tolerate nothing in the nature of apotheosis in the Greek manner. Whatever use Christianity made of Greek philosophical terms like *Logos*, or other terms like *σωτηρία* or *γενεσλα* it never compromised its central conception of God, which indeed stamped its use of these terms with a new content and new meaning. And this is true not only of Pauline Christianity, but also, fundamentally, of the later type of Christian thought and theology, when the Church had really become deeply influenced by Hellenism in various ways. Though threatened in the third century with syncretistic tendencies, the Church kept its recognised theology free from idolatrous taint. The heathen philosopher Porphyry is illuminating on this matter—his words show how the pagan conception of deity still lived on in strength and vigour. He wrote :

“If therefore you declare that beside God there stand angels who are not subject to suffering and death, and are incorruptible in nature—*just the beings we call gods*, inasmuch as they stand near

the godhead, then what is all the dispute about, with regard to names ? Or, are we to consider it merely a difference of terminology ? So if anyone likes to call them either gods or angels—for names are, on the whole, of no great moment, one and the same goddess, for example, being called Athene and Minerva, and by still other names among the Egyptians and Syrians—then it makes no great difference, as their divine nature is actually attested even by yourselves in Matthew xxii. 29-31.”¹

And yet what to Porphyry seems to be a mere question of names was to the Christian and Jewish conscience fundamental. When the people of Lystra insisted upon offering divine honours to Barnabas and Paul, calling Barnabas Jupiter and Paul Mercury, the distress of the Apostles was intense, and Paul tried to make them understand that they were the bearers to them of a message from the living God (Acts xiv. 12 ff.). Similarly the seer in the *Apocalypse*, when he is represented as prostrating himself before the angel, is bidden to desist, and “ worship God ” (Rev. xxii. 9). This lofty conception of deity with its implications is central both in Jewish and Christian theology. It dominates and forms the distinctive element in both. It is possible to argue ingeniously that Christianity, in spite of its Jewish heritage, shares many elements with Hellenism. But there has been a fundamental transvaluation of values produced by the Jewish (Christian) conception of God, and unless this is fully grasped detailed comparisons will prove largely misleading.

G. H. Box.

¹ Cf. Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

NOTES AND NOTICES OF RECENT CRITICISM.

SERMONS I HAVE NEVER HEARD.

It has fallen to me more than once to listen to sermons upon courage, but I would like to hear a sermon upon the courage which is often required for moral obedience. The duty of this is presented surely in a text like Joshua i. 7 : *Only be thou strong and very courageous, that thou mayest observe to do according to all the law which Moses my servant commanded thee.* It takes courage to do as we are told, moral courage, civil courage, if we like to make any distinction between civil and military courage, although after all these point rather to different spheres of the exercise of the quality. In *Redgauntlet* Sir Walter Scott makes young Alan Fairford defend his father, the old Edinburgh lawyer. "I tell you he has courage enough to do what is right and to spurn what is wrong—courage enough to defend a righteous cause with hand and purse, and to take the part of the poor man against his oppressor, without fear of the consequences to himself. This is civil courage ; and it is of little consequence to most men in this age and country, whether they ever possess military courage at all." It is true that Joshua had to display military courage as well as civil, but I think this text may be broadened out to include the moral courage required in ordinary life to adhere to the line of duty, without giving way in self-pity or swerving before the irksomeness of a task. From my own experience I find it requires a good deal of sheer courage at times to be straightforward or to persevere or to put duty before pleasure.

I left church the other Sunday with my ears ringing and my mind rather disquieted. Our clergyman had been denouncing us for the sin of anger, religious or irreligious anger, and he did it in an angry, quarrelsome tone. His text was from James i. 19-20 : *Wherefore, my beloved brethren, let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to wrath : for the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God.* But there was very little of *my beloved brethren* in the discourse, and I felt, not bitterly, I hope, how easy it is for a preacher to fall into the scolding vein and so to defeat his own ends. It is common to hear a vigorous critic

of public morals or of Church life described as "prophetic." Yet there is no need for the preacher to be sarcastic and scathing, for this is apt to lead him into unqualified statements, which are more earnest than wise, and also to discount a large part of his message by setting up a resentment in his audience, a resentment not of their faults but of his fault-finding. When I got home I turned to the wise letter written by Cowper to John Newton about a preacher of this kind whom they both knew, a letter in which he remarks that "no man was ever scolded out of his sins. The heart, corrupt as it is, and because it is so, grows angry if it be not treated with sane management and good manners, and scolds again." As, I am afraid, many in our congregation did. Cowper continues, "There is no grace that the spirit of self can counterfeit with more success than religious zeal. A man thinks he is fighting for Christ, and he is fighting for his own notions." I admit that hasty temper and harsh judgments are a besetting sin of the religious world to-day, as they seem to have been when the apostle wrote. But they need to be "managed," as Cowper suggests. I would like to hear another sermon on this text, therefore, with more affection and insight in it, allowing, for example, that this ugly habit of anger is often the exaggeration or perversion of good qualities, such as a keen moral sense and a strong faculty of moral indignation. Also the preacher might bear in mind one or two laws of life, which have long since proved their wisdom in this difficult region of remonstrance, viz. (i.) that you should not scatter your fire and rebuke people for several faults all at once, and (ii.) that it is well to convey blame on the back of praise, first of all saying whatever you can by way of commending those whom you have afterwards to reprove.

More than once I have heard sermons upon the deep verses in the First Epistle of St. John, ch. ii. 15-17: *Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world. And the world passeth away, and the lust thereof; but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever.* But I cannot recollect any preacher drawing attention to what seems to me a vital truth in the apostolic warning. It is this, that to love the Father (for this, I understand, is the meaning

of *the love of the Father*), which is mentioned at the opening, is the same as doing the will of God, which is mentioned at the close. One might have expected that the apostle would have put his last clause thus, *but he that loveth the Father abideth for ever*. Yet he prefers this equivalent, as if to indicate that the love to God which he inculcates is best shown by obedience. And I find that in this he is reproducing the spirit of our Lord Himself, for it is remarkable that Jesus, at any rate in the first three gospels, hardly ever speaks of the duty of loving God, although this was a traditional religious expression for devotion; He rather says, *he that doeth the will of my Father in heaven*, or something like it. There is an avoidance of love-language, in the interests of reverence and dutiful service, as though to safeguard the religious life against emotionalism and sentimentalism. Boileau has a couplet somewhere which puts the same idea tersely:

"Qui fait exactement ce que ma loi commande,
A pour moi, dit le Dieu, l'amour que je demande."

And it was another Frenchman, the saintly Fénelon, who was much nearer than Boileau to the ethos of the New Testament, or at any rate to the ethos of an epistle like this—it was Fénelon who told a French noble once that "true love of God often consists in a dry, firm resolution to give up everything to Him." I might venture to suggest that some plain, unemotional Christians in our congregations would be re-assured if this aspect of the New Testament's teaching about love to God were made more clear to them by their clergymen.

A. R. M.

RECENT LITERATURE ON JEREMIAH.

(a) "THE Poetry of Jeremiah," by Prof. T. J. Meek, in *The Jewish Quarterly Review* (1924, pp. 281–291). The book of Jeremiah is an anthology of short oracles, and those which were written by Jeremiah prove him to have been a considerable poet. Objection is taken to Duhm's methods of reconstruction, particularly to his idea that Jeremiah wrote only in the kinah-measure. Specimens of the variety of measure used by the prophet are quoted. Thus the 2 + 2 line is found in i. 13–15a, 17–19, which is rendered thus:—

"And the word of Yahweh came unto me a second time saying :
What seest thou ? And I said :

A pot blown upon I see and its blower is from the north.

Then Yahweh said to me :

Out of the north the evil is about to be blown upon all the inhabitants of the earth ;

For behold I am summoning all the kingdoms of the north.

It is the oracle of Yahweh.

And thou, gird up thy loins, and arise and speak

All that I command thee.

Be not dismayed at them, lest I dismay thee before them.

And behold I will make thee unto them a fortress city ;

And they shall fight against thee, but they shall not prevail against thee,

For I will be with thee to deliver thee.

It is the oracle of Yahweh."

(b) "Die Anfänge des propheten Jeremia," by Dr. F. Horst, in *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* (1923, pp. 94-153). An attempt to show (i.) that Jeremiah began to prophesy immediately after the battle of Megiddo, and that the traditional chronology which dates his activity from the year 626 is incorrect ; (ii.) that the so-called "temple" speech in chapters vii. and xxvi., when critically studied, does not invalidate this hypothesis. Horst works with a theory of double recensions of the text, and develops a minute criticism of the text itself, in order to prove that Jeremiah had no connexion with the Deuteronomic reforms, although later editors sought to suggest this.

(c) In his article on "The psychology and metaphysic of Thus Saith Yahweh" (*Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft*, 1923, pp. 1-15), Principal H. W. Robinson uses Jeremiah to illustrate his argument that sometimes this phrase covers reflective processes as well as sudden, abnormal visions. Thus, in chapter xxviii., "We have an example of the strong conviction that may slowly emerge through conscious or subconscious reflection." Jeremiah at first cannot do more than doubt the facile optimism of Hananiah. Later on, he feels moved, in the name and authority of Yahweh, to expose its falsehood. Again, the truth that ethical judgments are valid is illustrated by Jeremiah, who "has hardly given us anything more illuminating than the words addressed to him by Yahweh: 'if thou wilt bring out the precious from the worthless, as my mouth shalt thou be.'" This saying, in xv. 19, means that "the prophetic

consciousness is virtually analysed as a spiritual value-judgment, just as an educated Quaker of to-day might analyse a message of the Spirit. The realm in which the prophetic consciousness works is supremely that of moral truth."

(d) "God and the world in the religious faith of Jeremiah," by Johann Hempel, in *The Journal of Religion* (1924, pp. 32-45). Jeremiah, from his personal experience, believed in the sovereignty of God, who could transfer the rule of the world from one race to another. This sublime faith led to an emphasis on reverent submission to the will of God "as it is expressed in history and in allegiance to the government which derives its power from God." Jeremiah, however, sees help as well as awful power in God. "No one so emphasised the sovereign power of Yahweh in the world and in the life of the individual as did Jeremiah, and no prophet before him, not even Hosea who stands nearest to him, so emphasised the mercy of Yahweh. To experience God means not to complain and to discuss about Him, not even in profound silence to lose ourselves in Him; it means for us men to submit to Him, and in the very defeat of our first ideals to learn by experience that God's power is mighty and bliss-giving in our weakness."

HERE AND THERE.

(i.) IN *The Journal of the American Oriental Society* (Oct. 1921, pp. 307-312) Professor N. Schmidt writes on the two recensions of the "Secrets of Enoch." In opposition to those who regard the shorter recension, B, as a Slavonic abbreviation of A, which is held to represent upon the whole the original Greek text, Professor Schmidt argues that B goes back to a Greek original which probably was "a translation of an Aramaic or Hebrew work, written in Palestine before the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D.," whereas A represents a later, expanded version. He points out that B, which omits the Hellenistic material of A, retains only one trace of it, viz. (xxiv. 2) the statement about creation from the invisible or non-existent. Yet this might have been made by a Palestinian Jew as "a protest against the notion that the world was created out of previously existing material."

(ii.) In the *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*

(1924, pp. 152, 153) Professor C. Bruston of Montauban offers an explanation of the two names for the pillars at Solomon's temple (1 Kings vii. 21). What do "Jachin" and "Boaz" mean? Basing his argument on a Neo-Punic inscription, discovered in Tunis, which invokes the aid of the goddess Anath, the daughter of Boaz, and which describes Anath as "fille de celui en qui est la force," Professor Bruston contends that Boaz and Baal are names of the same Phœnician deity. "Jachin Boaz" meant "Celui en qui est la force (Baal) maintiendra (cet édifice)." This was taken over by Solomon for Yahweh. "Jachin" therefore is equivalent to "il maintiendra," and "Boaz" (= en qui est la force) describes the deity further.

(iii.) In the *Revue d'histoire Ecclésiastique* (October, pp. 547-574) Father Pinard concludes his series of articles upon the theory of religious experience from Luther to William James. The closing pages deal fully with Ritschl and Ritschlianism, the French symbolo-fideists, and the pragmatists, although the writer is too removed from these thinkers by his dogmatic axioms to enter into their contributions. He has no difficulty in noting their philosophical and religious defects, but the analysis, for all its lucidity, is of use mainly to those who resent "le rejet péremptoire de tout dogme défini."

REVIEWS.

Some Recent Contributions to the Study of the Old Testament.

WHILST it would be entirely untrue to suggest that the work of criticism, whether "higher" or "textual," has yet reached a point of final or even temporary stability, it is undoubtedly true that it has assumed a position of relatively less importance in the Old Testament studies of the last few years. It has been realised that it is of necessity a subordinate and ancillary element in the general subject. It is, of course, essential to have some idea of the relative dates and of the general structure of the documents, for without this a genuine study of the messages of the Old Testament and an interpretation of the revelation of God to and through Israel would be sadly inadequate, but no one now seriously thinks that the more mechanical features of Old Testament work form an end in themselves.

To-day, then, the centre of emphasis has shifted from purely literary research to an attempt to discover and expound the method by which Israel was gradually led to such an appreciation of truth as would make it possible for the supreme revelation in Jesus to be intelligible. In other words, it is the history of the religion of Israel which now attracts the attention of the serious student. The advance that has been made in a single generation is most striking. Hardly more than twenty-five years ago the fallow ground was broken by men like Wellhausen, Marti and Smend, and it was difficult to find anything in English except the most elementary text-book to recommend to enquiring students. To-day the subject can no more be adequately treated in a single volume than can the history of England or of any other European country. Recent contributions have necessarily confined themselves to some particular portion of the field. The actual area covered is extremely wide, and special attention has been given to comparative studies and to folklore; both these branches have proved fruitful in the interpretation and orientation of much that would otherwise have remained obscure or isolated.

In his latest contribution to the series of studies issued by the Faculty of Protestant Theology of the University of Strasburg, Professor A. Causse¹ traces the development of a single element in the religion of Israel. He realises that one of the essential features of the Jewish faith—essential, that is, for the creed which was to give birth to Christianity—is its universalism. This, of course, is no part of original Hebrew religious thought, and, indeed, in the earlier stages the stress was inevitably laid on a spiritual particularism. Israel had to learn that whilst other gods might be valid objects of worship and service for other peoples, she must confine her own attention to her own national deity. This learnt, she could proceed to find out what manner of God He was, and the insistence of the pre-exilic Prophets on the universal control and the universal moral demands of the God of Israel paved the way for a fuller monotheism. Passages like the “floating oracle” preserved in Isaiah ii. 2-4 and Micah iv. 1-4 show that there were those in her midst who looked for a time when Jerusalem should be

¹ *Israël et la Vision de l'Humanité*, Librairie Istra, Strasbourg and Paris, 1924. Pp. 152. 8 fr.

the religious centre for the race. The individualism of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, together with the doctrine of the New Covenant attributed to the former, made it yet easier for their successors to see that the God of Israel, so far from being a mere tribal patriot-god, was the one object of the spiritual aspirations of all humanity. This doctrine at length becomes explicit in Deutero-Isaiah and in such later passages as Isaiah lvi. 1-9 and lx.

With the Return, however, and still more with the establishment of the Law, particularism wins a fresh triumph. Israel has been oppressed amongst the nations, and though her God is now recognised as the One Living and True, she thinks of Him as caring only for Israel, and excluding from His favour all who are outside the political community. There were, nevertheless, especially amongst the Psalmists and the writers of the Wisdom Literature, Jews who cultivated a wider outlook. A similar spirit appeared in some of the prophetic writings, especially in the Book of Jonah. But it was inevitable that, in the conflict with Hellenism in the second century, the progress of this liberalism should receive a more or less severe check, and whilst there is a universalistic element in apocalypse, it is far from being as prominent as in such documents as Book III. of the Sybilline Oracles and the Book of Wisdom. The tendency was rather to look for the triumph of Israel and the universal subjection or destruction of other peoples.

Professor Causse has done valuable service in tracing the history of this universalism. It cannot, of course, be said that he propounds any startlingly new thesis, or brings to light facts that had been obscured. Perhaps one remark may prove in the long run to be a fresh and useful contribution to our appreciation of the history of Israel, and that is the suggestion that the imperial nations of the east imposed on conquered peoples some cultic and ritual elements which would indicate their subordination: "Un traité d'alliance se scellait par l'adoption des cultes de la nation alliée. Après une guerre, les vaincus rendaient hommage aux dieux des vainqueurs et les recevaient dans leur sanctuaire." The evidence for this statement is not cited, but, in addition to the narrative of the new altar of Ahaz, there seems ground for believing it to be justified. In that case the reforms which took place under Hezekiah and Josiah

may well have had a political as well as a religious aspect, and may have involved some gesture of independence. But even apart from such suggestions as this the work of Professor Causse has an importance and a value. He has collected and isolated for us a great deal of useful material, and has set it in order. Further, he has the true historian's instinct for a guiding principle, and he makes it abundantly clear that the real progress that Israel made in the direction which he is particularly studying was always due to the Diaspora. It was the wider knowledge of humanity that made her a missionary people, in so far as she ever earned that title, and in a very real sense it was her sufferings that gave her such comprehension as she had of her ultimate function. The same truth was to be manifested in the infant Christian Church also, for she only grew into a sense of her world-wide mission through the scattering blows of persecution. The nest must be stirred up before the eaglets will learn to fly. It is difficult to thank Professor Causse too warmly for having brought this home so strongly to his readers.

A far higher degree of originality must be claimed for Professor Mowinckel's fourth instalment of his *Psalmestudien*.¹ The author is already known in this country (though not as widely as his work deserves) for his acute study of the composition of the Book of Jeremiah, which should give an entirely new turn (though he probably owes something to Erbt) to the criticism of that book. His studies in the Psalms appear at first sight to be even more revolutionary than his work on Jeremiah. It may indeed be said that they involve far more than a mere critical question such as the meaning of the titles of the Psalms, and belong to a scheme of reconstruction of the details of Jewish ritual. It has been customary to rely on such details as are preserved in the Mishnah and other Rabbinic writings for our views on this subject, but Professor Mowinckel seems to be striking out an entirely new line in this series of essays on the Psalms. In the preceding volume (*Kultprophetie und prophetische Psalmen*) he propounded the thesis that not only the official cultic persons, i.e. the Priests, but also the Prophets were granted a formal place in the liturgy of Israel, and that many of the Psalms which involve a divine answer

¹ Sigmund Mowinckel, *Die technischen Termini in den Psalmenüberschriften*. Jacob Dybwad, Kristiania, 1923. Pp. vi. + 52.

to petition for deliverance from war or disease were ascribed to the prophetic share in the ritual. Whilst some of his readers will feel that he has drawn too liberally on Babylonian parallels, and that the inclusion of the Prophets in a cultic scheme is improbable, his theory is stimulating and interesting. In the work which has most recently appeared he goes still further, and endeavours to explain the titles which stand at the head of the Psalms by reference to the details of the worship, especially at certain festivals.

The dominant view up to the present is one which roughly divides these titles into two classes, (a) those which indicate the source or sources from which a particular Psalm has been taken, (b) those which convey musical instructions as to the kind of tune to which the Psalm is to be sung or other practical guides to worship. To the first class belong the proper names involved, which show to what earlier collections of religious poems the Psalms in question had belonged. So also such names as "Mizmor" (Psalm) and "Shir" (Song) pointed to groups and collections which were in existence before the final compilation of the whole book. On the other hand, such phrases as "Aijelet Shahr"—"The hind of the dawn"—showed that the Psalm was to be sung to the tune of a well-known song which began with these words. The two divisions are not exhaustive, but they will serve to suggest the general type of theory which is to-day most widely held by Old Testament students.

Professor Mowinckel will have little or none of this. He insists at the outset that the Psalms in our Psalter "are real cult-songs, which are only to be understood in connexion with definite cultic situations and practices (*Handlungen*)."¹ The particular rite to which each Psalm was appropriate, and to some extent its general character, might be gathered from these notes at the head. It will be obvious that such a position involves in some detail a knowledge of the actual course taken by the ritual of at least the main festal occasions, and Professor Mowinckel's theories, in so far as they are not philological, are based on his reconstructions of that ritual.

Apart from the personal names, such as David, Asaph and others, which Professor Mowinckel seems to regard as indications of authorship, he finds four classes of meaning conveyed

by these titles. The first includes those which give a general or more particular description of the character of the poem. Such are the words "Shir" (Song) and "Mizmor" (Psalm), which he regards as identical in meaning. Of these the former is a textual alternative for the latter. "Shir" is the ordinary Hebrew word for song, and "Mizmor" is a term of Babylonian origin which in its own home meant the same as the Hebrew. In Hebrew, however, the word is confined to sacred song, and thus indicates that a part, at any rate, of the ritual is Babylonian in origin. The "Songs of Degrees" or "Songs of Ascents" are not Pilgrim hymns, as is commonly supposed, but processional hymns, and were sung in the Temple itself, not on the road thereto. "Michtam," one of the standing puzzles of the Psalter, is explained as a Babylonian term implying that the hymn was sung in connexion with some ritual of atonement. A "Maschil" is a song of propitiation, but has possibly developed a specialised meaning which is no longer recoverable.

Professor Mowinckel notes, in dealing with the words and phrases which he interprets as of musical significance, the curious fact that in no case is an instrument mentioned which is known to us from the secular life of Israel. From this he justly argues that whatever these titles mean, they do not refer to the instruments which were to be used in accompaniments, and must be explained along other lines. It is possible, nevertheless, that such a form as "Higgaion" or "Shiggaion" may imply special musical emphasis, whether by the voices or the orchestra or both. "Sela" lays special stress on some point in a Psalm, possibly by means of some response or refrain, and whilst accepting the usual derivation from a root *sl* Mowinckel adds an interesting reference to the rendering in Aquila's translation. He also gives an illuminating analysis of the different passages in which the form is found. It may be remarked that a similar, though not identical, explanation was given some years ago by Miss E. Briggs.

It will be noticed that these are the only terms which Mowinckel includes amongst the musical notes. He definitely excludes the idea that any of the existing phrases can refer to tunes, as has often been supposed. Seven forms are held by him to indicate the purpose of the Psalms with which they are

connected. In view of his interest in ritual, it is noteworthy that he definitely denies that לְתוֹדָה, "for praise" or "for thanks" can refer to a thank-offering, as most students have thought. This is because the preposition, which to him indicates a cultic occasion, is not ל but עַל. "Leannoth" (Ps. lxxxviii.) he re-points, and makes it a description of the Psalm as one of self-humiliation. "To bring to remembrance" suggests a Psalm which recalls the iniquity either of the singer or of his enemies. "Jeduthun" is of particular importance, inasmuch as its occurrence in Chronicles shows that the latter compilation was not the source on which the Editor of the Psalter drew for his headings. The word seems to mean "recognition." "To teach" (Ps. lx.) has a reference to the Prophetic element in the ritual. The fullest discussion in the whole book is given to the term לְמִנְצֵחַ, normally rendered "to the chief musician," and supposed by Briggs and others to have been the title of an earlier collection of Psalms. The discussion is too long to be followed here; suffice it to say that Mowinckel finds it necessary to re-point the word and explains it as an abstract noun implying that the object of the Psalms to which it is prefixed was to secure the favour of Yahweh.

Finally, a group of ten phrases—those introduced by the preposition עַל ("upon")—includes those which refer to special features in the actual cultus. Thus the phrase "Jonath elem rechokim," which is sometimes rendered "The dove of the distant oaks," is explained as indicating a point in some special ritual concerned with the removal or cure of disease. "Aijeleth Shahar," "The hind of the dawn," becomes the ewe offered at the sacrifice of a sin-offering at the moment when the dawn grows red. The "Shoshannim" or "Lilies" (or "Shushaneduth") implies a flower-ritual. These were either offered at the Ark or used in securing an answer from the divine oracle. "Mahalath" is sickness, especially when caused by witches, and Psalms bearing that title (liii., lxxxviii.) are to be used to counter such sickness. A similar explanation is given of "Nehiloth." For "Alamoth," which an earlier generation explained as indicating a Psalm to be sung by female or soprano voices (the term "Sheminith" was supposed to refer to the bass), Mowinckel draws a picture of a processional ritual which culminated in the symbolic enthronement of Yahweh. "Alamoth"

he explains as "mysteries" in accordance with the rendering of the LXX, and supposes that Psalms with this title were intended to expound the meaning of the coronation ritual to the worshippers and spectators. "Sheminith" is derived from the numeral eight, and is connected with the eighth or final act in the ritual of the purification of sufferers who have recovered from certain forms of sickness. "Gittith," again, Mowinckel thinks, cannot possibly refer to Gath, but is connected with the return of the Ark to Jerusalem, and some processional festival which commemorated that event—if, indeed, the event was not invented to account for the festival. "Al tashhith" is the general title prefixed to the first Psalm in each of several groups, each of which contained Psalms which were prayers for deliverance.

Mowinckel's study of the subject is most interesting; his discussions are acute and scholarly, and many of his points are well made and supported by reference to a fairly wide range of Old Testament literature. It is well that we should have fresh suggestions to consider on these strange and tantalising phrases, whose meaning seems so obscure to the average reader of the Psalter. No future study of the question can afford to neglect this book, though it does not follow that Mowinckel's opinions will ultimately hold the field. It may be that a final judgment is impossible. The main importance of the work lies in the assumption of Babylonian influence in the Jewish cultus, and it is impossible not to feel that here the author has called our attention to a new possibility which many of us had not previously considered. It is here that the real challenge of the book lies. In itself the attempt to reconstruct ritual, especially the processional enthronement of the God of Israel, may seem a conjecture which has as little basis as many others, but the other suggestion lies behind it, and a fuller knowledge of the forms of worship characteristic of Mesopotamian religion may yet help to throw more light on the nature of not a few obscure features in Jewish religious life and practice.

T. H. ROBINSON.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

MR. C. H. WELCH publishes *The Apostle of the Reconciliation* (F. P. Brininger, London, 7s. 6d.), a study of acts and the Pauline Epistles, to prove that a momentous crisis occurs between Acts xxviii. 27 and Acts xxviii. 28 ; this is said to mark the boundary between the earlier and the later "dispensation," because in the former Israel is addressed as a nation, whereas in the latter a new "mystery" of Christ for the Gentiles is developed, as is evident in the prison epistles, which do not quote the Old Testament. Thus, in Romans xvi. 25-27 a secret is said to have been at last revealed. What is this "secret" or mystery? "The inner portion of Romans [i.e. i. 6 f.] will answer—Adam. . . . The gospel had been preached during the Acts and men of all nations had been urged to repentance, but no word had been breathed concerning the mystery of Adam and Christ. When we know *that*, we are at the very centre of things. Then we face not merely national issues, but the destiny of the race" (pp. 218, 219). There is a zeal, sincere but not always according to knowledge, elsewhere in this book, a zeal for the apostle Paul. Acts was written, Mr. Welch claims, to vindicate Paul's apostleship, "and in humbler form, and in faulty fashion, but with the same end in view, this present volume is largely penned. To rehabilitate Paul as the minister of the risen and ascended Christ to the Gentiles would of itself revolutionise Christianity to-day." Paul had to discourage some of his partisan admirers at Corinth. And I fear he would do the same to-day, if he were among us.

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Benham's Book of Quotations. By W. Gurney Benham, F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S. Ward Lock & Co. Cloth, 15s. net ; half leather, 25s. net.

Italics may be the resort of the forcible-feeble, and one ought to avoid them in ordinary prose ; but anyone who has used the earlier editions of this book will understand why we are tempted to write, "This is *the* book of quotations." We get over twelve hundred pages of "quotations from British and American authors, with many thousands of Proverbs, Familiar Phrases and Sayings, from all sources, including Hebrew, Arabic, Greek, Latin, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and other languages."

The references are exact, admirably classified, and distinctly printed. It is seventeen years since this handbook was issued ; Mr. Benham has now added to it and improved it, till it is more than ever an indispensable companion for the study-table. He says in the preface that he will be most grateful for additional references, etc., for use in future editions. It is the least one can do, by way of gratitude to him, to suggest some other quotations, though he has probably exercised his judgment already upon them. But Seneca's epistles are full of sententious maxims, for example, like "Non amo illum, nisi offendo" (I do not love the man, unless I am willing to hurt his feelings, *Epist.* xxv. 1), and "Vivit is qui multis usui est, vivit is qui se utitur" (he really lives who is of use to many, he really lives who makes use of himself, *Epist.* lx. 4). To the quotations from Crabbe, these terse lines might perhaps be added :

"'Twould give me joy some gracious deed to meet,
That has not called for glory through the street."
"Man is but man, and what he most desires,
Pleases at first ; then pleases not ; then tires."
"Books were his horror, dinner his delight."

Another good word from R. L. Stevenson would be : "Acts may be forgiven ; not even God can forgive the hanger-back," and Addison's *Spectator* yields, "For one cruel parent we meet with a thousand undutiful children," and "There is nothing which more denotes a great mind than the abhorrence of envy and detraction." The quotations from Tupper might be spared or reduced in order to make room for telling sentences like these : "One half of the world cannot understand the pleasures of the other" (Jane Austen, *Emma*), "There seems to be no part of knowledge in fewer hands than that of discerning when to have done" (Swift, *Tale of a Tub*), "It is not what you lose but what you have daily to bear that is hard" (Thackeray, *The Newcomes*), and Guicciardini's remark that "the most fatal neutrality is that which comes not from choice but from irresolution." On page 465 Mr. Benham quotes the well-known quotation, "Steal not this book, etc." He notes that there are many variants, and, as most bookmen suffer from people who borrow and fail to return a volume, we may furnish him with the full version.

"Steal not this book for fear of shame,
For here you see the owner's name.

But if you do, the Lord will say,
 'Where is that book you stole away ?'
 And if you say, 'I cannot tell,'
 The Lord will say, 'Go down to hell.'
 [And if you say, 'I do not know,'
 The Lord will say, 'Go down below.']"

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Dr. John Dickie, Professor of Systematic Theology in Knox College, Dunedin, publishes a pamphlet on *The Fundamental Principles of the Reformed Conception of the Church* (Aberdeen : James G. Bisset). It is a lecture delivered in New Zealand at a gathering of ministers summoned to discuss the Lambeth proposals for the re-union of Christendom. Dr. Dickie is frank and scholarly. He interprets the Reformation doctrine as implying that the Church exists to realise the Kingdom. "In our view the work of the Church is essentially an unrelenting war with evil, and the members of the Church are soldiers on active service, and must be judged as to the reality of their Church membership by something like the standards we apply to men actually confronted with the enemy." Hence he cannot allow that it is any special form of ministry which constitutes the Church. The lecture is critical, in the good sense of the term ; it criticises actual circumstances in the light of an ideal principle.

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We have to welcome another new magazine, this time from Canada. *The Canadian Journal of Religious Thought*, published at Toronto, is a bi-monthly which is intended to express Canadian thought ; it represents a number of the Churches, and aims to cover a wide field of interests. Each issue contains one article from outside, but the contributions otherwise are Canadian, though by no means local in spirit or in subject. We cordially wish success to a magazine like this, which seeks to educate as well as to interest its readers, on the principle that "the greatest of all heterodoxies is the heterodoxy of the heart that is not valiant for the truth that it accepts and claims to live by."

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Springs in the Desert. By the Rev. J. H. Jowett, C.H., D.D.
 Hodder and Stoughton. 5s.

These seventy-eight devotional studies in the psalter are brief and felicitous. The Authorised Version of the psalter is not quite equal to the Prayer Book Version, but it is studded with

suggestive phrases, which have acquired devotional associations. Dr. Jowett skilfully plays upon some of these. There was no one who followed Dr. George Matheson so aptly in the choice and handling of such phrases. For example, upon Psalm xxxvi. 5 ("Thy faithfulness reacheth unto the clouds"), he observes that while clouds shift and alter yet they "are not the creation of caprice"; the moral is that a steady purpose of God underlies all the changeable circumstances of life, and the meditation is entitled, "The Vicissitudes of Life." Those who felt the charm of Dr. Jowett's preaching, when he lived, and many more, will welcome this characteristic volume of meditations from his graceful pen.

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Professor A. R. Gordon, of Montreal, has reached the period of the kings and prophets in the fourth volume of his *Bible Stories Retold for the Young* (Hodder and Stoughton : 5s.). As it happens, the prophets are more heroic figures than most of the kings. But Professor Gordon gets useful warnings out of the monarchs, and his addresses are faithful transcripts, with a moral suggested unobtrusively. He likes to close each with a bit of verse. Thus, the tale of Elijah's cruel treatment of the soldiers, in the first chapter of Second Kings, is contrasted with the rebuke addressed by Jesus to the disciples who wished to call down fire upon the churlish Samaritan villagers; Dr. Gordon remarks that we must only follow even the prophets "in so far as they had the Spirit of Christ," and quotes from Whittier's lines on Barclay of Ury. The volume is a successful attempt to expound the stirring incidents of the period. Dr. Gordon has enriched it by some more correct translations of certain passages. Thus, by a single word, he suggests the real meaning of Elijah's word to Israel at Mount Carmel. "How long halt ye between two opinions?" suggests to the ordinary reader that the people were blamed for being undecided, for doing nothing at all, instead of making up their minds. What the prophet meant was, as Dr. Gordon renders it, "How long will ye go on limping between two opinions?"

CURRENT ISSUES.

LAST month we noticed the acute protest of Professor E. F. Scott against the undue claims made by some psychologists in the sphere of religion. The same subject is treated by Professor E. J. Price in the July number of the *Hibbert Journal*. He too is moved to point out that psychology is neither theology nor philosophy, and that it has strict limitations when one comes to interpret what is involved in the mental processes which it analyses.

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Professor Price takes the question of prayer. Now many psychologists find no difficulty whatever in prayer. They recognise the immense aid that prayer brings to certain natures. But they explain this commonly as the result of auto-suggestion. Under our lives there is supposed to lie a reservoir of energy of which we are normally unconscious, but on which we draw in hours of special stress. "Prayer is just one of the means through which these resources are tapped, and its efficacy depends upon faith in the process of prayer and upon persistence." That is, prayer is a form of suggestion. In tense moments we suggest to ourselves this reservoir within, and as we believe in it we are the better and braver.

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But psychology cannot rule out the religious belief that in prayer we are in touch with more than our own subconscious state. "If prayer is no more than the release of our own sub-conscious resources by way of suggestion," as Professor Price rightly asks, "is it more than lifting ourselves up by our own bootlaces? Will a man continue to pray if he believes that in prayer he is merely tapping his own subconscious?" The hypothesis of a divine activity in prayer is essential even from the philosophical point of view, as some psychologists are

ready to admit, and it is absolutely essential from the religious point of view.

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For in prayer the religious man's desire is to be with Another, in touch with Another's life, not with his own. Dean Burroughs brings this out in his excellent little pamphlet on *Prayer in Practice*, contributed to the "Anglican Evangelical Movement" series. He is arguing that in prayer man expresses his desire to be consciously with God; that, and not the desire to have some petition granted, is the primary element in prayer. He tells this anecdote by way of illustration. "A small girl came into her father's study when he was specially busy. 'Well, child,' he asked, a little sharply, 'what do you want now?' And he felt he had learned a lesson in the meaning of prayer when the child answered, 'Nothing, father, I only want to be with you.'"

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This thought, that God's presence is our supreme help, is brought out in the last chapter of the epistle to the Hebrews. The writer declares that God "hath said, I will never leave thee, nor forsake thee. So that we may boldly say, The Lord is my helper." Why this confidence? Simply because to be assured of God's unfailing presence is the supreme help of life. If we have that, we have everything. It is not a question of Him doing this or that for us, but of Him never leaving us to ourselves—never leaving us to face the difficulties of life with only the subconscious to fall back upon!

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The Scottish Church Society has issued a posthumous volume of sermons by the late Professor James Cooper, of the University of Glasgow. It is called *Kindness to the Dead and other Sermons*. Professor Cooper's historical and dogmatic interests are well known to many, and these, together with his rare devoutness of spirit, come out in these thirteen discourses. One of them is on "The Church and the Poets." It was preached in Jedburgh Parish Church on September 20, 1903, to commemorate the meeting of Wordsworth and Scott in that town a hundred years before.

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Professor Cooper recalls the fact that both Scott and Wordsworth influenced to some extent the Oxford movement, which, as he says, "restored the true Catholic faith" in Denmark as

well as in England. He recalls the congregation to "a more diligent study of their works, a more familiar acquaintance with their poetry, a nearer fellowship with their lofty and noble spirits. If in their writings there be aught that is *true and honest*, aught that is *just, and pure, and lovely, and of good report*; if there be *any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things*. So shall they welcome you at the last, not judge you."

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Professor Cooper, of course, admits that Wordsworth was the greater poet of the two. I do not think he would have admitted this of Byron. He once argued to me solemnly that Byron's poetry was inferior to that of Scott. Which, of course, was the result of a moralistic estimate, the same kind of estimate that makes some of John Wesley's criticisms of literature sound so strange. But in this sermon he contrasts Scott not with Byron but with Burns. And Scott, he claims, was a truer prophet than Burns. For "the direction, at least, in which Burns was moving, was to something colder and less living still" than the rigid Calvinism against which both he and Scott reacted. Burns' tendency "was toward Socinianism—that denial of our Lord's Divinity which always has meant spiritual death."

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The EXPOSITOR has always welcomed contributions from any quarter of the earth, but it is not often that one has come from China. We have special pleasure in publishing this month the first part of an essay by Mr. H. H. Rowley, who is teaching in the Shantung Christian University at Tsinanfu. Mr. Rowley was trained under the late Professor Buchanan Gray at Oxford, and his paper is of special importance just now, when in certain quarters there is too much reactionary writing on the book of Daniel. We hope soon to publish a new study of the prophet Nahum by Mr. W. W. Cannon, whose pages on Hosea during the earlier months of this year have excited such deserved interest.

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The Bishops of the American Protestant Episcopal Church recently issued a manifesto, calling for a stricter adhesion to the letter of the creeds. Among other statements they declared that it is "irreconcilable with the vows voluntarily made at ordination for a minister of this Church to deny, or to suggest doubt as to the facts and truths declared in the Apostles' Creed."

There are a hundred and forty-four bishops, and sixty-five were present at this gathering. Now the Faculty of the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge has taken up this manifesto, and issued a statement with regard to it. The controversy does not concern outsiders vitally, except in so far as it raises questions long familiar to the Churches in this country. But the Faculty make some remarks which are of wide significance.

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One is, that any dispute in the Church requires to be managed in a Christian spirit. The Faculty are addressing the alumni of the school. They point out wisely that the issue is an opportunity. An opportunity for what? Not for sarcastic talk. Not for a Pharisaic spirit. "May we all take the opportunity to seek out those with whom we disagree, and in conversation and conference talk things over with the utmost candour, remembering that we are brothers in one family, assuming that the religious experience of him with whom we talk is as deep and as rich as our own."

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This is indeed a true word. A hard saying, no doubt, but one which is only hard as people forget their common membership in the Church. Differences of opinion are a trial, a trial in families and in the family of the Church. What gives the right atmosphere in which they can be handled is the generous spirit inculcated by our American friends. Controversy may be an extraordinarily useful thing in the Church. That is, if it is on fundamental questions. Also, if it is carried on with a proper spirit of humility, without self-seeking. But zeal for the truth is apt to conceal personal animosities, and to produce a scornful temper in which the right cause may be urged on entirely wrong principles.

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A number of years ago Dr. A. B. Davidson called attention to a feature in the Old Testament which surprises the modern reader. It is the emphasis upon the sins of the tongue, sins like slander and backbiting. The psalms are full of warnings against this odious class of sins. Some of the psalmists seem to have suffered from imputations and false charges. They knew what was meant by the "strife of tongues," the sharp words that fall from religious people in a temper, the poisonous gossip

that spreads trouble in a community. In those days public opinion was largely a matter of talk. Orientals had a gift of abusive speech, which took the place of the modern newspapers.

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But Dr. Davidson pointed out one difference between the old world and our own. He slyly observed that "in those days, from the want of the means of public speech, slander was the weapon of strong men; it has now very much fallen into the hands of the weak things of the world, such as controversial writers on Scripture, and we mind it less." We mind it less, personally, perhaps. But it is a sin which we are bound to do something to overcome in others, even to rebuke, in the hope of exorcising it. We ought to shame such people out of their habit of making insinuations against other Christians who may not happen to share their opinions about doctrines like inspiration. If they can be shamed out of such evil practices, it is all to the good. And the way suggested by our American friends is the excellent way, to try if possible to get into touch with them, not in any superior spirit but with the desire to understand one another better.

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The other wise word to which attention should be called in this declaration, comes at the close. The Faculty confess that the real ground of anxiety to-day does not lie, for them, exactly where the good bishops seem to see it. The supreme reason for anxiety lies not in any divergence over matters of opinion but in "our halfheartedness in the religious affirmations that we share." What they mean is that the practical confession of Christ as Lord is the trying test. "Are we prepared to accept in our lives the implications of that confession, to permit Christ to be the Lord of our appetites, the Lord of our relations with our neighbours, the Lord of our family life, of our industrial and business relations?"

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It is a right and timely thing to recall this difficulty of difficulties. It does not mean that the importance of truth or doctrine is denied or minimised. It is not an attempt to evade inconvenient questions, or to shirk honest statements of belief. Rather it is a sense that when such a problem of loyalty to the Lord is recognised to be the central thing, then this recognition

will give the right focus for looking at any other issue. There is no surer way of rising above the censorious spirit in religious controversy than the practice of this habit, the habit of calling ourselves to strict account for our loyalty to the faith of our Lord. All else in the Church is a means to that end.

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Controversy is apt to suffer from the lack of perspective and proportion. The secondary assumes the place of the primary. People almost forget the end of religion in their ardent concern for the means. The immediate issue seems to bulk more largely in the mind than what is central, and the result is an irritable spirit. It is possible that even such Christian words as those we have just quoted from this American statement may sound to some beside the mark, and annoy instead of attracting. For it is one law of life that we dislike those who cannot bring themselves to share our eager opinions almost more than those who actually oppose them. People resent the attitude of one who seems to take a larger view, looking over their heads to deeper issues and a larger horizon. Yet it is such spirits who are in the right. Difficulties, doubts? Yes, but as Principal Denney used to say, in his incisive manner, "there is only one real religious difficulty, the difficulty of being religious." The need of the Church is to concentrate on that; in other words to do, as our American friends want their bishops to do, to call ourselves and others humbly and strictly to account for the measure of our practical loyalty to the gospel we profess.

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If anyone desires to know fully and painfully the meaning of "I have seen an end of all perfection," let him publish a translation of the New Testament. I have revised my own with care three times since it was first published, and lynx-eyed critics have helped in the work. But one slip remained undetected till the other day, when Dr. Forrest, of the University of Virginia, who was doing some critical work upon the book of Revelation, noticed that Rev. v. 6 ran, "It had seven heads and seven eyes!" In his communication he kindly remarks, "As there is no authority in any manuscript or version for *heads*, it is no doubt a misprint for the usual reading *horns*." It is. I take this opportunity of thanking Dr. Forrest and of calling attention penitently to the slip, that readers may correct it for themselves.

*THE TEN BEST BOOKS ON THE PROPHETIC
LITERATURE.*

THE study of the Prophetic literature of the Old Testament has many aspects, and could be surveyed from many points of view. Within the compass of a single article it is only possible to touch upon some of these aspects, and to refer to the more important literature of the subject ; and even this can only be attempted cursorily. The selection of "the ten best books," where so much that is important is involved, must, in any case, be open to the charge of a certain degree of arbitrariness, which can only be reduced, to some extent, by allowing the selection to emerge from a larger setting, in which some attempt will be made to indicate what is relatively important. It will be convenient to deal with the subject under three main divisions :—(1) The nature and historical development of Hebrew Prophecy ; (2) the place of Prophecy in the development of Hebrew Religion ; and (3) the critical interpretation of Hebrew Prophecy. The relevant literature, as the subjects themselves, cannot always be kept distinct, but will sometimes overlap.

I.

It has often been pointed out that the application of the historical-critical method of exegesis to the text of the Old Testament, and the critical reconstruction that has followed, has meant the recovery almost of something which had been lost, or rather of something which, if not actually lost, had been preserved in a state of suspended animation. This fact emerges clearly when we study the method of interpreting Scripture which, at a comparatively early date, became predominant in the Christian Church. The Hellenised Christian communities found it difficult to

assimilate the Jewish Scriptures. Yet the Old Testament, which had been the Bible of Christ and the Apostles, could not be rejected outright by the Catholic Church. Hence arose the allegorical method of interpretation, which still dominates the minds of countless numbers of Christian people, and is largely enshrined in the headings of the Authorised Version. The allegorical method was applied especially to Prophecy, and a study of it historically is very instructive. An excellent discussion of this subject is given by a competent Old Testament scholar in America, Professor K. Fullerton, in a volume entitled *Prophecy and Authority*, published in 1919.¹ The following passage will illustrate this line of treatment :

“The argument from prophecy was one of the most important factors . . . in the apologetics of the first two centuries. It was necessarily the burning question between Jew and Christian wherever they came into real debate with one another. It was the cornerstone in the system of the Greek Apologists. It played a fundamental part in what was one of the most critical struggles in the history of the Church, the struggle with the Gnostic and Marcionite heresies. These heretics attempted for the first time something like an historical criticism of the Old Testament. . . . They pointed out in particular certain features of Messianic prophecy which, though long denied, have been finally recognised by a scientific exegesis. But their criticism was carried on in the interest of theories fatal to the life of the Church. If they had succeeded in inducing the Church to reject the Law and the Prophets, they would have removed the foundation upon which Jesus himself claimed to build (Marcion significantly denied Mt. v. 27, a passage often cited against him), and would have smoothed the way for a complete Hellenisation of Christianity. Hence the apologetic importance for the Early Church of the argument from prophecy cannot be too strongly emphasised. *It saved the Old Testament to the Christian religion in the only way in which at that time it could be saved.* But in saving the Old Testament it preserved the organic connexion of Christianity with the previous history of revelation and prevented it from becoming evaporated into theosophical speculations, or distorted into a one-sided, because unhistorical, development.”²

¹ The Macmillan Company (sub-title : *A Study in the History of the Doctrine and Interpretation of Scripture*).

² P. 38 f.

The revival of Hebrew studies at the Reformation gradually paved the way for a more real exegesis of the Old Testament, which, however, could not be attained in any effective way till the rise of modern Criticism.

The consideration of the essential nature of the Hebrew conception of the prophetic calling can best be approached by a study of the meaning of the term that is most characteristic among the descriptive terms applied to the order generally—viz. *nabî'*, pl. *nēbî'im*. There are excellent discussions to be found in the various introductory volumes dealing with Hebrew prophecy, of which the following may be mentioned here:—Robertson Smith's classical treatise, *The Prophets of Israel*², pp. 390 ff., Dr G. A. Smith's *Book of the Twelve Prophets*, I. ch. ii., and Cornill's *Der Israelitische Prophetismus*⁶, pp. 9 ff. The discussion in the last two mentioned works is specially fresh and interesting. Cornill infers from the fact that *nabî'* cannot be explained from a corresponding verb in old Hebrew—no such root being used—that the term was originally imported into Hebrew from outside sources. The verbal equivalent in Arabic means "to announce," sc. a message; hence may be derived the sense of commissioned speaker.

With this may be compared the Assyrian *nabû* "to call," "inform," "command"; cf. Nebo, Isaiah xlv. 1; in Ethiopic *nabāba* = "to speak." The earlier view that *nābî'* could be explained from נָבַח "bubble up" (Kuenen, Wellhausen, Stade) is not now generally held.

König, in his interesting article, "Prophecy" (*Hebrew*), in Hastings' *Dictionary of Rel. and Ethics*, interprets the term as meaning "speakers," but in a unique sense, i.e. "they were heralds or messengers in the highest sphere of human interests, viz. religion." The word is never used in connexion with legal matters as if it meant "counsel" or "advocate." It may, therefore, be inferred that "the Hebrew *nabî'* was the 'speaker' in the religious sphere,

thus corresponding to the Greek *προφήτης*, originally 'the interpreter of the oracle,' and thus 'the expounder of divine revelation,' so that neither term at first connoted the idea of prediction." König brings out clearly the distinction of the prophets as such from priests and judges, and also from "the wise." It is important to emphasise the fact that the prophet is essentially a *speaker*; he delivers the "word" with the living voice. The writing down of the living word marks a later stage. And this is essentially true, of course, of the great prophets whose oracles have come down to us in written form. The delivery of the prophetic oracle would often be accompanied by appropriate gestures and active movements of the body, as well as certain striking and symbolic actions calculated, to impress the onlookers. In the last case, indeed, the action was the all-important element, while the spoken word only served to explain it (cf. e.g. Jer. xix., Ezek. iv.). The great prophets did not, of course, hesitate to avail themselves of the written medium, especially when they desired to make the message known to wider circles or preserve it for the future. In Jeremiah xxxvi. we possess a valuable account which describes the process by which the prophet produced a roll containing oracles spoken by him over a long period of years. Naturally what he wrote down was a summary of the spoken discourses, giving the gist but not a full report of what he had originally said. No doubt, also, the written form or book often owed much to the circle of the prophet's disciples.

The *nēbî'im* first appear in Israelitish history in the time of Samuel, and in contrast with the earlier "seers," who had hitherto represented prophecy, and from whom the new order is carefully distinguished (1 Sam. ix. 9). Whereas the "seer" had been a solitary, these, says Dr. G. A. Smith,¹

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 21.

“went about in bands. They were filled with an infectious enthusiasm, by which they excited each other and all sensitive persons whom they touched. They stirred up this enthusiasm by singing, playing upon instruments and dancing: its results were frenzy, the tearing of their clothes and prostration. The same phenomena have appeared in every religion—in Paganism often, and several times within Christianity. They may be watched to-day among the dervishes of Islam, who by singing, by swaying of their bodies, by repeating the Divine Name, and dwelling on the love and ineffable power of God, work themselves up into an excitement which ends in prostration, and often in insensibility. The whole process is due to an overpowering sense of the Deity—crude and unintelligent if you will, but sincere and authentic—which seems to haunt the early stages of all religions.”

With the new name, a new order of prophecy entered into the life of Israel. It was intensely loyal to Jehovah, and by making patriotism an essential part of the national religion succeeded in welding the tribes into a homogeneous nation. König, indeed, and some other scholars would deny that the *nabi* was unknown in earlier Israel, and in the article already referred to attempts to explain away 1 Samuel ix. 9. This article should be read, but has failed to convince many scholars.

Another question that is the subject of considerable discussion at the present time is concerned with the place of ecstasy in Hebrew prophecy. Is the ecstatic experience the essential mark of a prophet as such? According to Hölscher, who has given a brilliant exposition of the thesis in his great work *Die Profeten*,¹ it is. A similar view is held by Dr. Theodore H. Robinson, and expounded, with much persuasiveness, in his stimulating book *Prophecy and the Prophets in Ancient Israel* (1923). Dr. Robinson says:

“It is . . . probable that Isaiah, Amos, and Jeremiah were subject to the ecstasy, and the visions of Ezekiel and Zechariah may best be explained in the same way. It does not follow of

¹ Leipzig, 1914.

necessity that all their utterances originated thus, and yet it is at least possible."

It is true that the great writing prophets are classed among the *nēbî'im*, including even Amos, who indignantly disclaimed any connexion with the order so called (Amos vii. 14). What is the common element which will explain the use of the term *nēbî'im* to describe the earlier bands of ecstasies and the later canonical prophets? If the term *nabî'* meant "ecstatic" we should be compelled to concede Dr. Robinson's claim. But, as we have seen, the term really means "commissioned speaker" or "herald"; and while we can understand that one who spoke in the name of the Deity might be subject to ecstatic experience, especially in times of religious excitement, it does not necessarily follow that every *nabî'* would be similarly affected at all times. Some of the great prophets, like Ezekiel, may certainly have been ecstasies; but it is hard to believe this of Amos, or even of Jeremiah. Canonical prophecy, though the term "vision" (Heb. רֵאוּן) often occurs, constantly emphasises the content of the revelation as "the word of the Lord." The case against the ecstatic view has been put forcibly by M. Battenwieser,¹ who roundly asserts in the chapter he devotes to the subject² that "the inspiration of the great literary prophets has nothing in common with the ecstasy of the prophets of the older type." One thing can be asserted confidently—the great prophets came before their contemporaries convinced that they had received a divine commission to proclaim a certain message which they had received directly from God. This claim depends upon an inward spiritual experience on which they lay special stress, and regard as their "call" (cf. Isaiah vi., Jeremiah i.,

¹ *The Prophets of Israel* (Macmillan Company, 1914), pp. 138 ff.

² "Inspiration as Opposed to Divination or Possession," ch. ii. in Part II.

Hosea i., Amos vii.). It was because of this inward certainty that they could declare with such assurance that their message came straight from God ("Thus saith the Lord," etc.). We have no space to pursue the discussion of this subject further here. The reader can be referred to Dr. A. B. Davidson's *Old Testament Prophecy*, ch. x., or Sanday's Bampton Lectures on *Inspiration*, Lecture III. (pp. 128 ff.). To those who can read German F. Giesebrecht's *Die Berufsbegabung der Alttestamentlichen Propheten* (1899) is an all-important monograph. One other point must be mentioned, the question of the relation of the canonical to the so-called "false" prophets. The latter apparently claimed to speak—and, in some cases, quite sincerely—in Jehovah's name. One of the best discussions of this subject in English is contained in Sir G. A. Smith's recently published *Jeremiah*, pp. 258 ff., and to this the reader is referred.

II.

The fundamental position of prophecy in Old Testament religion is insisted upon by modern scholars with practical unanimity. Thus Davidson entitles the second chapter of his *Old Testament Prophecy* significantly, "Prophecy the dominating Factor in Israel's History from the time of Moses onwards." The very first words of this chapter are: "The history of Israel is a history of prophecy." In a later paragraph he adds:

"It is the conviction of the prophets and writers of Israel that the line of prophetic teachers has been uninterrupted since the days of Moses. Jeremiah (xv. 1) brings Moses and Samuel together: *Though Moses and Samuel stood before me, yet my mind could not be toward this people; cast them out of my sight and let them go forth.* Cf. also Jeremiah vii. 25 and Amos ii. 11."

That the prophetic element is primary in the development of the religion of Israel is one of the surest results gained by Old Testament criticism. However true it may be that

some of the more extreme critical positions have been successfully assailed in recent work, one broad result of criticism remains unshaken, that the Law, in the form in which we have it, comes after instead of before the writing prophets. "That broad change in the whole method of approach" (says Professor A. C. Welch) "to the study of the Old Testament is not seriously questioned in the many criticisms which are being urged to-day."¹

The prophetic books and the prophetic teaching are the heart of Old Testament religion. The spirit of the prophets has inspired the Law itself, and raised it to a loftier standard of ethical requirement and made its ceremonial the expression of a sublime religion of holiness. How central the prophetic literature is becomes apparent at once when an attempt is made to construct an Old Testament theology. The most important material required must be drawn almost entirely from the Prophets. This is well illustrated from an early work of B. Duhm, published in 1875, but still important, under the title, *Die Theologie der Propheten als Grundlage für die innere Entwicklungsgeschichte der Israelitischen Religion*. In English, besides the manuals devoted to the History of the Religion of Israel, which include chapters on the prophetic religion,² the following works in English may be mentioned as specially concerned with prophetic religion: Dr. A. B. Davidson's *Old Testament Prophecy*, which surveys in a thorough and systematic way the questions that arise in connexion with the growth and development of prophecy. This book by a master hand is indispensable for serious study. Robertson Smith's *The Prophets of Israel* is, of course, a classic. In spite of the fact that it was originally produced more than forty years ago,

¹ EXPOSITOR, December 1913, p. 518 f.

² One of the most important and original of these is Dr. Wheeler Robinson's *Religious Ideas of the Old Testament*.

it is still wonderfully fresh and stimulating. A new edition, by Dr. T. K. Cheyne, appeared in 1907 with a valuable new introduction, expounding the developments of criticism, and with additional notes. But the substance of the original lectures remains unchanged. Of more recent works the following are important: A posthumous volume of sermons by Dr. Driver (1915) with the title *The Ideals of the Prophets*. This collection has all the well-known marks of Driver's work—careful scholarship and cautious and lucid statement. Though cast in the form of sermons, and, therefore, in a sense popular in form, this volume brings out clearly the main religious ideas of the prophets of Israel. An older work by the present Dean of Ely (Dr. Kirkpatrick), entitled *The Doctrine of the Prophets*, ought to be mentioned in this connexion as a cautious and conservative treatment in systematic form which has been found very useful. There are, however, two works of outstanding importance to which attention ought to be directed, viz., Sellin's *Der Alttestamentliche Prophetismus* (1912), and Dr. A. C. Welch's "Kerr Lectures," published in 1912 under the title, *The Religion of Israel under the Kingdom*. This stimulating book, full of the results of first-hand study and research, has hardly received the recognition due to it. The book deals with the stories of JE, Prophecy before Amos, and has chapters devoted to Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Deuteronomy. Sellin's book consists of three lectures, devoted to (a) "A Sketch of the History of Old Testament Prophecy"; (b) "Age, Nature and Origin of Old Testament Prophecy"; and (c) "Ancient Oriental and Old Testament Revelation." The influence of recent work, especially Gressmann's, on eschatology is strongly marked in both books. Sellin, it is true, regards the eschatological element as much older than the time of Amos, tracing it back to the age of Moses, and looks upon it as a native Israelitish growth. Welch in-

sists that it is essentially characteristic of the prophets, and is a fundamental postulate of their thought :

"Elijah works upon it ; Amos develops it clearly ; every other prophet bases upon it. . . .

"From the beginning they work not with the thought of a new political order which is the outcome of the conditions of their time, but with the conception of a new world-order which Jahveh is to bring in. And the new world-order is determined in its character by the nature of Him who ushers it in. One may allow that not until the nation was settled in its land, and had answered the problems set by its conquest, did the people need to conceive some world-order. One may further allow that they were influenced by similar conceptions as to a world-order which came to them from the outside. But the prophets brought to meet the new moral and religious needs of their people, and to meet the vague unethical conceptions which were passing into Israel's thought from outside, the conceptions of God, His nature and His will, which they had already learned from their own faith. They make patent the power and the width of the great ideas which Israel had already learned ; and all that came from the outside was only admitted so far as it would conform with these. The greatness of Amos lies in the fact that he is so loyal to the old, so open to the new situation."¹

If, as Gunkel, Gressmann and Sellin, and, we may add, Welch insist, the eschatological element in the prophetic literature is old, some important consequences follow. Many of the passages depicting a brighter future may be older than the original writings in which they occur. Sellin even regards Amos ix. 8b ff. as due to Amos, though misplaced.² Welch is more cautious. He says : "While there are elements in this which appear old, and may even date from Amos, the passage has received so much alteration that it is practically useless for determining the early view."³ On the other hand he rightly recognises Hosea xiv. 1-8 as genuinely Hoseanic.

Another consequence of this view on which Welch insists

¹ *Exposit. Times*, xxiv. 209 (February, 1913).

² *Introduction* (E. T.), 168 f.

³ *Religion of Israel under Kingdom*, p. 261. For an interesting explanation of Amos ix. 11, cf. Abrahams' *Studies in Pharisaism*, etc., 2nd series, p. 51.

is that, if it be accepted, "we are done with the idea of the prophets as a species of superior politicians."

"They were what they claimed to be, religious men. They were not dealing with Israel in face of the accidental factor of an Assyrian invasion; they were dealing with Israel in face of an eternal factor, its God. They were working not on a little question of policy, but on the profoundest question of all, the question of the relation of God to His world. Has God an order for the world? And does He give any man, in the uncertainty of everything else, a knowledge of it? Their eschatology was the means of expressing the thought that there is a world-order, which cannot remain in the background, but which, at whatever time God wills, may break in on the world."¹

Welch, in the volume referred to above, has given us a fine series of studies of the eighth century prophets, characterised by independence of judgment backed by full knowledge. Among many other points his handling of the question of the prophets' attitude towards sacrifice may be referred to briefly. In discussing Amos v. 25 the author declares that if Amos believed that no sacrifices at all were offered in the wilderness,

"his view is simply incorrect; and J who makes sacrifice not only as old as the desert but as old as the race has a true historical vision as compared with the prophet.

The true explanation, Welch thinks, is that the prophet regarded sacrifices as secondary and comparatively unimportant:

"What Amos seems to mean is that then the nation were in such a relation to Jahveh . . . that they could rejoice in His immediate presence.

"So insignificant was it [sacrifice] in comparison with the other sense of their unity with their God, that it could be said that Jahveh gave no command about it at all. But now it bulks to them as though it were everything, for it is conceived by them as the chief means by which they seek to realize their dependence upon their God and to fulfil His will. They have substituted this comparatively trivial affair for the greater thing which Jahveh had in view when He made them a nation."²

¹ *Exp. Times*, as cited above.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

Considerations of space will not permit more than a brief reference to the importance of the prophets in connexion with the idea of revelation. The matter is discussed in the third of Sellin's lectures (*Der Alt. Prophetismus*), where the revelations of other Semitic religions are compared and contrasted with that of Israel ; and also in a masterly sketch by Dr. W. R. Matthews, *The Idea of Revelation* (1923), pp. 9 ff.

III.

A survey of the criticism of the prophetic literature, if it could be carried out on the scale of *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, would be almost as fascinating a study as Schweitzer's famous monograph. Such a work has yet to be written. Here all that will be attempted is to call attention to some of the more important works which reflect the movement of criticism as regards the prophetic literature of the Old Testament. "In recent times," says Cheyne,¹ "advance in the understanding of the prophets has moved on *pari passu* with the higher criticism, especially the criticism of the Pentateuch, and with the general study of Hebrew history ; and most works on the subject, prior to Ewald, must be regarded as quite antiquated, except for the light they cast on detailed points of exegesis." One of the older commentaries still worth consulting is Lowth's *Commentary on Isaiah* (1778), which is interesting because of its treatment of the rhythm of the prophecies, its textual criticism and philology. The illustrations from classical literature are also interesting, and sometimes valuable. Cheyne regards Lowth's work as marking "the beginning of a tendency to look mainly at the æsthetic aspects of the prophetic books, and to view the prophets as enlightened religious poets." The real work of criticism could only

¹ *Encycl. Biblica*, col. 3900.

begin when the prophets were put in their historic setting, and so studied critically. This was really begun by Ewald, whose great work on *The Prophets of the Old Testament* (E. T. 5 vols., 1876-7) is still well worth study. Of the scholars who have worked in this field since, the greatest services have been rendered, perhaps, by Kuenen, Wellhausen, Duhm, Marti, and Cornill. Wellhausen's volume on the Minor Prophets,¹ without a word of Preface or Introduction, plunges at once into the translation, which occupies 64 pages; this is followed by the "notes," which fill 156 pages. Not a word is wasted—every word tells. The work is a masterpiece of scientific criticism by a scholar of genius. The text and its analysis are dealt with throughout. Sometimes a whole critical problem is illuminated in a few brusque sentences, and it may safely be said that it has largely determined the lines of criticism since and has continued to exercise a powerful influence.

Further great advance has been made in the work of Duhm, Marti and Cornill. In particular the great commentaries of Duhm on *Isaiah* (2nd ed., 1902) and *Jeremiah* (1901) must be singled out. Duhm is both versatile and brilliant—and, sometimes, wayward. But even when least convincing, he is always extraordinarily stimulating and suggestive. Duhm's special contribution is in the restoration of the text largely on rhythmical principles. He articulates the poems in symmetrical form, and largely restores the text. But he is equally brilliant and suggestive in exegesis and in other forms of criticism. The careful study of this scholar's work is a real discipline which no serious student, who can devote extended study to the Old Testament, can afford to neglect. Marti's work, especially his commentaries on *Isaiah* (1900) and the Minor Prophets (1904, *Dodecapheton*) exhibits fine scholarship and critical acumen;

¹ *Die Kleinen Propheten übersetzt und erklärt* (Berlin, 4th ed., 1898).

but its criticism sometimes seems arbitrary and unconvincing. These commentaries, however, are indispensable. With these aids before him the student can see the whole range of literary criticism.¹

Duhm's *Jeremiah*, like his *Isaiah*, carried criticism to an extreme which failed to commend itself to subsequent scholars. He leaves to the prophet about 270 4-lined stanzas, and to Baruch about 200 Masoretic verses. Thus, almost two-thirds of the book are assigned to later supplementers and editors. The commentaries of Cornill and Giesebrecht (2nd ed.), though deeply influenced by Duhm's work, make clear that their authors consider that this criticism has gone too far. It is a fortunate circumstance that within the last two years two important books on Jeremiah have been published in English: one by Dr. Skinner under the title *Prophecy and Religion*, contains 19 chapters dealing with various aspects of Jeremiah's life, character, and religious thought. The book presents the mature reflection and ripe scholarship of its distinguished author on some of the deepest themes of the Old Testament. It is also furnished with a large number of new translations of the poetical pieces. The other volume on the same theme by Sir George Adam Smith is a fine piece of work. It, too, gives a number of new translations, but the best part of the book is contained in the last three chapters, especially the differentiation between true and "false" prophecy, the story of Jeremiah's inner life, and the defence of the authenticity of the great prophecy of the New Covenant. Before we pass from Jeremiah, it is worth while to call the reader's attention to an older work, which is well worth reading—Cheyne's *Jeremiah: His Life and Times* (1889).

¹ The present writer has largely embodied the results of Duhm's and Marti's criticism in his translation with notes and introductions of *The Book of Isaiah* (1908, reprinted 1913).

This, with the companion volume on Isaiah by Driver, will be found both interesting and useful.

For Ezekiel, Davidson's well-known commentary still remains the standard volume of its kind in English. It is, of course, a first-rate piece of work; but much has been done on Ezekiel since it was written—and work of very great importance. Till the volume which is being prepared for the International Critical Commentary on this prophetic book appears, the student who wishes to get abreast of modern investigation will have to consult German works, such as are indicated below.

Finally, a word may be added about the commentaries on the Minor Prophets. The importance of Wellhausen's great work has already been alluded to. Sellin's volume, which has only recently appeared, is one of a series of commentaries which that scholar is himself editing.¹ The volume contains much that is fresh and important, and ought not to be overlooked.

Perhaps the difficult task of selection from the large available literature that is important may be effected in ten divisions (several containing alternatives) as follows:—

A. GENERAL.

1. Robertson Smith, *The Prophets of Israel* (2nd ed., 1907).
T. H. Robinson, *Prophecy and the Prophets in Ancient Israel* (1923).
2. G. A. Smith, *The Book of the Twelve Prophets* (1896–8).
A. R. Gordon, *The Prophets of the Old Testament*, 1 vol. (1916).
3. Cornill, *Der Israelitische Prophetismus* (6th ed., 1906).
English translation, Chicago, 1898.
Sellin, *Der Alttestamentliche Prophetismus* (1912).

¹ An important commentary on Jeremiah by P. Volz has already appeared in this series, and one on Ezechiel by D. Johannes Hermann has just come to hand.

B. PROPHETIC RELIGION AND THEOLOGY.

4. Davidson, *Old Testament Prophecy* (1903) ; the article, "Prophecy and Prophets," by same writer, in Hastings' *D.B.*, vol. iv.
5. A. C. Welch, *The Religion of Israel under the Kingdom* (1912).
6. Skinner, *Prophecy and Religion : Studies in the Life of Jeremiah* (1922).

C. COMMENTARIES AND TRANSLATIONS.

7. *Isaiah*, Cheyne (new translation in Sacred Books of O.T.). Commentaries by Skinner (Camb. Bible, 2 vols.) and Whitehouse (Cent. Bible). G. B. Gray (i.-xxvii. in I.C.C.).
8. *Jeremiah*, G. A. Smith, *Jeremiah* (1924) ; Peake in Cent. Bible (2 vols.). [See also No. 6.]
9. *Ezekiel*, by A. B. Davidson (Camb. Bible), 1882. (German commentaries by Smend, 1880 ; Cornill, 1886 (textual) ; Kraetzschmar, 1900).
10. *The Minor Prophets*, G. A. Smith (as 2 above) ; Wellhausen, 1898 ; Sellin, *Das Zwölfprophetenbuch* (Leipzig, 1922).

G. H. Box.

THE BELSHAZZAR OF DANIEL AND OF HISTORY.

ONE of the most important tests of the historical trustworthiness of the Book of Daniel for the period in which the hero is represented as having lived has always been the account of Belshazzar. Until modern times this person was entirely unknown, save from Jewish sources. The Greek writers knew Nabonidus, or Labynetus, as Herodotus calls him,¹ but nothing of Belshazzar. Josephus, therefore,

¹ *Hist.* i. 77.

readily identified Nabonidus and Belshazzar,¹ and was for long followed. Since the Book of Daniel represents Belshazzar as the last monarch of the Neo-Babylonian empire, while the Greek sources call the last monarch Nabonidus, it was natural that that identification should be assumed. It was not, however, without difficulties, and critics had already challenged it when the Inscriptions dramatically revealed that Belshazzar was indeed a historical personage, but the son of Nabonidus. The defenders of the authenticity of Daniel hailed this discovery, and roundly challenged the critics to withdraw their denials of the historicity of Daniel's narrative, and there are still those who think that the Book of Daniel has been signally vindicated. On examination it soon proved, however, that there were real difficulties in reconciling the account of Belshazzar given in the book of Daniel with what we learn of this Belshazzar, the son of Nabonidus, so that though Daniel is right in so far that there was a historical character named Belshazzar, it is none the less impossible to accept the narrative as historical. The defenders of the authenticity of Daniel have endeavoured to harmonise the two records by free assumption, and some of their assumptions have been allowed to be possible, which the present writer holds to be quite impossible. Thus even Driver allows that Belshazzar may have been the grandson of Nebuchadnezzar,² while the assumption seems to be unchallenged that Belshazzar held out in some part of Babylon, until he was slain in an assault by Gobryas, the general of Cyrus. Both of these assumptions must be declared impossible on the basis of our knowledge from other sources, and the case against the historicity of Daniel's account is stronger than appears to have been yet stated. Indeed in no single point can the accuracy of Daniel be

¹ *Ant.* X. xi. 2.

² Driver's *Daniel* (C.B.), p. 62.

substantiated, save in that there was a person named Belshazzar.

We may first examine briefly the contemporary events, so far as they can be learnt from other records. Nebuchadnezzar was succeeded in B.C. 561 by his son Amel-Marduk, who is known in the old Testament as Evil-Merodach.¹ Little is known of him, and his brief rule of two years² is characterised as "lawless and impure."³ He seems to have been unworthy of his great inheritance, and his brother-in-law therefore murdered him, and seized the throne for himself.⁴ This brother-in-law is known in the Greek writers as Neriglissar, and in the Inscriptions as Nergal-shar-uzur. He is probably to be identified with the Rab-Mag of Jeremiah xxxix. 3, 13, especially as his father Bel-šum-iškun bore the same title.⁵ In the reign of Neriglissar there seems to have been some conflict with the growing power of the Medes.⁶ After reigning four years,⁷ he passed on the succession to his son Lâbashi-Marduk, who was but a youth. Nine months later,⁸ Lâbashi-Marduk appears to have been the victim of a priestly plot, and was murdered, the conspirators alleging moral delinquencies in the young king as their excuse.⁹ He was succeeded, not by a Chaldæan, but by a Babylonian, Nabu-na'id or Nabonidus.

This monarch was more devoted to religion and research than to government. Unrelated to his predecessor, exalted

¹ 2 Kings xxv. 27.

² Vide Berosus, *ap.* Joseph. *Contra Ap.* i. 20; so Canon of Ptolemy. Ct. Joseph. *Ant.* X, xi. 2, where he is assigned 18 years.

³ Berosus, *l.c.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Vide Hommel in Hastings' *D.B.* i. 229a.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 229b.

⁷ Vide Berosus, *l.c.*; so Canon of Ptolemy. Ct. Joseph. *Ant.* X. xi. 2, where he is stated to be the son of Evil-Merodach, and is assigned 40 years.

⁸ Berosus, *l.c.*; so Joseph. *Ant.* X. xi. 2. In accordance with this he is omitted altogether from the Canon of Ptolemy.

⁹ Berosus, *l.c.*

to the throne by the popular will,¹ or, more probably, by the will of the priests, he lived to prove his unfitness for the position, and to have his capital betrayed by the treachery of the priests into the hands of his foes. He was a builder and beautifier of temples, and caused their history to be searched and recorded.² The practical work of the government he seems to have left in the hands of his son, Bel-shar-uzur,³ who must be identified with the Belshazzar of Daniel. During this reign, however, events of far-reaching importance were taking place amongst the neighbouring states. Kuraš, or Cyrus, king of Anshan, stepped into the world's arena. When Istuirgu, or Astyages, the Median King, invaded the Babylonian empire, Nabonidus was glad to avail himself of the assistance of Cyrus to drive him back,⁴ and hailed him as "young servant of Marduk."⁵ But from this victory important results were to follow. Astyages was the overlord of Cyrus, and Cyrus could not rest until his rebellion had ended in conquest. By a fortunate act of treachery Astyages was delivered bound into the power of Cyrus,⁶ and in 550 B.C. Cyrus captured and sacked the Median capital, Ecbatana, and entered into possession of the whole Median empire, which extended to the river Halys, and bordered on the Lydian kingdom, ruled over by Crœsus. From this time on Cyrus is known as the king of Persia, and from this date is reckoned the beginning of the Persian empire.⁷

The totally different account given in Xenophon's *Cyropædia* is of no historical value. Even in ancient times it was perceived that this was no more than a historical

¹ Vide inscription quoted in Driver, *Daniel*, p. xxvii.

² Cf. Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the O.T.*, p. 373.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 374.

⁴ Cf. Hommel, *l.c.* 229b.

⁵ Vide Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 376. Cf. Herod. *Hist.* i. 127 f.

⁷ Cf. Hommel, *l.c.*, Sayce in Hastings' *D.B.* i. 542a.

romance, written for didactic purposes,¹ and this judgment is confirmed by modern research. Thus Xenophon makes Cyrus the general of his uncle Cyaxares, who is entirely unknown to us in other sources, and knows nothing of the revolt of Cyrus and the capture of Ecbatana, though these events are known to us from the contemporary records of Cyrus.² He makes Cyrus to assume the title of king first after the capture of Babylon,³ again in disagreement with the contemporary records. He records a siege and assault of Babylon,⁴ in conflict with the record of Cyrus himself.⁵ He makes his father and uncle to live and rule until after the capture of Babylon,⁶ Cyrus inheriting their realms on their death.⁷ In the Cylinder of Cyrus, however, his father is called King of the city of Anshan,⁸ which is the title Cyrus is represented in the Inscriptions as having had several years before the fall of Babylon.⁹ We must therefore conclude that his father was already dead, and that Cyrus had succeeded. Xenophon calls the father of Cyrus King of Persia.¹⁰ Cyrus does not give this title to his father, and since he himself first appears as King of Anshan, in Elam, and later as King of Persia, we must conclude that Persia was added by Cyrus himself, either by right of conquest,¹¹ or, more probably, by inheritance. That Cyrus was a Persian, indeed, may be taken as certain.¹² It would

¹ So Plato and Cicero, according to Prideaux. *Vide Connexion of the Old and New Testament*, ed. 1845, vol. i. p. 105. Prideaux himself challenged the view of the classical writers quoted.

² *Vide* Sayce, *l.c.* ; Driver, *Daniel*, p. xxviii.

³ *Cyrop.* VII. v. 37.

⁴ *Ibid.* VII. v. 1-36.

⁵ *Vide* Driver, *op. cit.*, p. xxix. ; Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

⁶ *Cyrop.* VIII. v. 17, 22.

⁷ *Ibid.* VIII. v. 17, vii. 1.

⁸ Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

⁹ Sayce, *l.c.*

¹⁰ *Cyrop.* I. ii. 1.

¹¹ So Driver, *op. cit.*, p. xxx.

¹² Cf. Tiele and Kisters in *E.B.*, i. 978.

appear that Elam had been conquered by the Persian Teispes, son of Achæmenes, and that the thrones of Persia and Elam, at that time both minor states, had been occupied by different branches of the same family until united in Cyrus.¹

But Cyrus could not rest content with the kingdom he had acquired with so little difficulty, and three years after he had added Media he was trying conclusions with Croesus.² Nabonidus joined the league against Cyrus,³ but seems to have backed this by no serious military effort. Cyrus could therefore afford to neglect him until he had completed the conquest of Lydia and the absorption of the whole of Asia Minor. Then, however, he turned his attention to the Babylonian empire. Meanwhile Nabonidus was making no preparation for the blow that must fall. He was instead alienating priests and people⁴ by his efforts to centralise the religion of the land in Babylon, moving images from temples in many cities to the capital.⁵ The priests were therefore solidly against him. Belshazzar led out an army to meet the invading Persian hosts, but was unable to offer any serious resistance, and was defeated at Opis.⁶ Cyrus marched on Sippar, and Nabonidus fled to Babylon.⁷ Two days later,⁸ Cyrus was in possession of Babylon itself, the priests having apparently betrayed it into his hands.⁹ The conquest was bloodless, and neither commerce nor

¹ *Vide* Sayce, *l.c.*; cf. Hommel, *l.c.* 229a.

² Cf. Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

³ Hommel, *l.c.* 229b.

⁴ *Vide* Tiele and Kisters, *l.c.* 979.

⁵ *Vide* King in *E.B.* i. 453; Cyrus Cylinder translated in Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

⁶ Inscription of Cyrus, translated in Driver, *Daniel*, p. xxix. f.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ This inference would seem to be warranted by the references of Cyrus to his choice by Marduk, and to the fact that all the gods had turned against Nabonidus. *Vide* Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 380 f.

religion suffered disturbance.¹ A few months later Cyrus made his triumphal entry into Babylon,² and assumed the title of King of Babylon,³ and a few days later Belshazzar was killed by Cyrus's general Gubaru, or Gobryas,⁴ while Nabonidus himself was sent to Carmania.⁵

We may now proceed to examine the difficulties in the account of the Book of Daniel.

I.

Belshazzar in Daniel is called "King"; in the contemporary records he is never called "King," but uniformly "King's son." Of the attempts which have been made to harmonise here, we may note the following:—

(a) R. D. Wilson endeavours to show that a number of Babylonian terms might be rendered in Aramaic by "King." Thus he "shows that the Aramaic word for 'king' is the equivalent of the Assyrio-Babylonian words *sarru*, *malku*, *pahatu*, *bel pahate* and *hazannu*. Each of the bearers of these titles would also be a 'ruler,' and the last three would be called 'magnates of the king.'"⁶ That this is utterly beside the point is manifest. If it is intended to show that though Daniel may have known perfectly well that Belshazzar was not really king, the exigencies of the Aramaic language made "king" a possible rendering of his real title, it would involve the ludicrous assumption that he was then carried away by the inexact rendering he had made. For the book of Daniel represents Belshazzar as really king. The author reckons dates by the years of his reign in precisely the same way as he does by the years of Nebuchad-

¹ *Vide* Sayce, *l.c.*

² *Vide* Inscription translated in Driver, *loc. cit.*

³ Contract tablets are known to have been dated by his reign from three weeks after his entry. *Vide* Driver, *op. cit.*, p. liv. note.

⁴ *Vide* Inscription translated in Driver, *op. cit.*, p. xxx.

⁵ *Vide* Hommel in *D.B.* i. 229b; Berosus *ap.* Joseph. *Contra Ap.* i. 20.

⁶ *Vide* Orr, *Problem of O.T.*, chap. xi. Note F.

nezzar and Cyrus. This is inconsistent with the supposed awareness of the author that he was not really king, and is at variance with the practice of the contemporary inscriptions which are in no case dated by the years of Belshazzar.

(b) The same scholar makes another suggestion. He says, "It is clear that for the national party, that was opposed to Cyrus, the son of the king, i.e. Belshazzar, must have been *de facto* king of the part of Babylon which had not yet surrendered, from the latter part of the fourth month, when his father, or predecessor, Nabonidus, was captured, until the eighth month, when the son of the king was killed in an attack made upon him in the place where he was making his last stand, by Gobryas, the governor of Gutium."¹ This suggestion, even if it could be allowed, would not do the work it is put forward to achieve, for it is in conflict with the Book of Daniel. We read in Daniel² of events that happened in the third year of this king, whom Wilson supposes to have been killed four months after he became *de facto* king. Moreover, it finds no support in the inscriptions, for the very inscription which furnishes the record of Gobryas's assault and slaughter of Belshazzar persists in calling him "the king's son."³

(c) Another, and more common, assumption is that Belshazzar was "co-regent" with his father. Pusey⁴ quotes the authority of Rawlinson for the statement that "no name is mentioned in the inscriptions, together with that of the reigning monarch, unless he were co-regent." Driver, however, states⁵ that this supposition of a co-regency "is destitute of foundation in the inscriptions." Moreover, this theory again leaves us with the problem of

¹ *Vide* Orr, *ibid.*

² viii. 1.

³ *Vide* Inscription translated in Driver, *Daniel*, p. xxix. f.

⁴ *Daniel the Prophet*, p. 405 note.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. li. note.

Daniel's dating events by the years of Belshazzar in contrast with the practice of the contemporary records. Even if Belshazzar had been associated with his father in the kingship, it could not be supposed that he would replace his father in this way during the latter's lifetime, and the clear testimony of the inscriptions is that he did not. And since Belshazzar died before Nabonidus, we are left with no room for this after the latter's death.¹

II.

We may turn next to the question of Belshazzar's relationship to Nebuchadnezzar. Daniel says that he was Nebuchadnezzar's son; the inscriptions, however, call him the son of Nabonidus. It will be sufficient to quote one passage from an inscription of Nabonidus²: "And as for Belshazzar, the first-born son, the issue of my body, do thou implant in his heart the fear of thy great divinity. Let him not turn unto sinning. Let him be satisfied with fulness of life." In view of the fact that Nabonidus here states explicitly that Belshazzar was "the issue of my body," it is quite impossible to maintain the accuracy of Daniel in calling him the son of Nebuchadnezzar.

It is therefore commonly supposed that he was the grandson of Nebuchadnezzar. Pusey argues at considerable length³ that such a relationship would be quite consistent with the language of Daniel, in accordance with the usage observed elsewhere. It may be admitted that this is possible, though with the reservation that the repeated and emphatic reference of v. 13 would suggest that the author really thought Belshazzar was the actual son of Nebuchadnezzar. The question we have to examine, therefore, is whether the

¹ Daniel v. 1, 11, 13, 18.

² Translation of Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

³ *Daniel the Prophet*, pp. 406 ff.

known facts will permit us to suppose that Belshazzar was the grandson of Nebuchadnezzar.

(a) He was not Nebuchadnezzar's grandson on his father's side. For Nabonidus was the son of Nabu-balatsu-ikbi, as is known from inscriptions on bricks found in Babylon.¹ Moreover, we learn from Berosus that he was not a Chaldæan, like the previous kings of the Neo-Babylonian empire, but a Babylonian,² while Abydenus states explicitly that he was not related to his predecessor,³ Lâbashi-Marduk, who was the grandson⁴ of Nebuchadnezzar.⁵

(b) It is therefore claimed that Belshazzar may have been the grandson of Nebuchadnezzar through his mother. This claim, however, fares no better. Pusey argues with undeniable truth⁶ that "intermarriage with the family of a conquered monarch, or with a displaced line, is so obvious a way of strengthening the newly acquired throne that it is *a priori* probable that Nabunahit would so fortify his claim." In a footnote he adduces a number of instances of this. It is also claimed that the fact that Nidinta-bel, the Pretender who rebelled against the Achæmenids twenty years later, gave himself out to be Nebuchadnezzar, the son of Nabonidus,⁷

¹ Quoted in Driver, *op. cit.*, p. xxvii.

² *Ap. Joseph. Contra Ap.* i. 20.

³ *Ap. Euseb. Praep. Evang.* ix. 41, 3. Adduced in Driver, *op. cit.*, p. xxvii.

⁴ *Vide supra.* Lâbashi-Marduk was the son of Neriglissar and the daughter of Nebuchadnezzar.

⁵ The older writers—e.g. Prideaux (*vide op. cit.* i. 110)—invoked Jer. xxvii. 7, "And all the nations shall serve him and his son, and his son's son," to prove that Belshazzar, whom they identified with Nabonidus, was Nebuchadnezzar's son's son. Recognising that Lâbashi-Marduk, who was known to them from Berosus as Laborosoarchod, was but the daughter's son, they were reduced to seeking the fulfilment of the prophecy in Belshazzar = Nabonidus. It will be seen, however, that it is impossible to maintain that either Nabonidus or Belshazzar was son's son to Nebuchadnezzar, and Jeremiah's words must be admitted to have had no exact fulfilment.

⁶ *Daniel the Prophet*, p. 406. ⁷ *Vide Sayce, in Hastings' D.B.* i. 558a.

gives great probability to the suggestion. It may be freely admitted that it does. But it does not affect the question of Belshazzar in the slightest. Even Driver seems to have been misled by the apparent plausibility of this suggestion, for he says,¹ "There remains the *possibility* that Nabu-na'id may have sought to strengthen his position by marrying a daughter of Nebuchadnezzar, in which case, of course, Nebuchadnezzar would be Belshazzar's grandfather on his mother's side."

We may rule out the possibility that Belshazzar was the son of Nebuchadnezzar's daughter by an earlier marriage, and therefore a step-son of Nabonidus', in view of the expression already quoted from an inscription of that monarch, where he declares that Belshazzar was "the issue of my body." We are therefore asked to suppose that Belshazzar was the issue of a marriage contracted after the usurpation of Nabonidus. That usurpation took place in 555 B.C. If we assume that Belshazzar was born in the following year, he would have reached the age of sixteen when Cyrus captured Babylon and Belshazzar met his end. At this somewhat tender age he is supposed to have been generalissimo of his father's army, and to have been for some years in charge of state affairs in his father's stead. Moreover, since we read in Daniel of the third year of Belshazzar, we should have to assume that he entered on his supposed co-regency at the latest when he was thirteen. Further, since we learn from the inscriptions that in the seventh year of Nabonidus, Belshazzar was with the army in Akkad, the alleged principle that mention on the inscriptions involves co-regency would demand that Belshazzar at the age of six or less became co-regent, while whether he became co-regent or not, since it is apparent from the inscription that he was in command of the army at that

¹ *Daniel*, p. 62.

time, we should be required to suppose that he was appointed to this early command.

(c) One further variation of the theory may be examined. R. D. Wilson conjectures¹ that Nabonidus had already married the daughter of Nebuchadnezzar prior to his usurpation, and that it was this fact that gave him the necessary standing to assume the throne. In this case, of course, Belshazzar might have been born earlier than the usurpation, and the difficulties just noticed would be avoided. But this would make Nabonidus to have been the uncle of Lâbashi-Marduk at the time of his usurpation, in direct conflict with the already mentioned testimony of Abydenus that he was unrelated. We are not free to set aside that testimony on the basis of an entirely unsupported conjecture.

We are therefore reduced to the conclusion that Belshazzar cannot have been the grandson of Nebuchadnezzar. It will be observed, however, that the present writer is disposed to agree that there is reason to suppose that Nabonidus may have married a daughter of Nebuchadnezzar after his usurpation, by whom he had a son who was named after his wife's father. It is possible that it was the widow of Neriglissar that Nabonidus married. While therefore it is impossible to suppose that Belshazzar stood in the supposed relationship to Nebuchadnezzar, he may have had a half-brother who did stand in that relationship.

III.

The defenders of Daniel's authenticity and accuracy have sought to strengthen their case by introducing the question of the Queen of Daniel v., and by identifying her with the Nitocris of Herodotus.² In Herodotus, Nitocris is the wife of Labynetos I., or Nebuchadnezzar, and a very

¹ *Did Daniel Write Daniel?* p. 30.

² *Hist.* i. 185 f.

powerful and energetic queen, who apparently administered the kingdom for some years. In Daniel v., the Queen, who enters in verse 10, is clearly to be distinguished from the king's wives and concubines, who are already mentioned in verse 2. Moreover she is a person of considerable influence, and her references to Nebuchadnezzar might accord well with the suggestion that she was the widow of that monarch. Josephus identifies her with the grandmother of Belshazzar.¹ It must be clearly recognised, however, that the Nitocris of Herodotus cannot have been the wife of Nebuchadnezzar. For Nebuchadnezzar was the ally of the Medes, and his Queen was a Median. The father of Nebuchadnezzar, Nabopolassar, had allied himself with the Medes against Assyria, and thereafter the Medes had invaded Assyria and destroyed Nineveh. That event was of immense profit to Babylonia, for through it Babylonia fell heir to rich spoils, and greatly increased her empire.² Moreover, it should be noted that in order to seal the alliance Nabopolassar married his son Nebuchadnezzar to a Median princess, the daughter of Cyaxares.³ But Nitocris is represented in Herodotus as being the enemy of the Medes, and her enmity is stated to have dated from that very fall of Nineveh⁴ which was achieved in an invasion to which her husband's father was a party, and as the result of the alliance which was sealed by her own marriage to Nebuchadnezzar. It is impossible to suppose that Nitocris was another wife of Nebuchadnezzar's. For in Herodotus' account Nitocris is plainly the principal wife, from the influence she wields, while it is clear from other writers that the Median wife was his principal queen. For Berosus tells us⁵ that it was for her that Nebuchadnezzar had the famous Hanging Gardens

¹ *Ant.* X. xi. 2.

² Cf. Hommel in Hastings' *D.B.* i. 228b.

³ *Vide* King in *E.B.* i. 451.

⁴ *L.c.*

⁵ *Ap. Joseph. Ant.* X. xi. 1.

constructed "because his wife was desirous to have things like her own country, she having been bred up in the palaces of Media." There is some reason for supposing that Nebuchadnezzar's friendship for the Medes was tempered by some anxiety as to their developing strength, and his mediation between Lydia and Media after the battle on the Halys may have been inspired by a prudent desire to prevent his neighbour's power from becoming too overwhelming.¹ But he seems not to have abandoned the alliance. In any case, it cannot be supposed that his Median queen went far beyond him in her hostility to her own race and kindred. Moreover, as we have seen, Belshazzar cannot have been either the son or the grandson of Nebuchadnezzar's queen.

The ground is therefore shifted, and Nitocris is represented as the daughter of Nebuchadnezzar, and the wife of Nabonidus.² In that case she would have been the true reigning queen. That Nabonidus married a daughter of Nebuchadnezzar, though it rests solely on conjecture, we have agreed may well have been the case. But this supposition does not establish the accuracy of Daniel, nor can it claim any support from Herodotus. For the Nitocris of Herodotus was the wife, not the daughter of Nebuchadnezzar, and her power is supposed to have dated from the fall of Nineveh. Moreover we have seen that whether Nabonidus married into the family of Nebuchadnezzar or not, Belshazzar cannot have been the grandson of Nebuchadnezzar, and it is difficult to suppose that his stepmother should have been ignorant of his relationship to her own father. The theory which involves us in that supposition can hardly claim to establish the historicity of Daniel's narrative.

HAROLD H. ROWLEY.

(*To be concluded.*)

¹ *Vide* Hommel, *l.c.* 229a.

² J. D. Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

THE ANTI-SABBATIC DILEMMA IN THE GOSPELS.

To the EXPOSITOR for May, 1922 (pp. 344-353) Dr. Rendell Harris contributed one of those illuminative short studies for which he has a special charisma. One of the secrets of these studies is that he reads the records of the Gospels so to speak in motion : at the touch of his hand the acting persons in the Gospel drama become living, speaking, discussing, gesticulating, smiling or laughing, angry or compassionate, victims or victors, just as they may be expected to have been in the special *mise-en-scène* in which they play their part.

In the study under consideration Dr. Rendel Harris treats of the debates of Jesus with His adversaries and especially with that kind of controversy which he calls the dilemma. The subject is of paramount importance, because it carries us back behind the records of the Evangelists and enables us to hear the actual speech of our Lord, and even the peculiar tone of His word through the reports of His disciples.

We may, perhaps, be allowed to elaborate a little further one of these instances, viz., the anti-Sabbatic dilemma in Mark iii. 4 and parallels. Dr. Rendel Harris has remarked already that the Synoptics give the stories in an abbreviated or even obscured form. There occurred several collisions of Jesus and His adversaries on account of His Sabbath-breaking, and the Gospels seem to have combined them, not always in the right way. We must be prepared to find the right reply not always attached to the corresponding objection.

For instance : the reference to the sacred bread eaten

by David and his companions belongs to the story of the Plucking of the Ears of Corn. Matthew, however, after having reported this reply, which ends by saying that *only the Priests* were allowed to eat the sacred bread, adds a reference to *the Priests* breaking the Sabbath in the Temple. In this reference, however, there is nothing which suggests any immediate connexion with the story of the Plucking of the Ears of Corn. By mentioning "mercy which is more than sacrifice" this reply seems rather to belong to a story of healing, possibly to the story of the healing of the man with the withered hand, which story follows in Matthew xii. 9.

It seems doubtful whether we shall always be able to put each reply in its proper place. For the present, however, it may be sufficient to keep in mind the remark of Dr. Rendel Harris, that we are dealing with a *series* of anti-sabbatisms, the sharpest of which is reproduced by Mark iii. 4 in this form: "Whether it is lawful on the Sabbath day to 'save' a soul or to kill."

This, however—*ψυχὴν σῶσαι ἢ ἀποκτεῖναι*—is the Greek form of the dilemma. In the original Aramaic the dilemma was put still more pointedly. The Syriac versions of the Gospels (which in many cases have preserved for us the vernacular speech of our Lord) have for *ψυχὴν σῶσαι*, the rendering: "to make alive a soul." In this way we read the dilemma in the startling form: "Whether it is lawful on the Sabbath day to make alive a soul (=somebody) or to kill."

It cannot be denied that this is a very unexpected question indeed, and not at all an obvious reply to those who object to Jesus healing a man on Sabbath. The natural answer to the question would be, of course, that it is never allowable to kill, either on the Sabbath day or on any other day, and that accordingly the question was absolutely out

of place. As a matter of fact, the question could be put in the way in which Jesus puts it, only if Jesus was certain beforehand that it was *in concessis* that the first part of it, viz., whether it was lawful to kill on the Sabbath day, was to be answered in the affirmative. The Pharisees must have decided, somehow, that it was lawful to kill on the Sabbath day. Jesus was sure, in that case, to overcome His antagonists with their own weapons.

Has "killing on the Sabbath" been a topic of Pharisaic dispute and afterwards of early Christian anti-Jewish controversy? It can be shown to have been a subject in the *Book of Testimonies* (cf. Dr. Rendel Harris, *Testimonies* 2d. part, Cambridge, 1920, p. 104 ff.). In this primitive Christian *vade mecum* there were brought forward as proofs of the lawfulness of killing on the Sabbath the case of Joshua at the siege of Jericho, and the case of the Maccabees. Here, however, something seems to be lacking. That Joshua and the Maccabees "killed" on the Sabbath day could be alleged as subsidiary proofs, but it is scarcely possible to regard these instances as the reason why the topic came into discussion at all. And certainly, killing was not a daily practice in Pharisaic and Jewish life, whatever mischief they, in the eyes of the Christians, may have been in the habit of brewing! And yet, the reply of Jesus loses its "point" if it has no bearing on some well-known decision regarding daily practice.

Here comes light from a quite unexpected quarter. It was known that the *Diatessaron* of Tatian contained glosses on the Gospel text, some of which found their way even into the Old Latin Gospels. The most famous of these glosses probably was the note that "both Joseph and Mary were from the house of David." Recently the present writer has drawn attention to a primitive form of the Tatianic *Diatessaron* preserved in a Liège MS. containing

a mediæval Dutch translation of an Old Latin Harmony.¹ This mediæval Text contains a great number of glosses. Some of these glosses betray a mediæval character, many others, however, clearly are quite archaic, and sometimes can be shown to be in origin genuine Tatian. The Preface, which in the Dutch text precedes the Harmony, declares that these "glosses" or "expositions" have been added for the purpose of elucidating difficult passages in the Gospel story as briefly as possible, and it seems quite probable that the Preface reproduces Tatian's own words.

Well, the Liège MS. gives in its 86th chapter the harmonisation of Matthew xii. 1-8; Mark ii. 23-28; Luke vi. 1-5. We find here Matthew xii. 5 in this form:

"Ende hebdi oc nit ghelesen in de wet dat de papen op den Saterdag in den temple breken den virte in din dat si dat quic doeden dat men offert ende de kinder besniden ende nimen berespt se daeraf."

If with the help of the Old Latin Gospel texts we try a retranslation it would probably run thus:

"Et nonne legistis in lege quia sacerdotes sabbato in templo violant celebrationem (sabbati) eo quod mactant pecus ad sacrificandum et circumcidunt infantes nec quisquam vituperat eos de hac re."

Of course the particulars of this retranslation are doubtful, but the main thing is clear: two instances are given of breaking the Sabbath by the Priests: the killing of cattle for sacrificial use and the circumcision.

Before discussing further the exegetical value of this gloss, we may be allowed to make a few remarks on its probable origin. In the Harmony of Zachary of Besançon, (printed by MIGNE, *Patrologia Latina*, tom. 186, col. 219 seq.) we find on the Vulgate text, "Aut non legi(s)tis in

¹ *A Primitive Text of the Diatessaron*, by Dr. D. Plooij, with an introductory note by Dr. J. Rendel Harris: A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgevers maatschappij, Leyden, 1923.

lege, quia Sabbatis sacerdotes in Templo Sabbatum violant, et sine crimine sunt," the following note: "(HIERON.) Sabbatum violant sacerdotes, occidendo tauros, circumcidendo pueros; *hic* non pronomen, sed adverbium loci legendum est," etc.

When we turn to HIERONYMUS, *Comm. in Matth.*, (MIGNE, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 26, col. 79), we find ad Matth. xii. 5:

"Calumniamini inquit discipulos meos cum per segetes transeuntes spicas triverint et hoc fecerint famis necessitate cogente, cum et ipsi Sabbatum violetis in templo, immolentes victimas, caedentes tauros, holocausta super lignorum struem incendio concremantes: et juxta alterius Evangelii finem (Joan. vii. 22) circumcidentes parvulos in Sabbato, ut dum aliam legem servare cupitis, Sabbatum destruat. "

We find in Jerome the same exegetical tradition, only enlarged, much in the same way as we shall find it in Aphrahat, and by its enlargement losing the exact point in Jesus' reply.

However, we might perhaps be inclined to regard both Zachary's note and the gloss in the Dutch Harmony as finding its origin in Jerome. It is, however, doubtful whether Zachary's note is rightly labelled: his words: '*hic* non pronomen sed adverbium loci legendum est' exactly reproduce Jerome's further comment; but the gloss on "the killing of cattle and the circumcision of children" is so much more pregnant than Jerome's extensive remark, that we scarcely can imagine that Zachary is simply abbreviating. Zachary's notes, as Dr. Rendel Harris has shown, in many cases presuppose an Old Latin text instead of the Vulgate which he prefixes to his commentary. And in this case the wording of Zachary's note and that of the Liège MS. (which by the way is an entirely independent witness) so closely resemble one another, that we venture the suggestion that Zachary (or his pre-

decessor-commentator) is working on a Gospel text which contained the gloss.

That this suggestion is not a too bold one may be seen from the *Capitularium* to the Vulgate MSS. AUVY of Matthew, which Wordsworth and White have printed in their Oxford Vulgate. Cap. xli. in these MSS. runs :

“Discipulorum Sabbato spicas vellentium reprehensores exemplo dauid *et circumcisione* redarguit.”

The words : *et circumcisione* are an instance of those frequent cases where a remnant of an Old Latin Gospel text is preserved in the *Capitularium* but “corrected” in the Gospel Manuscript itself. Accordingly we come with our gloss to a textual tradition *before* Jerome ; and though as yet a decisive proof that our gloss is really Tatianic cannot be given, it seems quite probable that it is, and at all events it represents a very early exegetical tradition.

This exegetical tradition provides us, it seems to me, with the key of the problem we are concerned with. The anti-sabbatic dilemma in this case finds its background and starting-point in one of the two great Sabbath problems given by the office of the Priests in the Temple :

1. *Quaeritur* : Are the Priests excused for breaking the Sabbath law when killing (cattle) for sacrifice in the temple ?

2. *Quaeritur* : Are the Priests guiltless when circumcising a child on the eighth day if this day is a Sabbath ?

The second problem is not referred to in the Gospels except in John vii. 23, where it is a sign both of the historical value of St. John's Gospel and of its anti-Judaic character that the topic is treated here in the correct form of anti-Judaic controversy. For the present we may leave this point undiscussed. But it seems worth while observing that here circumcision, as a local and partial operation, is contrasted with Jesus' healing of a whole man ; and that circumcision on the Sabbath was an item in the early

anti-Jewish propaganda (cf. Dr. Rendel Harris, *Testimonies*, ii., p. 195 seq.).

At present we are concerned with the former question as to the lawfulness of "killing" on the Sabbath. It is immaterial to our purpose whether the "Tatianic" gloss be based on early tradition or is simply an instance of Tatian's gift as a commentator and exegete. At all events the occurrence of the word "doeden" in it suggests that it refers to an occasion in which the problem of "killing" on the Sabbath played a rôle, though the word itself occurs only in Mark iii. 4. Evidently it should be a word which could be used for "killing" sacrificially and for ordinary "killing" as well. As for instance *mactare* in Latin.

That really "killing" was one of the things which were explicitly allowed on the Sabbath in the Temple may be seen from the instances quoted by SCHÜRER, *Gesch. d. Jüd. Volkes*, II⁴, 1907, S. 552 ff. The daily sacrifice was offered on the Sabbath. A special sacrifice even was ordered for that day. Among the thirty-nine acts mentioned in Mishna, Sabbâth vii. 2, as annulling the Sabbath is nr. 26: the killing of a gazelle. (Why a gazelle is mentioned especially I do not know; the act of killing was allowed for other victims as well, of course.) Also in *Jubilees* c. 50, among very severe warnings against doing any work on the Sabbath, sacrificing is explicitly excepted from the general rule. It is, however, worth noticing (and explains in part why the sacrificial argument afterwards is dropped in the Anti-Jewish propaganda), that both in the Mishna and in the Babylonian Gemara ¹ the remark is made that these regulations regarding the lawfulness of work needed for sacrificing were valid only as long as the sanctuary in Jerusalem was standing.

¹ Cf. Paul Fiebig, in the great Mishna edition by Beer und Holtzmann, II. 8, Giessen, 1914, S. 79.

Accordingly the question "whether killing is lawful on the Sabbath" had its normal origin not in the two cases of Joshua and the Maccabees, but in the necessary practice in the Temple. Therefore the sacrificial "killing" on the Sabbath is dropped in nearly all the quotations regarding "lawful killing" after the time of the destruction of the Temple, whilst Joshua and the Maccabees as "biblical proofs" continue to be mentioned. It survives, however, like many other archaisms, in Aphrahat's *Homily on the Sabbath*. Aphrahat's Homilies, especially those *on the Circumcision, on the Passover and on the Sabbath* are one of the richest mines for anti-Judaic Testimonies. His Church, living in permanent contact and controversy with the surrounding Jews, was obliged to defend itself continually against the Jewish arguments, and so the anti-Jewish controversy, which in other parts of the Church became more and more a thing of mere theory, in Eastern Syria remained a vital interest of the Church.

Now, in the *Homily on the Sabbath* we find the argument that Israel in vain boasts of its Sabbath keeping. Aphrahat brings forward the cases of Joshua and the Maccabees in the traditional way. But then he proceeds: "And not these only profaned the Sabbath, but *the Priests in the Temple profaned the Sabbath and were not blamed for it*. For on the Sabbath day the Priests offered the sacrifice, they killed and they flayed, and they clove wood, and they kindled fire, and were not blamed for profaning the Sabbath because they were ordered to do so."

I draw attention both to the agreement with the Dutch Diatessaron and with Jerome's comment on the passage of Matthew. Evidently Aphrahat is expanding the original dilemma of "killing" on the Sabbath day much in the same way as Jerome does. On the other hand it is quite clear that both Aphrahat and Jerome have lost the imme-

diate connexion of the dilemma with an actual case of controversy, as we find it presupposed in the Gospel of Mark. In the Syrian as well as in the Latin Father it is merely a survival of an early Christian Anti-Sabbatism which has lost its significance, since the Jews could ask like Johanan ben Zaccai did: "Now that the Temple is no more standing, is there any sacrifice still extant?"

The preceding observations justify, I think, the thesis that the sharp question put by Jesus, Mark iii. 4, as to whether it be lawful on the Sabbath to kill or to make alive (=save), constitutes the very centre of the group of Testimonies on the subject. We now may proceed to try to understand the whole situation as it is presupposed in the controversy of Jesus with the Pharisees on the anti-Sabbatic dilemma.

On some occasion Jesus was confronted with the necessity of healing on the Sabbath some one or other, probably the man with^h the withered hand (Mark iii. 4). Quite unexpectedly He asks: "Is it lawful to kill on the Sabbath day?" He uses the word which in the disputes on "killing" in the Temple has been used for the slaying of victims. What this word was is irrelevant. In Mishna, Sabbâth, it is שחט; Aphrahat uses the word נכח; it may even have been the word זכה, which word is used in Hosea vi. 6 and which may signify both *mactare* and *sacrificare*. At all events the word used was generally known from the discussion on "killing" in the Temple on the Sabbath.

Nobody, however, would have thought of the word in connexion with killing men! But we can imagine the utter embarrassment of the Pharisees when Jesus, by adding: "or to make alive" (translated by *σῶσαι* into Greek, but preserved in the vernacular tongue by the Syriac Versions) at once unexpectedly brings down the sacrificial act to ordinary "killing"! This equalisation already of

a ritual sacrifice with common slaughter is exceedingly significant for Jesus' opinion on Temple and sacrifice.

But the Pharisees do not follow Him in this. They are embarrassed, but not yet beaten. They cannot but concede that in some cases "killing" has been declared lawful on the Sabbath; if so, how much more, one would say, "making alive." The sequel is in Matthew xii. 5-7. "Did you not read in the Law that on the Sabbath day the priests in the Temple profane the Sabbath and are blameless? I say unto you that something greater than the Temple is here. If you had but understood what it means: 'I want mercy and no sacrifice,' you would not have condemned the blameless."

The Pharisees, we understand, are supposed to reply to the dilemma put before them by Jesus: "Ay, but 'killing' of that kind is done by the Priests in the Temple, and for sacrifice." Jesus answers: "Is it the Temple that excuses for breaking the Sabbath? Well, something greater than the Temple is here and makes me blameless for breaking the Sabbath. And you would have known what that greater thing is, if you only had understood what is written: I want mercy, *no* sacrifice."

Jesus makes the quotation from Hosea to have a double edge: "You blame one for breaking the Sabbath out of pity for this poor creature. But your blame is wrongly addressed; for it is written: I want mercy, not sacrifice. Not I am the wrongdoer, for I fulfil the divine Word; but you, with your sacrifices and Temple, are the wrongdoers, for God does not want sacrifice but mercy."

In this light the whole scene becomes full of life and of consequence. The adversaries are beaten with their own weapons, and this all the more admirably because it is not only by acute skill of debating, which in Eastern discussions (and not there only!) so often takes the place of persuasive

argument, but the whole debate is at once placed on the high level of spiritual service towards God, which service does not consist in keeping commandments of ritual Law or of sacrifices, but in divine mercy.

Two conclusions of the greatest importance may, I think, be drawn.

We understand that from that moment not only the Pharisees, but the priests as well, were Jesus' mortal adversaries. *The anti-Sabbatic argument turns out to be an argument against the Temple and its sacrifices as well.* When Jesus cleansing the Temple turns out everything necessary for *sacrificial* worship, He quotes from Jeremiah vii. 11 a word which in Matthew xxi. 13 (as well as in the Septuagint) is rendered by *λησταί*. It seems to me that Jesus used the corresponding Aramaic word with the same connotation of rejection which lies in His use of the word "killing" for a sacrificial act. When at the trial of Jesus He was accused of having spoken words of a direct tendency against the Temple, the accusers were certainly right in so far that Jesus condemned a Temple which was merely a place of ritual sacrifices and not a House of Prayer. And St. Stephen certainly walked in Jesus' steps when he "did not cease to speak blasphemous words against this holy place"—like this word spoken by his Master :

"I do *not* want *sacrifice but mercy.*"

The second inference is, I think, this: we have found decidedly a word of Jesus Himself which has grown out into a group of Anti-Judaic Testimonies. We can see it growing and found the historical scene from which it originated. At the same time we find that following generations have been more cautious in their judgment on the Temple and its ritual than Stephen was. *The anti-Temple and anti-sacrificial argument has been dropped from the anti-Sabbatic argument regarding the lawfulness of killing on the*

Sabbath. The text Hosea vi. 6 is found no more in the cycle of "killing" testimonies. It has been preserved only in Irenæus, *Adv. Haer.* IV. xvii. 4, and in the *Apostolic Preaching* c. 96. And here it occurs in the remarkable form which confirms our argument: "The Law will not command any one to pass the Sabbath in quiet and idleness who keeps Sabbath every day, who *in the godly Temple of the human body* serves God worthily and does justice every hour; for it is said: I want mercy and not sacrifice, knowledge of God and not holocausts." The orthodox Church had accepted the whole old Testament, and so, if only theoretically and as a doctrine, has to defend both Temple and Sacrifices.

D. PLOOIJ.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE GRACE OF GOD IN FORGIVENESS.

I.

(1) THE grace of God is His personal activity, and forgiveness is the restoration of personal relation to Him. We must avoid all language that would depersonalise what God does in this relation. What God does, and how man is related to Him, is determined by what God Himself is. We are in no way concerned with the abstract conception of the philosophical schools, which has so injuriously affected the theology of the Christian Church. It is with the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ with whom alone we have to do. While the Fatherhood of God is partially revealed in Creation and Providence, in His care and bounty towards all men (Matthew vi. 25-34), yet it is in Redemption that the Fatherhood alone finds its full expression. Here God's Fatherhood is His *com-*

municative and reproductive perfection ; He made man for fellowship with Himself, and likeness to Himself ; and when sin interrupts that fellowship and destroys that likeness, He restores that relation in the revelation and redemption in Christ Jesus.

(2) It is this activity of God that is described as His grace. God's love for man means that He sets a *value* on man which can be measured only by what He does for man, that He has an *interest* in man so that man's sin is His loss, and man's recovery is His joy, and that He has a *purpose of good* for man, this fellowship with and likeness to Himself. (Luke xv.) God's love appears as *grace* inasmuch as man is not only, as creature, dependent, subject, *inferior* to God, but as sinner is *unworthy* of the love of God. Grace is love which persists, despite *unworthiness*, in order that it may recover and restore *worth*. It is not a *thing*, a *quality* which God mysteriously, by sacraments or such other means, infuses into man ; it is the *character* of the activity of God in relation to man as sinner. It is in Jesus Christ and His Cross that that activity finds its full and final manifestation and efficacy. Accordingly to the apostolic benediction (2 Cor. xiii. 14) the love of God comes in the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ ; and we must avoid getting away from "the green pastures and still waters" of His Shepherdhood as our Saviour and Lord into the arid wastes of the dogmatic definitions of His work for and in men.

II.

(1) In grace God as Father regards and deals with men as sinners ; it is needful then, though very briefly, to indicate what is to be understood by *sin*. The three fundamental relations of man are to himself, to his fellows, and to God. When he, by the abuse of his freedom, injures his own

nature his act may be described as *vice*. While the injury is most manifest in such habits as drunkenness or uncleanness, yet we should not restrict the term *vice* to these, but should use it as widely as the term *virtue*, its opposite, for the hurtful reactions of man's act upon himself. When a man does wrong to one of his fellow-men, his act may be described as *crime*, and this term should also be used in the widest sense, and not limited to those wrongs which society recognises and punishes as such. But every act of man has a reference not only to himself and his fellows, but also to God, for not only in Him do all live and move and have their being, not only are all his offspring (Acts xvii. 28), but He is the Father over all, and He is Himself injured and wronged by every evil deed which is done by man. It is in this relation to God that *vice*, or *crime* is also *sin*.

(2) We shall not gain the distinctively Christian view of sin if we relate it to the *law* of God and not to His *love*. It is not with an abstract principle of righteousness that man is concerned, but with a concrete purpose of God for the good of man. In a moral reference sin may be conceived as *disobedience* to God's law, in a religious reference it should be thought of as *distrust* of God's love. It is estrangement from God as well as defiance of Him ; and these two react the one on the other ; estrangement provokes defiance, and defiance intensifies estrangement. In sin the purpose of God is opposed in both its aspects ; His fellowship is refused, and His likeness is rejected. The child of God refuses to live with, and in so living to grow like to the Father. We need not now concern ourselves with the origin of sin in the individual or the race, but with its distinctive nature. Nor need we concern ourselves with the imperfect apprehension of their own sin which so deceives and holds sinners captive. What we

aim at is the conception of sin which corresponds with grace as that is exercised by God in Jesus Christ for forgiveness.

III.

(1) What then is forgiveness? It is not primarily the annulment of the consequences of sin present and future. (a) If a man by his *vice* has brought disease on himself, or disorder of his nature, deterioration of his character, or if he has by his *crime* brought on himself the penalty of the law, or loss of reputation among his fellows, the forgiveness of his sin by God will not at once end these consequences. He may continue to suffer them even as he rejoices in God's forgiveness. But it is untrue and cruel to affirm, as is sometimes done, that in these respects forgiveness makes no difference at all. It does a great deal. *First of all*, these consequences, if not at once removed, are often to a great extent mitigated; some measure of health is restored to the man who lives virtuously, some recovery of reputation among his fellows is possible to the man who shows them that he has indeed "turned over a new leaf," and a restoration of character, as we shall see, follows and follows inevitably on the recovery of his relation to God. *Secondly*, even if the consequences remain, the man himself is so changed that, as will afterwards be shown, as they now are for him they are changed.

(b) In the preaching of a former time great stress was laid on the consequences of sin; hell-fire was preached with passion and power; eternal punishment was an impregnable article in the creed of orthodoxy. I cannot regret the change which has taken place. For, on the one hand, the conception of God as Father, revealed in Jesus Christ, makes incredible such a view of His treatment of men. And on the other hand the Christian life, or what

was taken for it, was begun from a wrong motive—fear, and not love. I shall not go so far as to affirm that the motive of fear must never be appealed to to arrest the sinner on his downward course, but fear alone can never be an adequate motive for the highest kind of Christian life. Much of the irreligion of which we complain to-day is due to the fact that not only has the motive of fear lost its force, but that the motive of love has not had the place given to it in the preaching of the past that it should have had. We are still in a stage of transition, and we must not make haste to despond. We preachers must learn to preach the love of God with the passion and power with which the fear of hell was preached.

(2) Even if we generally accept this change of emphasis, we must not go to the extreme of denying that there are future consequences of sin, a judgment to come. If the future life be, not a fuller disclosure of God than that given in Christ, but a fuller discovery by man of what God is, and how God regards sin, if at death a man learns to know himself, and cannot then as now evade that knowledge, if some of the present consequences of sin in a man's nature and character are continued, and it may even be increased under the conditions of the unseen world, then in a real sense the solemn warnings of the Holy Scriptures remain true, and we can still preach with conviction that the wages of sin is death (Romans vi. 23), that as a man soweth so shall he also reap (Galatians vi. 7). Forgiveness does not mean that all such apprehension is emptied of content. Death will not sever the continuity of life. We dare not affirm that none of the consequences of sin in this life will be carried into the next; but even if they should be, what has already been said about the present consequences will hold good. And we may surely add that faith is the root of which the fruit is love, and the flower hope; and for

the forgiven man there is no longer "a certain fearful looking for of judgment" (Hebrews x. 27), but a confident assurance that God's love hereafter will do greater things for him than it is doing, or can do, here. Only let the stress always fall on the present relation to God as the ground of any hope for the future good, and never solely on that future good. To have God as Father is heaven, to live without God is hell—this is where the accent should ever fall. While the preacher, then, should not primarily appeal to fear or hope, yet he is warranted not only by texts of Scripture, but by all the facts of life as now disclosed to us, in speaking very seriously and solemnly of the judgment to come. How God will finally deal with sin, whether by the complete victory of His grace over man's sin or by the extinction of the personalities who by continued defiance and estrangement have forfeited their right, or lost their capacity to continue as persons we cannot tell. But we can and we ought to make clear that there can be no peace for the wicked here or hereafter until they have made their peace with God in Jesus Christ.

(3) When in the consciousness of sin which the experience of forgiveness meets we have removed the fear of the consequences thereof, what remains? It seems to me two things—the *sense of guilt* and the *feeling of enslavement or weakness at least*. (a) The sense of guilt is not merely the apprehensions of the consequences, the knowledge of liability to punishment, although in men of insensitive conscience that may seem all. The sense of guilt is the sense of self-condemnation, the consequent sense that the relation to God has been disturbed: there may not be hostility, there may be indifference, or at most a feeling of uneasiness. Man made for fellowship with God misses it, although he may not be conscious of the extent of his loss. When conscience is awakened, there is acute misery, and that

not only fear of punishment, but sense of loss—loss of our own esteem of ourselves, and loss in relation to God: God is not to us, nor we to Him, what He wants to be to us, and we now wish Him to be. It is the disturbed relation to God which is the core of the consciousness of sin which craves forgiveness.

(b) With a man of less intense spiritual consciousness, and more active moral conscience, it may be the sense of enslavement to sin, impotence to overcome sin, such as Paul expresses in Romans vii., which becomes the more prominent. In Paul the two elements were both present, although the second finds more poignant personal expression. Augustine felt the moral impotence most acutely; in Luther, again, it seems to have been the consciousness of guilt as estrangement from God which was his great trouble.

(c) Those two elements correspond to the two elements in God's purpose for man which have already been mentioned—fellowship with Him, and likeness to Him. And although, in individual experiences, the emphasis on these two elements will vary yet in any constructive statement we must be careful to do justice to both. God is not to be regarded as Lawgiver and Ruler alone who is concerned only about men's obedience to His law. He is also Father, and He wants men to receive and to respond to His love. A change of character is not enough; there must also be a change in the conscious relation to God, a desire for and a delight in communion with Him. The sinner fully conscious of his sinfulness desires not only to be made good, but also, and even still more, to know that God as his Father looks on him with favour, and not displeasure, and seeks and grants him communion with Himself.

(4) We can now attempt to define what forgiveness is. It is primarily *the restoration of the personal relationship*

to God, and only secondarily, although as an essential consequence, *the restoration of the personal character* of the sinner. (a) This order must be insisted on, not as a subtlety of theology, but as a reality of experience. A man is not forgiven when he becomes good ; it is as he is forgiven that he becomes good. To use the distinction which theology makes, and which it is sometimes useful to recall, forgiveness is not an analytic act, discovering and expressing what already is, or even is going to be, but a synthetic, not only foreseeing what will be but creating the very possibility of its so being. Goodness becomes possible to a forgiven man as it was not, and could not be before. God does not forgive us because He knows that we are going to be good, and so accepts the intention for the deed ; but He forgives us in such a way that the desire, the motive and the power of becoming good come to us. It is not theological subtlety, but experimental superficiality to say that God takes the will for the deed, and that He forgives what we now are for the sake of what He knows that we are going to become. Whatever this may call itself, it certainly is not New Testament Christianity. We must go a good deal deeper into religious and moral reality than that. God knows that we are sinners, even as we know ourselves to be, and yet in forgiveness God regards and treats us as His children in fellowship with Himself.

(b) How can this be ? How can He regard the things that are not as though they were ? It is because in Christ forgiveness is a creative act ; it not only logically distinguishes the sin which God condemns from the sinner whom He accepts, but it really separates the sinner from his sin. Offered fully and freely in Jesus Christ without reservation and qualification, it wakes such *penitence* and *faith* in the sinner as leads him to condemn his own sin and to separate himself from his own sin, so that he may attach himself

to the God who forgives. By the grace of God in forgiveness the attitude of the sinner is so changed to God and to sin, that the sin God still judges no longer personally attaches to the man God forgives ; but it is God who has made the new creation which He can now pronounce good, and in which He can take His delight.

(c) We do injustice to the grace of God in forgiveness if we say that our penitence and our faith are the condition of it, that if we repent and believe, God will forgive. That was the expectation of the Psalmist (Ps. li. 17), but God in Christ goes beyond the aspiration of the Psalmist. Repentance and faith are the *products* of the forgiveness which grace offers and conditions of the full appreciation of that grace. The light brings the sight by which it is seen. The initiative lies with God ; and it is His action which brings about in man those conditions which are necessary to make forgiveness fully effective. It is all of grace, penitence and faith, the aspiration, motive and power of the new life.

(5) We shall again involve ourselves in difficulties of thought, if we remain in the region of theological conceptions only. The creative act of forgiveness is the creative personality of Jesus Christ ; in it God Himself comes and gives Himself to man. Repentance is the personal response to the judgment on sin which the sacrifice of the holy love of Christ evokes. Faith is the personal response to the lovingkindness and tender mercy to sinners Christ's whole personality conveys. His perfection inspires the aspiration after holiness. His love, to which we respond in love, constrains us to self-surrender and self-dedication to Him. He, present as life-giving Spirit, is the inward power by which the restoration of personal character is effected. God's forgiveness is no forensic act of acquittal of the accused at the bar ; it is love's self-identification with sinners in

all that Jesus was, did, and suffered, so that they in turn will identify themselves with the holy love which judges their sin and yet forgives them—the sinners.

(b) Thus the two aspects of forgiveness are inseparable. The grace which cancels guilt also makes holy. Justification and sanctification can be separated as theological abstractions. But a moral and religious monstrosity is produced wherever and whenever a man thinks that he can claim forgiveness without seeking and striving for holiness. As long as a man tolerates and compromises with his sin, he is not and cannot be fully forgiven, for the separation has not taken place between the sinner and the sin which the creative act of forgiveness effects. God's condemnation rests, and must continue to rest, upon the sin, but not on the sinner in so far as he is now separated from that sin. It seems to me we should be using language with greater accuracy if we never spoke of the *forgiveness of sin*, but only of the forgiveness of the sinner, who as forgiven is now no longer identified with the sin on which God's judgment rests and must ever rest. Without this separation there may be a passing-over of sin in God's mercy (Romans iii. 25), but not the forgiveness of grace.

(6) When the sinner by forgiveness becomes the child of God in fellowship with God and growing in likeness to God, the inward change—the new creation within—brings about an outward change, “the old things pass away, and behold all things become new” (2 Cor. v. 17). When there is peace with God, all things work together for good (Romans v. 1, viii. 28); redemption interprets providence. Even the consequences of former sin, so far as they remain, become no longer penalty, but chastisement, and a chastisement of peace, a discipline of religious disposition and moral character, consistent with the new filial relation to God. Outward circumstances which the estranged heart might

regard as token of God's displeasure, the heart reconciled may use as a means of grace, a condition of growth in holy love. Death even is robbed of his terror, and becomes the minister of the God of grace. This is what Ritschl means by the dominion over the world which follows justification. The changed relation to God results not only in a changed character, but even in changed conditions under which the relation and the character are perfected.

(7) This is the typical and ideal experience of the Grace of God in Forgiveness. (a) It must be frankly and fully conceded that the actual experience of Christian men approximates only more or less to it. All that God's Fatherhood means is not realised. The penitence is inadequate and the faith uncertain, and so the new creation is not completed. The aspiration after holiness wavers; the motive of the constraining love of Christ is opposed by other desires and purposes. The power of the Spirit is not fully claimed, used, and enjoyed. But this actuality is not the reality, but the reality is what God is and does in Christ, and our experience gains reality only as the ideal typical experience is approached.

(b) What, it seems to me, in view of the tendency of modern psychology to give exclusive attention to the subjective process in man, to reduce religion to a human experience, we need to emphasise is the objective reality of the grace of God in forgiveness. That is the measure and standard of what Christian life is, for that is the pledge and the power of the creation of that life. Instead of cultivating the habit of introspection of ourselves, which will result in disappointment and despondency, we should form the practice of contemplating God in Christ, for in that alone there lies for us certainty and confidence. While morality, as distinguished from religion, lays stress on what man ought to be and do, and on what man can be and

do, religion emphasises what God is, and does, and what God can make man become. Religion is nearer reality than morality, and it is in religion alone that morality can find its fulfilment. We shall live *best* as we live *most* in the experience of the grace of God in forgiveness.

(8) Although the paragraphs which follow may go beyond the strict limits set by the title, yet in my judgment the treatment of the subject would be incomplete did I not develop a little more fully what has been said about Christ as the agent or the channel of, or still better Himself the grace of God in forgiveness. (a) The earthly ministry of Jesus did convey the grace of God in forgiveness, as several instances familiar to us all show. But Christian thought has always more closely associated this grace with the sacrifice of Christ upon His Cross; and in so doing has the warrant not only of the greatest of the apostles, but even of Christ Himself. What is the reason for this? Let the answer be attached as closely as can be to the previous statement as to the nature of forgiveness. Judgment of sin does not cease in forgiveness, but the sinner is so detached, by God's creative act of grace in making him a new man in Christ Jesus, from that sin that the judgment which still rests upon it no longer falls on him.

(b) That continuance of judgment on sin, and that separation of the sinner from the sin, must be manifest and operative in that creative act. Did man not see and approve God's judgment on sin, and reproduce it in his penitence, he would not separate himself from his sin so as no longer to be morally responsible for it; and it is in the Cross of Christ that the human conscience reads most clearly the condemnation of sin by God. Did not man discover and accept God's goodwill toward him in so severing him from his sin that its judgment need no longer fall upon him, he could never exercise the faith by

which he identifies himself with the grace of God ; and again, it is in the Cross of Christ as in no other word or deed that grace makes its potent appeal to faith.

(c) That Christ might do *in us* what He does by His Spirit, He must needs do *for us* what He has done in His Cross. Christ in His Cross separated Himself from sin by His vicarious suffering of the consequences of sin which He approved as God's judgment on sin, and this He did not as an individual act, but as an act representative of all mankind, because recreative in all men who will respond in penitence and faith. Christ on His Cross so identified Himself with the human race in His holy love that God in Him has made "mankind sinners" His very own care and charge. God in Christ entered into the most intimate personal relationship with mankind in Christ in dealing with sin in judgment, and man in forgiveness. It is as man identifies himself with God in sharing God's judgment of sin, that the personal relation of God and man, disturbed by sin, is restored.

(d) If, in closing, a personal note may be forgiven, it is now forty years since my mind began to be engaged, strenuously and sometimes even tragically, with my experience of the grace of God in forgiveness, and during all these years the conviction has grown upon me, that, however my thoughts may have been "widened with the process of the suns" in criticism, science, psychology, philosophy, theology, yet God forbid that I should glory save in "the Cross of the Lord Jesus Christ, by which the world is crucified to me and I to the world" (Gal. vi. 14).

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

THE NEW JERUSALEM AND TOWN PLANNING.

JOHN'S vision of the New Jerusalem has certain salient features on which extracts from Hellenistic and earlier writers provide a topographical commentary.

The points on which extracts have been collected are :

(α) xxi. 16. καὶ ἡ πόλις τετράγωνος κεῖται.

(β) xxi. 21. καὶ ἡ πλατεῖα τῆς πόλεως.

(γ) xxii. 2. ἐν μέσῳ τῆς πλατείας αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ
ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ξύλον ζωῆς.

(δ) xxii. 1. καὶ ἔδειξέ μοι ποταμὸν ὕδατος ζωῆς λαμπρὸν ὡς
κρύσταλλον.

(ε) xxii. 2. ξύλον ζωῆς.

These points take up certain outstanding features in regard to the city, and the extracts will show that they embody what were considered to be features important in the formal description of ancient cities. Two remarks might be made in introduction. Herodotus describes Babylon and indirectly distinguishes it from Greek cities of the ancient order. He would lead his readers to believe that it was town-planned to a great extent, and was not in the main an accumulation of houses and buildings. The quotation from Aristophanes and the conception of the ideal city given there suggests that the features must have been familiar to such a well-informed audience as Athens provided. Haverfield indeed, in his *Ancient Town Planning*, thinks that Hippodamus, the proto-professional town planner, owed much to the popular conception of Babylon originated by Herodotus. Now, it is generally accepted that the main ideas with regard to the New Jerusalem belong to the Apocalyptic tradition, which derives its inspiration in great part from Ezekiel, who was influenced undoubtedly by Babylon. It is interesting to note that the Seleucids,

a house with almost a hobby for making new foundations on up-to-date models, or remodelling old foundations after new ideals, owed their first rise to power to the fact that Seleucus was satrap of Babylonia shortly after Alexander's death, that the strength of their position against rebels was always fortified by the loyalty of Babylon, and that there was constant intercourse between Babylon and Antioch, or Ephesus. Finally the country indicated in the seven Epistles was, until the Roman aggression, dominated by Seleucid influence, except Pergamum, which knew only their hostility. It would seem as if Apocalyptic visionary and Hellenistic potentate derived their ideas mediately or immediately from the same original source—Babylon. Meantime these notes show that at least the points dealt with were familiar among new foundations of the Diadochi.

(a) Herodot. i. 178: ἤν Βαβυλὼν, ἐοῦσα τοιαύτη δὴ τις πόλις· κεῖται ἐν πεδίῳ μεγάλῳ, μέγαθος ἐοῦσα μέτωπον ἑκαστον εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν σταδίων, ἐούσης τετραγώνου. Ibid. 180: τὸ γὰρ μέσον αὐτῆς ποταμὸς διέρχει . . . τὸ δὲ ἄστυ αὐτὸ ἐὼν πλήρες οἰκιέων τριορόφων καὶ τετρορόφων κατατέμνεται τὰς ὁδοὺς ἰθείας, τὰς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς ἐπικαρσίας τὰς ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐχούσας.

Aristophanes, *Birds*, 1004:

ὀρθῶ μετρήσω κανόνι προστιθείς, ἵνα
ὁ κύκλος γένηται σοι τετράγωνος, κὰν μέσῳ
ἀγορά, φέρονσαι δ' ὥσιν εἰς αὐτὴν ὁδοὶ
ὀρθαὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ μέσον, ὥσπερ δ' ἀστέρος
αὐτοῦ κυκλοτεροῦς ὄντας ὀρθαὶ πανταχῇ
ἀκτῖνες ἀπολάμπωσιν.

Strabo 565: Καὶ Νικαία (ἡ μητρόπολις τῆς Βιθυνίας) ἐστὶ δὲ τῆς πολέως ἑκαυδεκάσταδιος ὁ περίβολος ἐν τετραγώνῳ σχήματι. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τετράπυλος ἐν πεδίῳ κείμενος ἐρρυσμοτομημένος πρὸς ὄρθας γωνίας ὥστ' ἀφ' ἑνὸς λίθου κατὰ μέσον ἰδρυμένον τὸ γυμνάσιον τὰς τέτταρας ὁρᾶσθαι πύλας. Ibid. 793:

ἡ δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρεια—Ἔστι δὲ χλαμνδοειδὲς τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ ἔδαφους τῆς πόλεως (οὗ τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ μῆκος πλευρὰ ἔστι τὰ ἀμφίκλυστα . . . τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ πλάτος οἱ ἰσθμοί. ἅπαντα μὲν ὁδοῖς κατατέμνεται ἱππηλάτοις καὶ ἄρματηλάτοις, δυσι δὲ πλατυτάταις ἐπὶ πλεόν ἢ πλέθρον ἀναπεπταμέναις, αἱ δὲ δὶχα καὶ πρὸς ὀρθὰς τέμνουσιν ἀλλήλας. Also, according to Haverfield, Apamea on the Orontes was in outline an irregular oblong nearly an English mile in length, and varying in width from $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{2}{3}$ of a mile. A broad straight street lined throughout with colonnades runs from end to end of its length and passes two great buildings. Two other streets cross this main street at right angles. He adds that Græco-Macedonian cities were planted in bewildering numbers. Many discoveries show that these streets were laid out with regular chessboard street plan.

The definite principle of town planning was therefore based on the straight line and the right angle. Priene, called by Baumgarten the Pompeii of the East, and excavated by the Germans, is a typical instance of this principle. The town is roughly tetragonal and rectangular, i.e. as far as conformation of the ground allows, and the streets are planned to cut each other at right angles. The houses form a chessboard pattern, as in the plan of Pompeii.

On (β) see Xenophon's *Cyropædia*, 1. 6. 43 (ἡ στενὰς ἡ πλατείας ὁδός), and Strabo, 646 (Smyrna, rebuilt by Antigonus): ἔστι δὲ ἡ ρυμοτομία διάφορος ἐπ' εὐθειῶν εἰς δύναμιν καὶ αἱ ὁδοὶ λιθοστρώτοι κ.τ.λ. *Ibid.* 659. Mulasa has two fanes of Zeus, one in the city and the other in the mountain, to which leads a road—ὁδος τε ἔστρωται . . . ἱερὰ καλουμένη δι' ἧς πομποστελεῖται τὰ ἱερά. So, according to Haverfield, *Thessalonica* had one main street running southwards to the sea, and two more running east and west at right angles to that; at *Apamea on the Orontes*, a broad and straight street lined throughout with colonnades runs from end to end of its length. Two other streets cross this main street at right

angles; also at *Selinus*, two main thoroughfares ran straight from end to end and crossed at right angles. From these two main streets other narrower streets ran off at right angles.

(γ) *ἐν μέσῳ τῆς πλατείας αὐτῆς*. *Πλατεία* seems a common colloquialism to distinguish the Main Street or the High Street or "the Broadway," or the Broads. "In Asia," says Haverfield, "during much of its history, in early Greece, in Europe during the first half of the middle ages, towns have consisted of one or two dominant buildings, temple or church, or castle, of one or two processional avenues for worshippers at sacred festivals, and a little adjacent chaos of tortuous lanes and squalid houses." The breadth of 100 feet or so of the two *πλατεῖαι* in Alexandria is interesting, when compared with the fact that in Priene and Pompeii the broad streets were 23 feet only, and the narrow streets only 10 feet. In the New Jerusalem, with its visionary amplitude, there would be room *ἐν μέσῳ τῆς πλατείας αὐτῆς* for a row of trees down the centre. In the absence of a forum and basilicas, these would furnish shade, and might be compared with the colonnaded main street of Apamea on the Orontes—a city favoured by the Seleucids. As in Mulasa (see above), where Strabo notes the Sacred Street δι' ἧς πομποστελεῖται τὰ ἱερά, John probably connected περιπατήσουσι τὰ ἔθνη with the *πλατεία*. With καὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ compare Strabo 577: ἰδρυται δε ἡ Ἀπάμεια ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐκβολαῖς τοῦ Μαρσῶν ποταμοῦ, καὶ ρεῖ διὰ μέσης τῆς πόλεως ὁ ποταμός, τας ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἔχων. (This Apamea was founded by Antiochus Soter.) *Ibid.* 630: ἡ μὲν οὖν Ἀντιοχεία μετρία πόλις κειμένη τῷ Μαιάνδρῳ . . . ἐπέξενκται δε γέφυρα—χώραν δ' ἔχει πολλὴν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τοῦ ποταμοῦ. Cheirocrates suggested to Alexander the building on Mount Athos of two cities. ποιήσαντα πολεῖς δύο, τὴν μὲν ἐκ δεξιῶν τοῦ ὄρους, τὴν δε ἐν ἀριστερᾷ, ἀπὸ δε τῆς ἐτέρας εἰς τὴν ἐτέραν ρέοντα ποταμόν. 673:

ἡ δε Ταρσος· διαρρει δ' αὐτὴν μέσσην ὁ Κύδνος. 738 : *Babylon*. ὁ γὰρ πόταμος διὰ μέσης ρεῖ τῆς πόλεως, σταδιαῖος τὸ πλάτος. When giving a more circumstantial account of any city Strabo invariably includes the river and its proximity : e.g. 639 (the Seaboard of Ephesus) : εἰτα λιμὴν Πάνορμος καλούμενος, ἔχων ἱερὸν τῆς Ἐφεσίας Ἀρτέμιδος· εἰθ' ἡ πόλις. ἐν δε τῇ αὐτῇ παραλίᾳ μικρόν ὑπὲρ τῆς θαλάττης ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ Ὀρτυγία, διαπρεπὲς ἄλσος παντοδαπῆς ὕλης, κυπαρρίττου δε τῆς πλείστης. διαρρεῖ δι' ὁ Κέγχριος ποταμός.

The meaning of ἐν μέσῳ τῆς πλατείας αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ has caused various difficulties. τοῦ ποταμοῦ is generally taken as governed by ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν, with the meaning "on either side of the river," that is on both banks. Strabo, to give that meaning, writes : χώραν δ' ἔχει πολλὴν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τοῦ ποταμοῦ. The following quotation from Strabo's description of the famous garden on the Euphrates suggests that possibly τοῦ ποταμοῦ and τῆς πλατείας are both governed by ἐν μέσῳ, and not on the ground of fancy but of fact established for several centuries in his time. ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν might then only imply "at irregular intervals in the "midst of the river." The translation might read, "in the midst of the Broad Way, and of the river here and there"—as in Strabo (738) : ὁ κρεμαστός κήπος, ἔχων ἐν τετραγώνῳ σχηματι . . . συνέχεται δε ψαλιδώμασι καμαρωτοῖς ἐπὶ πεττῶν ἰδρυμένοις κυβοειδῶν ἄλλοις ἐπ' ἄλλοις· οἱ δε πεττοὶ κοῖλοι πλήρεις γῆς, ὥστε δέξασθαι φυτὰ δένδρων τῶν μεγίστων, ἐξ ὁπτῆς πλίνθου καὶ ἀσφάλτου κατεσκευασμένοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ αἱ ψαλίδες καὶ τὰ καμαρώματα. ἡ δε ἀνωτάτω στέγη προσβάσεις κλιμακώτας ἔχει, παρακειμένους δ' αὐταῖς καὶ κοχλίας, δι' ὧν τὸ ὕδωρ ἀνῆγον εἰς τὸν κήπον ἀπὸ τοῦ Εὐφράτου συνεχῶς οἱ πρὸς τοῦτο τεταγμένοι. ὁ γὰρ ποταμός διὰ μέσης ρεῖ τῆς πόλεως, σταδιαῖος τὸ πλάτος· ἐπὶ δε τῷ ποταμῷ ὁ κήπος.

(δ) ποταμὸν ὕδατος ζώης λαμπρὸν ὡς κρύσταλλον. Libanius (*Orat.* xi.) giving details and topics which an orator is sup-

posed to touch upon when addressing citizens with their city as his theme, writes : *Πρὶν δὲ, οἱ τινες πρῶτοι κατέσχον τὴν χώραν διδάξαι, περὶ φυσικῶς τε τῆς χώρας καὶ ὅπως μὲν ἀέρων εἴληχεν, ὅπως δὲ ἔχει πρὸς θάλατταν, ὅπως δε ὑδάτων μετείληφεν, ἥτις δε αὕτη καρπὸν ἐκτρέφειν κ.τ.λ.* Similarly Aristides (*Orat.* xv.) : *πάντα γὰρ ἤδη μεχρὶ τῆς παραλίας καταλάμπεται γυμνασίοις, ἀγοραῖς, θεατροῖς (κ.τ.λ.)* *λοῦτρα μὲν τοσαῦτα . . . δρομοὶ . . . κρῆναι τε καὶ πηγαί :* and, in *Orat.* xxii., *Μέλητα δε κοσμεῖν ἑτέροις τὰ νῦν παρήμῃ· καίτοι μέγιστός γε αὐτὸς αὐτῷ κόσμος ἐστὶν ὁρώμενος, ᾧ γε καὶ θέρος καὶ χειμῶν τὸν αὐτόν ἔχει λόγον . . . οὐδὲ πλάνης . . . ἀλλ' εἰοικεν ἐραστῇ τινι τῆς πόλεως.*

Libanius and Aristides, who are corroborated by other authors, thus imply that the utilitarian as well as the æsthetic value of the river was an integral part of these orations. Wherever a city was happy in the possession of such an amenity, its individual merits were highly extolled. Apart therefore from the fact that John's description would not seem to fall entirely outside this elastic model, a suitable site upon the banks of a river—flowing and of pure water—also seems to have been the *sine qua non* of the ideal city.

With regard to "the Tree of Life" (ε), while it would seem as if John contemplated them as planted singly, he also regarded them as the characteristic or possibly the sole species of tree in the New Jerusalem—as the oak was of Didona at Miletus, or the cypress of the hills near Ephesus. It is certainly, on the other hand, the peculiar tree of the Divine Ruler of the Sacred City. One feature which Strabo seldom neglects to describe in connexion with a city is the Temple and the sacred groves. This is so frequent that it need not be shown by quotation. But the similarity between the New Jerusalem and a Hellenistic city is utterly repudiated at one point by John. One essential feature of description, rhetorical or geographical, of a city is always

its temples, their number, their deities, their adornments, their groves. In one exalted sentence John strikes the fundamental distinction between the city of his vision and any other : οὐκ εἶδον ναόν ἐκεῖ.

Is it therefore too much to suggest, in view of these facts, that some modification is required of the extreme view expressed, for instance, in a recent publication by Dr. Beckwith (*Apocalypse of St. John*), that "this vision of the holy city is shaped throughout by the eschatological imagery contained in the prophets and apocalyptists"? It would be more reasonable to suggest that Babylon, mediately through Jewish writers, and mediately through contemporary ideals of Hellenistic town planning, exerted a dual influence upon John's vision. Had not apocalyptists some substance in contemporary facts for their vision of an ideal city? The age immediately following the Macedonian conquest was prolific in and remarkable for its new foundations and town planning.

D. McQUEEN.

NOTES AND NOTICES OF RECENT CRITICISM.

A RARE NEW TESTAMENT VERB.

IN 1 Thessalonians ii. 7 f. St. Paul, after comparing the "gentleness" of his love for his Thessalonian converts to that of a nurse "cherishing" her children, proceeds—οὕτως ὁμειρόμενοι¹ ὑμῶν ηὔδοκοῦμεν μεταδοῦναι ὑμῖν οὐ μόνον τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχάς, words which the Revisers render, "even so, being affectionately desirous of you, we were well pleased to impart unto you, not the gospel of God only, but also our own souls." The verb ὁμειρομαι does not occur elsewhere in the New Testament, but is found in Job iii. 21A, and in Symmachus's rendering of Psalm lxii. (lxiii.) 2. It is often regarded as a vulgar variation of ἠμειρομαι (cf. Winer-Schmiedel,

¹ Westcott and Hort prefer the smooth breathing: see their *Notes on Select Readings*,² p. 151. The new Freer MS. (W) reads ομειρομενοι.

Gr. § 16, 6), but Hesychius accepts it in the sense of ἐπιθυμέω, and confirmation of both form and meaning are supplied by a sepulchral inscription from Lycaonia, *C.I.G.* III. 4,000, where at the end of hexameter 7 we have—

ὁμειρόμενο[ι] περὶ παιδός,

with reference to certain priests Kallinikos and Ammia, “the sorrowful father and the mourning mother,” “greatly desiring their son,” Zotikos. The illustration of the passage in 1 Thesalonians is peculiarly apt if, with Wohlenberg in Zahn’s *Kommentar ad l.*, we regard ὁμειρόμαι there as a term of endearment (“ein edles Kosewort”), borrowed from the language of the nursery.¹

Unfortunately the reference has been obscured hitherto by the fact that both Boeckh-Franz (in *C.I.G.*) and Kaibel (*Epigrammata Græca ex lapidibus conlecta*, 406) unwarrantably correct the words of the inscription into—

ὁ[δυ]ρόμενοι περὶ παιδός.

But the original reading has been restored by Sir William M. Ramsay in a fresh rendering of the whole inscription in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, xxxviii. (1918), p. 152 ff., where he has also supplied an illuminating commentary on the circumstances, which would appear to have led to its composition.

Briefly stated, these arose from the desire of Kallinikos and his wife to commemorate the part which Zotikos had taken in reviving an old pagan rite in the city of Iconium in the fourth century of the Christian era. Such attempts, we are reminded, were not infrequent in order to exhibit “the old religion [of the country] as the patron of literature and true morality in opposition to Christianity.” And in this case the ceremony took the form of a procession in which Zotikos “drove cars-with-sacred-wheels to fair Galateia” (ἱερότροχα ἤγεν καλὴν εἰς Γαλατεῖαν), carrying with him a grey-white cock, the sacred bird of the god Men, in order to purify the city of Iconium, and secure its ransoming or atonement (ἐπὶ λύτ[ρ]οις) from guilt. It is possible

¹ According to Dr. J. H. Moulton, in a communication to the present writer, the root of the word is *smēr*, “remember,” as in *memor*, and the δ- comes from a derelict preposition ὦ (seen in ὦ-κεανός, participle of ὤ-κειμαι, “lie around”): cf. such parallel formations as δύρομαι and δδύρομαι, κέλλω and ὀκέλλω.

that this was the last occasion when the old ceremony was performed, and the definite mention of "Atonement" suggests to Sir W. M. Ramsay that the ceremony may have been "worked up under the late pagan revival to compete with Christian ideas."

G. MILLIGAN.

JOHN ii. 4.

THE question raised by the Rev. A. Souter, and the notes of Prof. Deissmann and the Editor, no doubt interested many readers of the EXPOSITOR.

To what has been said on the philological meaning of *τί ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί*, little can be added, though it might be asked if the classical meaning of this phrase really helps us in solving the problem. For apart from the able advocacy of Dr. Burney of an Aramaic background of the Fourth Gospel, the question of the language in which the Master addressed His mother is of great importance in the discussion, and this we have good reason for thinking was Aramaic. In order to get at the exact words used, we should have to know many things which at this distance of time are very difficult to ascertain; for not only would the exact words used need to be known, but also the way in which they were spoken. We have in Hebrew, Aramaic, Arabic, and cognate Semitic languages expressions of a similar nature whose exact meaning depends entirely on the manner in which they are used.

It seems to me that the question really is, Why did Mary ask Him to get wine for the company? Some customs pertaining to Jewish wedding-feasts may help us to answer it.

As is well known, marriage feasts last for seven days among well-to-do families, and during this period a good deal of wine is needed not only for ceremonial purposes but also for general use. It is a custom that has persisted to this day in Galilee that the relatives and guests take part in the supplying of the wine. While the wedding-feast lasts the relatives and guests send for wine as it is needed. It is the privilege of a Rabbi, Rab, Gaon and Melamed (teacher) of the bridegroom, if present and they so desire, to have precedence in supplying the wine.

The wine at the feast in Cana had given out, and Mary told

Jesus that this was the case, and suggested that He should supply the wine. There is no occasion whatever for assuming that He rebuked her for this. He may have thought that it was not His turn, that His "hour" had not come; yet, as she had brought the matter to His attention, He told her not to trouble about it, and that He would see that the supply is kept up.

Many other points in connexion with wedding-feasts would throw further light on the matter, but into these I cannot enter here, and hope to do so in another place in the near future.

N. LEVISON.

REVIEWS.

Il Figlio dell' Uomo, Studio sugli Evangelii. By Primus Vannutelli. Rome: Libreria di Scienze e Lettere.

The Messiah and the Son of Man. By Arthur S. Peake, D.D. Manchester: The University Press. 1s. 6d.

IN a pamphlet of nearly fifty pages Vannutelli presents a reasoned plea for what he calls "the human interpretation" of the name—the Son of man. He quotes and comments on all the passages in which the phrase occurs, and concludes that Jesus did not intend by it any hidden reference to His own Messiahship. "The true equation," he says, "appears to me to be—The Son of man = the man, this man = myself." He devotes a rather superfluous amount both of space and of erudition to establishing the fact that a speaker may naturally refer to himself in the third person, as Samuel did in the familiar—"Speak, Lord, for *Thy servant* heareth." Dr. Dalman too dogmatically has declared that "the custom of referring to oneself in the third person was in no way common amongst the Hebrews," and Vannutelli is justified in retorting with another saying of Dalman's that "in the usual Galilean speech the personal pronoun is in certain cases replaced by a substantive: thus—this man, this lady may equal I." But when by abundant quotation from Aramaic and Greek and Latin he has proved this minor point, he is a long way from having proved his case. He is cheered by the support of several of the Fathers—Justin and Jerome and Augustine and others, and feels that he is in good company;

but he does not even try to show why the phrase (except for two ambiguous instances—Mark ii. 10, ii. 28) should only be found on the lips of Jesus after Peter's confession of Him at Cæsarea Philippi. That is the vital part of the problem, and anyone who concentrates on these later chapters with their perpetual repetition of this enigmatic Name will find it hard to rest content with this "human interpretation." Many, like Wellhausen, have begun with it, though admitting that such a habit of referring to oneself in the third person is odd ; but one by one, they have been driven to feel that this interpretation is untenable. The Son of man must be understood as the Christ, the Bringer-in of the Reign of God ; and in this conclusion the mass of scholars now concur under the constraint of the Gospel evidence.

Dr. Peake's pamphlet is of a quite different degree of value ; it covers far more ground, and it does so with a fulness of knowledge and a ripeness of consideration that make it notable. The literature on the subject is enormous ; but if one were asked for a compact indication of the condition and the results of this whole discussion he would find it hard to point to anything clearer or more masterly than this. Dr. Peake dismisses in a sentence the extreme opinion of Wrede and Wellhausen that Jesus never, in word or deed, claimed to be the Messiah, and only attained this dignity in the mind of the Church after faith in the Resurrection had been established. He rejects the middle view of Harnack and others that Jesus came to this thought about Himself only late in the story, and that it broke upon Him in a way which is symbolically described in the narrative of the Transfiguration. Against this plea he insists with convincing brevity on the historical value of the record of Baptism and Temptation. To Jesus at the outset of His ministry not only His Sonship was made clear but His Messiahship, and that sent Him in a storm of feeling to the wilderness to settle on what lines His mission was to be discharged. But if Jesus believed that He was the Messiah—not merely a Messiah to be but a Messiah already at work in establishing the Kingdom—why did He not declare Himself to the people or at least to the disciples ? Here Peake stands firmly for the familiar view that this reticence was compelled by the general misconception of what a Messiah must be, and that when He did begin to hint at the character of His mission it was in veiled form by calling Himself the Son of man. The best

secured instances of His use of the term fall apart into two groups—one referring to the Passion and the other to His coming in triumph. Daniel and the Book of Enoch had prepared many in Israel to look for the Son of man in this second aspect, but “the connexion of the term with the Passion is His own contribution.”

It would be too much to say that Dr. Peake commands assent at every point ; but he has rendered a real service to New Testament students in this short, lucid and masterly outline of a subject of central importance.

W. M. MACGREGOR.

SERMONS AND SERMONS.

Kindness to the Dead. The Very Rev. James Cooper, D.D. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

Village Sermons by a Novelist. Gustav Frenssen. Heffer, Cambridge. 4s.

The Shout of the King. Ernest Raymond. Hodder and Stoughton, London. 5s.

United Free Church Sermons. Thomson and Cowan, Glasgow. 5s.

“THERE are diversities of gifts,” says the Apostle, “but the same spirit.” In the four volumes of sermons before us there are diversities of gifts. Gustav Frenssen and Ernest Raymond are novelists, Dr. Cooper was an eminent Church historian, and each of the preachers representing the United Free Church of Scotland has his own right of appeal. The novelists have the gift of arresting the attention, the historian speaks to those who are interested in the annals of their country, the appeal of the preachers of the United Free Church of Scotland is to those “who do not believe that to be called upon to think in Church is to be invited to break the Sabbath day.” Every Church produces its own type of preaching gift. Mr. Raymond’s sermons are quite typically Anglican. They are simple, clever, interesting and short, but never profound. Frenssen, for all his liberalism, is a son of the great German pietists, and his sermons are quiet and devotional. Dr. Cooper’s discourses are delivered with that stately eloquence which a venerable cathedral seems to call forth. The *United Free Church Sermons* are characterised by hard thinking and direct, unadorned expression.

"There are diversities of gifts, but the same spirit." Anglican and Lutheran, High and Evangelical Presbyterian, preach the same Christ. The translator tells us that Frenssen's sermons have often been preached in Roman Catholic pulpits. And why not? For Frenssen's gospel is, in the true sense, catholic. Dr. Cooper delights in the thought which has been borne in upon us again by reading these sermons, that in all the branches of the Church the centre of worship has been ever the same. After taking the occasion of the re-opening of the West Church, Perth, to review the tangled ecclesiastical history of that city, he concludes: "You are then, brethren, the successors of fifty generations who here in Perth have known Christ Jesus as their God and King and Saviour."

We do not look for genius in the pulpit, though there is a type of talent which is described as "pulpit genius." Whether Gustav Frenssen has this latter kind we do not know, but he certainly has more than a touch of real genius. We heartily endorse the eulogy by Mr. Kinloch, his translator. "Nowhere in ancient or in modern times does any preacher succeed better in making men's hearts burn within them than Frenssen does in his Village Sermons when he speaks with the tenderness, the simplicity, the reverence, the devotion of a great artist, about Him whom he believes to be the Light of the World." Frenssen has learned the preacher's hardest lesson. He can be simple without being commonplace. He can be interesting without being clever. To our mind his sermons are models of what sermons ought to be.

Of Mr. E. T. Raymond's addresses one is tempted to say—and it is a cruel thing to say of any sermon—that they are clever. But St. Paul was clever when he caught the attention of the crowd on Mars' hill, and Mr. Raymond has evidently to speak to people who will only listen to some new thing. And he can catch their attention. He knows that if he begins by giving out a text he is lost, but a sentence from one of their own poets, from Mr. George Meredith for example, will make them listen. So he begins a sermon on the conversion of the Apostle Paul with "We are sons of yesterday, not of the morning." The best thing in the book is an address (or is it an essay?) on "The Believers." It is one of the truest and most delightful bits of writing on a child's religion we have ever read.

The editors of *United Free Church Sermons* have drawn from a rich quarry. Some of the finest seams have not been worked, but the book gives some indication of the spiritual and intellectual wealth of a Church great in its preaching traditions. We have examples of the scholar as preacher. It is generally supposed that those who are elevated to a professorial chair tend to grow professorial in their preaching. But there is no sign of this in the volume before us. One of the most simple and helpful sermons is that by Prof. Moffatt, the most technically perfect is that by Prof. Clow, while in Prof. Robertson's there is real spiritual genius. Dr. James Black and Mr. Boyd Scott furnish good examples of popular preaching, while the religious essayist is represented by Mr. H. L. Simpson. We are glad to find that the younger men, Mr. W. W. Gauld, Mr. D. H. Hislop, and Mr. Lewis Sutherland are worthily upholding the preaching traditions of their Church. If any criticism were to be passed upon the general character of the preaching illustrated in this volume, it might be that it tends to be a little academic. As every preacher knows, there are sermons which are more to the gratification of the composer than to the edification of the hearer. Many preachers dull the cutting edge of their sermons by using too much sand-paper. We once spoke to a physician of the "technique" of a well-known preacher. He said, "I do not understand you. The only object of a surgeon's technique is to save life."

The Memorial volume of the late Professor Cooper's Sermons belongs to a category different to that of the other volumes we have noticed. The discourses selected are not parochial, but occasional. They were delivered at such special services as the re-opening of a church or the dedication of a memorial. Such sermons are not to be judged by the ordinary standards. They are concerned in showing kindness to the dead. Within its own limits, however, the volume is one which will appeal to all who venerate the memory of a very saintly Scottish Churchman, and to all who are interested in the annals of the Scottish Church. Of most general interest is the sermon on "The Church and the Poets," preached in the Parish Church of Jedburgh on the centenary of the meeting in that town of the poets Wordsworth and Scott.

It is often remarked that expository preaching is a thing of

the past. Every modern preacher knows its difficulty. Either the passage chosen seems to be so familiar that nothing fresh can be said about it, or it is so unfamiliar that it requires an historical introduction of disproportionate length. Topical preaching is easier, and wins more applause. Yet a continuous diet of topical preaching would be disastrous to the spiritual life of any congregation as Milton long ago discovered.

“The hungry sheep look up, and are not fed,
But, swoln with wind and the rank mist they draw,
Rot inwardly.”

The sheep, whether they desire it or not, do require to be fed on substantial and convenient food. And some of them do desire it. Lord Sands, than whom none knows the Church of Scotland better, complains that he never hears an expository lecture from the modern pulpit, and never ceases to urge the younger ministers to content themselves, now and again, with simply making the Word to be understood of the people. But Lord Sands is no longer a young man. Would a modern congregation stand this type of preaching? Not unless it is well done. But it can be well done.

Frenssen can do it. His sermons were delivered to a simple country congregation numbering about twenty. So he is very simple. There is nothing ingenious in his divisions. Here are the heads of a sermon on the Pearl of Great Price. (1) There was a merchant who sought for goodly pearls: you are that merchant. (2) He found a pearl of great price: this pearl is the kingdom of heaven. (3) He went and sold all he had and bought the pearl: you must do the same. But Frenssen is also modern. “I take the text out of its ancient setting and plant it in our own life, and in our own time.” He makes us see the merchant going up and down the world in search of a pearl of great price, and he brings us near to the Fisherman in the brown coat, who gives the pearl, and whose name is Jesus Christ.

Professor Clow can do it. His sermon is the only one of the twenty *United Free Church Sermons* which is, in the narrower sense, expository. His exegesis is, we think, unsound. His text is our Lord's strange words about John the Baptist—“Notwithstanding he that is least in the kingdom of

heaven is greater than he." The preacher's argument is that John was a man who missed the highest, because he did not become a disciple of Jesus. And so Dr. Clow preaches an expository sermon, which, if unconvincing, is at least arresting from beginning to end.

Or take Mr. Raymond. His printed addresses have no texts. Some of them, we suspect, never had texts. Yet Mr. Raymond is an expositor. He has a sermon on a well-worn theme, Our Lord's Temptation. He begins, "Let us try an experiment. Let us read the story of the Man Jesus' temptation as if we were reading it for the first time." And the experiment is successful. Mr. Raymond may be ultra-modern, he may never go very deep, but he has the gift of the expositor, the gift of reading a familiar story with the fresh wonder of a child.

But preaching may be expository which is not expository preaching. There is only one topical sermon in the United Free Church volume. The rest belong to a familiar variety. There is an historical introduction. A Scottish congregation demands that. The text is not mishandled. And after that the preacher delivers his message. That message may go beyond the text, it may even part company with it altogether. But the preacher's message is the message of the Bible. He may or may not expound the text, but he expounds the Word, and that after all is the main thing.

D. W. GREENFIELD.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

IN *Chrétientés Orientales* (Librairie Istra : Strasbourg, Paris) Professor Frédéric Macler, the well-known Orientalist, reprints in pamphlet form an essay on the Eastern forms of Christianity as distinguished from the Greek Church, which, he points out, "est la moins orientale des Églises d'Orient." The political association of France with Syria lends a timely value to these pages. The author recalls the historical outline, for example, of the Jacobite Christian Church, of the Nestorians, the Maronites, and other small branches. He then passes on to describe the Georgian and Armenian Churches ; he expects much from the

former, though the outlook for the latter seems melancholy. It ought to be a service to French people to have their attention fixed upon these Churches in a region for which France is particularly responsible. Professor Macler wisely avoids any political advice; he is content to arouse interest and some intelligent sympathy.

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Who is Jehovah? By C. H. Titterton, M.A., B.D. London: C. J. Thynne and Jarvis. Price 9d.

This is called "an exposition and an exposure." It purports to be an "exposure" of modern Old Testament critics. On the very first page Mr. Titterton accuses them of assuming that "the art of writing was a late introduction" in the history of Israel. We turn to two of the most recent and representative critics who have published Old Testament Introductions; Cornill observes, "It would be altogether unwarrantable to assert dogmatically that Moses could not have been possessed of a knowledge of writing," while Sellin holds "that the question should ever have been raised whether Moses, living about 1300 B.C., could have known how to write, appears to us now absurd!" On page 7 Mr. Titterton contemns "the attempts made by keen critics to separate Shakespeare's 'mixed plays.'" We can assure him that literary criticism here is by no means so bankrupt as he imagines. His own ingenious hypothesis to account for the problem of Exodus vi. 2-3 is that the name of Jehovah (Mr. Titterton ascribes "rich converting power and blessing" to this mispronunciation) was given at the Creation, but that the people by their sins never learned what it really meant until the Exodus, and that even then they had to be punished by being prevented from pronouncing it properly. It is much to be desired that those who write upon such difficult historical and literary problems would rid themselves of the idea that their critical opponents are actuated by malign motives or inspired by dark antagonism to anything like faith and revelation. Accuracy and good temper are two essentials in any controversy that hopes to be fruitful.

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The Children's Bible (4s. net) and *The Little Children's Bible* (2s. net): Cambridge University Press.

Not long ago Messrs. Nelson issued, for the Scottish Churches,

"Graded Bible Readers," in two volumes, consisting of extracts from the Bible corresponding to the syllabus of instruction drawn up by these Churches for schools, and adopted by the Educational Institute. The text was carefully revised, and the volumes were enriched with illustrations. This is a similar venture, originating with the Cambridgeshire Education Committee. The first and larger book is designed for children between seven and eleven; the second is for children between five and seven. The editors, Dr. Nairne, Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, and Mr. Glover, explain that these books are not intended to be substitutes for the entire Bible, but simply meant to promote in children "a life-long love of the Christian story and the Word of God." There are no illustrations, but the text is beautifully printed, and certainly the outward form of the volumes is attractive. Both put the story of Jesus first; then extracts from the Old Testament follow. For example, in the second volume, these are arranged as "stories that Jesus would learn from his mother." The general arrangement is skilful, and the books deserve to be widely circulated. In both, it is interesting to observe, the Song of the Three Children is included.

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Mr. Stanley Wood, of Dinglewood School, Colwyn Bay, has printed a shilling pamphlet *On the Teaching of Shakespeare in Schools* (London: George Gill & Sons, Ltd.), which is the outcome of practical experience. Mr. Wood has a refreshing faith in the power of Shakespeare to appeal to children. He lays stress upon the need of enthusiasm as well as of intelligence in the teacher, and offers many valuable suggestions on method. One of them is: "Unless you are a genius, avoid lecturing to small boys; so far as possible all direct information should come to them in response to some question they have asked or in the course of some conversation they have started."

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Mr. Otis Cary's pamphlet on *The First Christian School* (The Pilgrim Press: Boston, Chicago) is a popular description of how Jesus taught His disciples. The author outlines the educational methods in Palestine, and emphasises the appeal of our Lord to youth. Indeed he goes the length of suggesting that Martha, Mary, and Lazarus were all young people in their teens, since men were usually married at eighteen, and since the intimacy

of Jesus with the sisters "would hardly be in accordance with Jewish ideas of propriety, were they of marriageable age." The pamphlet is brightly written.

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The Missionary Genius of the Bible. By the Rev. Vernon F. Storr, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 3s. 6d.

Canon Storr remembers that Dr. Horton wrote upon "The Bible, a Missionary Book" twenty years ago, but he rightly believes that a fresh treatment of the subject will be opportune. He feels the religious gain of the higher criticism, and sets himself to expound the conceptions of God's purpose in the Old Testament and then in the New, showing how "Israel failed to be the missionary people which her own prophets saw that she was meant to be," and how "Christians have caught the treasure which Hebrew hands let slip." The historical treatment of the subject is particularly helpful. Canon Storr's pages will clear away a number of popular misconceptions, and enable his readers to understand, in the light of modern research, how the Bible witnesses to a human, catholic revelation of God which culminates in the gospel of Jesus Christ.

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Dr. A. C. McGiffert's *God of the Early Christians* (T. and T. Clark: 6s.) is characteristically lucid, but it is hardly so convincing as some of his earlier books. He begins by denying that the teaching of Jesus about God was different from the best Jewish teaching of the day—an estimate lower even than Montefiore and Abrahams allow. "So far as the God of the Christians is different from the God of the Jews, it is due not to Jesus' teaching about God, but to the teaching of Paul and those who came after, or still more to the personality of Jesus and the interpretation his followers put upon it" (p. 21). The words "or still more" give away Dr. McGiffert's case. He then argues that many of the early Gentile Christians made Jesus Christ their God alone, though he admits "the precarious nature of much of the evidence." The theologians or apologists made God "in the main a philosophical abstraction," and eventually the functions of Jesus Christ the divine were extended to cover creation, providence, and judgment, which had been warmly discussed in the theistic controversies of the second century. From Dr. McGiffert's pages, with their historical acuteness, the

student usually gains something. But the thesis of this book does not seem based upon an adequate appreciation of the vital and unique revelation which explains the successive attempts to interpret its content. The problem is one which demands more than the historical method for its solution.

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Mr. C. F. Ream publishes *An Approach to the Bible* (London : J. W. Butcher), in connexion with the Wesleyan Methodist Sunday School Department, a small red pamphlet, containing about sixty pages of sound, elementary information for young people "who want to approach the Bible in the right spirit and in such a way as to make the most of a serious study of Holy Scripture." Mr. Ream has written a simple, effective little introduction. Such help is needed in many quarters, and we welcome every attempt like this to interpret the Bible in the light of the new knowledge, untechnically. Principal Garvie contributes an appreciative foreword.

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Classics of the Inner Life. Edited by F. B. Macnutt, Archdeacon of Leicester. Hodder and Stoughton. 5s.

Six Lenten lectures, delivered in St. Martin's Collegiate Church, Leicester, each dealing with a devotional classic. It would be all to the good if Christian people would read one of these classics once a year at least, and lectures like those reprinted in this book are intended to send the reader back to books like the *Imitatio*, Augustine's *Confessions*, Brother Lawrence's *Practice of the Presence of God*, Law's *Serious Call*, and Andrewes' *Preces Privatae*. Dr. Walter Lock contributes a singularly fresh appreciation of *The Christian Year*. He explains how the soothing and rather sober tone of the verses was due to the circumstances of its composition, and, while he admits that Keble "never caught the glow of the nobler side of a great city," and that "the connexion of thought as between verse and verse is sometimes obscure," he brings out the devotional qualities as well as the Wordsworthian poetry of the volume. The Bishop of Oxford thinks that in these days when we "harp too much on the failure or inefficiency of the Church" and yield to "the passion for Conferences and general pronouncements," we shall do well to recall "William Law's message to steady us and bring us back to the fundamental idea of the religion of Christ." The merit

of the various addresses is that they whet the appetite for an intelligent perusal of the devotional books with which they deal.

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Songs of Sorrow and Praise. By Duncan Cameron, B.D. Edinburgh : T. and T. Clark. 7s.

It is a pleasure to call attention to these studies in the book of Psalms, written by a scholar who is in close touch with the original language of the psalms and alive to their devotional value. One useful feature is the new versions of some difficult passages. Mr. Cameron offers independent renderings which often light up a text, as for example when he points out that a phrase like "the fear of the Lord," in Psalm xxxiv. 11 or xix. 9, is best expressed in English by "the true religion." He has a good chapter on "The Law in the Psalter," in which he shows how devotion to the Law or Torah runs through the whole collection. Indeed he offers an ingenious explanation of Psalm xl. 7 : "burnt-offering and sin-offering hast Thou not required," which seems to contradict the theory that the psalmists revered the ritual and ceremonial Law. Mr. Duncan suggests that the Hebrew term translated "sin-offering" should be taken to mean "sin," as usual. In this way he gets a meaning for the line which accords with devotion to the sacrificial system. "The message is that sacrifices are not well pleasing to God when they are offered by those who are quite content to live in sin." This is parallel to some other statements in the psalter but it is hardly necessary. What some of the prophets felt, about sacrifice might well have been felt by one of the psalmists, and the fortieth psalm is quite prophetic in this respect. But, whatever may be thought of Mr. Cameron's exegesis here and there, his book is most helpful and suggestive, an unpretentious effort to reveal something of the perennial value with which the psalms are charged for the Christian Church.

CURRENT ISSUES.

THERE is a good deal of moral instruction conveyed by means of novels nowadays. Fiction has become a channel of propaganda, not always to the benefit of its artistic structure, and in some modern romances the reader unawares is brought into touch with counsel and ethical analysis. In one recent novel called *The Faithful Heart* there is an example of this. An old seaman is distilling his wisdom of life for the benefit of his boy, and among other things he declares: "Remember that, in all history, salt matters more than anything else. . . . And do not forget in the end that Christianity, whichever way you look at it, is an anchor."

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"In all history, salt matters more than anything else." But what does "salt" mean? If we took the word in a strict Oriental sense, it might mean "good feeling" or "loyalty to engagements," for salt was an indispensable item in ancient compacts. And this would yield a good sense. Nothing would do more for the world than a heightened sense of honour in fulfilling contracts or pledges, either between nations or between individuals. But probably what the old seaman meant was that life needs to be kept from growing corrupt. No salt, no health on board! Where salt fails, scurvy prevails. And life on land as on sea requires those who are "the salt of the earth," people who give a tone to their circle, their Church, or their community. It is of vital moment indeed to have such an element present. The old mariner's sentence is an echo of what Jesus said when He told His disciples that they were "the salt of the earth." As they embodied His principles and spirit, they kept people round them from growing corrupt.

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But how? Christianity as an anchor is more intelligible. We all know that life is wrecked, in a moral crisis, if it lets go

Christian principles of purity and honesty. Men and women ride out the storm as they hold fast to these principles. But how Christianity works as the salt of the earth is not so easy to perceive. Not so easy even to practise. A writer in the *Journal of Religion* faces this question. His article is entitled, "Does the Church Lead?"

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The answer to the question is No. The Church does not lead, either in politics, for example, or in social ethics. The Church does not dictate. No one looks to the Church for advice or for guidance. "The futility of her claim to leadership is witnessed in the indifference shown her when she assumes to speak with authority; she is severely ignored in the world of practical affairs."

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Some deplore this. They lament the failure of the Church to issue orders to the world. But the writer of the article—he is an American—is not dismayed. He regards this as the inevitable result of the Church's position; the Church is not in the world to assume such leadership, it "preaches clearly defined principles, but has no definite programme." Now, as soon as a principle becomes attached to a programme of reform, those who agree on the principle are not always agreed upon the wisdom of the particular programme which claims to realise it, and the Church cannot command assent from all its members.

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The writer gives some illustrations. The principle of peace is accepted and urged by the Church, but, once that is put into the concrete demand for disarmament, a variety of opinions exist as to whether America can afford to disarm, in view of the present condition of the world. Again, the unanimity of the Churches about prohibition, we are told, does not mean that the Church to-day could marshal its forces with "the same united front" if the question were raised about the permission to use light wines and beer. The prohibition amendment has met with "only moderate success, with the result that faith in its practicability has been shaken." Not that the Church repudiates the principle; it simply has to face the fact that disagreement has arisen over its application. "The experience of the last few years has raised a serious doubt in the minds

of many Christians whether the principle has not been applied too rigorously."

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So it is not easy to exercise the functions of salt. The writer of the article in question recognises that. But he will not admit that the Church needs to deplore any loss of prestige in leadership. Whatever the defects of the past have been, the Church has witnessed for centuries to ideals of justice, righteousness, and brotherhood. What has been achieved, has been due to the Church's existence and testimony working in the mass of prejudice and indifference. "Only in so far as she fails to create and to develop public conscience and humanitarian sympathies can she be charged with failure. For it is not the Church's task to provide programmes, but to inculcate Christian principles; it is not her task to assume leadership in every realm of thought, conduct, or relationship, but to develop Christian leaders."

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Behind the Gospels of Matthew and Luke lie two main sources. So most scholars are agreed. One of them is the Gospel of Mark, more or less in its present form. The other is less easy to identify. By some scholars it is held to be the "Logia" of Matthew mentioned by Papias in the second century, but those who feel unable to accept this theory have to look elsewhere for traces of its origin. Professor John Line, a Canadian critic, is one of these. He devotes an article in the July number of the *Canadian Journal of Religious Thought* to the problem of this second source.

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According to Professor Line, it had close affinities to the Fourth Gospel. He lays stress upon the saying in Matthew xi. 25-27 = Luke x. 21, 22, and also upon the words of Matthew xi. 19 = Luke vii. 35, where either Jesus identifies Himself, or the Evangelist identifies Him, with the Wisdom of God. Now, the conception of Wisdom is absent from the Fourth Gospel, and this might appear to tell against Professor Line's theory. But he holds that both the Logos and Wisdom were conceptions of this Hellenistic Judaism, his conclusion being that while "the Fourth Gospel presents Jesus as the Incarnation of the Divine Logos, the second Synoptic document portrayed Him cognately as the Incarnate Wisdom of God. In other words,

the document represents an earlier phase of that same Ephesian movement in Christian doctrine of which the Gospel of John is the consummation."

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And who wrote it? Who was in Ephesus during this pre-Johannine period? Paul was, Priscilla was, but Professor Line prefers the third candidate, Apollos. No doubt, Apollos was at first very imperfectly acquainted with the truth about Jesus; when he came to Ephesus, he needed instruction. But perhaps he picked up there fuller knowledge of the facts than he had gained at Alexandria, and then was able to prepare this document for the use of the Pauline Churches. "On some record to which he was indebted—a record that was itself very probably Palestinian—Apollos may have based, when his Christian belief had become maturer, his portraiture of Christ as Incarnate Wisdom."

THE TEN BEST BOOKS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

THE term Philosophy of Religion dates only from the close of the eighteenth century, but the thing denoted is much older. As to how much older, there is difference of opinion. Writers on the subject are not agreed as to how philosophy of religion should be defined, or even described. Some use it as synonymous with religious philosophy or with Theism, in which case we ought to begin with Plato or even earlier Greek philosophy. Others deny that philosophy of religion can be said to have emerged till the end of the mediæval period which saw the rise of theosophical mysticism and the anti-scholastic Renaissance philosophy, on the ground that while among Fathers and Schoolmen there was much able speculation on religion, their thinking was never scientific, never independent, but was always guided, though in varying degree, by dogmatic presuppositions and the interests of church doctrine. Spinoza maintained in his

Theologico-political Treatise (1670) that theology and philosophy ought to be strictly distinguished and not mixed, each having its own sphere and pursuing its own ends. Spinoza's distinction cannot indeed be sustained, as he expressed it, for theology no less than philosophy aims at truth. His work, however, had its value as paving the way for a study of religious phenomena from a new, viz. a scientific point of view.

Writers on our subject, especially writers on its history, do not always recognise the distinction between the two conceptions of their subject-matter: the wider, in which it means simply religious philosophy, and the narrower, in which it is taken to be the scientific investigation of religious phenomena in the life of man. Hence we find a history of the philosophy of religion taking account of practically every philosopher, every theologian and nearly every body of Christians. For most philosophical systems lead up to, or deal by implication with, religion; nearly every systematic theology has a philosophical prolegomena; and every denominational body of doctrine and practice has its logical foundations and presuppositions.

In general Philosophy of Religion may be described by saying that it is concerned with two questions: what is religion? and what its truth?

For an answer to the former it investigates the results of the sciences Psychology of Religion, and History of Religion. The first can as yet hardly be said to be out of its infancy. The other, though not much older, is much more mature and surer of its results. Yet neither a study of the religious consciousness nor a collocation of facts observed as to the phenomena manifested by the adherents of various religions has up to now led to any approach to unanimity as to how religion should be defined, or as to what precisely constitutes the essence of religion. Views of the origin, nature and

essential features of religion are almost as numerous as writers on the subject.

The second enquiry, as to validity, opens a very extensive field which in a measure justifies the wider conception of philosophy of religion, and expands its history to almost unmanageable sweep.

This enormous range makes the selection of the ten best books on the subject savour of presumption and arbitrariness. "Best" can be here employed only in a relative sense. What is attempted is best to put the student abreast of the matter as a whole. Many excellent books on this or that aspect of it are omitted. So are many the living interest of which has either passed or been absorbed, although in some cases they almost marked an epoch in their day. Omitted is the whole class of strictly "apologetic" literature. Apologetic is the other side of philosophy of religion. It has in view a definite adversary or is primarily concerned to repulse some particular form or forms of attack. Those vary from age to age. Philosophy of religion has another aim and interest. Although it cannot escape the impress of the Time-spirit and does not ignore hostile attack, its aim is positive, and, so far as may be, timeless. It must, of course, be said that if the "apologetic" be general enough and base itself deeply enough, no clear distinction from philosophy of religion is possible.

I have further omitted all books on the subject which are not available for the English reader in translation. When all such deductions from the total are made, there remain a formidable number, an *embarras de richesse*. If, however, we find place for four volumes which among them trace the history of the philosophy of religion and expound sufficiently for our purpose the views of various writers, our task will be greatly simplified.

Let us recall how death deprived us of some books that

it may be confidently asserted would have been of outstanding merit. Pünjer, Flint and Ormond had projected and promised works on our subject, but were cut off before their design could be realised. The massiveness of their learning, the extent of their knowledge, their critical insight and constructive ability were such that it is impossible to estimate how great a loss their removal meant for illuminating discussion of the problems of the philosophy of religion in systematic form.

The list I suggest is as follows :—

- (i.) Otto Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History*, vols. i. and ii., translated by Stewart and Menzies, Lond. 1886-7.
- (ii.) A. Caldecott, *The Philosophy of Religion in England and America*. Lond. 1901.
- (iii.) A. Caldecott and H. R. Mackintosh, *Selections from the Literature of Theism*. Edin. 1904.
- (iv.) W. L. Davidson, *Recent Theistic Discussion*, Edin. 1921.
- (v.) J. Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, Oxford, 1888.
- (vi.) J. Caird, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, Glasgow, 1880.
- (vii.) R. Seeberg, *The Fundamental Truths of the Christian Religion*, trans. by G. E. Thomson and C. Wallentin, Lond. 1908.
- (viii.) R. Eucken, *The Truth of Religion*, trans. by W. Tudor Jones, Lond. 1911.
- (ix.) G. T. Ladd, *The Philosophy of Religion*, Lond. 1906.
- (x.) G. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, Edin. 1914.
- (i.) Pfleiderer's work is in four volumes, but the first two only are occupied with the historical account for which the book is here adduced. He gives a very lucid and, with the exception mentioned below, an adequate representation of the German philosophy of religion from that of Spinoza,

with whom he holds that the subject really begins, to that of Lotze. He classifies philosophies of religion as (a) critical, Spinoza to Kant; (b) intuitive, Hamann to Romanticism; (c) speculative, Fichte to Hegel. He adds a chapter on the tendencies of philosophical religious thought in his own day, in which he deals with Positivism, Ritschlianism, Herbart, Schopenhauer, Rothe, Lotze, etc.

This work has three defects. First, his principle of classification, while it has a certain measure of utility, is not sufficiently illuminating, it is indeed misleading. Spinoza, the English Deists and Kant are under one class for no other reason than that they were all critical of positive religion. The differences among them are far more important than such a superficial resemblance. So, too, the reconciliation of the rational-critical and the mystical tendencies are no doubt attempted by Schleiermacher and Hegel, who, for that reason, are classed together, but the attempts are totally different, and to associate the two is almost grotesque. They, along with Kant, might much more stand sharply distinguished as heads of three main types of Theism—ethical (Kant), emotional (Schleiermacher), and intellectual (Hegel). Second, while Pfleiderer's criticism of Ritschlianism is justifiable and penetrating, it is rather ill-natured and not appreciative enough. There is more of value in the movement, despite its limitations and contradictions, than is here granted. The student should supplement his reading on this topic with *The Ritschlian Theology* by Dr. A. E. Garvie (Edinburgh, 1899).

The third and most glaring defect is the utterly inadequate treatment of British thought.

(ii.) This last defect of Pfleiderer's work is met by Caldecott whose book deserves the highest praise. I am inclined to say that this is the work of which I have fullest confidence that it cannot be omitted from the list. Its survey extends

from the period following the Reformation to the date of publication. It is recognised that British thought did not run an independent course, but moved in vital connexion with that of the Continent. Reference is made to the latter, however, only in the case of such leaders as introduced real changes into the British current. Theories are divided into two main types, Rationalism and Empiricism. These are subdivided so as to produce a total of thirteen varieties of view. Each is fully explained and the rest of the book illustrates all in turn. It is a marvel of condensed but adequate exposition. Not a single name of any importance is omitted. In fact, if the book has a fault it is its very completeness, which causes the really outstanding writers to be somewhat obscured in the crowd. This might have been obviated by the use of different type in printing. One may regret that the author deals only with the Divine Being and His attributes to the exclusion of Theodicy, i.e. attempted theistic solutions of the problem of evil.

(iii.) This volume consists of illustrative extracts from a selection of the most important writers. The choice both of writers and passages is excellent and will be found most illuminating. Abundant notes make all necessary explanations. The student will find the book specially interesting in that it extends his knowledge of the history so as to include the Scholastic period. While there was then no philosophy of religion in the strict sense—for there was then no conception of history and no thought that religion in itself was subject for investigation—there was a massive religious philosophy which to this day more or less dominates the Roman Church. The demonstrative theism of Aquinas which the Church officially sanctioned, and the ontological argument of Anselm which the Church thought unsafe, have both had far-reaching influence in many quarters. They have been refuted and restated periodically down to our

own time. Such acquaintance with Anselm and Aquinas and also Descartes as is here given is indispensable for knowledge of all the most important elements of religious thought.

(iv.) The series of Gifford Lectures has been a remarkable one. It has been carried on by a succession of scholars all pre-eminent either in philosophy or in the sciences that bear on religious thought—Hutchison-Stirling, Campbell Fraser, Pfleiderer, the two Cairds, Fairbairn, William James, Sayce, Royce, Ward, A. B. Bruce, Haldane, Balfour, Emile Boutroux, Bergson, Dean Inge and others. A list of ten very good books on subjects that fall within the philosophy of religion might be compiled from the Gifford Lectures alone. Professor Davidson has done meritorious and most helpful service in summarising so succinctly and appetisingly such a series. He selects four for fuller treatment. This little book is indeed *multum in parvo*.

So much for the history.¹ He who masters those four books will realise the interest and importance of the subject. He will understand its problems and the types of solution offered. It is safe to predict that the very variety of solution will at first bewilder, perturb and depress. The student of this subject must have great patience and high courage. It cannot be mastered rapidly; there may be "French without tears," but there can be no grasp of philosophy of religion without sweat. Nor can its problems be evaded by choosing either blank agnosticism or a pious but panic-stricken flight to "revelation."

We have now to select six source-books. Here again the task is simplified by the circumstance that four writers

¹ The student who has an appetite for the history of the subject may add B. Pünjer's *History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion from the Reformation to Kant*, trans. by W. Hastie (Edin. 1887), which for the period dealt with is fuller than Pfleiderer's work, and J. Lindsay's *Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion* (Edin. 1897), which imparts fuller knowledge of French and Italian thought than is to be found elsewhere.

worth attention have entered the field since the historical review of i.-iii. was completed, and not being Gifford lecturers they are outside the scope of iv. In accordance with the definition of "best" here followed they must be included, and by their own intrinsic merit they deserve to be. That leaves two to be selected.

(v. and vi.). With regard to Martineau I do not think there would be difference of opinion among those competent to judge as to his right to be included. His book is one of the most notable contributions to the subject that have been made, even allowing for the fact that his own opinions seemed to change in the direction of giving a fundamental place to the intuitive element. There would be less agreement as to giving John Caird a place in this list. The Cairds stand all but alone in British thought, and their philosophy is in some quarters regarded as not free of grave dangers to religion. But the book here adduced is such a literary treat; it succeeds so fully in transplanting German transcendentalism to British soil, making it appear almost a native product; its refutation of materialism, to mention one detail, is so thorough; its vindication of philosophy of religion is so complete; and its "rationalism," if exaggerated, is such a wholesome counterbalance to the "irrationalism" which in varying form and degree is so pronounced in much of the most recent philosophy, that I have no hesitation in selecting it. For an account of Martineau's work see ii. pp. 343 ff., and iii. pp. 386 ff.; for Caird, ii. 146 ff., also 36 ff.

(vii.) Seeberg's book consists of a series of almost popular lectures. Among the weighty volumes here adduced the reader will probably welcome one such. Although its right to be included among works on the philosophy of religion may be questioned on the ground that it has in view the main elements of the Christian religion and a resetting of

Christian doctrine, yet it will be found to have a more general significance in the earlier portion especially which, after discussing the nature and origin of religion, shows that Christianity is the absolute religion, and deals not with its specific truths but with its truth. Seeberg is largely influenced by Schleiermacher and in a less degree by Ritschl. He has no sympathy with the Ritschlian isolation of religion, but he shares its insistence on the essentially practical character of religion and its proof. He demonstrates the truth of Christianity by showing that we can answer in the affirmative the three questions, is it logical and consistent in its train of thought? is that confirmed in its history? does it supply absolutely the needs of the soul? It has a power of self-reform which distinguishes it from every other religion. Heathenism declined because of its principles; Christianity declined whenever it forsook its principles. But may the whole not be illusion? Is it realities that religion makes known to us? We can only fall back upon the inmost experience of the religious soul. He who believes and loves has thereby become certain of the sovereignty of God. The traditional theistic "proofs" are valueless. The religious man does not need them, the irreligious will never be persuaded by them. (Seeberg here might have strengthened his case by recalling how Flint's *Theism* drove Romanes to atheism.) If religion is held to be illusion there is no counter-proof but that of practical knowledge. Only he can judge of religion who has felt its spiritual effects.

(viii.) It must be acknowledged that most readers will find Eucken not at all difficult to read, but very difficult to follow. He is certainly one of the greatest of recent thinkers, and this book has been hailed in some quarters as one of the greatest apologies for religion ever written. But Eucken is prophet rather than philosopher, earnest rather than clear. His terminology is often indeterminate

and perhaps indeterminable. He has no complete system. He often repeats himself and resumes a point that we thought he had settled. He sometimes gives the impression of raising a question of crucial importance and leaving it in the air. Yet the reader may be counselled to grapple with this book. He will feel better for doing so. The intensity of Eucken's moral earnestness, his call to a higher life, his insistence that the essential demand of religion is for a new world, his summons to the Church and to Theology to strip off all dead matter from the past and everything that is at present hampering and fettering them, so that men may enter into the full life, liberty and joyousness of vital religion, are a tonic. Any adequate representation of his views here is out of the question. As an "activist," he has no patience with mere speculation which he holds as one of religion's worst enemies. Of the problem of evil, for instance, no theoretical solution is possible, at all events none ever offered can satisfy. It is the task of man not to explain evil but to conquer it. He would also liberate religion from any dependence on historic fact, though he holds the life of Jesus to be of supreme value and importance. The fundamental facts of life are proved by life itself, we feel their truth but they are not subjects for speculation or intellectual proof. The spiritual life of man, the union of the human and the Divine, the freedom of the spiritual personality, though in a sense dependent on the Universal Spiritual Life, are to Eucken not postulates, but axiomatic certainties. To attempt to prove such things is like trying to prove life. For Eucken the absolute religion is not Christianity as it is but as it might be, reformed as he would have it. That "reform," it may be said, is far more drastic than many, perhaps any, of us are prepared for.

(ix. and x.) These two may be bracketed together, for with differences in detail they are very similar. Their con-

ception of philosophy of religion is alike, both reject its limitation to Theism. Both deal with the same problems and the same phenomena of the religious life, and follow almost the same order. Their results in many cases are practically the same. Both reject the validity of an appeal to individual experience of conviction such as Seeberg makes, both admitting freely that it has a certain value. Both deny that the traditional "proofs" are really proofs at all, but, unlike Seeberg, neither dismisses them as without significance. Both unconvinced by a view such as Eucken's, or by any form of pragmatism, find it necessary to base the validity of religion on the congruence of several lines of evidence, including as of great importance the results of epistemological and metaphysical study. Surely in this they are right. A philosophy of religion cannot be built on the meagre and precarious foundation left when philosophy has been flung to the winds, and without a philosophy of religion religion is in peril, for to man's persistent, inevitable and wistful questionings as to reality no stabilising answer can be given. Principal Galloway had considerable advantage over Professor Ladd. He wrote some years later with his predecessor's work before him, and here and there he has just criticism to offer. Ladd is chargeable with some exaggeration of intellectualism, he tends back towards John Caird. Then the fact that Galloway's work is in one volume against Ladd's two is not only a great convenience to the reader but a real merit in the author. Galloway's may be said to be the nearest approach to a textbook on the subject in the English language, Dr. W. K. Wright's admirable book notwithstanding (*A Student's Philosophy of Religion*, Lond. 1923).

In an addendum let it be said that no source-book is yet available in English which would inform the reader as to the views of one of the most noteworthy of recent writers,

Ernest Troeltsch, whose untimely death all scholars deplore. Powerfully influenced by Kant and Schleiermacher, he occupied in the philosophy of religion, as in all the subjects he handled, a place of his own ; and in this field as in many others, account will more and more have to be taken of his thought. For a penetrating and sympathetic representation and estimate of his position on our subject the reader may best consult *The Sufficiency of Christianity and Ernest Troeltsch* by R. S. Sleight, Ph.D. (Lond. 1923), chaps. iii. and vi.

The above list does not answer the really unanswerable question, what are absolutely the best books on the subject ? It may be claimed, however, that the student who has "got" those is adequately equipped. He will know all the important elements and movements of thought down to his own day, be able to place and estimate any book on the subject he may read, and know where to start his own independent work should he feel such a call.

Fresh work, it may be remarked, will have to take account of the "new Psychology," which, with all its uncertainties and in many cases its quite unscientific rashness, must be allowed to have given a fresh sharpness and a new orientation to such problems as determinism, the relation of origin and validity, the Balfourian distinction of causes and reasons, the reality or illusion of religious experience.

W. D. NIVEN.

THE BELSHAZZAR OF DANIEL AND OF HISTORY.

IV.

BEFORE leaving this question, we may enquire into the possible source of the inaccuracy of the book of Daniel. If the suggestion above accepted is right, and Belshazzar's half-brother was the grandson of Nebuchadnezzar, it may

have been this fact which gave rise to the error of the author of Daniel. Another possibility is that it arose from a confusion between Belshazzar and Evil-Merodach. Elsewhere in the Old Testament but two kings of the Neo-Babylonian empire are mentioned, Nebuchadnezzar and Evil-Merodach. Nergal-sharezer, or Neriglissar, is, indeed, also mentioned,¹ but not as king. The author of Daniel mentions but two. He may have known the name of Belshazzar as connected with the fall of Babylon, and identified him with Evil-Merodach, the son of Nebuchadnezzar. It is impossible to be certain, of course, that his reason for mentioning but two kings is that he knew of but two. He was not writing a systematic history, and may have omitted the others simply because they were not required by the exigencies of his story. Some support is lent to this suggestion, however, by the fact that he only knows four Persian kings,² and elsewhere in the Old Testament but four are mentioned. It is probable that these are the four he has in mind, and in this case it may be regarded as a distinct possibility that Evil-Merodach was in his mind when he wrote of Belshazzar, the picture of whom would well agree with Berosus' description of Evil-Merodach, ἀνόμως καὶ ἀσελγῶς.³

It remains to notice that in the Greek writers also there is some confusion as to the relationship between the last king of the Neo-Babylonian empire and Nebuchadnezzar. In the account of Nebuchadnezzar's prophecy which Megasthenes gives,⁴ the reading of von Gutschmid is probably to be preferred,⁵ and the passage would then read,

¹ Jer. xxxix. 3, 13.

² Daniel xi. 2.

³ Ap. Joseph. *Contra Ap.* i. 20.

⁴ Quoted in Abydenus, "On the Assyrians," ap. Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* ix. 41. Cited and translated in Bevan, *Daniel*, p. 87 f.; and Driver, *Daniel*, p. 59.

⁵ οὗ δὲ συναλτὶς υἱὸς ἔσται Μήδης, τὸ Ἀσσυρίων αὐχμημα instead of οὗ δὲ, συναλτὶς ἔσται Μήδης, τὸ Ἀσσύριον αὐχμημα. Vide Bevan, *l.c.*

"He ascended the roof of his palace, and being inspired by some god or other, cried aloud, 'O Babylonians, I, Nebuchadnezzar, forewarn you of the coming disaster, which neither Bel my ancestor nor Beltis the Queen can persuade the Fates to avert. A Persian mule shall come, with your own gods as his allies, and shall make you slaves. And his helper in this undertaking shall be the son of a Median woman, the boast of Assyria.' " The Persian mule is Cyrus, who is elsewhere called a mule in ancient authors,¹ and the son of the Median woman would appear to be Nabonidus, whose incompetence and interference with the religious practices of his subjects was regarded as a contributing cause of the downfall of the empire.² Now Nebuchadnezzar himself is known to have had a Median wife,³ and it would seem therefore that in the story of Megasthenes, Nabonidus is wrongly represented as the son of Nebuchadnezzar. Again Herodotus represents Labynetus II. as the son of Labynetus I.⁴ The latter is identified with Nebuchadnezzar, and as the former was reigning when Cyrus conquered Babylon, he is to be identified with Nabonidus. This again is historically inexact. Even if Labynetus II. could be identified with Belshazzar, the case

¹ Cf. the Delphic oracle's reply to Crœsus, "Wait till the time shall come when a mule is monarch of Media" (Herodotus, *Hist.* i. 55), and the explanation given later when Crœsus complained of the misleading answer he had received, "Cyrus was that mule" (*ibid.* i. 91).

² Nabonidus had transferred the gods from various shrines to Babylon, and it would appear that this was a very unpopular policy, since Cyrus immediately reversed it. He says on his Cylinder Inscription, "And the gods of Sumer and Akkad, whom Nabonidus, to the anger of the lord of the gods, had brought into Babylon, by command of Marduk, the great lord, I caused them peacefully to take up their dwelling in habitations that rejoiced the heart. May all the gods, whom I brought into their cities, pray daily before Bel and Nabu for long life for me." (Translation of Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels*, p. 383.)

³ *Vide* Berosus, *ap.* Joseph. *Contra Ap.* i. 19. Cf. also *D.B.* iii. 503a, where Abydenus, *ap.* Euseb. *Chron.* i. 9, is cited.

⁴ *Hist.* i. 188.

would be no better, for neither Belshazzar nor Nabonidus can be supposed to have been the son of Nebuchadnezzar. It is interesting to note therefore that the author of Daniel seems to have shared his confusion as to the relationship between the second and the last of the kings of the Neo-Babylonian empire with the Greek writers.

V.

Again, when we examine the story of Daniel v. it is impossible to reconcile it with the history that we know. Cyrus captured Babylon without bloodshed, probably through the treachery of the priests.¹ Cyrus records ² that "without battle and conflict he (i.e. Marduk) permitted him to enter Babylon. He spared his city Babylon a calamity. Nabonidus, the king, who did not fear him, he delivered into his hand. All the people of Babylon, of Sumer and Akkad, princes and governors, fell down before him and kissed his feet"; and again ³ that "the soldiers of Cyrus, without fighting entered Babylon." The story of Herodotus might be reconciled with this. He states ⁴ that Cyrus entered by the stratagem of diverting the stream that flowed into the city, and entering by the bed,⁵ securing easy possession of the place, while the people in the centre of the city, who were feasting, knew nothing of what was happening. The same story appears in Xenophon,⁶ though it is there garnished by the record of a siege, and of considerable bloodshed. At first sight it might seem that the story in Daniel v. could easily be harmonised with the accounts of

¹ Cf. Hommel, in *D.B.* i. 229a.

² *Vide* Rogers, *op. cit.* p. 381.

³ *Vide* Inscription quoted in Driver, *Daniel*, p. xxix. f.

⁴ *Hist.* i. 191.

⁵ Cf. the statement of Cyrus, "His numerous troops, in number unknown, like the waters of a river, marched at his side" (Rogers, *l.c.*). Is this a reference to the method of entrance? Or did some popular story grow out of this figure?

⁶ *Cyrop.* VII, v. 8 ff.

the contemporary records and of Herodotus. There is a picture of feasting, and complete absence of the sense of danger, followed swiftly and unexpectedly by the capture of the city. No general slaughter is mentioned, but only the death of Belshazzar.

A closer examination, however, reveals the difficulties. The inscription of Cyrus states that when the city was captured, Nabonidus was taken prisoner,¹ but it places the death of the king's son four months later.² There is some doubt about the reading at this point, Sayce reading³ "the wife of the king died," instead of "slew the king's son." The majority of scholars adopt the latter reading, however, and since so conservative a scholar as R. D. Wilson accepts it,⁴ we shall not be charged with unfairness to the conservative position in adopting it. But this means that either Daniel v. 30 is unhistorical, or the feast recorded in Daniel v. has nothing to do with the feast recorded in Herodotus. The fact that Herodotus reports a feast to have been in progress when the city was taken cannot be quoted in support of a theory that a feast was in progress four months later when Belshazzar was slain.

It is commonly supposed that Cyrus did not get possession of the whole city at first, but that the inner part of the city, or at least the palace and its precincts, held out for four months after the entry of the Persian forces.⁵ It is supposed that the fact that the entry of Cyrus into the city was delayed till four months after the capture proves that the capture was not complete. All this is pure conjecture, and proves entirely unsatisfactory. For, assuming its truth, we find Belshazzar in his fastness with a very considerable

¹ Quoted in Driver, *l.c.* Cf. also Inscription in Rogers, *l.c.*

² *Vide* Driver, *ibid.* The question of the date will be referred to below.

³ *D.B.* i. 542a.

⁴ *Vide* Orr, *Prob. of O.T.*, chap. xi. Note F.

⁵ *Vide*, e.g. Orr, *op. cit.*, chap. xi., Section viii.

force, since he was able to give a feast to no less than 1,000 noblemen. What his total force must have been can only be conjectured, but it must have been very numerous. If the final assault of Gobryas was upon this large force, it is inconceivable that Cyrus could say in his inscription, "He spared his city Babylon a calamity,"¹ for in that case the calamity and the bloodshed were but postponed.

But passing this by for the present, we may next note that Belshazzar is able to send for the sacred vessels that Nebuchadnezzar had brought from Jerusalem. These, we read in i. 2, had been placed in the "house of his god," i.e. in the Temple of Marduk, E-sagilu. But Belshazzar certainly did not have control of that Temple at this time, for Cyrus tells us that in the month of the first entry of his soldiers they were in control of that Temple, and were appointed to guard its approaches.² It is impossible to assume that Belshazzar had recovered it, and equally impossible to assume that the sacred treasures had been removed to the palace before the entry of the Persians, since that entry had been so rapid and unexpected that such removal is quite out of the question. Moreover, since it is apparent that the priests were on the side of Cyrus, for he claims that the Babylonian gods were on his side,³ they are hardly likely to have suffered this sacrilege.

Again, we find in verse 7 that Belshazzar still commands the "Chaldæans," and there is no hint of the defection of the priestly caste to Cyrus. Moreover, since Belshazzar still dispenses honours in the grand way announced in verse 7, it is impossible to think that the author knew that at this time the whole kingdom had already been lost to Cyrus, with the exception of the fastness where the king

¹ *Vide Rogers, l.c.*

² *Vide* Inscription quoted in Driver, *op. cit.*, p. xxx.

³ *Vide Rogers, l.c.*

was besieged. The only impression which an unprejudiced reader could get from the story is that Belshazzar was still in full control of his kingdom and living in as grand a display of luxury and power as at any time in his career. To read anything else into it is to say that the author had a singular power of expressing himself so as to convey an impression completely at variance with the fact he is assumed to have known.

But the crowning irony would be in the promise to make Daniel "the third ruler" in the kingdom.¹ The term which is thus translated is a very anomalous one, and it is far from certain that that is a correct translation. But the defenders of the authenticity and historicity of Daniel have found in it a really striking confirmation of their theory. The discovery that whatever authority Belshazzar enjoyed was during his father's reign is held to vindicate the expression. The two rulers, Nabonidus and Belshazzar, were to be reinforced by a third. At the first blush, this seems impressive, and it is little wonder that the defenders of Daniel have extracted much comfort from it. It must be observed, however, that it is unlikely that the junior partner of this dual kingship, that is assumed to have existed, should have had sufficient authority to admit a third. Belshazzar does not talk and act like a junior partner. To this it may be replied that at that time Nabonidus was already a prisoner, and therefore the sole power was in the hands of Belshazzar. But did Belshazzar expect Nabonidus to be freed and resume the kingship? If he did, what validity could this act possess? If he did not, what value could it possess? And if Nabonidus was assumed henceforth not to count, how is the three made up? Nor does the case rest there. On this theory, Belshazzar offered an empty and perilous honour. *Ex hypothesi*, his authority extended

¹ Daniel v. 7.

no farther than the immediate precincts of his palace. The tempting honour of a share in the government of this somewhat narrow realm is announced as though it were some mighty boon. A hitherto victorious army was besieging the fastness at the time, an army which had already conquered the Medes and the Lydians, and in whose power the whole Babylonian Empire, with the exception of the feasters and their *entourage*, already lay. Surely there was more peril than profit in being elevated to share the purple at that time! This theory would require us to suppose that Belshazzar was a humorist, and the author of the book of Daniel, if he had known these facts, might have been expected to give some indication that a strong strain of humour was entering into his narrative at this point. The theory also has the disadvantage that it reduces Daniel's prophetic announcement to a somewhat tame performance. If Belshazzar had been for four months besieged, and his kingdom had already fallen into the hands of the invaders, and if Cyrus had ten days earlier celebrated his triumphal entry into the city, it would not require any amazing revelation to enable Daniel to predict the cession of the empire to the invaders. Apparently Belshazzar and his followers were living in a world of make-believe, and it was forbidden to make any reference to the actual situation in which they found themselves. And the author of Daniel omitted to mention this significant fact.

VI.

It must therefore be admitted that the attempt to defend the historicity of Daniel v. entails difficulties far too great to be conceivable. We may now proceed to note that the assumption that underlies the attempt at harmonising is undoubtedly without any justification. That Belshazzar held out for a period of at least four months may be taken

as very probably established. But that he held out *in Babylon* is not only not stated, but certainly not possible, though it seems to be generally assumed. The inscriptions tell us that Babylon fell without a blow, and make no reference to any fighting in that city. They contain no suggestion that only a part of the city was held. It is, moreover, known from contract tablets that business was not disturbed by the occupation.¹ This could not have been the case if a part of the city, held by a substantial force, had been besieged for four months. Such a period of hostilities within the city would be in direct conflict with the inscription quoted above. Further the suggestion that the delay of Cyrus' triumphal entry into Babylon was due to the incompleteness of his control of the city is quite groundless. For in that case, why should Cyrus have entered in triumph ten days before Belshazzar fell? It can hardly be supposed that he was tired of waiting. The fact that he did enter before Belshazzar fell may be taken as evidence that the battle for the city was at that time over, and that Belshazzar was not sitting behind fortifications within the city, with a thousand noblemen and the forces they commanded. Moreover, before the death of Belshazzar, the general of Cyrus is found appointing governors in Babylon.² The delay of Cyrus to celebrate his entry must be explained by the fact that he was busy elsewhere. It may be taken as certain, then, that Belshazzar was not holding out *in Babylon*. Have we any intimation, then, where he was? Yes, indeed. Belshazzar is mentioned several times as having been, during his father's reign, "with the nobles and his soldiers in the country of Akkad."³ Again, Cyrus describes the forces conquered at Opis as "the troops of Akkad,"⁴

¹ Cf. Sayce, *D.B.* i. 542a.

² *Vide* Inscription quoted in Driver, *Daniel*, p. xxix.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

and since these appear to have been hitherto commanded by Belshazzar, it is likely that he was commanding also at Opis.¹ We are told, further, that after Belshazzar was assaulted and slain "there was lamentation in Akkad."² From these facts, an unprejudiced historian would have no difficulty in reaching a conclusion. Belshazzar, after the battle of Opis, escaped, but instead of fleeing to Babylon, like his father, where he knew there was considerable disaffection, remained in the northern province of Akkad, where from his constant residence and military leadership he may be presumed to have had considerable influence. There he rallied the scattered forces, and attempted to reorganise the resistance. Cyrus was occupied with these forces, to which, indeed, he refers in his inscription—"wherever they gathered themselves together he smote them"³—and therefore his own entry was delayed until the menace was practically removed. A few days later, Gobryas, hearing that Belshazzar with some force was in the neighbourhood, took the field and surprised him in a night attack, in the course of which Belshazzar was slain.

One possible objection to this account may be met. It is known that contract tablets were made out in Babylon in the name of Nabonidus until the 10th of Marchesvan,⁴ and this might seem to give some countenance to the idea that some part of Babylon was held by the loyalists until that date. This is no necessary conclusion, however. Cyrus' forces entered Babylon on the 16th of Tammuz,⁵ and were in peaceful possession of the city thereafter. He did not enter into the city in person until the 3rd of Marchesvan,⁶ and immediately after the record of his entry we read,

¹ So Rogers, *op. cit.* p. 377.

² *Vide* Inscription quoted in Driver, *op. cit.* p. xxx.

³ *Ibid.* p. xxix.

⁴ *Vide* Driver, *op. cit.* p. liv. note.

⁵ *Vide* Inscription quoted in Driver, *op. cit.*, p. xxix.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. xxx.

"Peace to all Babylon did Cyrus proclaim. Gubaru, his governor, appointed governors in Babylon." This would naturally imply that a few days after his entry, Cyrus issued a proclamation annexing the Babylonian empire, and proceeded to appoint governors, in accordance with that annexation. Until that proclamation was made, it was natural that contract tablets should continue to be made out, dated by the years of the reign of Nabonidus. Until Cyrus had officially assumed the kingship, it would be out of the question to begin to date documents by his reign. It is therefore natural to assume that the change introduced between the 10th of Marchesvan, when the date was given by Nabonidus' reign, and the 24th of the same month, when the date had begun to be given by Cyrus' reign,¹ was brought about by the proclamation of Cyrus rather than by the death of Belshazzar. Indeed it is hard to see what connexion the death of Belshazzar could have had with it. Nabonidus was still alive, and the cessation of the use of his name would not be brought about by the death of his son, unless there were simultaneously an edict dethroning him and annexing his kingdom. And the issue of such an edict would not depend on whether Belshazzar was killed *in Babylon* or not, and is more naturally connected with the triumphal entry of Cyrus into the city.

VII.

With some diffidence, the present writer would venture to make a further suggestion as to the *date* of the death of Belshazzar. Hitherto the dates given in the inscription of Cyrus² have been accepted, and the conclusions reached would not be altered by the suggestions now to be made, whether they should prove acceptable or not. It is to be

¹ *Vide* Driver, *op. cit.* p. liv. note.

² Quoted in Driver, *op. cit.* p. xxix. f.

noted that in line 18 we read, "On the 3rd day of Marchesvan (November) Cyrus entered Babylon." In line 21 we find, "From the month of Kislev (December) to the month of Adar (March) the gods of the country of Akkad . . . returned to their own cities." In lines 22 f., "On the 11th day of Marchesvan during the night Gubaru made an assault and slew the king's son. From the 27th day of Adar to the 3rd of Nisan (April) there was lamentation in Akkad." It is strange that we pass from November through December to March, and then revert to November, and again pass back to March. Moreover the mourning for the king's son would seem to be unduly delayed if he died in November and the mourning was postponed until the end of March. It would seem that it would be more natural to place the death of Belshazzar in March, when it would be followed immediately by the mourning, which began in the same month. This would restore sequence to the inscription, and place the death and the mourning in a reasonable relation to one another.

It should be stated that Meyer has suggested,¹ and Driver has endorsed the suggestion as probable,² that in line 16, Tammuz (July) is an error of the engraver for Tishri (October), since Elul (September) has already been reached in line 10. Unless, therefore, there are epigraphical grounds for regarding the one error as intrinsically more likely than the other—and the present writer has no means of making a judgment on that matter, though it would seem not to be a question of that kind at all—it may be regarded as at least possible that this rather careless engraver made a second error in line 22. As long as the change in the dating of documents from the reign of Nabonidus to the reign of Cyrus was thought to be connected with the death of

¹ *ZATW*, 1898, p. 340 f. Referred to in Driver, *op. cit.* p. xxix. note.

² Driver, *ibid.*

Belshazzar in Babylon, this reading was not challenged, but indeed appeared to confirm the cause of the change. It has been shown above, however, that it is wholly unlikely that Belshazzar held out in Babylon, and that the change in the dating of documents is naturally to be explained by the decree of annexation issued by Cyrus at that time. Since the reference to that decree occurs in the inscription, together with the record of the appointment of governors for the provinces by the Persian conquerors, before the reference to the death of Belshazzar, it is not necessary to regard it as a consequence of that death. The accuracy of the reading of the inscription as to the date of Belshazzar's death is not therefore required by other known facts. It must be emphasised, however, that the previous conclusions in no way depend on this, or fall to the ground whether this is accepted or rejected. It would merely involve a slight readjustment of the dates of the events in the sequence, but no change in the character of the events or their order of sequence.

VIII.

We are brought therefore to the conclusion that the account of Belshazzar given in the book of Daniel is completely unhistorical. The only assured point that we have reached so far is that there was a historical character named Belshazzar. Nevertheless, it must not be supposed that this account was just the free creation of the author. We may, indeed, with some probability, point to the sources of his account. It would seem that he had confused various events, and in particular, the capture of Babylon in 538 B.C., and its capture in 520 B.C. (1) Belshazzar was a figure in the former, or at any rate in the war of which the capture of Babylon was an episode. The hero of the latter gave himself out to be Nebuchadrezzar, the son of Nabonidus.

This may give some support to the suggestion that Nabonidus had married a daughter of Nebuchadnezzar on his usurpation, and though it has been shown that Belshazzar could not have been the issue of that match, there would seem to have been a child named Nebuchadrezzar born. The confusion between Belshazzar and his half-brother may account for the relationship between Nebuchadnezzar and Belshazzar in the story of Daniel. (2) The Queen of Daniel v. would then be the step-mother of Belshazzar, or the mother of the Nebuchadrezzar with whom he was confused. She could only be identified with the Nitocris of Herodotus on the assumption that Herodotus wrongly makes her to be the wife of Nebuchadnezzar, and we have already seen that Herodotus cannot have been right in this matter if he is right in his description of the character of Nitocris. That the Queen of Daniel v. has been understood by Josephus and others to be the widow of Nebuchadnezzar would suggest that on this point the author of Daniel shared the confusion of the Greek. (3) Belshazzar never reigned as king, while the Pretender did assume that style.¹ (4) In both cases the city seems to have been taken through treachery,² and to have been unexpected. In the former case, however, Belshazzar was not taken in the city and put to death when the city thus unexpectedly came into possession of the conqueror, while in the latter case the Pretender was.³ (5) The story of the feast has come down to us in Herodotus in connexion with the former capture, though in his account it was a popular feast and not a royal one.⁴ It has been seen that this cannot be harmonised with the account we have in Daniel, since the feast in Herodotus is connected with the sudden capture of the city, and in

¹ *Vide* Sayce in D.B. i. 558a.

² Cf. Herod. *Hist.* i. 191, iii. 152-158.

³ *Vide* Sayce, *ibid.*

⁴ Herod. *Hist.* i. 191.

Daniel with the death of Belshazzar, which were separated by some months at any rate. If, however, the author had confused the account of the capture of the unsuspecting feasting city with the account of the capture when the Pretender was slain, our present story would be explained. (6) In the former case, finally, Cyrus entered into possession of the city and empire, while in the latter case it was Darius, as stated in Daniel.

We may fairly conclude, therefore, that the author had some more or less vague knowledge concerning these two captures of Babylon, and since he was not writing a formal historical work, did not consult "sources," but proceeded on the basis of his confused ideas to create a story which should do the work for which he designed it. The attempt to treat it as accurate and sober history can only fail completely. Its value is quite different. The worth of a parable is not dependent on its precise historicity, but on the spiritual message it enshrines and the spiritual power it communicates. And for more than two thousand years the story of Belshazzar has been a powerful warning against profanity and sacrilege, and has proclaimed the instability of the authority which is not rooted and grounded in God.

NOTE

Owing to my residence in China, Boutflower's recent book *In and Around the Book of Daniel* did not come into my hands until a fortnight after I had despatched the above article. In this note, therefore, I wish to deal with such points which Boutflower raises as have not been dealt with above.

Boutflower frankly admits (p. 117) that Belshazzar cannot have stood in any blood relationship to Nebuchadnezzar, but he assumes that since Nabonidus would naturally be anxious to establish his claim to the throne, it was therefore "a point of etiquette at the court of Babylon to speak of and treat Belshazzar as the legitimate son of the defunct Nebuchadnezzar (*ibid.*). He then somewhat remarkably claims that this assump-

tion, which is *merely* an assumption, is "a corroboration of the truth of the narrative" (*ibid.*). The use of the word "corroboration" is singular. Moreover, the assumption is an intrinsically improbable one. If Nabonidus wished to strengthen his claim, why should he have represented his son as the son of Nebuchadnezzar? If he pretended that Belshazzar was not his own son, it could not strengthen his claim. If he admitted that Belshazzar was his own son, he violated this assumed etiquette of the court. But indeed Nabonidus freely admitted in his inscriptions that Belshazzar was his own son, and Belshazzar is uniformly called "the king's son" in all contemporary records. In the face of this known fact, it is quite impossible to suppose that this assumed "court etiquette" ever existed, save in the mind of the would-be harmoniser, or to imagine that the Babylonian court lived in an atmosphere of such patent make-believe.

Boutflower further supposes that Nabonidus married the widow of Nebuchadnezzar (*ibid.*), whom he inclines to identify with the Nitocris of Herodotus. The Nitocris of Herodotus was old enough to hate the Medes from the date of the fall of Nineveh, some fifty-five or more years before the date of her supposed marriage to Nabonidus. She must therefore have been reaching a somewhat advanced age when she bore the son, Nebuchadnezzar, to Nabonidus, whom Boutflower conjectures her to have borne him. It would seem that there is room for some further assumption of make-believe here.

As to the position of Belshazzar, Boutflower assumes him to have been King of Babylon. He says, "Nabonidus was king of the *empire* of Babylon; Belshazzar was merely King of Babylon" (p. 118). He further compares the situation at a later date under Cyrus, saying "Cambyzes is styled 'King of Babylon,' while his father Cyrus takes the larger title 'King of the Countries.' It is reasonable, therefore, to suppose that Belshazzar bore the same title that was afterwards given to Cambyzes" (*ibid.*). This, of course, ignores the fact that in the inscriptions it is Nabonidus, and not Belshazzar, who bears the same title as Cambyzes. It also ignores the complete change which took place in the status of Babylon with its annexation to the Empire of the Achæmenids. Moreover, Boutflower leaves the difficulty of Daniel's dating events by the years of Belshazzar unmet. On this point he says, "My answer is, that the writer of this

Book in mentioning the first and third years of Belshazzar most certainly adopts a different system of dating from that found on the tablets " (p. 120). This, of course, merely recognises the difficulty, and does not "answer" it.

When he comes to the question of the Fall of Babylon, Boutflower assumes, as is commonly done, that "the troops of Cyrus could only have entered into a part of the city on the 16th of Tammuz," and that "when Cyrus entered Babylon in person on the 3rd of Marchesvan, he only entered the suburbs" (p. 131). In order to harmonise with the Greek writers, he assumes that the stratagem by which they report him to have gained possession of the city was not employed until the final capture on the 11th of Marchesvan (*ibid.*). This would mean that the real and effective capture of the city took place on the day Belshazzar was slain, and not at an earlier date as is explicitly stated in the contemporary inscription. Boutflower admits this conflict, but rules the contemporary document out, on the assumption that it was "edited" (p. 130). This is not to argue on the basis of the available evidence, but to set evidence at defiance. It is undoubted that contemporary documents were edited to magnify the exploits of the kings for whom they were written, but there is no question of magnifying the exploits of Cyrus here,¹ but simply of the relative order of events and the date on which Cyrus secured effective control of the city. Cyrus himself claims that he had sufficiently complete control to feel free to annex the Empire and to appoint governors before the death of Belshazzar, and there is no reason whatever to doubt his claim. Boutflower is himself uneasy on the question. He adds a note (p. 131 f.), discussing how much of the city Cyrus occupied when his troops first entered, and is constrained to recognise that since Cyrus had control of the great temple of Marduk, "a considerable portion of the city must have been in the hands of Cyrus' army." He concludes by saying, "Here, then, is an enigma which seems still to defy solution: if Mero-dach's temple were in the hands of the enemy, how could business in the city of Babylon be still transacted as under the rule of Nabonidus?" To that enigma he offers no solution. Either the contemporary records would have to be much more drastically dealt with, or the whole theory of the situation in Babylon at the time must be revised. In the above article it has been shown

how the enigma completely disappears by accepting the contemporary records as valid evidence.

H. H. ROWLEY.

THE PREACHER AND THE TRANSFIGURATION.

WE are apt to forget the emotional and intellectual ferment that the presence of our Lord brought into the lives of the twelve. For us all, education is often an uneasy series of surprises ; a succession of crises. As we progress we zig-zag painfully from one extreme to another. But if this is the story of our progress, how much more tumultuous must have been the mental history of these men under the tuition of Jesus. Those strange disputes of theirs, over which we sometimes feel so superior, were they not in part the result of "spiritual fatigue" which causes men to "grow mighty in discrimination and terrible" ; to "grow puny in synthesis and creative power" ? ¹ Yet never, surely, were they in a state of more painful tension than after the confession of Peter at Cæsarea Philippi. We should not, perhaps, read too much into Peter's belief at this stage. Was it a moral judgment, the result of insight into the ways of the Most High, or was it that "the mere vital energy" ² of Jesus compelled his admiration ? In any case it must have greatly stimulated the ambitions of the twelve when they began to realise that in the person of their Leader "the purposes of God's creation were summed up." ² But Jesus proceeded to speak in a way that pitilessly rebuffed their rising hopes. He is not to be a brilliant figure winning the world's assent and applause ; He is to suffer, to be rejected of men, and slain. The two sets of ideas, almost incompatible as they seemed, must have meant nothing less than

¹ Hocking, *The Meaning of God*, p. 416.

² See Herrmann, *Communion with God*, p. 85 f.

torture to mind and heart. "They kept the saying, questioning among themselves . . ." For six or eight days the tumult of conflicting opinion and repressed emotion gathered violence until Jesus perceived some relief was necessary. Judas at last went down under such strain as this, and there was danger that certain of the others were nearing the breaking point. Jesus, accordingly, took three of His followers up the hillside for quiet and saving intercourse with one another, and with Nature, and with God. It has often been pointed out that he took His most promising disciples ; but it is significant that they also seem to have been the three most ambitious !

We are not told all that happened on the hill ; only the vividly dramatic and emotional incidents remained graven in memory. We can be sure that Jesus was not entirely silent as they climbed ; under the spell of His words their spirits grew quiet and mental poise was restored. Then, as in Gethsemane, He would withdraw Himself a little, wishing to be alone, yet to feel them near. So the three were left, in the quietness and beauty of the night, knowing their Master was praying for them and for Himself. They were speaking, if at all, subduedly ; but for the most part they brooded silently on what had been said. They did not even strain after the Master's meaning ; it was enough that the music of His words had filled their heart. Reverie is perhaps the word that best describes their condition.

"In reverie we abandon the struggle for life, we cease to control our thoughts, we give them free rein." As this process continued, one idea was surely finding its slow way to "the seat of power" in the minds of the three. If one of them uttered a word it was as if the other two found their own thoughts expressed. The blind was guiding the blind, but in the process they all began to see. They are thinking and feeling, at last, as one ; and they move away in search

of their Master, for already a new idea flickers uncertainly in their mind. Then rounding a curve (shall we say ?), they see Him to be in prayer.

“And as He was praying His countenance was altered.”¹ Nothing more was needed ; the idea, already flickering into life, leapt instantly into clear and strong conviction. Now for the first time they see all things clearly. For a few intense moments they see what is—and always had been—the real glory of their Lord. *It is this flash of insight that really constitutes the Transfiguration.* Peter’s physical judgment has become a spiritual judgment. How they had loved their great companion ; and yet they had almost hated² Him when His words chastised their too insolent ambitions. They had dallied with the thought of deserting Him—they were going astray like sheep—solely because the world would reject Him. They had been in despair because He would have no kingly honour. But now they see that His life of holy obedience, and of redemptive service and suffering, is in itself a possession more kingly, beautiful, and rewarding, than any extrinsic honour the whole world could bestow. It is impossible to write adequately of this discovery. They could never speak of it very coherently, and Peter was perhaps too wise to mention it in his epistle.

“How should I tell, or how can ye receive it,
How till He bringeth you where I have been ?”

But the whole of that epistle is beautiful with memory of it ; sentence after sentence glistens in the light of this experience as the raiment of Jesus had seemed to do : “rejected indeed of men, but with God elect, precious” ; “who called us out of darkness into His marvellous light” ; even of

¹ Cf. a striking incident in the life of Debendranath Tagore. See C. F. Andrews, *Christ and Labour*, p. 45.

² “There always exists in us a double current of contradictory feelings.” See G. Berguer’s *Some Aspects of the Life of Jesus*, p. 210 n.

smaller matters he can write : " whose adorning let it not be the outward adorning . . . but let it be the hidden man of the heart " ; here too is a fine stab of memory—" that at the revelation of His glory also, ye may rejoice with exceeding joy." So we might continue ; to read the epistle is almost like tramping among the Yorkshire hills—continually we are lifting our eyes to the towering peak of the Transfiguration, finding fresh beauty in it, because seeing it from an always different angle !

But upon the joy of the Transfiguration another mood swiftly followed.¹ Luke the physician tells us these men were heavy with sleep ; that may be no more than his personal attempt to explain what followed ; but modern theories are quite in keeping with his suggestion, and it is difficult to resist the idea that the three watchers, unwilling to disturb their Master, and worn out by their strong emotion, eventually fell asleep. They fall asleep with one problem central to their thoughts—the relation of what they have just discovered to their own hopes and fears. We do well, therefore, to notice what has been said by Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, one of the wisest and safest guides we could possibly follow. " Dreams are attempts to solve, in sleep, conflicts of the waking life " ² ; " it is probable that dreams always arise out of recent situations " ³ ; and " I mistrust any interpretation of a dream which does not lead one back to a factor which definitely touches the self-interest of the dreamer." ⁴ To the three it is not clear what their own fortunes are to be under this strange Leader ; it is not surprising, then, if their conflicts come to an issue in their dreams.⁵ John, it may be, finds most significance in the

¹ Berguer, in the main, is of this opinion.

² *Conflict and Dream*, p. 81.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁴ p. 47.

⁵ The suggestion, which follows, of a threefold expression for one and the same experience is taken from Weiss: *The Life of Christ*.

radiance of His face, like the glory He had with the Father before the world was (we may have here the starting point of the fourth Gospel !) ; Peter, always influenced by tradition, sees his Master in the great prophetic succession of those who live and suffer for men. The insight, here gained, was not kept without a struggle, but the day came when he wrote, " Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example." His own dream, with the freakish literalness of some, simply *places Jesus in the glorious company of Moses and Elijah*. James, first of the apostolic martyrs, becomes sure that this is indeed the Son of God for whose sake no loss nor suffering can be too great. James, not Jesus, hears the voice ; for " it is simply the higher mental process that is read as a voice from another world." Thus all three learn the same great lesson, and that they wake in fear is quite in keeping with this ; for " the affect (in a dream) is painful when the conflict fails to satisfy the most prominent wishes of the dreamer." ¹ The men who later were to ask for the places of honour in the Kingdom had gained an insight that for the present at any rate left them loyally willing to accept very much less than that ; but even in their half-waking state the acceptance was a hard and painful thing. And now, lest a critical reader should suggest that such high matters could never be settled in a mere dream (or a somnolent condition, for it matters little which), we conclude this section of our paper with the very striking confession of Dr. Rivers ; " For many years I have been the habitual subject of an experience in which as soon as I become aware that I am awake, I find that I am thinking, and have for some time been thinking, over some problem, usually in connexion with the scientific work upon which I am at the time engaged. Many of the scientific ideas I value most, as well as the language in which they are

¹ *Conflict and Dream*, p. 81.

expressed, have come to me in this half-sleeping, half-waking state directly continuous with definite sleep.”¹

We are not concerned for the acceptance of every detail of this exposition²; but we are very anxious that the stress should be placed upon the new insight gained by the three. Placing the stress there—we still may have missed something, but we carry away with us bread to sustain us while we continue our search for rarer gains. For one thing we have a magnificent parable, setting forth our continual temptation. We tend always to go with the crowd. We are prone to adopt the prevalent and conventional standards of happiness or goodness or success. In Rome we are not content with doing as Rome does; we are capable of despising our finest possessions if Rome is too blind to see their value and their beauty! What a fine thing it is at times to secure for ourselves spiritual solitude; to use every means in our power to recover mental integrity; to see things as they really are, accepting the guidance of the Spirit only.

We are granted moments of insight at times; and much of the Art of Life consists in treasuring whatever word of God may come to us in such moments as these. We should go back to those moments, as Peter went back to the Transfiguration, again and again,

“ And bore its image o’er the deep
To soothe a martyr’s sadness,
And fresco, in his troubled sleep,
His prison walls with gladness.”

Go back to such great moments whenever you are in perplexity; live them over again in memory and in faith. Tell yourself how sure you were then; how real was God,

¹ *Conflict and Dream*, p. 7.

² It is not necessary to suppose they slept. “Between the dreams of day and of night there is not so great a difference”—C. G. Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, Chap. I.

how near was Christ ; tell yourself that things which once were so real and so precious cannot be less precious and less real now. On such rocks as those build the home of your soul, and through every gale it shall stand.

S. TONKIN.

LATIN EXPRESSIONS IN THE PRISON EPISTLES.

THE eleven references to his bonds in *Phil.*, *Col.*, *Eph.* and *Philem.* show that his chain occupied the apostle's thoughts sufficiently to allow us to expect to find some echoes of the life he lived in company with the Roman guardsmen. Two fairly well supported readings in Acts xxviii. 16 throw light upon his captivity. The centurion, according to one, handed over his prisoners to δ στρατοπεδάρχης, the *præfectus prætorii*. Up to the appointment of Burrus, and after him, there were always two prefects. Agrippina, however, plotted to have the two prefects removed and the sole command conferred on Burrus (Tac. A. 12. 42). After his death (62) Nero appointed two prefects. Trajan, in a letter to Pliny, also mentions *prefects*. A plural word would therefore have created a difficulty in Acts xxviii. 16 ; so a singular may be allowed to help. Burrus was honest and humane, and would give a prisoner like Paul, who was a Roman citizen, a large measure of liberty. According to the other reading, he was allowed to live in his own quarters "outside the camp" ($\epsilon\acute{\xi}\omega$ τῆς παρεμβολῆς). Ambrosiaster has "extra castra in conducto suo." This helps to locate his residence in the north-east corner of the city close to the Viminal gate, outside of which lay the *castra prætorianorum* and the *campus* in which the men paraded. Juvenal (III. 71) describes Greek adventurers settling down in the Esquiline and Viminal quarters,

“Esquillas dictumque a vimine collem.” Martial, (l. 117), who came to Rome about 64 A.D., seems to have had his lodging in the west corner of the adjacent Quirinal. The Viminal, as Mayor says, “was never a West End.” It was chiefly occupied by the lower classes, and here the married soldiers probably had their quarters.¹

Behind it lay the vegetable market, the Subura, with its unsavoury smells and noises, and other things that attracted soldiers mentioned by Persius (v. 32), Juvenal and Martial (v. 22). Juvenal (xi. 51) called it “hot stuff” (fervens). Paul’s friends would choose a lodging for him convenient—not to the *Palatium*, where only nobles like Drusus were confined (Tac. A. vi. 23)—but to the Prætorian Camp, as high as possible above the Subura. The upper stories of the houses were let in flats. Juvenal mentions a fire breaking out in the third story² below his friend. Martial lived on the third landing and high up.³ These rooms were entered from staircases outside the house. Cicero comments on the height of these tenements (insulae), “Rome with its garrets towering aloft in the air.”⁴ Such a lodging would be “conductum.” Cicero speaks of a client having some kind of a lodging (aliquid conducti) outside the city gate (*Cluent.* 62). This explains *μισθωμα* in Acts xxviii. 30, which means “hire” or “rent” (Isocrates), but is there strangely used to express “conductum” or “meritorium.” It might also be called hospitium.⁵ *ξενία* in Acts xxviii. 23, and Philem. 22, not used in the Classics in this sense, is evidently intended to represent *hospitium* in the sense of lodgings, whether rented

¹ Prætorianæ cohortes per hospitia dispersæ (Suet. *Tib.* 37).

² “Tabulata tibi jam tertia fumant” (III. 199).

³ “Scalis habito tribus sed altis” (“the third landing and high up at that”).

⁴ Romam coenaculis sublatam atque suspensam (*de leg. agr.* II. 96).

⁵ Si Virgilio . . . tolerabile desit Hospitium (*Juv.* 7. 69).

or not.¹ The Greek words are plainly attempts to translate the Latin. From his staircase outside the third floor of the house on the Quirinal or Viminal, Paul could see the cohorts of the Prætorians drilling in their *campus*. He would see, for the first time in his life, the finest army in the world—for they mustered nearly 20,000—under arms, marching in close formation, or standing in massed battalions to receive cavalry, practising military movements with clock-like precision. He could not but admire their *acies et agmen*, the steadiness and solidity of their ranks. When writing to the Colossians (ii. 5) he describes their faith in similar terms. "Seeing (as I see the guards) the steadiness and firmness of your ranks (*βλέπων ὑμῶν τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὸ στερέωμα*) in the faith of Christ." If he made an impression upon the Guards Brigade (*Phil.* i. 13), there can be no doubt that the fine men of that splendid corps made an impression upon him. It had been the desire of his heart to visit Spain (Rom. xv.), the most Romanised, literary (for was it not the home of Seneca, Columella, Quintilian, Lucan, and Martial?) and prosperous of all the provinces, studded with Roman *coloniæ* and Spanish *municipia* which preferred the Latin to their own language.²

To carry out his plan it was necessary to become proficient in Latin, of which he appears to have had some knowledge from his references to a will, guardians, adoption, etc., in Galatians, and the well-known fable of the limbs and the body in Romans xii. He may have acquired some Latin in Antioch, the headquarters of the Roman Empire in Syria, where the decrees were published in Latin. But now he is in daily touch with picked men of the old Italian

¹ Apud me hospitium tibi præbebitur (Plaut. *Poen.* v. 2, 93).

² Strabo (151). "The dwellers in the regions of the Bætis have been so thoroughly Romanised that they have actually forgotten their own tongue."

race, raised from "Etruria, Umbria, Latium, and the old Roman colonies" ¹ (Tac. A. iv. 5). No Gaul, German or Greek was admitted. Otho addressed them as "Italiae alumni, Romana vere juvenus." (Tac. H. i. 84). These men of pure Latin birth would not speak or understand Greek. They would share the hatred of Greek ways and people felt by conservative Romans; like Juvenal in the next generation, who scorned the "Græculus esuriens," detested the "Græca urbs" ² and "omnia Græce"; like those in Tacitus (A. 14. 20) who opposed the Greek games of Nero (60 A.D.), and objected to gymnastic contests as a substitute "pro militia et armis." They would enjoy the sneers of Horace at those who preferred *Græcari* when called to *militia*, S. 2. 2. 9, and Plautus' attack (Cur. II. 3. 16) on "isti Græci palliatæ qui incedunt suffarcinati cum libris, conferunt sermones inter se drapetæ" (cf. Acts xvii. 21). As they would not speak Greek, grudging the toil and despising the people, Paul would have to speak Latin to them. In order to do this he would memorise their sayings and practise conversation with them, which they willingly engaged in with a Roman citizen. A light is thrown from this source on many passages he wrote in prison and afterwards. In their short pithy sentences—a soldier is never prolix—they would describe the sights they had heard of or seen in their own city, the Roman triumph, the chariot races in the circus, the plays they had witnessed, and probably something of their campaigns. Their experiences would be interesting, for they served sixteen years, while legionaries came in who were qualified by birth and fitness. Like other soldiers they would speak of their parades, drill, arms, duties,

¹ See also Dio Cassius, lxxiv. 2, etc. From the time of Severus (193 A.D.) they were selected from the best barbarian troops.

² III. 78; III. 60; VI. 187.

officers and comrades (*commilitones*). He would hear them discussing the races, their bets, and luck and barrack gossip. They would be also interested in their prisoner, for whom they would have a natural respect, and discuss him with one another, so that he could truly say, after some time, that his bonds were known *ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πραιτωρίῳ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσι*, in the whole brigade and to all the rest. The Latin is essential here. *Prætorium* cannot mean palace or camp. It means the corps, the brigade of Guards.¹

See Tac. H. 4. 46, where soldiers who sought to serve again in the *prætoriana militia* were taken back, *accepti in prætorium*. To serve with the guards—*militare in prætorio*—was the ambition of many a legionary, for it meant double pay, shorter service, donatives and *circenses*. One of the nine cohorts was detailed for duty at the Palace at the opposite end of the city (Tac. H. 1. 26), so that through their talk others would hear of Paul. Otho, who depended principally upon them, addressed them as “*Commilitones*” (Tac. H. 1. 84). Said Galba the Emperor to a guardsman, “*Commilito quis jussit?*” (T. H. 1. 35). Paul alone in the New Testament, and only then after he had met these men, used the word *συστρατιώτης* (*Phil.* ii. 28; *Philem.* 2) which is the Greek for *commilito*. As a man he would be interested in their appearance, doings, drill, arms and sayings. On the sole occasion he had used the word *ἡλικία* (*Eph.* iv. 13), “stature”; he had just spoken of the perfect man,” *ἄνδρα τέλειον*. Before and beside him stood Roman guards, picked men of the crack corps, who should be of good stature and fine build, splendid specimens of manhood, and compared with his own insignificant

¹ Suetonius (*Nero*, 9) and Tacitus, H. 1. 20 are also passages where *prætorium* can only mean the brigade. These are not to be confused with the German bodyguard of the Emperors, a *collegium* of slaves.

appearance, "perfect men," unto whose stature (*ἡλικία*) it was the ambition of many an Italian to attain. They had also some education. The training of the youth in learning poetry at school, chiefly Virgil and Horace (Juv. 7. 227) would lead one to expect scraps of such poetry in the epistles. Suetonius (*Nero*, 47) says that when Nero sought to persuade some prætorian officers to share his flight, one exclaimed in the words of Virgil he had probably learned when a boy (Aen. 12. 642), "Usque adeone mori miserum est?" (is it so very hard to die?) Similar quotations would be on the lips of those guards of Paul. He would hear them quoting Ovid (Met. 7. 21), "Video meliora proboque," and would reset the saw in the words *δοκιμάζειν τὰ διαφέροντα* (Phil. i. 10). He would hear them quoting Horace (1 Ep. 1. 11):

"Quid *verum* (right) atque decens curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum," and he adapted the saying in *Phil.* iv. 8, "ὅσα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ ὅσα σεμνά, ὅσα δίκαια . . . ταῦτα λογίσεσθε, ἀληθῆ," representing what is morally right like *verum*.¹ He might also have heard them quoting Cicero's brilliant saying, "Nihil est amabilius virtute" (*Lael.* 28), for he continues, "ὅσα προσφιλῆ (amabilia). εἴ τις ἀρετή (virtus). The following words *εἴ τις ἔπαινος* are strange; *ἐπ.* not meaning an act meriting praise. *Laus*, however, which is used for a praiseworthy action, "merui qui *laude coronam*" (Virg. *Æ.* 5. 355), "sunt hic sua præmia *laudi*" (worth), *ibid.* 1. 461, explains the passage. Again, for *εὐφημα* (auspicious) we have also to fall back on the Latin "benedictum." Horace (Ep. 1. 1. 155) says the Roman poets were forced to adopt a less biting tone." "Vertere modum . . . ad *bene dicendum* delectandumque redacti." Of course, after a time his friends would have

¹ Cf. also Hor. Ep. 1. 12. 24, "*verum* orabit et æquum" (right and just); cf. "Sublimia cures" (*ibid.*).

brought St. Paul books from the stalls of the Argiletum, where Martial¹ says his book was for sale, not far from his own lodgings, and he may have studied them, unless he was unlike other men, active and learned, and students like himself, when reduced to a life of inactivity. *Phil.* iv. 11, *ἐν οἷς εἰμι ἀυτάρκης εἶναι*, may be based on the Latin saying ascribed to Seneca, “*beatus est præsentiis, qualiacunque sunt, contentus.*” Several passages in the Pastorals seem to be based on Latin proverbial expressions, e.g., *γραῶδεις μύθους* (1 *T.* iv. 7), which is precisely the “*aniles fabellas*” of Horace 2 *S.* vi. 77. “We brought nothing into (*εἰσηνέγκαμεν*) the world, neither may we carry out (*ἐξενεγκεῖν*) anything,” might be from Seneca’s “*non licet plus auferre quam intuleris*” (the verbs are parallel) *Mor.* 52; and other expressions in Ovid and Propertius;² and “the love of money is the root of all evil” might be taken for many a Latin saying, e.g., “*Auri sacra fames*” (*Virg. A.* III. 66); “*argenti pallet amore*” (*Hor. Sat.* 2. 3. 78); “*Ex avaritia omnia scelera gignuntur*” (*Cic.*).

As we have seen in the case of *Phil.* iv. 8 f., *εἴ τις ἔπιανος*, the meaning of many passages in the epistles can only be determined with the help of Latin, e.g., *Phil.* iii. 16, *πλὴν εἰς ὃ ἐφθάσαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ στοιχεῖν*—the following word *κανόνι* came in from *Gal.* vi. 16—translated in *Exp. G. T.* “only so far as we have come let us keep to the same path.” But he is referring not to ground already covered, but to the road in front, and the journey on which they have started, an exact parallel being Terence’s “*pergam quo coepi, hoc iter*” (*Hec.* 1. 1. 194). *πλὴν* represents the elliptico-adversative use of *nisi* frequent in Plautus and Terence, e.g., *Miles*, 24, “*Nisi unum, epityrum illi estur*

¹ 1. 117. 9, gives price as 5 denarii.

² E.g. “*nil feret ad Manes*” (*T.* v. 14, 2) and “*haud ullas portabis opes Acheruntis ad undas*” (*III.* 3).

insanum bene"; *Adelphi*, 153, *nisi*, quicquid est, volo scire." The meaning of this passage, which recalls to us the pregnant brevity of Tacitus or Sallust, would then be—*there is only one thing to do—to advance by the same road on which we have started*. Which might correspond to the Latin *nisi, quo coepimus, pariter incedere* or *nisi, quo pervenimus* (retaining the prolepsis, cf. the parallel in Terence, *Eunuch.* i. 40, "Sine me *pervenire* quo volo") *eodem pergere*. *στοιχεῖν*, to march, being a military term, *στοίχω*, step, would be understood, or else *στίβω* path, cf. Cicero *de Div.* 2. 54, *eadem via pergere*. *ἐφθάσαμεν* is proleptic. The writer is thinking of the goal as already reached. He had used the word in *Romans* ix. 31, *εἰς νόμον οὐκ ἐφθασεν* (reached). Cf. Virg. *Æ.* 1. 69, "*Submersas obrue puppes*" (overwhelm and submerge); Aisch. *Agam.* 1247, *εὐφημον κοίμησον στόμα*, lull into silence.¹ *ἐτέρως φρονεῖτε* (III. 15) may represent the Latin "*seorsum sentio*" (Plaut. *Capt.* 3. 5. 52); cf. also *aliter* in "*aliter visum est*" (Plautus). Phil. ii. 15 f., *ἐν οἷς φαίνεσθε ὡς φωστῆρες ἐν κόσμῳ λόγον ζωῆς ἐπέχοντες*, "among whom shine as stars in the world, *holding unto the end* the word of life." *ἐπέχοντες*, rendered "directing," "holding fast," "holding out," is suggestive (like *ἐφθάσαμεν* of the goal and represents probably the Latin "*usque tenentes*." Cf. Virg. *Ec.* 9. 64, "*cantantes licet usque* . . . *eamus*," "let us go right on." The next words *οὐκ εἰς κέρον ἔδραμον* support the idea. The reference here is not to the torch races of the Greeks, to which we have many allusions in the classics,³ but to the procession

¹ Cf. Keats's "So these two brothers and their murdered man Rode to fair Florence."

² *Usque morari*, Virg. *Æ.* 6, 487. Hor. S. 1. 2. 65, *pœnas dedit usque*.

³ Arist. *Ranæ* 131. Plato, *Resp.* 328. Lucr. II. 78, "*quasi cursores vitæ lampada tradunt*," cf. Persius VI. 61. There is a *soupçon* of the original meaning, "In my religion I have learned."

of the mystics, walking or running, carrying their torches, and following their leader (ὁ δαδοῦχος) right to the Temple of Demeter at Eleusis (cf. μεμύημαι iv. 12). So here the torch-bearers of the word carry it right to the end. They do not pass it from one to another as the runners in the torch race did.

The next words, "nor did I labour in vain," εἰς κένον ἐκοπιάσα, is the Latin idiom "frustra laboro," "frustraque laboret," Hor. A. P. 241 (see also Isaiah xlix. 4, LXX. κενῶς ἐκοπιάσα). In i. 7 the ἀπολογία καὶ βεβαίωσις of the gospel recalls the *confirmatio* and *reprehensio* of the Roman pleader. By the first he gave proofs for his own position; by the second he refuted his opponent's arguments. Cic., *de Inventione* 1. 4, defines the first, "Confirmatio est per quam argumentando nostræ causæ fidem et auctoritatem et firmamentum adjungit oratio." Surely this is a more appropriate explanation of βεβαίωσις than *Evictio*,¹ which means a recovery of property. In Colossians ii. 6-8 the Latin suggests the right meaning of παρελάβετε and συλαγωγεῖν—As you received (not "learned" ²) Christ, for here παρελάβετε means to take as an ally, or friend, or chief, like the Latin *assumere*, cf. Hor. S. 1. 6. 51, "Cautum dignos assumere" (sc. amicos); also of wife and son in Tac. A. xii. 2; cf. i. 8. Hdt. 1. 76 has παραλαβών of taking allies. The meaning then is, as you assumed or took Christ for your friend, ally, and chief, march in Him, in His ranks. Here the metaphor changes to that of a building and is then resumed—"confirmed."

βεβαιουμένοι = *confirmati*, a verb used of encouraging soldiers to fight by Cæsar (B.G. 5. 49. 52, etc.). "Abounding in thanksgiving," περισσεύοντες = *abundantes*. Cf. Plautus, *Stich.* II. 16, "ripas superat mihi atque *abundat* pectus lætitia, so here it means "overflowing." "Beware

¹ *Expositor's G.T.* III. 420.

² In Phil. iv. 9, it is with ἐμάθετε.

lest any one be making you his booty." *συλαγωγεῖν* is not found in classical or biblical Greek, but is found in Aris-tænetus (350 A.D.). Field has "rob you." Of what? we ask. The Latin helps again, *prædam* and *prædas agere* occur in Plautus (*Aul.* 4. 2. 3), "he would have a fine haul who found this jar, 'pulchram prædam agat.'" ¹ The idea of seizing and abducting from the column on the march is present here. When speaking of making converts Paul says, *κερδήσω*, 1 Corinthians ix. 21; but he who perverts them is *ὁ συλαγωγῶν* (cf. "sheep-stealer").

Philippians iv. 7, "the peace of God shall garrison (*φρουρήσει*) your hearts and minds"; "the peace of God rule (*βραβεύτω*) in your hearts, unto which (peace) you were called" (*ἐκλήθητε*), Colossians iii. 15, are strange expressions. How could peace garrison or rule unless it were personified. Horace more mildly speaks of "Peace returning." ² The explanation is, that owing to the extent and duration of the *Pax Romana* the empire became identified with the pax, and so pax is a synonym of empire in some passages, e.g., Pliny 27. 1. 1, "*immensa Romanæ pacis majestate*," where we have the *majesty* of the Roman peace ³ = empire. *L'empire c'est la paix* was a saying of the third Napoleon. So here "the peace of God" is another term for the Kingdom of God "unto which we were called." Of the parable of the kingdom in Matthew xxii. 1-14, the conclusion is *πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσιν κλητοί*. The parallel is completed in Colossians iii. 15.

Many phrases in these letters are possibly the equivalents of the slang expressions of the soldiers. *Phil.* iv. 12, *μεμύημαι χορτάζεσθαι καὶ πεινᾶν*, my religion has taught me to be gorged and to do without food: *χ.* is used of

¹ Cf. Sallust, *Jug.* 20. 8; 32. 3.

² *Carmen Seculare*. Jam Fides et Pax . . . redire . . . audet.

³ Cf. Seneca. *Olem.* 1. 8, 1. 1. 4.

fattening beasts and is hardly a word the apostle would use, unless it corresponded to some slang term the soldiers used. There is such an expression, *saginare*, which was used of fattening animals and birds, and then of gourmands. This would, then, be a soldier's term, for it was either a feast or a famine with them. Tacitus (H. 4. 42) used it of a "bloated" millionaire, "septuagies sestertio saginatus." Sagina was also the gladiator's fare, Juv. 4. 67, "stomachum laxare saginis." We have the same contrast in Plautus *Pers.* 1. 3. 22, "*Esurio venio non advenio Saturio*. πεινᾶν is the *esurire* so frequent in Horace, e.g., S. 1. 2. 115.

Again Phil. iii. 8. ἡγοῦμαι σκόβαλα is a coarse expression which would be used by soldiers. Cf. Plautus, *Truc.* II. 7. 8, "Amator qui bona sua *pro stercore habet*, treats as dirt; cf. Cicero *de Orat.* 3. 41. 164, "nolo *stercus curiæ dici* Glauciam." A similar word of abuse is *sterquilinium* (dunghill). In Plaut. *Pers.* 3. 3. 3, a leno is called "*sterquilinium publicum*." A soldier in Plautus, *Cas.* 1. 26, addresses the bailiff as "*ex sterquilinio effosse*." The verb is used in LXX, and the noun σκυβαλισμός (contempt) in Polybius; but St. Paul would not have used the term but for hearing it so often from the soldiers. Another coarse expression is Phil. iii. 19, "whose god is their belly" (ἡ κοιλία), which must often have been heard in Rome where *ventricolæ* abounded. "Vivite ventres," said Lucilius to the gluttons of his day. The Roman epicures were unique and notorious. For the idle rich the banquet was the chief event of the day, and ended often in scenes of drunkenness, debauchery and gluttony, "a second appetite" artificially produced. See Juvenal (4. 138), "*aliamque famem*." See also Cicero, *Phil.* 2. 41, "*ab hora tertia bibebatur, vomebatur*." Sea and land were ransacked for the Roman appetite, "*Gustus elementa*

per omnia quaerunt" (Juv. xi. 14). The Roman stomach had to be *appeased* like an angry God; as in the dinner of Nasidienus (Hor. S. II. 8. 5), "tell me what dish first appeased the angry stomach," "quæ prima iratum ventrem placaverit¹ esca."

Sallust speaks of many people, "ventri dediti" (*Cat.* 2), and says all who had wasted their substance by "gambling (manu) and luxury (ventre)" joined Catiline (c. 14).

Juvenal similarly personifies *gula*, "Quanta est *gula* quæ sibi totos ponit apros (1. 140); dum *gula* sævit (v. 94). The once famous epicures like Apicius would be sobriety (frugi) itself in his day (iv. 23). The guards would discuss such matters with their prisoners. We may regard this word, then, as due to Roman military surroundings, although κοιλιοδαίμων may be a late word. Another term which is used in a distinctly Roman sense in at least one passage (Philem. 12) is σπλάγχνα, *viscera*. We have "in the heart (σπλ.) of Jesus Christ" (Phil. i. 8); "if any heart (σπλ.) and compassion," 4. 11; "a merciful heart" (σπλ.). Colossians iii. 12, and in Philemon 12, "Whom I sent unto you, even my own son" (τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα). σπλάγχνα is not used in the Classics of children but *viscera* is. See Ovid, *Met.* v. 18, "quæ visceribus veniebat bellua ponto, exsaturanda meis, (my daughter); *Met.* vi. 651 (of Tereus), "inque suam sua viscera (children) congerit alvum." Maecenas wrote to Horace, "ni te visceribus meis plus jam diligo" (my own children, or my life). Juvenal (III. 71) has *viscera* magnarum domuum (bosom friends). Ovid (*Tr.* 1. 7. 17) burns his books (*viscera nostra*, my offspring), just as Thestias was the means of burning her son. The frequency of σπλάγχνα in these epistles (six times) is remarkable, and has a Latin sense in other places as well as in Philem. 12, e.g., in Phil. i. 8, "to long

¹ See Cic. Leg. ii. 9, "iram deorum donis placare."

for you *in the heart* of Jesus Christ." So Cicero said that others who were absent were true to the republic; *aderant tamen in medullis populi Romani ac visceribus haerebant* " (Phil. i. 15). He might well have addressed them in the very phrase Paul used here,¹ "*quam valde desidero vos in visceribus reipublicæ.*" Paul called the people of Philippi by a Roman name *Philippenses* (cf. *Mutinenses*), *φιλιππήσιοι*, whereas Stephanus (*Byzant.*) pointed out that *φιλιππηνοί* is the word used by Polybius, cf. *Ἀβυδηνοί* (Athen. XII. 524 f.). This expression may also have come from the guards. These men, like all soldiers, would be interested in the racing in the circus, and would have their bets and their games of chance. John xix. 24, "let us obtain it by lot" (*λάχουμεν περὶ αὐτοῦ*) is a true touch. The consuls drew lots² for their provinces and the legions for their place in the line of march, and the soldiers for many things among each other. It was their "sporting" way of settling disputes, either by putting "*sortes*" into a "*sitella*" (Plaut. *Cas.* 2. 5. 34) or by throwing *tali* (41 or *tesseræ* (3) or by flicking fingers.³ One of these methods was used at the Cross. Although prohibited by law (*vetita legibus*, Hor. *Od.* III. 24) gambling (*alea*) went on, "*luditur alea pernox*" (Juv. 8. 10); "*alea quando hos animos . . . positâ sed luditur arcâ*" (1. 89 f.). Augustus himself played for high stakes (Suet. *Aug.* 71). One of the humorous passages in Martial (v. 84) is where a tipsy gambler asks the policeman (*ædilis*) to lend him money. Gambling was a favourite pastime, especially during the *Saturnalia*. The naughty boy in Persius only cares about throwing dice (III. 50). The old men indulged in games with *tali* and *tesseræ*. Pliny also describes the women at play. Still

¹ ὡς ἐπιποθῶ πάντας ὑμᾶς ἐν σπλάγχχνοις, I. X.

² Consules inter se sortiri jussi, Liv. 38. 35; legiones de ordine agminis sortiuntur, Tac. H. 2. 41.

³ Micare digitis.

the confirmed gambler (aleator) had an unsavoury reputation.¹ But considering that it was the favourite amusement of the soldiers, it would be strange if we had no reference to it. In Ephesians iv. 14 we have the solitary New Testament reference to dicing (κυβεία), which some render "sleight," and so lose sight of the apostle's meaning. He is comparing the fickleness of those who are led to change their views by the specious plausibility of other teachers with the proverbial fickleness of the gambler's luck. This uncertainty is expressed also in κλυδωνιζόμενοι, a rare word, which he used to render the common Latin "fluctuantes" or "fluctuati," e.g., Virg. A. 10. 680, "animo nunc huc nunc fluctuat illuc," and Livy 32. 13, "fluctuatus animo."² περιφερόμενοι παντὶ ἀνέμῳ expresses the Latin "ventosus," fickle, e.g., "Lepidus homo ventosissimus," "ventosæ plebis suffragia."³ The Latin is *circumagere* rather than *circumferre* (Vg. *circumferamur*), being used of turning a ship round, and of the veering of the wind, and of the change of fortune,⁴ e.g., "hic paululum *circumacta* fortuna est." This last quotation from Florus supports our view that the allusion here is to the fickleness of the gambler's luck, and especially when high and daring, ἐν τῇ κυβείᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν πανουργίᾳ, apparently an hendiadys, in the reckless gambling of men, or, in the gambling of reckless men; cf. βασιλείαν καὶ δόξαν, 1 Thessalonians ii. 12, "glorious kingdom." This figure is common in the classics.⁵

πανουργία means "audacity" as well as "cunning." Juvenal (xi. 201) speaks of audacious betting, "*audax*

¹ Cic. *Cat. Maj.* 58; Pliny *Ep.* 27. 24; Cic. *Phil.* ii. 27.

² "Mens fluctuat ipsa malis," Catullus, 65. 4; cf. 64. 62; "turbæ fluctuantis," Tac. *H.* 1. 40; *vita fluctuatur* (*Sen.*).

³ Cic. *Fam.* xi. 9; Hor. *Ep.* i. 9. 37.

⁴ Pliny, xi. 47; Livy, 37. 16; Florus, II. 2. 22.

⁵ E.g., Aisch *Eum.* 247, αἷμα καὶ σταλαγμόν, drop of blood.

sponsio." This also supports our view. The purpose and destiny as well as method at work is expressed by *πρὸς τὴν μεθοδεῖαν*¹ *τῆς πλάνης*; cf. 2 Thessalonians ii. 11, *ἐνεργεῖαν πλάνης*, according to, and in furtherance of, the scheme of Deceit.² *πλάνη* is personified here, the spirit that deceives and causes men to veer from point to point of the doctrinal compass. It is also active, as "error" in Virg. *Æ.* II. 47, "aut aliquis latet error," "some trap is laid." Another word that expresses the hazard of the throw is *παραβολευσάμενος τῇ ψυχῇ* (Phil. ii. 30), gambling with his life. Aristophanes used *παράβολος* for reckless, and Menander *παραβόλως*, recklessly. The idea of a "stake" is here, cf. "posito pignore."³ According to Juvenal (x. 81) the only things the Roman populace cared for were "Panem et Circenses." The people were racing mad. Juvenal (xi. 198) said it would prove a second Cannæ if the green faction (one of the four racing stables) lost.⁴ Nero favoured the Green, as Caligula had done, and from his youth was devoted to racing. According to Martial (x. 48 and xi. 1, 16), "cum sponsio fabulæque lassæ de scorpo fuerint et incitato," the chief topic of conversation at Rome was the racing prospects of the rival factions. Charioteers were popular and rich. It would be strange if we had no reference to this popular sport, which would be much discussed by his guards, in these letters.

In Phil. iii. 14 we have a striking passage, *τὰ μὲν ὀπίσω ἐπιλανθανόμενος τοῖς δὲ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεκτεινόμενος κατὰ σκόπον διώκω εἰς τὸ βραβεῖον*. Lightfoot thought the metaphor here might be derived from the chariot races in the Circus, as the epistle was written from Rome. Horace had often witnessed these races and the daring

¹ A. *τὰς μεθοδίας*, cf. vi. 11. ² Cf. 1 John iv. 7, "The spirit of deceit." Matt. xxvii. 64, "the last deceit."

³ Ovid A.A. i. 168. Plautus has "da pignus," lay a wager.

⁴ Cf. Petronius, 70.

attempts of the drivers to pass each other. He used similar language—

“Ut cum carceribus missos rapit ungula currus,
Instat equis auriga suis vincentibus, illum
Præteritum temnens extremos inter euntem” (S. i. 14)—

to St. Paul's. The latter must often have heard his guards, who had good places at the races, especially when acting as escort, discussing the charioteers and the way they bent over their teams, not daring to look behind as Virgil describes them, “illi instant verbere torto, et proni dant lora” (G. III. 106). Nestor advised his son to lean forward, κλινθῆναι (Il. 23. 335).¹

An expression in Ephesians v. 16 and Colossians iv. 5, ἐξαγοραζόμενοι² τὸν καιρόν, rendered “redeeming the time,” or “occasion,” seems rather to mean “using to the full.” “Buying up the opportunity” leads to such questions as “from whom?” and “with what?” The Latin *eximere* (ex-emere), exhaust, is the exact equivalent of ἐξαγοράζειν and is used with time, e.g., diem dicendo *eximere*,³ “ea res exemisset illum diem,”⁴ dicendo tempus *exemit*.⁵ The middle form of the Greek suggests ownership. *Eximere* is also used in sense of *release*, “eum tanquam e vinculis *eximamus*,”⁶ cf. ἡμᾶς ἐξηγόρασεν ἐκ τῆς κατάρας (Gal. iii. 13), cf. “*eximere morti*” (Tac. A. 14. 48), “*ex culpa eximere*” (Cic. Inv. 2. 7); “*se crimine eximere*” (Livy, 6. 24). Thus *eximere* corresponds to ἐξαγοράζειν in both meanings, “exhaust” and “deliver.”

There are references to the triumph and victory march—the chief features of the Roman military power. St. Paul previously was not ignorant of these displays. 2

¹ See article, *EXPQSITOR*, Oct., 1919, p. 313 f., by present writer.

² In Dan. ii. 8, means “gaining time.”

³ Cic. Q. Fr. 2. 1. 3. ⁴ Livy 1. 50. ⁵ Cic. Att. 4. 33.

⁶ Cic. Or. 23. 77.

Corinthians ii. 14 f., "To God who leadeth us in triumph (*θριαμβέοντι ἡμᾶς*) in Christ." Cf. the saying of Cleopatra, *οὐ θριαμβεσθήσομαι*. He also referred to the incense¹ which was used at such times, and signified death to some (Jugurtha) and life to others (Caractacus). But since he had come to Rome he had heard more details from his guards. As their service was for sixteen years many Prætorians of his time would have been present on that great day when Caractacus was led through the streets of Rome and before the seats of Claudius and his consort. Tacitus (*A.* 12. 36) describes the scene—"Vocatus ad insigne spectaculum populus, *stetere in armis prætoriæ cohortes campo qui castra præjacet. Tunc incedentibus regiis clientelis, phaleræ, torques, quæque bellis externis quæsiverat traducta, mox fratres et conjunx et filia, postremo ipse ostentatus.*" (57 A.D.) The spoliation of the captive princes, and their exhibition to the people by the general who paraded as the servant of the Roman Jupiter were the chief features of the triumph, which was at once a display of power, wealth and conquest and a religious thanksgiving.

Livy (i. x.) describes Romulus carrying the spolia of the slain leader on a frame (*feretrum*) to the Capitol, "*factorum ostentator* haud minor" (i. x.). Horace, referring to the triumph of Augustus (29 B.C.), says "*res gerere et captos ostendere civibus hostes attingit solium Jovis,*" is to reach the throne of Jupiter. Suetonius (C. 37), describing Cæsar's Pontic triumph, says, "*inter pompæ fercula trium verborum protulit titulum 'veni, vidi, vici,'*" Cicero comments on the slowness of the march, "*pomparum ferculis similes.*"

Livy, 26. 21, describes the triumph of Marcellus, "*præ*

¹ Hor. Od. iv. 2. 51, "*dabimusque divis Thura benignis,*" speaking of a triumph. Ovid. T. iv. 2. 4, "*Turaque in igne sonent*"; cf. Plutarch, *Aem. Paul.*, 132, "every temple was open and was filled with garlands and incense."

se prædam in urbem intulit cum simulacro captarum Syracusarum." Models of cities, forts and hills, etc., were borne aloft, e.g., in the triumph of Germanicus.¹ The names of the cities taken were displayed.² The captives were stripped of all their insignia and were led before the car of victory, "Crinibus en etiam passis Germania fertur," wrote Ovid (*Tr.* iv. 2. 43). Tacitus described how the trophies won by Caractacus were carried in this triumph. Now all these features are found in Paul's description of the Lord's triumph (Col. ii. 15). ἀπεκδυσάμενος τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἐξουσίας ἐδειγμάτισεν ἐν παρρησίᾳ θριαμβεύσας αὐτοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ. Ἀπεκδυσάμενος, a middle form like ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι (Eph. i. 10, sum up for Himself), means "having stripped off their insignia from them for Himself," not "having stripped off from Himself these powers." He treated the hostile powers as a Roman general in his triumph treated his conquered foes, parading them in triumph, deprived of all their insignia and state robes, as a spectacle to please the citizens ;³ while he himself drove a car of victory, wearing the insignia and emblems of mighty Jupiter to the Capitol.

So Christ made in His triumph a public exhibition of the forces of evil and worldly pomp before His own car—the Cross—on which His titulus, like that of Cæsar's "veni, vidi, vici" was nailed. The connexion of a public display of the defeated with a triumph is a prominent idea here. We may compare Plutarch's description of Marius' triumph (c. 12), where similar words are used, τὸν θρίαμβον εἰσήλασεν ἄπιστον ἐπιδείξαμενος θέαμα Ῥωμαίοις Ἰονγοῦρθαν. The latter (Jugurtha) was literally stripped of everything, and thrown naked (γυμνός) into the dungeon. In St. Paul's

¹ "Vecta spolia, captivi, simulacra montium, fluminum" (Tacitus).

² "Cum ducum titulis oppida capta leget" (Ovid. *Tr.* iv. 2. 19) ; "Et titulis oppida capta legam" (Propertius, iv. 4. 16).

³ Captivi ante currum ducti spolia prælata (Liv. 31. 49),

figure the gibbet of the slave was transformed into the *feretrum* on which the *spolia opima* of the Christus triumphans were carried before Him. The shame of the cross having been done away, it became the car of victory in the theology of St. Paul. Who can say how much this glorious thought has done for the Church of Christ, and how much of it was due to the talk of the Roman guards? *ἐδειγμάτισεν ἐν παρησίᾳ* is the "aperte ostendit" of Horace, *S. l. l. 84*, i.e., frankly, fully, openly. Ignatius (*Eph. ix.*) similarly described the Christian life in the terms of a religious procession. "You are all comrades of the way, God-bearers, shrine-bearers, Christ-bearers, bearers of holy things." Revelation iii. 4f. adds another feature, the white robes of the people, Rome being "*candida urbs*" at such times. For the preceding words (v. 14) "having blotted out the bond written in ordinances, that was against us, which was contrary to us, even it (*καὶ αὐτό*) he hath taken out of the way by nailing it to the cross," we again have recourse to Latin customs and expressions. But first *τὸ χειρογράφον τοῖς δόγμασι* is briefer and more precise than Ephesians ii. 15, *τὸν νόμον . . . ἐν δόγμασι*, and means the bond with its decrees, or decrees and all, cf. dative of accompaniment, e.g., Aisch. *Prom.* 221, *αὐτοῖσι συμμάχοισι*, allies and all. The article here suggests that *δόγμασι* had been used before, "the aforesaid decrees," in the Ephesian letter. The nailing of the bond to the cross, whatever the reference may be, denotes the permanence of the satisfaction or contract. The Apostle might be thinking of the Mosaic law and its regulations among the *spolia opima* of Christ as nailed up, just as the *spolia opima* were fixed up in the temple of Jupiter, "*Ter tiaque arma patri suspendet capta Quirino*" (Virg. *Æ.* vi. 859). If Christ is the subject of *ἐξαλείψας*, as seems most suitable, this might be correct. The laws inscribed

on brass tablets were fixed up in the capitol and curiæ. Tacitus says Domitian ordered the old laws to be replaced.¹ Plautus² helps us too in the passage, "The public morals have the laws in their power. In their misery the laws are fixed to the walls with iron nails (*ad parietem fixæ clavis ferreis*), where it were fitter that bad morals should be nailed up" (*affigi*). The nailing up does not denote cancelling. On the contrary, see Aisch. *Supp.* 721, where the nail driven through a decision of the people makes it permanent,³ an allusion to the custom of fixing up the decrees of the people in the temples and public places.

Finally, there is the soldier's equipment. Paul would admire the glittering arms of the guards. In his presence they would mount and relieve guard and "stand to," much as the British soldier does. They would also burnish their weapons in their spare time. Note how he repeats the word "stand," *στῆναι*, *στῆτε*. Tacitus says the prætorians stood under arms, *stetere in armis*, when Carac-tacus was led in triumph. The soldiers stood to attention to have their arms inspected, they also stood in their ranks in the conflict. Here the former idea is paramount, for the offensive weapons, the *pila*, javelins, are absent. Neither is the soldier wearing *greaves* (*ocreae*) which under the Empire were worn by officers, but attention is given to the *caligæ*, *ὑποδησάμενοι* representing *caligati*,⁴ booted, the ordinary name for the privates, the *calceus*⁵ being worn by officers.

Juvenal has many humorous remarks on the soldiers' *caligæ* which were studded with nails.⁶ The last portion

¹ Hist. iv. 40, "æra legum dilapsa poscerent figerentque.

² *Trin.* 4. 3. 30 f.

³ τῶνδ' ἐφῆλται τορῶς γόμφος διαμπάξ ὥς μένειν ἀραρότως: cf. προσηλώσας.

⁴ Suet. (*Vit.* 7). ⁵ Juvenal 16. 14.

⁶ III. 247, XVI. 24. See story in Josephus, B.J. VI. 1. 8.

of the armour to be put on was the helmet, "*Galeatum sero duelli pœnitet*," wrote Juvenal, I. 160. Cæsar describes the enemy coming on so fast at one time that "there was no time to put on the helmets,"¹ these being hung over shoulder or breast while the men were marching. The rank and file carried their short swords attached to a *balteus* slung over the left shoulder and hanging on the right side. Having taken up the shield and donned his helmet, the man would slip the *balteus* over his head and under his right arm, "*Umero cum adparuit alto balteus*" (Virg. *Æ.* 12. 942). Tacitus (H. 2. 88) describes how some civilians cut the belts of some soldiers (*abscissis furtim balteis*) and then enquired if the men's side arms were safe ('*an accincti forent*,' cf. *περιζωσάμενοι*, vi. 14). So the *balteus* or belt of truth holds the sword of the Spirit which is the word of God. The soldiers would also speak about the *malleoli*, darts (cf. "bombs") used in their warfare, "*malleolos stupæ illitos pice*" (Livy 42. 64). The vigilance of the guards, whether *vigilantes* or *excubantes*, patrolling or doing sentry, is expressed by *ἀγρουπνοῦντες*, and their *perseverantia* by *προσκαρτέρησις*, which only occurs here. "Our wrestling (*πάλη*) is not with blood and flesh but with principalities, powers, etc. (vi. 12) recalls the fact that wrestling was another Roman sport, attributed to Mercury (Hor. *Od.* i. x. 4) who civilises men, "*decoræ more palæstræ*," as well as "*voce*." St. Paul was once called *Hermes* because of his speech. The poets often refer to the "*uncta palæstra*." In many private houses there was a *palæstra*, or room for the purpose. *Lucta* and *luctamen* were slang terms among the men for a fight. But the point here is that it is not a wrestling with human foes, but with powers and elements that are not human. Hercules, as the ideal wrestler, was a

¹ B.G. 2. 21, "*ad galeas induendas tempus defuerit*."

favourite subject with the Romans. He was often depicted wrestling with Antæus, and then he was not wrestling with mere flesh and blood, but with mother earth as well. Propertius (iv. 22, 9) refers to the statue of Hercules and Antæus wrestling. Juvenal (3. 89) speaks of Hercules holding Antæus far above the ground (*procul a tellure*). Martial refers to the strength of Antæus, and Lucan (IV. 589-655) gives a detailed account of the contest which he may have taken from Apollodorus, and in which Hercules proved the victor by depriving Antæus of his more than human powers of resistance. Strabo (xvii. 8) spoke of the tomb of Antæus, where an enormous skeleton was found. These allusions before and in St. Paul's day to this wrestling match show how popular the subject was, and would be among soldiers, especially when their emperor wished to encourage the sport, and to be styled Hercules.

F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK.

NOTES AND NOTICES OF RECENT CRITICISM.

OUR LORD BLESSING LITTLE CHILDREN.

THE famous passage which describes our Lord's blessing the little children is endeared to us by many tender associations. Innumerable pictures have left an indelible impression upon our minds. To Anglican clergy the paraphrase of the passage in the Baptismal Service is even more familiar than the Bible text. "Beloved, ye hear in this Gospel the words of our Saviour Christ, that he commanded the children to be brought unto him, how he blamed those that would have kept them from him; how he exhorteth all men to follow their innocency. Ye perceive how by his outward gesture and deed he declared his good will toward them, he laid his hand upon them, and blessed them." An attempt to fix the exact meaning of the words may be welcome to some, though others would perhaps prefer to leave them unexamined, the glamour of the traditional text being so great.

In the Revised Version the passage runs as follows :

“ And they brought unto him little children, that he should touch them : and the disciples rebuked them. But when Jesus saw it, he was moved with indignation, and said unto them, Suffer the little children to come unto me : forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of God. . . . And he took them up in his arms, and blessed them, laying his hands upon them ” (St. Mark x. 13-16).

They were bringing to him boys (παιδιά) that he might touch them. A *παιδίον* may be any age from a baby (Matt. ii. 8) to a man (John xxi. 5). “ Boy ” is the best translation, for there is no indication that any women or girls were present. *Touch* is ambiguous. By itself it might imply a healing touch, but verse 16 shows that the Evangelist has in mind a spiritual blessing. *But the disciples rebuked them.* *Them* at first sight is the fathers. But these have not been mentioned, and *them* in the previous sentence means the boys. The disciples’ rebuke is more naturally taken as addressed to the boys. In all ages the first impulse of men accompanying a leader, if a crowd of boys gather round, is to say, Go away. Our Lord’s words are more pointed if the disciples had scolded the boys.

And putting his arms round them he blessed them, laying hands on them. The same word (*ἐναγκαλισάμενος*) occurs in Mark ix. 36. Jesus is in the house with the disciples. He places a boy in the midst. The obvious position for Jesus is sitting. The boy would be standing and the Master’s arm would be round him ; *ἀγκάλη* is the bend of the arm. So here. The Master may be pictured with His left arm round each boy in turn, His right hand being laid on the head in blessing. This laying on of hands was used in the “ ordination ” of Jewish Rabbis, and was a natural gesture to accompany the blessing given by fathers to children or by Rabbis to their disciples (see Strack’s Commentary on Matthew xix. 13).

The interpretation here given of *ἐναγκαλισάμενος* is borne out by the LXX., where the verb represents the Hebrew *ḥbq*, “ embrace.” In Genesis xlviii. 10 the same verb is rendered *περιέλαβεν*, but this passage, describing the blessing of Ephraim and Manasseh, is the best illustration of our present passage. They were big boys and certainly were not lifted up by Jacob.

Having fixed the meaning of Mark, we can now turn to the other Gospels. Matthew xix. 13 alters the impersonal “ they

brought" (*προσέφερον*) into the passive *προσηνέχθησαν*, with no apparent significance in the change. Matthew defines the touching—that he might lay hands on them and pray—bringing out the sense clearly intended by Mark. He misses out the vivid touch of *ἐναγκαλισάμενος*.

Luke xviii. 15 by a slight change alters the sense appreciably. The boys (*παιδιά*) become babes (*βρέφη*). So in the Infancy narratives Matthew speaks of *τὸ παιδίον*, Luke of *τὸ βρέφος*. Luke then understands Mark's *παιδιά* to be very young children. The subject of the verb must be their mothers, since the babes would be in their mothers' arms. But Luke has not altered *αὐτοῖς*, by which he must have intended the mothers and the accompanying fathers. And he retains *παιδιά* in the next verse.

St. Luke may have used his favourite word "babes" without realising that he was altering the sense of the Marcan narrative. But one likes to think that the Evangelist of womanhood, who described the childhood of Jesus, intended to reproduce Mark's narrative accurately, but by a slight alteration to suggest what he had heard in Palestine, that women and babies played their part on that great day. The symbolism may also have appealed to him, for he seems to have known about infant baptism from his own experience (see Acts xvi. 15, 33).

W. K. L. CLARKE.

THE CAROBS OF THE SEA.

THE diet to which the prodigal, in our Lord's parable in the fifteenth chapter of Luke, was reduced, is described in the Authorised Version as "the husks which the swine did eat." The Geneva Bible, and the Douay version, agree with this rendering, but Wiclif, Tyndale and Cranmer translate the Vulgate *siliquis* by the English word *cod*, which is the equivalent of the word *pod*, and their rendering is, no doubt, much more exact, since the Syriac versions render the Greek word *κεράτια* by *carobs*, a term commonly used of the bean-like pods of the carob tree. Leaving the question open as to what particular tree is intended (we shall see that "tree" is a misnomer), we simply observe that the Latin *pods* and the Syriac *carobs* go together, and mean the same thing. So far there is general

agreement. At this very point, where the Syriac equivalent term is being enquired after, we find that the Old Syriac of Cureton has the peculiar reading that the prodigal longed to satisfy himself "with those carobs of the sea that the swine were eating." The addition of the words "*of the sea*" is, as Burkitt says, "very puzzling."

No explanation has been suggested, as far as I know, from the point of view of a Syriac text or transcription, but if we put the expression into Latin, an explanation is immediately forthcoming, for

de siliquis maris

differs only by a single letter from

de siliquis amaris,

on which hypothesis the carobs, which the prodigal was constrained by hunger to eat, were bitter.

Let us see, then, if this explanation can be accepted, and if it throws light upon the point in the parable. At first sight it seems improbable, for almost all writers who discourse on the pods or beans of the carob emphasise their sweetness. The so-called locust bean of commerce, which is the basis of Thorley's food for cattle, is valued for its saccharine properties, and on that very account is eaten by children both in the West and in the East. How then are we to justify the adjective "*bitter*" when applied to a "*sweet*" fruit?

One explanation would be that the *κεράτια* are of a strongly astringent character, and this fact seems to have been in the minds of patristic commentators on the passage. For instance, an anonymous writer in Cramer's *Catena on Luke* explains the situation allegorically, and says that "Sin is compared to the *κεράτια*, because, just as their taste is sweet but is also intrinsically harsh (*τραχεῖα*), so also the nature of sin is that it gladdens a little and punishes a great deal; it pleases for a time and chastises for eternity." This mystical explanation evidently has in mind the unpleasant after effects of the eating of the carobs, and in that sense it might be maintained that the prodigal's food was bitter.

Bede also, in his commentary, tries to explain away the superficial sweetness of the carob, and gives an allegorical interpretation. "The carobs which the swine were fed with

are the high-sounding doctrines of heathenism," and he calls them "a sterile sweetness."

It will hardly be thought that these interpretations and the like are adequate to explain the bitterness of the carob, though they look in that direction and may be thought to suggest it. "Sweet but harsh" says the Catenist; "Sweet but sterile" says Bede.

Before we can make any progress with criticism of the emendation, we must know more about the carob. We will take first the description which is given in Theophrastus' *History of Plants*¹: "This tree the Ionians call carob (*κερωϊαν*); for this, too, bears most of its fruit on the stem, though it bears a little on the branches. The fruit is in a pod; some call it 'Egyptian fig' erroneously; for it does not occur at all in Egypt, but in Syria and Ionia and also in Cnidus and Rhodes. It is evergreen and has a whitish flower, and is somewhat acrid (*ἔχον τι βαρύτητος*), and it sends out side-shoots from its lower parts, while it withers above. It has on it at the same time both last year's fruit and the new fruit, etc."

Upon drawing the attention of my colleague Dr. Mingana to this passage, he said that the description was very correct, that the carob grows all over the East, and that the popular accounts of it, such as Dr. Post's in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary* or Dr. Cheyne's article in the *Encyclopedia Biblica* are wrong, and do not at all describe the carob of Syria or Mesopotamia. To begin with, it is not a tree at all, but a low shrub of the height of a gooseberry bush. It is sold in the streets of Mosul to the accompaniment of an advertising chant of "Sweet carobs," and the adjective is necessary, because there are other varieties, not saleable nor suited for human food, *on account of their bitterness*. The wild boars come out of the forests to eat the carobs in the open country, which, of course, they could not do in the case of a tree of any height. Cattle and domestic animals eat freely of the pods. Dr. Mingana, to represent humans, has often done the same. Here we have evidence of the existence of two varieties of carob, "bitter" and "sweet": and the emphasis which the word "bitter" gives to the prodigal's situation is that it represents him, in time of famine, attempting to eat what was not suitable for human consumption.

¹ *L.c.* iv. 3, 4 (tr. by Hort).

The addition of the word to the Cureton text is probably a Tatianism; *the Diatessaron* may be thought of as a bilingual text, in which the Latin has reacted on the Syriac. It is in Tatian's manner to add a word or an expression which will illuminate the context: he did a similar thing earlier in the same chapter, where the woman is said to have lost a drachma of gold. How much easier to lose a tiny gold coin than a big silver one of the size of a half-crown! So we suggest that "carobs of the sea" is a Tatianic gloss, to be explained in the manner which we have intimated, and that it is an effective illustration for the parable itself.

Let us see now what the Syriac and Arabic writers say about it: for this is a point on which Eastern lexicographers can hardly go wrong, or if they do so, escape correction. Here again Dr. Mingana is my guide. In the Arabic Dictionary known as the *Tāj* (vol. i. p. 231) we find as follows:

"Carob [Ar. Kharnub]: Abu Hanifa says: there is a wild and a Syrian variety of this shrub. The wild variety (called also thorny carob) [Ar. yanbut] has thorns and is used as firewood. It grows up to a cubit in height, has branches and bears berries light in weight and inflated, but these berries are harsh and are not eaten, *except in time of exigency*, and contain hard and somewhat transparent seeds. The Syrian kind is sweet and is eaten. It has berries similar to those of the thorny carobs (yanbut), but is somewhat larger in size. They are somewhat like those of a cassia fistula tree, and inside they have seeds which are broad and contain pulp (rob) and juice."

In the Syriac Lexicon of Bar Bahlul also, we have two varieties clearly distinguished; one he calls the Syrian and the other the Nabataean (i.e. wild). Thus the Eastern authorities are clear for two sorts, an eatable and an inedible variety. The street hawkers are quite prepared to sell one for the other, and leave you to find out by experiment that you are repeating the experience of the prodigal.

RENDEL HARRIS.

ST. MARK IX. 5.

"MASTER, it is good for us to be here. And let us make three tabernacles—one for Thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elijah."

What exactly was in the mind of St. Peter when he uttered

these words is not easy to decide. That he desired that the presence of Moses and Elijah might be prolonged, and that he made his suggestion with this in mind, is clear. But was there any further thought in his mind? Did any associations of a definite and particular character attach themselves in his thought to the word "Tabernacles?"

The suggestion of Dr. Swete is that "the ideal in St. Peter's mind seems to be that of the annual *σκηνοπηγία*: he would anticipate it by a week spent on this leafy height in the presence of the three greatest Masters of Israel" (*Commentary on St. Mark's Gospel*, p. 179).

But except in so far as it may have suggested a definite period of time—a week—it is hard to see how there can be this reference to the Feast of Tabernacles. There was nothing in the circumstances to suggest such a reference. The Feast of Tabernacles was a Feast of Thanksgiving for Harvest. In the case before us the suggestion to make three tabernacles arose out of the desire of St. Peter to prolong as long as possible the presence of those whom Swete aptly describes as the three greatest Masters of Israel.

If the word "Tabernacles" (*σκηναί*) was used with any special connotation, it would be more in harmony with the general situation to suppose that—whether consciously or subconsciously—what was present to the speaker's mind was the scene recorded in Exodus xxxiii. 9-11. There Moses enters the Tabernacle (*σκηνή*); the pillar of cloud descends and remains at the door of the Tabernacle and the Lord talks with Moses "face to face as a man speaketh unto his friend." The scarcely articulate train of reasoning would be as follows:

As then God spoke to Moses in a Tabernacle, perchance He will now speak in like manner to each of the Three. Let us make for each of these "Masters of Israel" his own Tabernacle, that therein God may speak face to face with each, and we will listen and profit.

It is not necessary to suppose that the word *σκηνή* was used by St. Peter with all the associations which in course of time gathered round the word. The prominent idea in Exodus xxxiii. is that of a tent as the place where the Divine Presence was manifested—the place of Revelation.

According to this view the immediate appearance of the

Cloud, the Symbol of the Divine Presence, and the Voice which followed, must be regarded as constituting the Divine Answer to St. Peter's suggestion and all that it implied.

The difference between Moses and Elijah on the one side, and the Christ on the other side, was not one of degree but of kind. "This is My Beloved Son. Hear Him." Jesus, the Christ, was *sui generis*. It was to Him that Moses and Elijah had borne witness. They must decrease. He must increase. The Voice from the Cloud was the utterance of an eternal truth, but its occasion was the mistaken idea of equality, which in spite of the great Confession,¹ still lurked in St. Peter's mind.

This interpretation of the Divine Voice is not bound up with the suggested reference to Exodus xxxiii. as present in St. Peter's mind. Whatever the sense in which the word "Tabernacles" was used, St. Peter by his "One for Thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elijah" had placed the Christ alongside of and not above the other two. In Jerome's words, "*Si quando inaequales æqualiter honorantur, majoris injuria est.*"

But assuming that St. Peter thought of the *συνναί* as the means of perpetuating the presence of the Three with a view to further revelations from God, then the passage in Exodus furnished the obvious instance of a tent used for such a purpose, and was clearly appropriate in the case of Moses. The "Cloud" of St. Mark ix. 6 would then gain an added significance, as though God were saying to Peter, "You look for the Divine Symbol at the door of each tent. Here and now is the Divine Symbol, and the one supreme revelation which you must receive is that—as My Beloved Son—Jesus is the one and only Teacher, and none else." The disappearance of Moses and Elijah at this point will also be significant.

The obvious objection that there were no materials available for the making of tents is best met by calling attention to the way in which two of the Synoptists comment on St. Peter's words. St. Mark's words are "He knew not what to answer" (ix. 6). More strikingly St. Luke adds, "Not knowing what he said" (St. Luke ix. 33). The implication is that the words were crude and extravagant. Can it be doubted that these comments reflect the judgment of St. Peter himself as he viewed the incident in retrospect?

¹ St. Mark viii. 29.

Now there was no extravagance in the request to be allowed to provide σκηνή if what was in view was merely the prolonging of the companionship of the Three by the provision of shelter. But if at the back of the request lay the hope that the Three might be prevailed upon to remain in order to teach Divine truth, then in the light of the subsequent experience of the Christ, and especially of the Resurrection, the words would seem altogether wild and irreverent.

The greater includes the less. To speak of a tent as a means of revelation when there was nothing out of which to make a tent is only an insignificant detail as compared with the extravagance of bracketing Moses and Elijah with Christ, and the self-criticism of St. Peter in the light of after events may well have referred not only to the request which he made, but to the form in which the request was cast. Both may have been intended to be covered by the explanation which is given: "He knew not what he said."

Our comment, on the other hand, might well be "felix error," since Peter's mistaken request was the occasion of a Revelation, so convincing and so final, of the Divinity of Jesus.

H. J. GIBBINS.

THE PROBLEM OF ΕΓΩ ΕΙΜΙ IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

IN the EXPOSITOR of December last the Rev. P. J. Beveridge favoured us with an article on this subject. This was an encouragement to the present writer, since in his book, *The Teaching of Jesus and the Jewish Teaching of His Age*, he had several times, as the index will show, made some suggestions with regard to this very "I am." There is agreement, then, that these "I am" passages require further attention. It may be, however, that the outcome of this investigation will be other than Mr. Beveridge seems to anticipate. Very many of these passages in the form in which they came from Jesus may have referred not to himself, but to God as the I AM.

The closing remark of Jesus to the Samaritan woman might be interpreted, "I AM (is) he who tells (all things) to you" (iv. 26). In that case its object was, not to announce himself as Messiah,—a very unlikely procedure on his part, even in Samaria,

—but to bring the woman's mind back to the subject of God, from which it had wandered off to that of the Messiah.

His word to his disciples on the Galilean lake were very likely a reminder of the providence of God. "I AM (is): don't be alarmed" (vi. 20 || Mark vi. 50, Matt. xiv. 27). This reminder of the existence of God would be singularly appropriate as an assurance that God would protect them from all types of harm, whether in the sea, or in the air. This harmonises with his requirement of faith on a similar occasion, "Why are you terrified so? Alas! haven't you faith?" (Mark iv. 40 || Matt. viii. 25), where faith in God would seem to be most appropriately intended.

In chapter vi., whatever the Jews may have made of it (ver. 41),—and there was some excuse for them,—the main point of Jesus on the occasion may have been that God Himself, the I AM, as He was constantly coming into human life, was the bread from heaven. "I AM (is) the bread of life" (ver. 35, cf. 48); "I AM (is) the living bread" (ver. 51). There may, of course, have been with this the additional emphasis, that this living bread comes down through prophetic personalities, who had been so often persecuted even unto death—and might be again, if his own case went as he expected it would.

It was quite in Jewish fashion for him to remind his fellow-Jews that they should be "the light of the world" (Matt. v. 14), and for him to claim that he was in himself living out that idea (John ix. 5). But in viii. 12, "I AM (is) the light of the world" seems to be the correct rendering. Jesus adds, "He who follows me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life." The meaning of the whole verse is made perfectly clear by reference to the Johannine epistle, where "*God is light*" (1 John i. 5), and we are told that we should "walk in the *light* as he is in the *light*," and so "have fellowship with one another" (ver. 7).

In the same chapter there are several other references which can very legitimately be taken as references to God as the I AM. Thus, "I AM (is) he who witnesses about myself, that is (*καὶ*), there witnesses about me He who sent me—Father" (ver. 18); "If you do not trust I AM, you will die in your sins" (ver. 24); "When you have lifted up the son of man, then you shall know that I AM (is)" (ver. 28); "Before Abraham came into existence,

I AM (was) " (ver. 58). This frequent reference to God as I AM may have been with Jesus a habit of speech, especially resorted to on those occasions on which his use of the name Father for God, though not entirely new, may yet have given some offence to the orthodox. So the original of x. 30 may have been an explanation that "I (AM) and the Father" were identical, as in ver. 18 quoted above.

In chapter x. an exegetical difficulty might be solved by taking "door" to refer to God as I AM, and "shepherd" only to apply to Jesus himself; thus, "I AM (is) the door of the sheep . . . I AM (is) the door . . . I am the good shepherd . . . I am the good shepherd" (vers. 7, 9, 11, 14). This ambiguity in his use of "I am" makes the misunderstanding of some of the Jews, and apparently also of some of his disciples, all the more excusable. Similarly, "I AM (is) the way, and the truth, and the life" (xiv. 6), and he himself again is the shepherd leading them to it.

In chapter xi. "I AM (is) the resurrection and the life" (ver. 25) is a very suitable reminder in the circumstances of what the power of God is equal to. It may be, too, that the same reference is made in the following, "I (AM) will raise him up at the last day" (vi. 40), words which are significantly repeated again in verses 44 and 54. "Resurrection" was once taken as a name for God (Acts xvii. 18), and "Sons of the Resurrection" (Luke xx. 36) is perhaps just another way of saying, "Sons of God" (cf. Matt. v. 9). Besides, "I AM (is) the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He is not the God of dead but living" (Matt. xxii. 32 || Mark xii. 26; Luke xx. 37 f.) are words used in connection with the resurrection by "the power of God" (Matt. xxii. 29 || Mark xii. 24).

In chapter xiii. the concern of Jesus may have been, as it was on other occasions (see e.g. vi. 20, viii. 24, 28, quoted above), that a real living faith in God be sustained during the approaching trying experiences. "From now I tell you before it happens, that you may trust,—when it has happened,—that I AM (is)" (ver. 19). The Matthean form of the words of his disciples suggests that their point was that God would prevent such a catastrophe, "Is there not I AM, sir?" (xxvi. 22 || Mark xiv. 19); and that it was only Judas who put the personal question, "Am I he, Rabbi?" (ver. 25).

In chapter xv., "I am the true vine" (ver. 1), "I am the vine" (ver. 5), must remain as a reference of Jesus to himself. Since, however, this is an instance probably of the appropriation of language used in popular literature of the Wisdom of God to apply to himself, it is in a way intermediate between his use of "I AM" and the ordinary "I am."

In chapter xviii. Jesus at his arrest is represented as having two or three times uttered the equivalent Aramaic of *ἐγώ εἰμι*. On the first occasion (ver. 5) he seems to have intended to indicate that he was the person whom they wanted. This, or a repetition of it (ver. 6), seems to have been understood as a reference to the Divine name, "I AM (is),"—a reminder to bad men of the existence of God; hence the impression which made his would-be arresters go backward and fall to the ground. He repeated the words (ver. 8) to make his meaning clear (cf. ix. 9; Luke xxiv. 39). This is an excellent illustration of how easily the one use might be mistaken for the other.

In some passages of the Synoptics it is possible that Jesus' use of I AM may be traceable. "You are not the speakers, but the Holy Spirit" (Mark xiii. 11 || Matt. x. 20; Luke xxi. 15) in its Lukan form should probably be translated, "I (AM) will give you mouth and wisdom." Perhaps, too, "Look! I (AM) has given you authority to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and on all the power of the enemy . . . the spirits are submitting to you" (Luke x. 19 f.). So, "Many shall come in my name, saying, I AM (is)" (Mark xiii. 6 || Luke xxi. 8), may refer to an imitation of the style of Jesus, or if it could be read "in the Name," omitting "my," to the pious talk of really bad men,—not to a claim of Messiahship, as the Matthean version would have us suppose (Matt. xxiv. 5). Again, "I AM (is), and you will see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the Power, and coming with the clouds of heaven" (Mark xiv. 62 || Matt. xxvi. 64, Luke xxii. 69 f.), is a very pointed reminder to Caiaphas that God was ultimately to be reckoned with, and that finally he himself would have to appear before the popularly recognised vicegerent of God at the day of Judgment.

Further, the reference of Mark xiv. 28 || Matt. xxvi. 32 may be the same as that of John xii. 32, "And I,—if I am lifted up from the ground, *all* will I draw to myself"; thus, "But after I have been raised, I (AM) will lead you forth (from Jerusalem)

into Galilee," that is, "of the Gentiles" (Matt. iv. 15), from whence came probably the Greeks of John xii. 20,—hence on the road to a larger mission than hitherto. Blass's restoration of the first part of the fifth Oxyrhynchus Logion, "Wheresoever there are two, they are not without God," favours the rendering, "Where two or three have come together in my name (or, perhaps originally, 'in the Name') there I AM (is) in the midst of them" (Matt. xviii. 20). So, too, the final words of assurance that God would always be with His people, "And look! I AM (is) with you all the days till the consummation of the age" (Matt. xxviii. 20).

In a word, *ἐγώ εἰμι* represents in our records (1) the plain "I am," (2) the significant Divine name, I AM. Sometimes the hearers of Jesus hardly knew which he meant. Sometimes our translations have obscured the difference. Sometimes the reverence of the disciples may have unconsciously substituted the one for the other. Occasionally *ἐγώ* or *εἰμι* or the first person singular of a verb may now represent an *ἐγώ εἰμι* used for the Divine name, since sometimes in the LXX *ἐγώ εἰμι* is used ungrammatically for the longer form of the personal pronoun *אֲנִי*, e.g., in Judges vi. 18.

THOMAS WALKER.

REVIEWS.

Grammaire de L'Hébreu Biblique. By Paul Jouön, S. J. Pp. viii., 543, 80. Rome, 1923. 75 liras.

This new Hebrew grammar may be described, in comparison with Gesenius, as more of a student's manual and less of a book of reference. The author and the printers have combined to make it more readable than Gesenius-Kautsch. A minimum use is made of notes and small type. The whole treatment is based upon a knowledge of the Semitic languages generally, and frequent reference is made to them for purposes of elucidation. In the syntax the giving of examples *in extenso*, and not merely by reference to chapter and verse, is an admirable feature. In comparison with A. B. Davidson and Gesenius-Kautsch, much of the syntax is better arranged and more fully given (e.g. under the heading of temporal sentences). The syntax of the cases is brought together in one section with advantage. An attempt

is made to give rules for the use of the particle *אֵת*, and the rules for the order of subject and predicate are stated more fully and clearly than is usual. Perhaps the weakest part of the syntax is the section treating of final and consecutive sentences, about which much more can be said than is found in any of the three grammars that have been named.

The *Institut Biblique Pontifical* is to be congratulated upon the result of its enterprise. Père Jouön's grammar, issued under its auspices, will render valuable service to the study of Hebrew amongst French-speaking students, and may be used with advantage by those of other nationalities also.

W. B. STEVENSON.

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A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles.

By Rev. Walter Lock, D.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford. Pp. xlv. and 163. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1924. Price 12s.

A new volume in the International Critical Commentary may justly claim the character of an event, and if before it comes to a safe place in port there is some warping, and some wash of expectation and criticism at bow and stern, that is only what is due to its eventfulness. Prof. Lock's Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles will, we doubt not, assume a useful and important place as an addition to New Testament literature, having all the prestige which its position in an illustrious series and the ripe scholarship and broad evangelical and catholic sympathies of its author can confer. Of the last-named quality the dedication of the book *Joanni Chrysostomo, Hermann von Soden, Martino Dibelio, harum epistolarum interpretibus locupletissimis*, is a pleasing indication. That Dr. Lock's work will have to itself the whole field of the Pastorals is hardly to be expected, for besides the commentary of Dr. R. S. J. Parry English students now possess Dr. P. N. Harrison's *Problem of the Pastoral Epistles*, which on the question of the language, literary character, and authorship of these writings has thrown all other discussions into the shade. To the elucidation of the special problems treated by Dr. Harrison the new volume by Dr. Lock makes no contribution. The character under which

it must be appraised is simply that of a commentary, but here doubtless it will have its own honourable place.

Dr. Lock sees in the Pastoral Epistles primarily a practical purpose, an effort to build up the character of the contemporary Christian Church on a foundation of moral life which would attract the outside world to Christ. The Church was settling down to join in the life of the Empire, and the writer bases his teaching broadly on the moral principles recognised by the heathen world, that from this base the Christian community might go on to *adorn* the doctrine of its Lord and Saviour. This it must do by realising in life those new dimensions of faith, hope, and love, in which the power of the Incarnate and Risen Lord comes to expression. The Pastorals are primarily edifying treatises. Any value which they possess as reflections of, or contributions to, ecclesiastical organisation is secondary; this despite the fact that, as the Muratorian Canon rightly says, "in honore tamen ecclesiæ catholicæ in ordinationem ecclesiasticæ disciplinæ sanctificatæ sunt." While we may agree with this as a sound initial position, it is less easy to be satisfied with Dr. Lock's other initial postulate that the authorship question is quite subordinate. "I cannot but think," says Dr. Lock, "that by this time in the history of Christianity the question of authorship of almost any book in the Bible has become of only secondary importance." This may be true so far as the doctrinal foundations of the Christian religion are concerned, but it is doubtful whether such equanimity is compatible with a full degree of interest in New Testament science. Volumes have been written to show just why it is difficult, on linguistic, doctrinal, and historical grounds alike, to acquiesce in an open verdict on the Pauline authorship of these Epistles. Dr. Lock knows this work, but he is content generally with a verdict of *Non liquet*, and to take the Pastorals, provisionally at any rate, as "coming direct from St. Paul's hand," this being "what their author intended, whoever he was." We are not sure that the full obligations of a commentator can thus be written off.

With regard to the expository part of the work it is possible to speak in more unqualified terms of admiration. Dr. Lock is always clear, and his matter is always carefully chosen. The book abounds in excellent summaries, paraphrases, and renderings: the preacher who has not fallen into the habit of looking

always for the merely sensational will find abundant fructifying help and suggestion. Dr. Lock wastes no words, and he never forces his reader's judgment. He places before him the whole array of the evidence, contenting himself to mark the explanation which he prefers with a "perhaps" or a "probably." It is not possible, except in a few places, to indicate in a review the character of this sifting. He connects the "myths and genealogies," of which we hear so much in these epistles, with Jewish Haggadic speculations rather than with the Gnostic mysteries of æons, though what the precise character of these speculations was, and wherein lay the danger to Christianity, is nowhere clearly indicated. The *τεκτογονία* by which woman (Eve?) shall be saved (1 Tim. ii. 14) is not child-bearing in general, but the Incarnation, the child-bearing of Mary. The episcopal qualification "husband of one wife" (1 Tim. iii. 2) formulates or includes the Christian protest against divorce and remarriage, and is not pointed against second marriage *simpliciter*. The "antitheses" of "gnosis wrongly so-called," against which Timothy is to guard (1 Tim. vi. 20), refer not so probably to Gnostic anticipations of Marcion's famous attempt to set the Old Testament against the New as to the eternal casuistry of Jewish teachers of the Law: in this case Timothy is exhorted to teach, like his Master, with authority and not as the scribes. With regard to the use of *πίστις* in these epistles, Dr. Lock admits that in the Pastorals the term approaches more nearly than in the other Pauline letters to the meaning of "a faith professed and taught," but he thinks that the difference, though noteworthy, is "conceivable within St. Paul's lifetime and in his own writing." The emphasis on *καλὰ ἔργα*—a phrase not found in the other Pauline epistles—betokens the author's desire that the lives of Christians should be such as to attract pagan society to Christ, and this, says Dr. Lock, "would be quite natural to St. Paul, always insistent on the duty of his converts to the heathen world." At Titus ii. 13 Dr. Lock is in favour of referring the whole phrase "our great God and Saviour" to Jesus Christ: whether this ought to be done is, however, not quite certain, as we do not see why the natural construction of the sentence should not be "waiting for the appearing of Him who is the glory of the great God, even our Saviour Jesus Christ."

The book is without appendices, though it would not have been out of place if Dr. Lock had found time for some further treatment of the "myths and genealogies" which in the pages of these epistles are so constantly deprecated as contrary to sound doctrine. We would like to know how exactly these speculations formed a peril to the faith of the Christian communities. We should also have liked some special discussion of the "faithful sayings" or elements of creed latent in the contemporary Christian mind. Considering too that *θεός σωτήρ* occurs so frequently, some discussion of the contemporary ethnic religious bias would not have been irrelevant, and specially we should have welcomed some fuller note on Marcion's relation to these epistles.

But perhaps this is to expect too much. The thing that will be chiefly missed in an otherwise admirable commentary is some more thorough and serious treatment of the authorship question. Dr. Lock, while accepting provisionally the Pauline authorship, keeps open the other alternative that they are from the hand of a later Paulinist working on Pauline notes. But his openness on the question involves the disadvantage that he is not obliged to consider what portions of the Pastorals might, upon the second alternative, be ascribed to the apostle's own hand. Here is the point at which the new commentary is not sufficiently adjusted to Dr. Harrison's investigations. Dr. Lock is not whole-heartedly interested in the source-criticism of the Pastorals. He throws upon the student the load of deciding whether Dr. Harrison is right. We feel that this is asking too much of the average student. He will be apt to think that if it does not matter to Dr. Lock, it need not very much worry himself. It is hardly right to say that the authorship-problem is not important. It is important for St. Paul's sake, and it is important for our understanding of early Christianity after St. Paul. Thus Dr. Harrison has constructed a very strong case for showing that certain portions of the existing epistles, viz. (i.) Titus iii. 12-15, (ii.) 2 Timothy iv. 13-15, 20-21*a*, (iii.) 2 Timothy iv. 16-18*a*, (iv.), 2 Timothy iv. 9-12, 22*b*, (v.) certain other fragments of 2 Timothy, constituting a last letter of St. Paul, are genuinely Pauline. He has supported this theory on linguistic grounds, and by segregating and using these genuine personalia he has been able to throw a flood of light

on St. Paul's later years. Dr. Lock does not ignore these reconstructions, but he scarcely takes a sufficient interest in them. He feels that they leave difficulties, and this is right. Nevertheless in a commentary which will deservedly rank with the best English work on the Pastoral Epistles some fuller discussion of these matters might have been expected. It is to scholars like Dr. Lock that the student looks for guidance, and he will ask it on the authorship question as well as on those exegetical problems which the text raises, and on which this commentary is so excellently fitted to help.

W. MANSON.

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Essays in Early Christian History. By Elmer Truesdell Merrill. Macmillan & Co., London, 1924. Pp. viii + 344. Price 15s. net.

THE incursion of a classical scholar into the field of early Church History is an event as welcome as it is fruitful. On one hand, it is another very satisfactory sign that the artificial barriers between the "sacred" and the "profane" are fast disappearing; on the other, the professional classicist, experienced in the dispassionate handling of material containing no element of controversial challenge, can bring a careful knowledge of the environment in which the early Church had to live and grow, and at the same time give a valuable demonstration of scientific method in the examination of questions where the "ecclesiastical temper" is likely to misread the evidence and warp the conclusions. Professor Merrill's book both contributes to Church History and criticises its methods; his tone throughout is calm and courteous, even when he is exposing the prevalence and the hurtfulness of the "ecclesiastical temper" in professional Church historians. The truth of his gentle but thorough-going impeachment cannot be denied; the common opinion that ecclesiastical history is an "easy" and "soft" subject, requiring no special equipment to teach and no special effort to learn, is a hoary untruth which has kept Church History in a lamentably backward condition. It is hardly too much to say that no department of theological learning has made so little progress since the reformation. The work before us will go a long way towards stimulating the rise and development of a proper critical spirit, which will spare no pains in its search

for truth and in its utterance be hindered neither by fear nor by favour.

Professor Merrill's first chapter, "On Materials and Methods," ought to be read and digested by all students and teachers of the subject. Among other matters, his discussion of the possibility of discrimination between genuine historical tradition and mythical invention is particularly valuable, as much because of the object-lessons in this difficult art of diagnosing the legendary which he provides in almost every chapter, as from the fact that it is exactly this problem which confronts every honest student who attempts to unravel any problem in the history of the Church. The author's impartiality and integrity, a product of his training on the field of pagan learning, give each chapter a clearness of edge and point which are admirable; this learning and impartiality are perhaps especially prominent in the chapter (II.) which discusses the attitude of pagan Rome towards religion and religious cults. Religion being simply a political duty implying good citizenship, private organisations for supplying the more emotional and truly "religious" element were unrestrained as long as they neither shielded immoral practices nor encouraged political disaffection. Such *collegia* were either *licita* or *illicita*; if *licita*, they constituted juristic persons, could acquire and convey property, sue and be sued; if *illicita*, they were only unauthorised, not "illicit," in our sense. Within the first two centuries there are no valid indications of any interdict against Christian associations simply as being *illicita*. The Roman demanded no exclusive conformity, while Christianity did; their collision was inevitable, because the ideals of the State and of the Church were fundamentally incompatible.

After this general introduction, Professor Merrill examines several of the persecutions in detail. The pagan and the Christian accounts of the Neronian are excellently handled. The Tacitean account is judged "in every essential aspect trustworthy, though in some degree rhetorically elaborated" (p. 113). No allusion to this persecution is to be supposed in the First Epistle of Peter (p. 114); nor in *Hebrews*, nor, probably, in the *Apocalypse*; nor, too, in 1 *Clement* nor the *Shepherd*. There is no trace of early Christian tradition other than the vague reference to SS. Peter and Paul; the mentions in Melito

(possibly) and in Tertullian (certainly) are derived from Suetonius, and Professor Merrill thinks it incredible that the passage in Suetonius can have any reference to Christianity. Tacitus is then the only authority, and his account shows that the "persecution" was instigated by Nero simply to shield himself, and left behind it no such precedent and principle, as is often supposed, that Christians were henceforth nothing but "out-laws"; the persecutions under Domitian and Trajan are validly explicable on quite other grounds.

We pass over some valuable chapters on the later persecutions to come to one which is perhaps the greatest triumph of scientific criticism in the whole book, namely, that which denies any existence in fact to the reputed bishop Clement of Rome. Here, Professor Merrill's marshalling of the arguments is masterly, complete and—to our mind, at least—conclusive. The striking discrepancies in the pontifical lists and other traditions giving a place to Clement among the bishops of Rome antecedently testify to an uncertainty about him which is ominous. We have evidence of the existence of one Clement, contemporary of Hermas and clerk and secretary to the Church at Rome in charge of its foreign correspondence. The first ascription of the letter known as *First Clement* to an individual of that name is made by Dionysius of Corinth, as quoted by Eusebius. Irenæus does not say that the writer is Clement, but that the letter was written when Clement was bishop of Rome, the earliest extant mention of Clement as bishop. In Origen, we have the first definite identification of the writer with Clement, bishop of Rome, the Clement whom St. Paul addressed as resident in Philippi. Thereafter the identification is accepted and repeated, though "Clement, bishop of Rome" never emerges from his shadowy obscurity.

It must, I think, be granted that Professor Merrill has made good his case: Pope Clement must be dismissed from the list of Roman bishops, as being merely an *ad hoc* creation of the legend-monger. But there are questions raised by his re-dating of the "First Epistle of Clement" not far from the *Shepherd* of Hermas, or about 140 A.D., which cannot be adequately discussed here, though we ought to give Professor Merrill credit for presenting a very clearly arranged and impelling case.

The concluding chapter is one which will probably raise much

of that "ecclesiastical temper" which the author has so strongly criticised. It deals with the often-debated question whether or not St. Peter was ever in Rome and suffered there. If the historical statement be proved false, then obviously its theological corollary, the inheritance and transmission of the Apostle's spiritual power and authority to govern and direct the universal Church, must fall to the ground. The evidence for his visit and martyrdom there is twofold: there is the identification of Rome with the Babylon of *1 Peter* v. 13. This Merrill denies: "The interpretation of St. Peter's Epistle as dated from an actual Babylon is perfectly natural, and in itself unobjectionable" (p. 282); he explains the identification as the work of a myth-maker, desirous of bolstering up a historical speculation. Besides this, there is the "surely not altogether insignificant silence of the New Testament." The "fable which made St. Peter a founder of the Church in Rome" is due to Hegesippus alone; once introduced, it won acceptance on all sides, because it seemed to explain what was doubtful or unknown, and suited the purpose of the Roman Church, ambitious to obtain pre-eminence. Irenæus echoes the tale; Tertullian adds to it the story of the martyrdoms of both St. Peter and St. Paul in Rome, and from the latter half of the fourth century it has been held as the official view of the Church of Rome.

We believe that this is an unanswerable case; Professor Merrill has fully supplied evidence of the genesis and development of the story, and the motive he asserts for its acceptance and propagation bears manifest tokens of genuineness. That it leaves us in entire ignorance of the last days of the Apostle is in its favour, for one of the most obvious pretences of tradition is to leave no loose ends in our knowledge, but carefully to provide, or create, material to round off and complete that which has come down, in its authentic form, mutilated and imperfect. Future advocates of the theory that St. Peter visited Rome and died there will have to face the onus of using evidence which has been clearly shown to be late, motivated and progressively developing—all marks of myth.

This excellent work has laid all students of Church History under deep obligation. It reveals good sense and good feeling; it makes a masterly contribution to the study of problems which have for long been contentious and controversial; and above

all, it exhibits in a mature and inspiring fashion critical scholarship in action, using all its delicate skill for the discovery and chaste presentation of truth.

J. H. BAXTER.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

In *The Psalms of David* (Melbourne: Macmillan & Co., in association with the Melbourne University Press), Dr. E. H. Sugden, Master of Queen's College, has attempted an extremely difficult task. He translates the psalms as far as possible after their original strophic system, and translates them into rhymed English verse. He even manages most ingeniously to reproduce the acrostic form of psalms like the hundred and eleventh and the hundred and nineteenth. Dr. Sugden bases his criticism largely upon Dr. Briggs's edition, but he has more poetical feeling than the American scholar had. Sometimes he translates "Yahweh" by "Jehovah," sometimes by "Lord." The enigmatic term "Selah" is rendered "interlude." A fair specimen of Dr. Sugden's work may be seen in the opening verses of the acrostic hymn known as the thirty-fourth Psalm:

"At all times will I bless the Lord, and praise Him with unwearied voice;

Boasteth my soul in Him; O let the afflicted tell it, and rejoice. Come, magnify the Lord with me, exalt His name with cheerful noise.

Distressed in soul I sought the Lord; He rescued me from all my fears;

Eyes that were dim are gleaming bright; for God hath wiped away their tears."

The experiment is decidedly interesting, and behind it lies much study. Dr. Sugden writes, as he says, not for students of the original but for English readers, that they "may the better realise the infinite wealth of this treasure-house of devotion." Lyrics are an exacting test for the translator, especially when he adopts as here the modern rhyme-system, which was unknown to the Hebrews. Dr. Sugden has done wonderfully well in handling his material under this self-imposed limitation.

CURRENT ISSUES.

THE Master of Selwyn College, Cambridge, has published the Hulsean Lectures which he delivered six years ago. He calls them "The Goodness and Severity of God." They are issued by the Student Christian Movement, which published lately a large volume called "The Lord of Thought," by Miss Dougall and Mr. Emmet, on the apocalyptic and eschatological element in the teaching of the New Testament. Dr. Murray does not always agree with Mr. Emmet's elimination of that element from the vital Christian message, and gives reasons for differing. He does not admit that the apostles and evangelists are discredited because they mistook the date of the Last Day; he thinks that their conviction, which went back to Jesus Himself, did not involve a literal fulfilment.

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But this is by the way. Dr. Murray's earnest thesis is that the salvation of all men is the everlasting purpose of God. He does not feel attracted by conditional immortality. And an attitude of reverent agnosticism does not satisfy him in considering the fate and future of mankind. He desires a view which does not leave us "dumb before the most paralysing fears and the most stimulating aspirations of the human heart." So he argues acutely in favour of a final triumph of good over evil. "I believe," he says, "that Jesus spoke out of the fulness of His own heart when He said that no true Shepherd could rest as long as a single member of His flock was missing. I believe, therefore, that He will go on trying one method of approach after another, until He wins an entrance through all the doors that are closed against Him." And this involves a probation after death.

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Dr. Murray realises that he has to argue this in the light of
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the Bible. He is not content to utter pious hopes. The first of his lectures is entitled : "The Bible a living fountain of light on the mind and will of God." That is, he approaches the subject as "a convinced believer in the authority of the written Word, and in the presence of the Spirit of God with His Church in all ages to guide us into all the truth little by little as we are able to bear it." Now this raises a problem. How are these two convictions to be held together? The testimony of the Bible and the intuitions of conscience, or of the Church's consciousness—how are they compatible?

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Dr. Murray reminds his readers : (i.) that "to deny the validity of the veto of conscience on all that claims to come to us from God is to cut at the root of all faith in the inspiration both of the Bible and of the Church." (ii.) The verdict of the Church needs now and then to be revised, and revised in the light of fuller knowledge of what the Bible really teaches. (iii.) There is fresh light to come from the Bible itself. Or, as he prefers to put it, there is a "tremendous store of spiritual energy that is latent in the pages that we handle so casually." Dr. Murray thinks that we to-day are living in an age when such a fresh revelation of light and power is to be expected, in a "last time" or day of visitation." And on what more vital subject than the doctrine of the Last Things? His lectures were delivered towards the close of the great War, and they naturally bear marks of the strained atmosphere of that period, when the thought of immortality assumed special prominence. Five or six years have made a difference, however, in the mental atmosphere. The judgment of men is less apt to be affected to-day by the emotional tension under which these lectures were composed, or at least delivered. But the fundamental question of method remains : how is a fresh re-statement of any theological issue to be related to the authority of the Bible? This means the discussion of such ultimate questions as those of inspiration and authority. And behind these, behind other problems too, like that of the re-union of the churches, lies the deeper question of what is meant by development? It is time that some of these were brought into the open and discussed afresh. They are or ought to be living issues.

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Does every one know what a serviceable book eightpence will buy? Some do, but others, in the active service of the Church, may be still unaware of the small books issued by the S.P.C.K. called "Question Time in Hyde Park." The fifth series has just been published, edited by Professor Clement F. Rogers. Any one who has to deal with current religious difficulties ought to possess this pamphlet and its four predecessors. They give exactly the right answers to ordinary objections. The wisdom and knowledge which they put at the disposal of slower-witted Christians is something to be grateful for.

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This fifth series is devoted to questions about Christianity and Conduct. The questions are real. Now and then they are unfair, but they are invariably answered fairly. Sometimes the inquirer misunderstands because he has mistaken what was said by the speaker, and the result is amusing. Thus one man asked, after an address on the Divinity of Christ, "How can you say that the Iceni who fought with Queen Boadicea drew up the Nicene Creed?" But as a rule the queries are honest, intelligent expressions of perplexity.

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Sometimes, even on economic matters, they are prompted by an acquaintance with the New Testament. Most of us have at one time or another been taken to task on the parable of the labourers in the vineyard, for example. Were they treated fairly? Well, here is how this was dealt with in Hyde Park. One man asked: "Do you think it was fair that the labourers who worked all day in the vineyard should get no more than those who only did an hour's work?" The answer given was frank. "Quite. They got the fair day's wage that they bargained for. It wasn't the fault of the others that they only got an hour's work all day, and even if it was, the first lot were no worse off because the others had a stroke of luck. It was very natural, of course, that they should feel aggrieved. I can quite sympathise with them. I often feel like that myself, but I am not proud of it. It is an element in fallen nature that has to be corrected. The feeling that you are injured by other people's good fortune is a very contemptible one, surely."

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This fifth series is the last of these small books. Professor

Rogers hopes that they will be circulated, and it is a reasonable hope. They ought to be in the hands of all ministers and clergy who are in living touch with the outsider to-day. It is all to the good that people should voice their perplexities instead of suppressing them, and it is needful that ready answers should be forthcoming, so far as answers can be given. A set of books like this provides material which is apt, candid, and satisfactory. They represent the sifted experience of eight years' work in Hyde Park, dealing with the objections and inquiries of all sorts of people, and Professor Rogers deserves the gratitude of many for the skill and neatness with which he has conveyed his methods to his fellow-Christians.

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When Jesus was arraigned before the Jewish Council, two witnesses declared that they had heard him say, "I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to build it in three days," or words to that effect. The charge was deadly, and it clung to the minds of the Jews. They taunted him with it as he hung upon the cross. But what did the words really mean? The Jews took the saying literally, of course. But according to the Fourth Gospel it referred to the resurrection. "He spake of the temple of his body." Some hold it really referred mystically to the new Temple or Body of the Church which he intended to found, but the likelihood is that the interpretation mentioned in the Fourth Gospel pointed to the risen body.

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In the *Journal of Theological Studies* for July, Professor F. C. Burkitt offers another view. Neither the literal nor the Johanneine interpretation appeals to him. What Jesus had in mind, he thinks, was that "the requirements of true worship involve little material expenditure; if the Temple were to perish, the necessary arrangements for the sacrifices, for the services, for fencing off the Holy Place, for the organisation of prayer and praise, could be made in three days' time." In other words, all that Jesus meant was that the temple-organisation was needlessly elaborate.

THE SECOND COMMANDMENT.

WE can readily perceive the difference between this commandment and the first. That commandment stands on its own right, and ought to be understood by everybody. It demands faith in the ancestral God. A man or a community not worshipping God for His own sake will never give a worthy worship to secure any reward or to escape any punishment it may be possible for God to hold out. The second commandment is more difficult to obey, and therefore it has to be backed up by promises and threats. We have it given in much plainer language, and with much greater detail, for one thing, so that there might be no possibility of mistake. The lawgiver in Israel meant to run no risk of having this law subverted. Idolatry is a more prevalent crime than atheism or polytheism, with a peculiar fascination for a certain type of mind, and therefore it needs vigorous treatment in order to be suppressed.

The first commandment forbids the worship of any other God than Jehovah. That is not exactly the declaration of pure monotheism, although it is very much on the way towards it. It is very difficult to dogmatise on a matter like this, but it seems as if it was only in the times of the prophets that monotheism could have been propounded as the faith of Israel or could even have had sufficient footing to have had this commandment addressed to Israel. It is directed against a very human tendency. The beginnings of Hebrew religion were in polytheism and idolatry ; Abraham, for example, was called away from a life of heathenism, and told to go and find a new land and a new God far from his father's house. It is quite easy to see in the later history of Israel, in the Ephod and Teraphim, the brazen serpent and the bull, that traces of this idola-

trous origin remained in the religious life of Israel, and that it took centuries of discipline and education to root it out. The characteristic of primitive life is the belief in the multiplicity of spirit-influences. All nature is regarded as being animated by the same kind of spiritual life as that of man. The distinction between the divine and the human, the human and the animal, the animal and the plant, is one of degree and not of kind. Men can be raised to the rank of divine spirits, divine spirits can come down to earth and walk about in the garden, a spirit can dwell in a river or a stone, and do good or harm to you, as you placate it or annoy it. There is no doubt that Hebrew religion began somehow like that, and it took centuries before it recovered from the effects of its origins. But by the time that clear history began to be written, Israel had gone much further. Some of the spirits, for one reason or another, had been elevated to divine rank, and now the separate nations were beginning to have their own Gods. And this is where another human tendency comes in. The primitive mind finds it a great advantage to believe in a number of Gods; if one God won't give you what you want, then another God may. It is always an advantage to have some Gods in reserve that you can fall back upon. Religion is almost entirely a question of give and take. There is very little question of loving God; it is mainly a question of getting the aid of His power to help you to live.

The second commandment is directed against another human tendency which is, however, bound up with the first. It forbids the worship of God under the form of any material likeness; it forbids the making of any image or idol or picture either as an object of worship or as an aid to worship. If anything, this is an even bolder demand than the first, and strikes even more deeply into the instincts of the human heart. It was a direct challenge to all the

religious customs of the time. Israel had been reared in idolatry. She had just been delivered from a nation whose religion was idolatrous to the core, both in the form of human images, and even more characteristically in the form of animal images. Israel was crude and unformed when she went into Egypt; she was positively heathenish and idolatrous when she came out. She was going into another land which was equally defiled with idols; in fact, even more so, since the Baal and Ashtarte images in Canaan were nearly all cruel and obscene. We may even say that there was hardly a nation alive at the time that did not reveal the same tendency. When Jehovah made the demand of Israel that she should not represent Him in image or idol, He asked her to do one of the hardest things that has ever been asked of man.

The first commandment is, on a superficial study of it, more justifiable than the second. Many different kinds of religious experience and many different kinds of research have contributed to the notion of the unity of God. Some educated men and women are atheists; they do not believe in the existence of God. Some educated men and women are agnostics; they preserve an open mind upon the subject of the nature of God. But no educated men and women are polytheists; they do not believe in a multiplicity of Gods. This belief in monotheism has become part of the common stock of the human mind. Israel, more than any other nation, by her intense moral faith in Jehovah, has made monotheism commonly accepted among all people. Even she had to go through fire and blood in order to discover it, and to keep it when once discovered, but the gratitude of all the nations of the earth ought to be given to her for making sure the unity of God. Science and philosophy may both leave the existence of a creator very uncertain, but neither science nor philosophy will endure the thought

of a plurality of creators. Every new discovery, every new phase of philosophic reasoning, goes but to make more sure the thought that the world is a unity, created and fashioned and governed by one all-pervading mind and purpose.

But it is by no means so easy or so justifiable to condemn the making of material images, which are used by millions as an aid in the worship of the deity. Why it should be condemned is, for many people, very difficult to see. God is hard to understand. The idea of His spirituality is hard to grasp. Just as the child expresses its inborn maternal instinct by lavishing its love upon a doll which is taken to be a baby, so many adults find it very natural to show their affection for an image or a picture which is taken to be the symbol of the deity. Just as a mother will clasp the photograph of her child to her breast and cover it with her kisses, although she knows that it is nothing but a piece of cardboard and chemicals, so many find it an aid to devotion to offer their prayers before the crucifix or before the picture of our Lord, although they know quite well that the object before them is only wood or stone or paper. The pure spirituality of God is, without doubt, the conception of Him that all educated people have in their minds, but the heart of very few of us keeps pace with the head, and to worship in thought a being who is absolutely formless, and without the power of appearing to the physical eye, is a task too difficult for a good many people. And so multitudes have found it an aid to devotion to use some material object, not as an object of worship, but as a symbol, which can make the personality of God more real to them, control their wandering thoughts, and secure their complete interest. It may be a religious attitude with which we do not agree, but it is assuredly one deserving of our sympathetic study.

It may be a strange thing to say, but historical research

seems to prove it, that idolatry, strictly so called, is by no means universal among primitive peoples, and, in fact, that it is not strictly accurate to speak of it as primitive at all. It has been a favourite theory, often revived in the history of religious thought, that, at the beginning of human history, man had a pure and spiritual idea of the deity which had been given to him by direct revelation. Then, when his lofty ideas changed through a moral fall, he began to make God more real to himself by making images of Him in human likeness. In process of time these images ceased to be regarded merely as symbolic, and began to be regarded as shrines of the real divinity, and worship began to be paid to them. The theory does not meet the facts of the case. Idolatry is not the result of a fall : it is rather the result of a rise. Man had to be advanced a fairly long way in the scale of culture before he could be "idolatrous" in the strict sense of the term. Idolatry is not necessarily found among primitive peoples. It is unknown in early India, China and Japan, and in each of those countries we have to come far down in the history of culture before we find clear traces of it. Among the ancient Semites, Romans, and Greeks, it was absent. Among many savage peoples to-day, who have only the merest rudiments of culture, idolatry is absolutely unknown. Primitive man is animistic rather than idolatrous. Idolatry is an example of the tendency to localise the deity, and that is one of the sure signs of a progressive civilisation, although it is one that must be grown out of.

Another fact is this, that nearly all the great historic religions of the world have, in some of their branches, compromised their spiritual conceptions in this matter of idolatry. Judaism and Mohammedanism have both waged a ceaseless warfare against idol manufacture and worship ; but in nearly all the other religions, deliberate and continued

attempt has been made to set forth the fundamental facts of the faith in the form of pictures and images. The reason in the case of some religions is obvious. Christianity, for example, depends upon certain historic facts—the birth; life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, together with many incidents which go to make up the life. The first aim in Christian propaganda is to make real the facts about Jesus Christ, in order to make Him a living person to the listeners. The first thing that a Christian missionary did in Asia Minor in the first century, was to tell the people about Jesus Christ; it was historic facts, first of all, which he attempted to make plain, and, from those facts, was built up the religious life of the believer. The first thing a Christian missionary does to-day is to tell the people about Jesus Christ, what He did and said, how He lived and how He died. The savage mind, and often also the civilised mind, is very like that of a child; it sees ideas best when it can see them in the form of pictures. That is why we put pictures of Jesus on the walls of our Sunday schools. That is why we send pictures out to Africa. There are many reasons which have led to something very like idolatry in the Christian Church, but one of the chief among them is the intelligent and worthy intention of making the life of Jesus real in picture form. Art and religion have always gone hand in hand. The noblest art has always been religious. And it is a tendency of which the whole history of the race tells us to be beware, that when art is religious, it soon becomes idolatrous.

In the Puritan times in Israel, just as in the Puritan times in England, this commandment was taken quite literally. It seems that until the time of King Hezekiah, idolatry was practised without any rebuke, except in occasional outbursts, but, later on, the law against images was carried out mercilessly. This commandment was taken by some

as forbidding not only idolatry as such, but all art and painting of any sort whatever. And it is remarkable that the contribution of Semitic religion to the artistic world is almost negligible. When God chooses out a nation for one great purpose, other powers seem to be neglected. The Old Testament is quite proof enough of the religious and poetic genius of Israel, but her poverty in painting and sculpture is one of the wonders of the world. Semitic religion in general, even though it gave remarkable emphasis to the strictly ethical aspects of life, was lacking in beauty, imagination and sympathetic power.

The place of art in the expression of religious thought and feeling in the Christian religion is one deserving of study. The earliest examples of it are to be found, not in houses, not even in houses set apart for the meeting of Christians in worship, but in burial places. Often, of course, the painting there is merely of a decorative kind, due to the very natural desire to beautify the resting-place of a beloved friend. But quite often there were added paintings of a definitely religious significance. The figure of Christ appears very often, even in the first and second centuries, generally in the form of the Good Shepherd or as the performer of miracles. In the second century, paintings appear of the twelve with Christ seated at the table partaking of the Last Supper, showing that Christian art was becoming of a more theological character. But for a long time there was a strong feeling against art in the Christian Church, owing partly, perhaps, to the influence of Jewish feeling, and partly to the natural desire not to contaminate Christian buildings with pictures which showed any connexion with the often immoral art of the Greek world. So long as Christianity was making its fight with paganism and the Roman Empire, so long did it keep its worship pure, and refused to have anything to do with any art that ran the danger of being

idolatrous ; but when Christianity became the official religion of the Empire, and pagan philosophy began to show itself as an interpreter of Christian truth, then the veneration of images began.

The fact that idolatry has been of such prevalence in the history of religion, and has made its influence felt even in such spiritual religions as Judaism and Christianity makes very necessary the careful study of it, in order that we may discover its cause and cure. That it is natural can be proved quite easily from the fact that Israel did not keep this commandment. Indeed, it would have been remarkable had it been otherwise. Their traditions told them of so many wonderful things in their past history that it is only natural that they should endeavour to express them in the form of art. These historic facts, and particularly the deliverance from Egypt, were as sacred to the children of Israel as the events of the life of Jesus are sacred to us, and just as we have expressed the inner truth of our religion in the crucifix which some have printed on their Bibles or wear upon their watch-chain, in the halo which some painters make to encircle the head of Christ, in the monuments to the saints and the statues to the Virgin, so the Jews, without the slightest thought often that they were running the danger of committing idolatry, made statues in bronze and gold, to set forth in the Temple the great historic facts which had rescued them from servitude and made them free. The outstanding fact in the Exodus was not that Israel was delivered from the power of Egypt, but the fact that she was delivered from the power of sin and heathenism. It was the first great bid made in the history of man for the pure worship of God, with the prohibition of nature-worship and the immoral practices which went hand in hand with heathenism. But hardly had they been delivered from Egypt, and even while Moses was still

receiving the commands of Jehovah on the mount, while the wonderful works of their newly-found God were still in their minds, they turned their faces towards the past, and made a golden calf which should be to them the symbol of their invisible king. And many times after that, Israel found the purity of her faith too much for her, but each time, eventually, the better feeling of the nation manifested itself and the idolaters were made to pay dearly for their crime. Israel learned by bitter experience that Jehovah was a jealous God, who made the people pay hard and long for any violation of His revealed law.

H. J. FLOWERS.

THE TEN BEST BOOKS ON THE LIFE OF JESUS.

MODERN criticism set out to discover the historical Jesus. When the cry of "Back to Christ" was first raised, it was felt that the course of theology had been directed into a plain and simple path where it would be scarcely possible for it to miss the way. After the wearisome intricacies of the Christological debate, it seemed such a simple thing to turn to the New Testament and take a stand upon the facts of history. What could possibly be clearer, it was felt, than the portrait of Jesus drawn by the Evangelists in the Gospels? Yet when the experiment came to be made, it was soon found that the hopes of the optimists who had promised a simple and speedy reconstruction of faith on the basis of historical fact were doomed to swift disillusionment. The controversy about the facts and their true interpretation has been quite as acute as any controversy in the past about the metaphysical explanation of the person of Christ. The quest for the historical Jesus in modern times has been quite as hard and elusive a task as the quest for the Chalcedonian formula in the fourth century. It is only necessary to follow the record of recent investigation in such books as Weinel's *Jesus in the Nineteenth Century*, or Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, to understand the nemesis which has fallen on the heads of the theologians who thought they were setting the Church a school-

boy's task when they urged it to seek the solution of its problems in the historical Jesus. The gulf that separates the Christ of Arius from the Christ of Athanasius, or the Christ of Luther from the Christ of Calvin is insignificant compared with the chasm which divides the Jesus of Harnack from the Jesus of Schweitzer, or still more the Jesus of Bousset from the Christ of Feine and Forsyth.

The first thing therefore that has to be said is that no satisfactory life of Jesus exists. Modern scholarship has failed in its objective. It has not produced a classic biography of Jesus. The highest praise that can be bestowed on the best modern attempts is that they are tentative experiments and that they succeed in illuminating some aspects of the immortal story. Matthew Arnold once said that "Jesus was above His reporters." He is certainly infinitely greater than any of His modern portraits.

The failure of modern scholarship may be illustrated by the experience of Dr. Sanday. Dr. Sanday set before himself as the goal of his life work the production of a biography of Christ. And he only succeeded in achieving two or three volumes of *Prolegomena* and an *Outline*. And we are still to-day, more or less, in the "*Prolegomena*" and the "*Outline*" stage.

The difficulty of course lies in the fact that the modern criticism of the New Testament has raised so many problems, and until some general agreement is reached with regard to their solution it is impossible to reconstruct the details of the history of the life of Jesus. Our attitude to the sources and the amount of credibility which we attach to their statements must inevitably affect our judgment and decision. And we have not yet even formulated any objective canons of historical criticism which will enable us to gauge with any exactitude the data presented to us in the four Gospels. The subjective judgment and feeling of the historian are almost always the controlling principle and the final court of appeal. And in the case of Jesus this must always be so. In the realm of history—and this is pre-eminently true in the case of its greatest personality—there are no such things as bare facts. The very statement of the fact is necessarily an interpretation of it. And the consequence is that we have, and are bound to have, different schools of thought, each with its own point of view and its own attitude to the facts. This

is true of course even of our canonical gospels—each of which is an interpretation and not merely a record of the life of Jesus.

We need not be surprised therefore if modern criticism has thrown up the most diverse accounts of Jesus. To Drews and Kalthoff, for instance, He is a mythical figure, created by the fortuitous concourse of the religious and philosophical forces of the time. To the authors of *The Beginnings of Christianity* He is a great Jewish Rabbi with intense moral insight and fervour and a wide human sympathy. To most modern scholars of the Liberal School He is the supreme exponent of spiritual religion and the moral ideal. To others He is pre-eminently a social reformer. To one school of thought the significant fact lies in the Incarnation, while to another it is to be found in the death upon the Cross; Johannes Weiss and Schweitzer claim that the significant point in His teaching lies in His apocalyptic vision of the Kingdom. And all these presuppositions necessarily colour the efforts of these writers to get at the facts. What we find therefore, in most modern Lives and interpretations of Jesus, is a partial and onesided view of the historical data. Few modern scholars seem to have avoided the intellectual mistake of taking a fraction of the truth and stating it as if it were an exhaustive statement of the whole truth.

Other attempts fail because they divorce criticism from faith or faith from criticism. There are some critical examinations which compel one to ask, Could these dry bones have ever been endowed with life? There are other works which, in spite of the faith and devotion that characterise them, fail to carry conviction because they rest on insecure foundations.

The conclusion to which we are driven therefore is that *every minister and theologian ought to construct a life of Jesus for himself.*

There are, it seems to me, three necessary qualifications for such a study.

(1) A man must have a background of personal faith. Every man finds in the Gospels the Christ of his own experience. "As a man is, so he sees." The defect in many modern lives of Christ is that they are written without real spiritual appreciation. Spiritual facts can only be spiritually understood. And it is for this reason that I find Papini so stimulating. His critical basis is often unsound—and I have to put notes of interrogation on almost every page—but he makes Jesus live again, and I feel

that in spite of his manifest defects and limitations he has given me a new vision of Christ.

(2) A man must also have a background of critical knowledge. Faith may become credulity if it is not tempered by scientific knowledge. It is necessary to be able to appraise the value of the sources and to apply historical tests to their statements.

(3) A man must have too a philosophical and theological background which will enable him to face the fundamental problems which confront him at almost every point of the story, and which the usual canons of historical research are quite inadequate to solve. His attitude to the miracles will be determined in the long run not by the material evidence but by his general conception of God and the Universe.

Granted the existence of these three qualifications without which nobody is properly equipped for the task, how is the student to begin his work and what materials is he to use?

I. He cannot begin the task *in vacuo*. He must first of all make himself familiar with the work of his predecessors in the field of study—the pioneers and pathfinders who have already surveyed the ground and broken up the soil. The two most helpful books on this part of the subject have already been referred to—Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, of which an excellent translation by Montgomery exists under the title *The Quest for the Historical Jesus*, and Weinelt's *Jesus in 19. Jahrhundert*, which has also been translated and expanded by A. G. Widgery, though it should be stated that the translation is very often inaccurate and unsatisfactory. Sanday's *Life of Christ in Recent Research* is also valuable, though it is slighter and less comprehensive.

If I had been asked to enumerate the epoch-making books on the Life of Jesus—the books which have left their abiding mark upon the history of thought—the task would have been comparatively easy. I should have selected the following:—

- (1) Strauss (both the earlier and later editions of the *Leben Jesu*).
- (2) Schleiermacher's *Leben Jesu*.
- (3) Renan's *La Vie de Jésus*.
- (4) Keim's *Jesus of Nazareth*.
- (5) Schenkel's *Das Characterbild Jesu*.
- (6) *Ecce Homo*.

- (7) Bernhard Weiss' *Das Leben Jesu*.
- (8) Edersheim's *The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*.
- (9) Réville's *La Vie de Jésus*.
- (10) Holtzmann's *Das Leben Jesu*.
- (11) Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*.

If I had wished to extend this list I should have included the lives of Jesus by Neander, Ewald (in vol. 6 of the *History of Israel*, E.T.), Didon, Pressensé and Farrar. The books I have selected represent the most important of the modern schools of thought. All of them make important and vital contributions to the subject, and if we apply to them the dictum, "Theologians are generally right in what they affirm and wrong in what they deny," we shall find that not only are they indispensable to our purpose but that they throw the most brilliant light upon the particular aspect of the life of Jesus which they seek to emphasise. Treated with discrimination the exhaustive and monumental work of Keim is of invaluable service to the modern student.

II. Most of the preliminary studies which are necessary to this investigation fall outside the scope of this article, and need only therefore be briefly mentioned. As an Introduction to the critical study of the sources Burkitt's *The Gospel History and its Transmission* is, for our purpose, *facile princeps*. It would be very useful to study some book on the principles of historical research, e.g. Langlois and Seignobos' *Introduction to the Study of History*. For the environment of the life of Jesus there is much valuable information in Edersheim's *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, though he is often tempted to make use of material which belongs to a later date. Montefiore's *Synoptic Gospels* is of the utmost importance on this point and on its positive side displays remarkable insight. The two volumes of I. Abrahams' *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels* contain a mine of useful information. Schürer's *Jewish People in the Time of Christ* and Bousset's *Die Religion des Judenthums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter* are of course the standard authorities on this part of the subject. T. Walker's recent book on *The Teaching of Jesus and the Jewish Teaching of His Age* gives an excellent summary of the facts.

III. The next stage will be the study of the different portraits of Jesus drawn by the New Testament Evangelists. There are

two useful books in English on the Marcan picture. (1) W. H. Bennett's *The Life of Christ according to St. Mark*, which has as its main purpose "to present the impression of Christ which would be derived from St. Mark's Gospel by a reader who had no other source of information."

(2) J. M. Thompson, *Jesus according to St. Mark*, which confines its discussion mainly to the teaching. Thompson pays a striking tribute to the historicity of the narrative. "The more one studies this early record, the more convinced one becomes that it is a true biography in which no essential part of the figure has been left out and nothing is obviously disproportionate or out of drawing."

If we go further afield, the following books have an intimate bearing on the subject: M. Goguel's *L'Évangile de S. Marc et ses rapports avec ceux de Mathieu et de Luc*; Wellhausen's *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*; J. Weiss, *Das Aelteste Evangelium*.

Another fresh and stimulating book which has won high commendation from Dr. Rendel Harris—J. A. Findlay's *Jesus as they Saw Him*—gives an account of the portraits drawn by Matthew and Luke as well as that drawn by Mark. It needs to be read *cum grano salis*, but the discriminating student will find many valuable hints in it.

IV. In the next stage of the process it will be necessary to face the problems which the Gospel narrative raises. There are several books which deal with these problems as a whole. Among these I should give a high place to Fairbairn's *Studies in the Life of Christ*, because, though it addressed itself to the situation in 1880 and very much has happened since then, it contains a great deal that is relevant to the issues that confront us to-day. These *Studies*, as the author himself says, are not intended to be "exhaustive and critical discussions on the Gospel History, but, at most, attempts at orientation—at reaching points of view from which the life of Christ may be understood and construed." Still more important are Weizsäcker's *Untersuchungen ueber die evangelische Geschichte*, which, though it was first published in 1864, is still essentially modern in its method of investigation, and the interesting discussions in Von Soden's *Die wichtigsten Fragen im Leben Jesu*. Mention should also be made of Otto Schmiedel's *Die Hauptprobleme der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*, and Barth's *Die Hauptprobleme des Lebens Jesu*. Of

the problems in detail, nothing need be said here either on the question of miracles or on the issues raised by the Teaching of Jesus because they are the subject of special articles. Of the other problems, probably the most important is concerned with the psychological study of the mind of Christ. The questions that it asks are: What were the motives that actuated Jesus? What were the guiding principles that shaped His life-purpose? What was it He set out to do? What place did He assign to Himself in the fulfilment of the design? Until some answer has been found to these questions, the facts in the Gospel narrative are a series of unrelated events without any unifying purpose behind them.

Modern literature on this theme is immense, and it is only possible to mention the most outstanding books. In English we have Garvie's *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus*, which sets out to determine "the mind, heart and will of Jesus as revealed in His words and works." Much of Denney's *Jesus and the Gospel* is occupied with the same theme, especially the chapters which deal with the "detailed study of the earliest sources as illustrating the self-consciousness of Jesus." There are valuable discussions on the leading points in Lake and Foakes Jackson's *Beginnings of Christianity*, though the conclusions which they reach are mainly negative. But it is on the Continent that the most striking contributions have been made. Baldensperger's *Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu*, first published in 1888, opened a new era in the study of the theology of the Gospels. Its main theme is that the Messianic consciousness of Jesus had its foundation in a pure spiritual unique sense of communion with God and developed through several stages before it reached its final climax. The most notorious—because the most advanced—treatment of the subject is found in W. Wrede's *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien* (1901), which maintains that "The Messiahship of Jesus as we find it in the Gospels is a product of Early Christian Theology correcting history according to its own conceptions." The most valuable criticisms of Wrede are to be found in Oscar Holtzmann's *Das Messianitätsbewusstsein Jesu* (1902), and in a little book of Schürer with a similar title.

The eschatological outlook properly falls under the Teaching of Jesus, but the subject is of such vital importance in every attempt to reconstruct the life of Christ, that some reference

must be made to it in the present connexion. The modern debate has very largely turned upon the place of Apocalyptic in the vision of Jesus. On the one extreme we have E. Haupt and Wellhausen, who think that the references to the Parousia are later additions to the text of the Gospels and had no place at all in the original Teaching. On the other extreme we have Johannes Weiss and Schweitzer who think that from first to last the mind of Jesus was dominated by these ideas. The former view has been strongly advocated by Emmet and Dougall in their *Lord of Truth*, which is an attempt to reconstruct the life of Jesus and restate His teaching on the assumption that the position of Haupt and Wellhausen is established. Both extremes seem to me to be untenable—but there is no denying the fact that in this matter we are confronted with the most intractable problem in the Gospel narrative. One of the most helpful books on the subject is von Dobschütz *The Eschatology of the Gospels*, which attempts to give a mediating explanation; Charles's Jowett's lectures on *Eschatology*, and Leckie's *World to Come and Final Destiny* are indispensable to every student who is anxious to investigate this question.

There are two other issues upon which a man who essays the task of writing a life of Christ must come to some decision. The one is the question of the Virgin Birth, the other is the question of the Resurrection. Both fall under the head of miracle and come within the scope of another article. But they are too important to omit altogether when we are dealing with the literature of the life of Jesus. On the Virgin Birth the best books on the negative side are Lobstein's *Virgin Birth of Christ*; Soltau, *The Birth of Jesus Christ*; Cheyne, *Bible Problems*; and H. Usener's article on the *Nativity* in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. The best books on the positive side are those of Box, Thorburn, Knowling, and an article by Bishop Gore in his *Dissertations on the Incarnation*. In the case of the Resurrection the negative side is best represented by Schmiedel's article on the *Resurrection and Ascension Narratives* in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. The most notable attempts to find a natural explanation of the narrative are described in the *Lives of Christ* by Strauss, Renan and Keim. There is a good discussion of the various views in the relevant chapters of Fairbairn's *Studies* and Bruce's *Apologetics*. One of the best defences

of the orthodox position is in Schwartzkoff's *Prophecies of Jesus Christ*. Another book of great value on this side is Loofs' *Die Auferstehungsberichte*. Milligan's *The Resurrection of our Lord* used to be a standard authority on the subject, but is scarcely adequate for the modern discussion. Lake (*The Resurrection of Jesus Christ*) attempts to take up a mediating position, but the tendency of the book is in a negative direction.

The problems of chronology present very serious difficulties. The best modern treatment of the data is, I think, to be found in C. H. Turner's article on *The Chronology of the Gospels* in Hastings' Bible Dictionary. There is a valuable discussion of some of the main points in Sir W. Ramsay's *Was Christ Born at Bethlehem?* Hort's note on John vi. 4 also contains useful material from Patristic sources. Wieseler and Clinton are still the standard authorities on the subject, and Chwolson's *Das letzte Passamahl Christi* contains useful material for one of the most important problems.

V. So far I have assumed that our life of Jesus is to be constructed out of the Synoptic Gospels. But we are bound to deal with the problem of the Fourth Gospel. We cannot avoid facing the question—Is the Fourth Gospel entirely the romance of an idealist? Granted that its main purpose is theological and apologetic, yet it contains many historical elements, some of which have parallels in the Synoptics. What value is to be attached to the historical framework and how far are we justified in using its material for our purpose? Can we adopt, as so many writers do, its chronological arrangement? Can we trust its statements about the early ministry in Jerusalem? What about the date of the Crucifixion? Personally I think that a very strong case can be made out for a discriminating and scientific use of the historical data in the Fourth Gospel, but it is difficult to find a satisfactory winnowing-fan which will enable us to sift the wheat from the chaff with anything like conviction or precision. The literature on the subject is immense. The matter is discussed with more or less acumen in most of the Lives of Jesus. E. F. Scott's *The Fourth Gospel*, though it deals mainly with the discourses of Jesus and the theology of the Gospel, contains much that is valuable for enabling us to approach the problem. Spitta's *Das Johan. Evang. als Quelle der Geschichte Jesu* is a very valuable contribution to the question.

Wendt's book on the Fourth Gospel is of vital importance. Armitage Robinson has an excellent article on the *Historical Character of the Fourth Gospel* in "Cambridge Biblical Essays" (pp. 251-328). Askwith's book on *The Historical Value of the Fourth Gospel*, takes up a strongly conservative position. Garvie, in his *Beloved Disciple*, tries to untwine the different strands in the Gospel in order to reach the elements of objective historical value, and his book is very suggestive on many points. Schmiedel, in his *Johannine Writings*, takes up a negative position. Drummond's *Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel* is particularly useful because it faces the question of historicity very frankly, though it accepts the Johannine authorship.

VI. We have now reached the point at which, having cleared away the preliminary difficulties and come to some decision on the debatable problems, and having collected our materials from the Gospels, we are able to construct an outline of the life of Jesus. Fortunately modern scholarship has produced a large number of outlines and short sketches to help and guide us.

Schweitzer has told us that "the ideal Life of Jesus of the close of the nineteenth century is the Life which Heinrich Julius Holtzmann did not write, but which can be pieced together from his commentary on the Synoptic Gospels and his New Testament Theology." We might parody that statement and say that the ideal "Life" for us at the same period is the Life which W. Sanday did not write but which is known to us from his *Outline*, his critical studies, his Bampton Lectures, and his volumes of *Prolegomena*. The *Outline* was originally an article in Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible, and it is probably still one of the best things of its kind. It discusses, briefly of course, but still with masterly ability, all the main points of interest, and in spite of the compression of style inevitable under the circumstances, it envisages with great clearness and lucidity and many gleams of insight the outstanding problems of the Gospel narrative.

Another article of great value is to be found in the Dictionary of Religion and Ethics by W. Douglas Mackenzie, which certainly deserves to be reprinted.

Quite one of the best modern Outlines is Piepenbring's *Jésus Historique* recently translated under the title *The His-*

torical Jesus. Originally in its first form it was intended to be a reply to Loisy, but in its later edition the controversial element became less pronounced and the positive statement more definite. In its concluding chapter it contains a very valuable comparison between Jesus and Laotze and Epictetus, under the title "The superlative Value of the Gospel of Jesus." I venture to prophesy that Piepenbring in its English dress will secure popularity and leave its mark on religious thought in England. Another book to which I should assign an even higher place in the hierarchy of this literature is Bousset's *Jesus*, which almost deserves to be regarded as a classic, though I am by no means prepared *jurare in verba magistri* or to accept anything like all Bousset's conclusions. There is a strong emotional element in the book which rises at times to real devotion and which finds its culmination in the concluding words, "we who occupy our place in the history of Jesus through the centuries can still feel his presence near us, with his trust in God and his nearness to God, his relentless moral earnestness, his conquest of pain, his certainty of the forgiveness of sins and his eternal hope."

To these I should add C. Anderson Scott's *Dominus Noster*, which an eminent theological scholar told me recently he regarded as the best modern presentation of Christ, and T. R. Glover's *Jesus of History*, which has secured a wider vogue than any book on this subject since Farrar. Then there is Dr. Stalker's excellent little handbook for the use of Bible Classes. Dr. Stalker is one of the men of our time who might have written a really great Life of Christ, as this Handbook and his *Imago Christi* prove. I remember how long years ago, when I was a student at Mansfield College, Oxford, Dr. Fairbairn once set one of the members of his Seminar—I think it was Sylvester Horne—to write an essay on the contrast between *The Imitatio Christi* of Thomas à Kempis and Dr. Stalker's *Imago Christi*, and it was this discussion that first brought home to me the difference between the mediæval and modern conceptions of Christ.

There are several books of this type which have aroused some interest in America. The most important are B. W. Bacon, *Jesus the Son of God*; Rush Rhees, *The Life of Jesus of Nazareth*; and E. D. Burton and Shailer Matthews, *The Life of Christ*, arranged for the use of Bible Classes.

I ought also certainly to have included Loisy's *Jésus et la tradition primitive* in this list, because it gives a general summary of the position which he reaches in his larger book on the Synoptic Gospels, and P. W. Schmidt's concise *Geschichte Jesu*.

VI. We now reach the final and most difficult stage of all—the attempt to reconstruct a full and detailed biography of Christ. And it is here that the failure of modern scholarship is most obvious. As Dr. Sanday confessed, “To write the Life of Christ ideally is impossible. And even to write such a *Life* as should justify itself either for popular use or for study, is a task of extreme difficulty. After all the learning, ability and even genius devoted to the subject, it is a relief to turn back from the very best of modern *Lives* to the Gospels. And great as are the merits of these modern works there is none which possesses such a balance and combination of qualities as to rise quite to the level of a classic. What is wanted is a Newman with science and adequate knowledge. No one has ever touched the Gospels with such innate kinship of spirit as he: The ideal Life of Christ demands sound scholarship, passionate faith, and supreme literary genius. And one of these three qualities is always lacking and often two of them. Renan, for instance, to quote Sanday once more, “had all the literary gifts, a *curiosa felicitas* of style, an æsthetic appreciation of his subject and a saving common-sense which tempered his criticism. But even as literature his work is spoilt by self-consciousness and condescension and his science was none of the best.” Most *Lives* of Christ are too conventional—they are simply a modern *Diatessaron* of the four Gospels with a more or less accurate attempt to envisage the atmosphere and circumstances of the times. They are useful enough in their way for popular purposes and in their day have exercised an enormous influence. I refer to such *Lives* as those of Farrar, Geikie, Pressensé, Didon and David Smith. But they leave practically untouched the great problems raised by modern criticism and are totally inadequate to the modern situation. I say this in spite of the fact that in my early days I owed a great debt to Farrar for his vivid and graphic pictures of the scenes in the Gospel story. R. J. Campbell might have written a much more valuable book if he had been able to give more time to the subject and had not been compelled to allow the “homiletical method” to predominate

"in the treatment of the contents and the principles governing their selection."

On the other hand the critical *Lives* of Jesus are, generally speaking, too cold and unconvincing. As I read them I feel anew the force of the plaint which Browning in his *Epilogue* puts into the mouth of Renan about the paling of the Star of Faith and the dimming of the Face of Christ.

"Who failed to beat the breast
And shriek and throw the arms protesting wide
When a first shadow showed the star addressed
Itself to motion and on either side
The rims contracted as the rays retired ;
The music, like a fountain's sickening pulse,
Subsided on itself ; Awhile transpired
Some vestige of a Face no pangs convulse,
No prayers retard : Then even this was gone,
Lost in the night at last."

Modern criticism in its radical form has overreached itself, and it has left the figure of Jesus so thin and attenuated that it affords no explanation of the origin of the Christian Church or the great experience of redemption. But the last word does not lie with radical criticism but with faith ; and as Christians we are bound to subscribe to Browning's confident prophecy—

"That one Face, far from vanish, rather grows,
Or decomposes, but to recompose,
Become my universe that feels and knows."

The signs of the decomposition are writ large in radical criticism from Strauss to Lake and Foakes-Jackson. What indications are there that the process of restoration has commenced ? I regard Headlam's *Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ* as the most notable contribution to the subject in England within recent years. It is incomplete, being, as the author says in the preface, only "a fragment of a large design." In so far as it is polemical it is directed against the school of thought which holds that "the greater part of the contents of the Gospel tells us not what Jesus taught but what the Christian Church, which grew up after His death, thought." The general conclusions which Headlam reaches are (1) That the subject matter of the Synoptic Gospels represents the traditions about Jesus which were current

in the earliest years of the Christian Church. (2) That it harmonises with what we know of the conditions and circumstances of the time. (3) That the teaching of Jesus is harmonious throughout. (4) That the narrative of the life of Jesus forms a consistent whole. The book does not deal at all with the Birth narratives, and breaks off at the commencement of the last journey to Jerusalem. It is greatly to be hoped that Dr. Headlam's episcopal duties will not prevent him from finishing a work which is a real contribution to the subject.

The best German critical *Life* is, I think, that of Oscar Holtzmann, which has fortunately been translated into English. One of the strong points about Holtzmann's book is that the polemical element is kept in the background. What Holtzmann sets out to do is to reconstruct the life of Jesus in the light of the results of modern criticism. Much of his detailed examination of the narrative is sound and illuminating. His weakness lies in the fact that he does not recognise any redemptive element in the generally accepted sense of the term—in the work of Jesus. Apart from this serious limitation, the *Life* is extremely valuable—in fact it may be said to be indispensable.

I think that probably the best attempt to reconstruct the life of Jesus in Germany is D. A. Schlatter's *Die Geschichte des Christus*, which is really intended as an introduction to a New Testament Theology, because it supplies what is lacking in Holtzmann. Schlatter sees that the Gospels cannot be isolated from the rest of the New Testament, and that no *Life of Christ* is satisfactory which does not provide in His Person an explanation of the later experience of the Christian Church. Hence he regards the preaching of the Kingdom and the death upon the Cross as the two outstanding events in the Gospel narrative. Unlike Holtzmann, Schlatter frankly abandons any attempt at chronological arrangement and is content to discuss the events without trying to fit them into a chronological framework. After the negative efforts of so many modern scholars, it is refreshing to find that it is possible to make, what must be regarded as a conservative reconstruction, on the basis of sound criticism.

Among the writers of the last generation a high place must be assigned to the *Life* by Bernard Weiss. It takes up a mediating position, though inclining to the conservative point of view. "Moderately orthodox" is the description which Wein

gives to it. It certainly does not deserve the scathing criticism which Schweitzer has passed upon it.

Now we come to the almost impossible task of selecting the ten best books out of the mass of material at our command, a great deal of which has had to remain unmentioned in this article owing in part to the lack of space and in part to the writer's ignorance.

We must make the list as representative and catholic as possible and not fall into the mistake of choosing only the *Lives* that are more or less in agreement with our own point of view.

We must start the list with a book that will form a fitting introduction to the investigation, and of those that are available, Schweitzer seems to me to be the best, though it is always necessary to remember that his estimates are biassed by his own particular theory and that he weighs everything in the scales of Apocalyptic. Weinel is a good second and might stand as an alternative.

Of all the books that have been written in English on the subject, there is only one that can claim to be a classic—*Ecce Homo*. *Ecce Homo* is not technically speaking a *Life* of Jesus at all. But there is so much first-class material in it that I think it ought certainly to have its place in our list.

Then I think we should do well to find room for two outlines or sketches, and it seems to me that Sanday and Bousset will probably be the best selection, as they represent different schools of thought. I should place Piepenbring *proxime accessit* and possibly as an alternative for Bousset.

We ought also to have a book which deals specifically with the problems connected with the *Life* of Jesus, and probably Fairbairn will do as well as any.

Of the larger *Lives*, Headlam must certainly have a place in the list, and I think Oscar Holtzmann and Schlatter as well.

For the fourth place I hesitate between Keim and Bernhard Weiss, but I think it will be wise to choose Weiss lest our list should seem to be overweighted on the critical side.

For the last place I want to select a different type of book. None of the *Lives* in our list so far kindle the emotions or set the heart aflame with love and adoration, and none except Schlatter and Weiss emphasise the redemptive activity of Christ. But such a book is difficult to find. With some hesitation I select

Papini. If Denney's *Jesus and the Gospel* had been a Life of Christ, I should certainly have included it, but it does not belong to this category at all. The Life of Christ can only really be written by a "twice-born" man, and Papini certainly is that. He is a child in matters of criticism; in fact his general bent is anticritical. But he makes Christ live as few others do. The ideal *Life*, it seems to me, would be a fusion of Papini and Oscar Holtzmann. But at present that kind of fusion has not taken place. The discords are more apparent than the harmony, but out of these discords a harmony will eventually ensue.

Here then is the final list. It is inadequate and unworthy of the great figure of the Christ, but it is the best that I can make.

A. An Introductory Study :—

- (1) Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*; or Weinel, *Jesus in the Nineteenth Century*.

B. A Classic Exposition :

- (2) *Ecce Homo*.

C. Two short outlines :

- (3) Sanday, *Outline of the Life of Christ*.
 (4) Bousset, *Jesus*; or Piepenbring, *The Historical Jesus*.

D. A book dealing with the problems :

- (5) Fairbairn, *Studies in the Life of Christ*; or Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*.

E. Four larger Lives :

- (6) Headlam, *The Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ*.
 (7) Oscar Holtzmann, *The Life of Jesus*.
 (8) Schlatter, *Die Geschichte des Christus*.
 (9) Bernhard Weiss, *The Life of Christ*.

F. An Emotional *Life* :

- (10) Papini, *The Story of Christ*.

HERBERT T. ANDREWS.

EARLY CHRISTIAN REMINISCENCES OF JESUS.

WRITING recently upon the accuracy of the Gospels, I had occasion to urge the ability of memory to report in reliable fashion upon events and sayings after a space of years. Even if no contemporary records were made of the life of Jesus (which, however, I regard as an extremely improbable supposition), the general correctness of the narrative can still be maintained. But the same fact of memory is of importance in considering the question of the genuineness of the Christian tradition in other ways also, and it should be of value, therefore, to take a wider survey of the subject.

One or two actual examples of the possibilities of memory may usefully preface such a study. Mr. G. W. E. Russell, in *Collections and Recollections*, mentions that his uncle, Lord John Russell, visited Napoleon at Elba in 1814 and had a long interview with him, some points of which are there given; further, his father remembered meeting as a boy an old Highlander who had been "out" with the Young Pretender in 1745. Mr. Russell died in 1919, which means that details of the appearance or utterance of these men might quite possibly be preserved with substantial correctness, not by writing but by transmitted memory through a period of over 100 years and 170 years respectively, with but one connecting link in the one case, and but two in the second. One can quite sensibly conceive of a "Life" of either of these men being added to or modified accurately in some slight degree by information so gleaned—Napoleon's aphorism on war, for example, might well be included on such evidence alone: "Eh bien, c'est un grand jeu—belle occupation." Mr. Russell also gives a number of other interesting links with the past, amongst them being that of a lady who saw Robespierre executed in 1794 and "dis-

tinctly recollected the appearance of his bandaged face ” ; as she did not die till 1886, many must still be living who heard her narrate her reminiscences, and it is therefore entirely possible to think of an account of that event being written to-day—130 years later—yet giving in substance an eye-witness’s account, though without any documents behind it. These are extreme cases, of course, but they should suggest the ease with which memory can bridge a generation or two without being of necessity at fault.

It may be thought needless to argue thus, but these considerations seem to me to be commonly ignored in modern critical studies. Foakes-Jackson and Kirsopp Lake devote a large amount of space in *The Beginnings of Christianity*, to demonstrate the rapidity with which legendary accretions gather round great personalities—dealing elaborately and surely at undue length with the stories of St. Francis and of Margaret Catchpole. I am far from denying the growth of Saga, but I would urge that the other side of the question needs to be remembered also, and these and other writers appear to undervalue it. To hold a just balance between the influence of authentic memory and the presence of baseless myth is no doubt difficult and we shall all differ in our conclusions, but to underrate the former factor is certainly as great an error as to neglect the latter and it may have more fateful consequences. Similar facts to these I have quoted respecting longevity and memory are cited by Gregory in his *Canon and Text of the New Testament*, but only with reference to his argument that the statements of Irenæus and others regarding the origin of the canonical Gospels are worthy of credence. I feel they have a much wider significance.

In addition to the point referred to at the beginning of this essay, there are at least three ways in which this question of memory is of importance for a critical investigation into

the life of Jesus. It may well have a bearing upon our study of the Synoptic Problem, of the manuscript and patristic variants of Gospel texts, and of the extra-canonical sayings ascribed to Christ or details added to the story. I do not for a moment imagine that it can solve any of these enigmas, but that it can contribute something of value towards our thought of them is perfectly clear.

There is first of all, then, the very real possibility that the facts which constitute the Synoptic Problem are in some part due to this cause. The retentiveness of Eastern memories was, of course, a main bulwark of the oral theory of the origin of the Synoptics; it is impossible to accept that solution of the complicated matter, but I believe it is a mistake to ignore the possibility that a clash of rival memories enters into the question. Stanton¹ says: "To the present writer it seems that no form of the oral hypothesis can furnish an adequate explanation of the phenomena of the Gospels; yet he believes that the influence of the period of oral teaching needs to be taken into account, in dealing with the whole problem of the origin of the four Gospels, far more than it commonly is by the adherents of the various documentary hypotheses." One reads discussions of the subject which almost appear to be based on the creed that no one had any accurate recollection of the life of Jesus except Peter (more or less faithfully reported by Mark), and the authors of Q and Luke's "special source" (adopting conventional descriptions). Surely it is more reasonable to suppose that each of the Gospel writers or editors was in touch with partially divergent traditions of the events and teachings recorded. Remember Paul's interesting statement that one of the Resurrection appearances was to "five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain unto this present" (1 Cor. xv. 6), words

¹ Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. ii., p. 238.

written at the time when the Synoptics were in process of formation. We must therefore allow for the possibility of "doublets" creeping in—even into Mark; were there two desert repasts or have two variant reminiscences of the same incident been included? And it is entirely probable that modifications may have been made here and there in the story by the first and third evangelists, as they worked over Mark's narrative, in consequence of meeting with other lines of tradition; since they did not scruple to make large insertions of matter not dealt with by Mark and to alter his order very considerably, it is quite likely that some of the little changes introduced into the stories which they borrowed from him are due to the same cause and not merely to sheer carelessness or literary fastidiousness.

Such variant traditions may have grown up in different places as a result of the visits of different apostles or other disciples, and become part of the regular instruction of the local churches. J. A. Robertson has some interesting and quite feasible suggestions upon this point in *The Hidden Romance of the New Testament*, where chapter vii. deals with those "eye-witnesses from the beginning" to whom Luke refers in his Preface; he shows reason for thinking that the evangelist was indebted to Silas, Philip and his daughters, Mnason, and Manaen. It would have strengthened his case to have mentioned Eusebius' statement that the daughters of Philip "transmitted stories of the old days." But I would go further than this and urge that the cause of some of the variations between the Synoptics is to be found in the impact of some divergent personal reminiscences upon a more or less established tradition. For example, may not the compiler of "Matthew" have heard Salome (or an intimate of hers) acknowledge her share in the ambitious request of her sons? And may not Luke have altered Mark's statement as to the place where

Bartimæus was healed in consequence of information received from some acquaintance—an eye-witness perhaps—whose memory he felt he could trust? Surely this is a more natural explanation in such cases than the “sloppy method of writing” theory commonly advocated.

It is, of course, in the teaching rather than the narrative parts of the story that variations due to memory are most likely to be found. If the Gospels had been written in entire independence this would not be so, for incidents would naturally be told not only in different language but from different stand-points and with different stress, whereas the use of Mark as a groundwork by the other two largely prevented such divergence. In the case of the teaching, however, two considerations suggest the likelihood of greater variation. In the first place, the parables and brief pointed utterances were as a rule spoken in the hearing of crowds and therefore likely to be remembered by many and in slightly different language, while the incidents frequently were known only to the few. And secondly, there is the very big probability that many of the words of Jesus were spoken on more than one occasion and not in exactly the same form each time; every teacher repeats himself—in fact it is a mark of the good teacher so to do. There has surely been inadequate recognition of this by scholars. Plummer,¹ for example, half timidly considers the idea that the Lord’s Prayer was taught more than once; should not our point of view rather be that it is almost impossible to suppose such instruction was not repeated? And again, is it not natural to think that its form would vary somewhat on different occasions, since it must have been the method of prayer that Jesus was anxious to impart and not a precise form of words to be invariably followed? Discussion as to whether Matthew’s form or Luke’s is the

¹ Hastings’ *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. iii., p. 141.

more original seems to me therefore entirely beside the point. So with much of the Gospel teaching; variations may be due to careful memory rather than to careless method. It is refreshing to find Holdsworth¹ suggesting that the three varying forms of the Parable of the Mustard Seed point to three different sources, though he does not make it clear whether or not he thinks (as is entirely possible) that it was told at three different times.

In all these ways then the factor of memory appears to me to enter into the Synoptic Problem. This does not simplify the puzzle but rather makes it more complex, which, however, may be a gain if it prevents us from trying to analyse the Gospels into their constituent fragments and to assign its relative worth to each. I doubt if such efforts are really profitable; they tend to make Bible study a question of dissection rather than of devotion, and to lessen the sense of general reality and spiritual truth which is of much more vital consequence than the exact measure of historicity in every detail.

The second way in which the question of memory requires to be considered is its bearing upon textual criticism; many variations of Gospel passages found in manuscripts and Early Church writings are best explained by this factor. If many folks in the first century retained memories of Jesus, and transmitted them with even moderate accuracy to their children and acquaintances, surely it is only to be expected that the second century should be a time of much floating tradition—in some part legendary, in some part authentic—and that many well-founded variants should make their way freely into copies of the Gospels and other early books. The wonder is not that such variants are found but that there should have been so little recognition of the likelihood that some of them are probably based on accurate reminiscence.

¹ *Gospel Origins*, p. 98.

It has commonly been admitted that some alternative readings may have come from oral sources, and very occasionally even that such sources may have been well informed. I urge that the real possibility of this should be more carefully considered in all cases, except where other known causes of variation have clearly operated. The fact that a corruption of the original text may be historically a correction because a better reminiscence of what actually happened is seldom stated ; if criticism could give us an absolutely correct transcript of the original text, we might conceivably miss many points both of interest and of actual fact.

Further, it must never be forgotten that scanty evidence and a late date for the appearance of a variant are no proof that it does not embody true memory. A sixth century manuscript may have copied an improvement made in one of the second century by the grandson of the person involved. The famous anecdote of the man working on the sabbath is a case in point ; it has no witness but D, yet it is accepted as a substantially true story by most people. And why not ? Of course, scores of other hypothetical explanations are possible to account for the solitary reference to it.

An interesting quotation from J. H. Moulton¹ may be made here ; "Those who lived in the early days were constantly meeting witnesses who could add to their collection of the Lord's words. . . . It was not till the eye-witnesses had passed away that our Gospels were compiled out of the mass of material to which St. Luke's first words and St. John's last bear eloquent testimony. For another century or two we see floating scraps from this tradition. The problem of the so-called "Western Text" is itself evidence of the unsettled state of the gospel tradition in days when so much survived from the first age, which had

¹ *A Neglected Sacrament*, p. 70.

not been incorporated in the Church's authoritative documents."

A few examples of textual variants in which memory may well be involved is all that is possible here. Mention was made above of the differences between the versions of the Lord's Prayer given in the first and the third Gospels, and the probable reason for them. It is not surprising to find that there are yet other differences found occasionally elsewhere; the most interesting of these is the beautiful petition, "Let Thy Holy Spirit come upon us and cleanse us," which is [found in several manuscripts and early orthodox writings as well as in Marcion, substituted either for the first or for the second petition. It is not unreasonable to think of it as included in the Prayer by Jesus Himself as He taught it on some other occasion than those recorded in the Gospels.

A quaint instance is Justin Martyr's citation of a familiar text in this form: "I give unto you power to tread on serpents, and on scorpions, *and on scolopendras*" (*Dialogue with Trypho*, ch. 76). It is commonly agreed that Justin was in touch with other traditions than the Synoptics, and this may be an addition due to someone who heard Jesus speak. The scolopendra, or centipede, let us say for the benefit of those who have no Dictionary or Natural History at hand, may well have been meant to represent the tiniest forms of sin, as the serpent and scorpion the largest and more ordinary respectively. In that case the promise is of complete supremacy over evil—however big and powerful, however commonplace and persistent, however subtle and insidious.

One of the most interesting and important passages in the New Testament is the great intercession, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" (Luke xxiii. 34). The marginal note in the Revised Version to

the effect that "some ancient authorities omit" these words has no doubt perplexed and perhaps worried simple readers. Those who are qualified to weigh the evidence for and against the authenticity of the passage are almost inevitably impressed by the array of adverse witnesses and compelled to admit that Westcott and Hort were right to bracket the verse with the comment, "We cannot doubt that it comes from an extraneous source." The Revised margin is felt to be mercifully but unwarrantably mild. The point should not be missed, however, that the same editors are confident this extraneous source was trustworthy and that the saying is authentic—"Few verses bear in themselves a surer witness to the truth of what they record." In other words, we can properly regard this as a case of someone's accurate reminiscence but not one made use of by Luke. I think, however, we can go further than this. In the *Clementine Recognitions*, vi. 5, there is this odd statement: "*When He was being led to the cross by those who knew Him not, He prayed the Father for His murderers, and said, Father, forgive their sin, for they know not what they do.*" Unless this is a very strange case of faulty memory it surely means that there was a well-established tradition that Jesus prayed thus at the time of the crucifixion, but also a measure of doubt as to exactly at what point, which is quite what we should expect in view of the fact that probably none of His friends were present and that the report of the saying must have come from those who at the time were amongst His foes.

We come then to our last point, the bearing of this idea of reliable memory upon the uncanonical words attributed to Jesus and of other details added by early writers to the story. These sayings are technically known as the *agrapha*, and the study of them overlaps the previous discussion slightly, such a saying as that to the sabbath-worker

obviously ranking as one of them, although it is involved in textual criticism in a way most of them are not. The extra information occasionally found in ancient books is commonly spoken of as apocryphal tradition; the Apocryphal Gospels themselves hardly require to be considered, though even there at times a detail claims attention as quite conceivably coming from some reliable source.

The almost entire neglect of such possibilities in works like Burkitt's *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, Evelyn White's *The Sayings of Jesus from Oxyrhynchus*, and Findlay's *Byways in Early Christian Literature*, in spite of the great value attaching to each of these books, makes one feel the inadequacy of much modern criticism. The impression one gets, whether or not it is intended, is that almost everyone in the first two generations of Christians was extraordinarily credulous and exceptionally careless except just the two or three mainly responsible for the production of the earliest records.

It is refreshing then to come upon some recognition of the real importance of this uncanonical matter. Preaching on one of the papyrus Sayings, J. H. Moulton ¹ said: "When we think of those three years which were so crowded with teaching, whereof a mere fraction is preserved for us in the Gospels, and think, moreover, how many thousands heard the great Teacher speak, and passed on to their children and grandchildren the well-remembered sayings which fastened on their memory, our wonder must surely be that so few traditional words of Jesus have come down to us." And upon the question of the authenticity of the Oxyrhynchus Sayings he urges: "That He really uttered the sayings ascribed to Him in this fragment I cannot doubt for a moment."

Another interesting passage may be quoted from Cobern's

¹ *A Neglected Sacrament*, p. 81.

*The New Archæological Discoveries*¹: "Men talked as much and wrote almost as freely in the first century as now. The words and acts of Jesus made a great stir, and therefore hundreds of people either took notes on the spot, or in after years talked with those who had seen the events. Local incidents were remembered best and were naturally exaggerated. . . . Would not the grandsons of the man who was born blind or who had been healed of a withered hand tell about this? Justin Martyr and others may have had good authority when they gave the names of these men and told their trade, and gave also the names of the two thieves on the cross, and of the centurion who had charge of the crucifixion, and of the soldier who pierced the side of Jesus. . . . When Clement of Alexandria quotes Jesus as saying, "Ask great things and the small shall be added unto you"; when Origen quotes Him as saying, "For those that were infirm was I infirm, and for those that hungered did I hunger, and for those that did thirst did I thirst"; when the Gospel of the Hebrews puts in His lips the words, "Never be joyful except when ye have looked upon your brother with love"; when the Acts of Philip reports Him as saying, "If you do not make your low things high and your crooked things straight, ye shall not enter into My kingdom"; and again, "He who longs to be rich is like a man who drinks sea-water, the more he drinks the more thirsty he becomes, and never leaves off drinking until he perishes"; these may represent possibly valid historical memories carried down by oral tradition from the earliest times."

The apocryphal details and uncanonical sayings quoted in this passage are fairly typical of the matter we are considering. It will probably be felt that the former are unimportant though they undoubtedly lend colour and

¹ P. 243 (fifth edition, 1921).

verisimilitude to the narrative; the agrapha, however, are surely of evident worth, and the point that must be made clear is that those cited have no higher claim to authenticity either on the ground of source or of sense than dozens of others. If there is a reasonable likelihood that somebody's remembrance of what Jesus said has salvaged each of these from the mass of lost sayings, there is equally good ground for supposing that a very considerable treasure-store of such things can and should be rescued for popular use.

The last of the five agrapha quoted is attributed to Jesus in a Mohammedan work, and is one of many such; the question of their origin and authenticity requires a special study for which there is not room here. Dr. J. Rendel Harris dealt with it to some extent in the *EXPOSITOR* in August, 1918. To me it appears that a particular application of the thought upon which this essay is based is involved and that we should not just rule out all such as worthless because of their strange venue. Islam in early days won many adherents from amongst Christians who lived in lonely corners of Arabia where genuine traditions of Jesus might still linger.

Sufficient has probably been said to suggest that this whole subject has higher claims to consideration than has commonly been admitted. And if the objection is raised that it seems to be a question of probabilities rather than of certainties, the answer must be made that on the purely historical side of things this must frequently be so, but that a consensus of probabilities often amounts as near to practical certitude as it is possible to reach.

RODERIC DUNKERLEY.

THE RELATION OF PENTECOST TO THE FIRST COMING OF CHRIST.

I HAVE often felt that one of the most widespread and disastrous errors in Theology is due to the confusion of thought which surrounds the subject of the Advents of Christ, and the relation between what is called His First with His Second Coming.

It is not so much argued as taken for granted, that while He was exercising His ministry in Palestine, His First Advent was already an event of the past, and that His frequent allusions to a future coming must necessarily refer to a Second Advent, which, in this year of grace 1924, is in the future still.

Yet it is, I think, demonstrable beyond all question that when the disciples asked, "What shall be the Sign of Thy coming?" they regarded His First Coming as still to take place. "Art thou he that cometh?" asked St. John the Baptist. The idea that He had already "come," that He was about to disappear and would then come again a second time, never crossed the minds of His followers. It was with a feeling of dismay that they learned that His coming would be a manifestation to them, and not to the world generally. "Lord, what is come to pass that thou wilt manifest thyself to us and not to the world?"

It has been widely assumed that they considered that their Master had come already, that they understood that He was shortly to be separated from them, and that they asked when they might expect Him again after the time of separation was past. It is quite clear that, in the light of what followed, people have read into their words a meaning which simply could not have been theirs.

What they did expect was that, without leaving them,

He would, in some signal manner, manifest Himself in all His power in the eyes of the Hebrew people, and that, convincing them of the truth of His Messianic claims, He would ascend the throne of His father David, and restore again the Kingdom to Israel. "When," they asked in effect, "will thy mission reach its climax, when all will see and believe?"

What has not been sufficiently recognised is that, before Jesus Christ could come to the world as Son of Man, He had to come to the Jews as their Messiah. The larger Mission lay hidden in the narrower one, as the flower lies latent in the yet unburied seed. It was "to all the people," i.e. to Israel, that the herald angel brought the glad tidings at Bethlehem. He was born "under the Law," and the vast, infinite love of the eternal Son of God was cabined, cribbed, confined in its application and expression by the Law's separating restrictions. His mission in the flesh was strictly limited. He was "not sent save to the lost sheep of the House of Israel." Nor would He, during His earthly ministry, allow those limitations to be overpassed by His disciples. "Go not," He said, "in the way of the Gentiles and into any village of the Samaritans enter ye not, but go rather to the lost sheep of the House of Israel."

That Jesus Himself felt acutely the necessary restrictions of His Commission on the active going forth of a love that embraced all mankind is very strikingly shown by the words He spoke when certain Greeks came to Philip at the feast saying, "Sir, we would see Jesus." Their request brought on Him prematurely the pangs of the Crucifixion. In that hour He realised that only by His death as a Jew could He free Himself from the hampering restrictions of the Jewish Law. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, except a grain of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone,

but if it die, it beareth much fruit" . . . "Now is my soul troubled; and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour? But for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name. . . . And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." The same thought underlies His words towards the close of His ministry. "I have a baptism to be baptized with, and how am I straitened till it be accomplished."

Nothing but His death as a Jew would break down the separating barriers of the Law and rend the veil, and bring Him into saving contact with all. So by His Crucifixion He blotted out the restricting bond written in ordinances that was against the Gentiles and, to use the magnificent rhetoric of St. Paul, He took it out of the way "nailing it to His Cross."

On Palm Sunday, in the fulfilment of prophecy, He entered Jerusalem as King. He was crowned and enthroned a few days later and the great words written over Him "*This is Jesus, the King of the Jews.*"

Till He had died as a Jew, His coming to the whole world as Son of Man could not take place; therefore, while He frequently calls Himself "Son of Man," He invariably speaks of His "coming" in that capacity as an event of the future. In the Body which He took of the Virgin Mary, "made under the Law," it was impossible.

But "the Law hath dominion over a man only while he liveth." By dying Jesus Christ became free from the Law and broke down what St. Paul calls "the middle wall of partition." The Messianic mission was one of the things completed by the great cry from the Cross.

For His wider mission to the whole world as Son of Man, He needed a Body which could be diffused throughout the world, a Body in which He could be active in a thousand places at once and which could live from age to age.

It was in His mystical Body and on the Day of Pentecost that His First coming as Son of Man to the whole world took place. As He became incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and took from her the Body in which He discharged His earthly ministry, so on Pentecost He became incarnate by the Holy Ghost in His Body the Church.

It is altogether a mistake—though a very common one—to speak or think of the Holy Ghost as the substitute for an absent Christ. He is, on the contrary, the living Medium by whom Christ, according to His promise, came.

“I go away and I come to you” (R.V.). I go beyond the reach of the bodily senses that I may come to you by the pathway of the Holy Spirit. The close and essential connexion between the Ascension and the coming of the Holy Ghost is as remarkable as the close and interchangeable connexion between the coming of the Holy Ghost and the coming of the Christ to the whole world as Son of Man.

“If I go not away, the Holy Ghost will not come unto you . . .”

“A little while and ye behold me no more, and again a little while and ye shall see me.”

Before the Holy Ghost could be given Jesus had to be “glorified.”

“The Holy Ghost,” says St. John, “was not yet given because Jesus was not yet glorified.”

“He shall glorify him *in himself* and shall straightway glorify him.”

“And now, O Father,” He prayed, “glorify thou me with the glory that I had with thee before the world was.”

Let us ask then, what did that glorification mean?

Surely it could mean nothing less than this. Receive My human spirit into full and complete union with God

the Holy Ghost, that in His coming I may come, and in His abiding I may abide.¹

So, if we ask, what happened at the Ascension, we should say that with their bodily eyes the Apostles saw Him raise His hands to bless them, that while He blessed them a mist or cloud gathered round Him, and then—like a cloud of steam on a dry day—it passed, and from the sense-world He was gone.

But if our thoughts—like the Apostles’—gaze steadfastly into Heaven ; not “up into Heaven,” but “into Heaven” (R.V.), into the place where they saw Him disappear, into the inner world into which He had gone, they may reverently behold how God glorified Him “*in Himself*.”

It was in truth, “the taking of the Manhood into God.” It was the Assumption by the Holy Ghost of the human spirit of Jesus, and of all that belonged to that perfected Manhood. Thus it was through the Holy Ghost that the Son of Mary reached the throne of Godhead, through the Holy Ghost that He became incarnate in His Church and through the Holy Ghost that He makes us one with the eternal Father and one with one another.

“I in them and thou in me, that they may be one in us.” He comes to His followers now as then, approaching them from within, from the spiritual side of their being, by the way of the Holy Spirit. True, because our eyes are still turned towards the material world, He, by the same Holy Spirit, assumes a sacramental Body, and approaches by the way of the senses ; but that sacramental approach—precious as it is—is temporary, “till He come,” and after the manner of a reflection as when a friend approaching from behind is seen in a mirror as though approaching from the front. The eyes of the friends really meet, and when

¹ See an interesting article on “The Theology of the Holy Spirit,” by the Rev. W. S. Bishop, D.D., in the *EXPOSITION* for April, 1917.

in the mirror the friend appears to arrive He is really there, and we may say, like Browning in his poem about the coming of the unseen friend,

“Hush, I pray you,
What if this friend happen to be God?”

At Pentecost, then, and in the lifetime of those who heard Him speak, and before His disciples had gone over the cities of Israel in the way of preparation, the great First Coming of the Son of Man took place. But it was indeed a coming “with clouds”—and we may remark in passing that clouds are invariably in Scripture meant to conceal, not—as is generally assumed—to reveal. The world was blind to that Coming. *It* could not receive Him because it saw Him not, but His disciples saw. In the Coming of the Holy Ghost the human spirit of Jesus came, and in the indwelling of the Holy Ghost they found within themselves in all His love and power the Master whom they had followed and loved and worshipped.

Brooding over His Church and dwelling in it, He controlled and directed the actions of His followers.

Cf. “They assayed to go into Bithynia; but the Spirit of Jesus (R.V.) suffered them not.”

He was near them before; now, as Faber so beautifully says, He was not far enough away to be near.

At the cost of some repetition, let me shortly sum up what, so far, I have tried to show.

Jesus Christ came first to the Jews as their promised Messiah—the Son of David. As such He was circumcised and made obedient to the Law, with all its separating restrictions.

Cf. “It is not lawful for a man that is a Jew to come unto one of another nation.”

Accordingly, He recognised that, during the days of His flesh, His mission was limited to His own nation.

Yet He spoke the words of eternal life, and His love embraced all mankind. As Son of Man He longed to break down "the middle wall of partition," and to take out of the way the handwriting of the ordinances that was against the Gentiles.

To accomplish this He recognised that there was only one way. The Law only had dominion over a man while he lived. He must die as a Jew if He would "draw all men unto Him."

His rejection as Messiah and His Crucifixion were in the providence of God the necessary preliminaries to His Coming to the whole world as Son of Man.

Shortly before His death He spoke of this Coming as future and as imminent—as certain to take place in the lifetime of some who heard Him.

This promise was fulfilled, and, as Kingsley says, they are

"Fools, who fancy Christ mistaken."

At the Ascension He departed from the world of sense.

At Pentecost He came to the world by the way of the Spirit—"a new and living way."

But before He could come by the way of the Spirit it was necessary that He should be "glorified."

This involved the Assumption by the Holy Ghost of the human spirit of Jesus—"The taking of the Manhood into God."

So He came to the world as Son of Man in a Body against which the gates of death could not prevail, and in which He could actively carry on His work in a thousand places simultaneously.

Till this Pentecostal Coming, His world-wide Gospel was to be kept back. From the date of that coming His followers were to go out with their message to all the world.

Now let us see how deplorably the failure to realise the

truth of these simple propositions has told on modern theology, and quite needlessly shaken the faith of good men.

In his review of my book *Apocalyptic Problems*, the present Archbishop of Melbourne writes, "Perhaps his most striking argument is his dealing with the 'Coming of the Son of Man.' One of the most confident and orthodox exponents of the Futurist school confessed to the reviewer recently what a staggering problem to his faith was the assertion of Christ in Matthew x. 23: 'Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of Man be come.'"¹

Bishop Gore, in his recent book, *Belief in Christ*, writes: "Recently it has come to be widely and confidently stated and believed that Jesus Christ anticipated and proclaimed His *immediate* Coming as the glorified Christ within the lifetime of His own generation; and was in this (as in some other respects) deluded, or the victim of current ideas which were, in fact, illusion; and there has been a great deal of discussion upon the bearing of these delusions of the mind of Christ upon the Theology of His Person."

Elsewhere, he says: "So wise a man as the late Henry Sidgwick was alienated from the faith and membership of the Christian Church mainly by the conviction that Jesus Christ had certainly proclaimed the immediate coming of the end of the world, and that it had not come as He prophesied. Jesus, he thought, was certainly under a delusion, and could not therefore be what Christendom believed Him to be."

"Did Christ," asks Archbishop Bernard, "expect an immediate Parousia? . . . How are we to deal with such

¹ He asks, What would the gain be of believing that these words refer to the First "Coming," which was still an event of the future, and quotes this reply, "We get rid at once of all the difficulties which have troubled those who assumed that His first Coming took place at Bethlehem and that it was to His Second Coming that He referred when He spoke the words quoted above."

passages as 'Ye shall not have gone over all the cities of Israel till the Son of Man be come'; and, 'There be some of them that stand here who shall not taste of death till they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom'?"?

"I will say quite frankly that if we had no report of the Lord's words but that in St. Matthew, there would be no escape from the conclusion that in these sayings He anticipated a manifestation of the Son of Man, which, in fact, did not take place." The Archbishop's solution is to correct the words of St. Matthew by the corresponding passage in St. Mark, in which the words "Son of Man" are omitted, and to regard them as an editorial addition of the former Evangelist.

The late Principal Denney writes: "When all qualifications are made, it is impossible for any candid writer to get rid of the fact that Jesus conceived the triumph of the Kingdom to come with His own Coming in glory, and that He spoke of it as so near that the very people whom He addressed must be in constant readiness for it."

Then in guarded words he goes on to make it quite plain that Jesus took a "fore-shortened" view, and he asks, "Does it change our attitude to Jesus to think of Him thus? Are we the less willing or the less able to call Him 'Lord,' when we realise that in the days of His flesh He walked by faith and that the assurance of His triumph, in which all history is His justification, did not enable Him to hold up to His disciples a mirror in which the course of history could be foreseen? In substance His words are true, but, as in all prophecy, the form is inadequate to the substance, and this state of the case must simply be recognised." What an amazing amount of verbiage it takes to camouflage a simple but unpleasant statement that the Christ made a mistake!

Again, the same writer says that in St. John's Gospel

“the eschatological hopes of the earlier Gospels are not simply omitted, they are replaced.” The evangelist has “substituted a spiritual for an outward coming”—a “bold transmutation of the prediction of Jesus, which was forced on the evangelist by the teaching of events and by the Spirit.”

Personally, I should feel that if I could accept such statements as these I should have very little foundation left for any faith at all. Yet that is the accepted teaching among many of the Modernists of to-day. Christ, they suggest, held a fanatical belief that the world was coming to an immediate end, and He was to make an immediate spectacular coming surrounded by clouds which were not to veil, but to display His glory. All these expectations were disappointed, and out of the ruins of its Master's hopes arose the Holy Catholic Church!

All these distressing theories and needless emendations would be scattered like morning mist if it were realised that the First Coming of the Son of Man to the whole world—the Coming to which these passages refer—took place at Pentecost, when He became incarnate by the Holy Ghost in His mystical Body, the Church.

In conclusion, I need hardly say that while I am urging that many passages which have been mistakenly applied to the Second Advent were meant to refer to the First, I am not for a moment questioning the truth or reality of the former. There are, of course, many prophecies and many promises subsequent to Pentecost which necessarily can apply to that alone.

H. ERSKINE HILL.

NOTES AND NOTICES OF RECENT CRITICISM.

HERE AND THERE.

(a) *The American Journal of Philology* (1924, pp. 47-63, "Philological Studies," by Paul Haupt). Evaporation, i.e. vapour drawn up from the earth, which returns in the form of rain, is alluded to in Job xxxvi. 27 f. (c. 100 B.C.), to be translated thus :

He sucks up the drops from the sea,
they are stored for the flood of His rain,
Which the clouds cause to flow down
and shower on many a man.

"The story of the fall of Jericho in the Book of Joshua is due to a misunderstanding of the term *qol sôpar*, sound of a horn, which denotes the subterraneous rumbling preceding or accompanying an earthquake" (p. 57). "The phrase *The word which Isaiah saw* appears in a new light if we compare the statement of the author of the cuneiform epic *Sa-gimir dadmê*, that the god *Isu* let him see by night in a dream the lines of a poem, and when he awoke in the morning, he did not omit anything, nor did he add a single word" (pp. 59, 60).

(b) *Biblica* (Commentarii editi a Pontificio Instituto Biblico, Roma), March, pp. 49-53, "locutions hébraïques avec la préposition לִפְנֵי devant לֵב, לִבָּי," by P. Joüon. "Upon the heart," a metaphorical expression for "in the mind (memory)," e.g. in Deuteronomy vi. 6, Proverbs vi. 21 ; to "speak on (to) the heart" is to encourage or speak kindly, as e.g. Genesis xxxiv. 3, Judges xix. 3, sometimes (Isa. xl. 2), but not always (2 Chron. xxxii. 6—"peut-être les lévites avaient-ils quelque crainte, quelque scrupule à exécuter les désirs du roi en négligeant les formalités légales"), with an appeal to the emotions.

(c) *Biblica* (ibid., pp. 1-25, "el herem biblico," by A. Fernández). The Hebrew term *herem* (anathema, Vulgate) denotes separation, reservation for Yahweh, primarily the irrevocable dedication to Him of what is pleasing to Him, and also the separation, for destruction, of what He abhors. The term does not necessarily mean "sacrificed," but may come to mean this.

(d) *The Crozier Quarterly* (April, pp. 202-204), by Mr. E. B.

Pollard. The term *ὑποπιάζω* in Luke xviii. 5 means to "pummel with words"; the unjust judge uses a facetious expression, "lest she give me a verbal beating." Like Shakespeare's Philip, in *King John*, he was afraid of being "bethumped with words."

(c) In his recent (1924) commentary on Ezekiel, in Sellin's *Kommentar zum Alten Testament*, Professor J. Herrmann offers an emendation of Ezekiel iii. 14, a passage which, in the R.V., runs thus: "So the spirit lifted me up and took me away: and I went in bitterness, in the heat of my spirit, and the hand of the Lord was strong upon me." The LXX (AQ) implies a different text; instead of "I went in bitterness (*mar*)," it reads "I went in mid-air ((*μετέωρος*)," i.e. reading *murâm*. Either *murâm* was the original reading, corrupted into *mar* ("which can hardly be original"), or it was an effort to amend *mar*. The omission of *μετέωρος* altogether in B and the Syriac version, however, leads Herrmann, like Cornill, Toy, and Rothstein, to omit the Hebrew equivalent altogether as a gloss. According to the older interpreters, the text denoted the moral sympathy of the prophet with the divine indignation against Israel, "the heat of my spirit" expanding the sense of bitterness. As Dr. A. B. Davidson put it, "the prophet was lifted up into sympathy with God and shared His righteous indignation against Israel." According to Herrmann, any such allusion would be out of place. The reference is merely to the strong ecstasy or trance which caught away the prophet; "my spirit" is not the spirit of the prophet, but the divine spirit first mentioned, "the spirit which overpowered me." As Herrmann omits verse 13, the passage (verses 12, 14) runs thus: "The Spirit caught me up and I heard behind me the roar of a great earthquake [as in 1 Kings, xix. 11, Zech. xiv. 3, 4, the accompaniment of a divine manifestation], as the glory of Yahweh rose from its place. The Spirit had lifted me up and bore me away, and I went under stress of the spirit which had entered me."

(f) F. Horst (*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 1923, pp. 220-238) on the reformation of Josiah (2 Kings xxii.-xxiii.) in 621 B.C. Was the book discovered or alleged to have been discovered in the temple the book of Deuteronomy? Horst estimates frankly the difficulties in the way of accepting this book as Deuteronomic; he is disposed to agree

that Deuteronomy is post-exilic, and offers a reconstruction of the text in 2 Kings, xxii.-xxiii. which yields two sources. The older makes the book found in the temple to be not a law-book but a collection of doom-oracles or threats on the people and the country. This was the original, authentic tradition.

(g) The title of the sixtieth psalm is : " To the chief musician upon Shushaneduth, Michtam of David, to teach : when he strove with Aram-naharaim and with Aram-zobah, when Joab returned and smote of Edom in the valley of Salt twelve thousand," i.e. an allusion to the campaign mentioned in 2 Samuel viii. 13, etc. The phrase " to teach " (*lëlammedh*) is commonly connected with 2 Samuel i. 18, where David is said to have taught the Judahites the song or the use of the bow. S. Mowinckel, in his new monograph on *Die Technischen Termini in den Psalm-überschriften* (1923, p. 17), denies this outright. The phrase certainly has nothing to do with the religious instructions for bows which were to be given to the youth of Israel. It refers to Yahweh's revelation made to the prophet who is inspired by Him in the service to reassure the Israelites as they start to fight against Edom. He connects the phrase with *limmûdhé Yahweh* in Isaiah liv. 13 (l. 4) as a designation of prophets taught by the Lord. Elsewhere he suggests that the historical situation of the psalm may be found in 2 Kings viii. 20-22, although it is no argument against the reference to David to say that 2 Samuel viii. 13, etc., never mention any defeats at the hand of Edom, since such reverses were easily forgotten.

(h) In the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (1924, pp. 133-153) Franz Dornseiff re-opens the question, how and why did *μάρτυς* come to mean " martyr " ? Was it under Jewish or under Hellenistic influence that a term for " witness " acquired this red sense of suffering and death ? He rightly sees that the change was not simply due to Judaistic precedents, though he is disposed to think that the prediction about the suffering servant in Isaiah xliii. 9, 12, xliv. 8 may have suggested to the New Testament writers the rôle of courageous endurance as part of the vocation of one who witnessed to God's truth.

(i) The statement of Luke i. 39 that when Mary went to visit Elizabeth, she journeyed *εἰς πόλιν Ἰούδα* is re-examined by Dr. C. C. Torrey in the *Harvard Theological Review* (January, pp. 83-91). He still maintains that the ordinary

renderings of the phrase, "to a town (or city) of Judah" are unlikely, and that the words are an erroneous rendering of the original Hebrew מְדִינַת יְהוּדָה, *medina* meaning "province" or "district." The correct rendering ought, therefore, to be, εἰς τὴν χώραν τῆς Ἰουδαίας, "into the province of Judæa." Fresh evidence is adduced to show that *medina* in Hebrew had this meaning, though in Aramaic it came to denote "city," the postulate being that Luke translated chapters i.-ii. from a Hebrew source, "while the remainder of the gospel is made up from his renderings of Aramaic documents."

(j) In the May number of the EXPOSITOR (p. 322) reference was made to the injunction, "thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk" (Exod. xxiii. 19, xxxiv. 26, Deut. xiv. 21). Mr. Max Radin now discusses the origin and meaning of the sentence in *The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures* (April, pp. 209-218). He begins by refusing to attach any importance to the LXX's change of "kid" into "lamb," and by declining to trace back the origin of the prohibition to any humanitarian motive. What then was the origin? A desire, as Maimonides suggested, to prohibit Israel from following some idolatrous rite of the surrounding nations? But "no direct evidence has been offered that such a rite or anything really like it, existed." A tabu connected with sympathetic magic, such as anthropologists like Sir J. G. Frazer suggest, as if the boiling of the milk would injure the goat's supply? But this does not explain the seething of the flesh. Mr. Radin prefers to think of the Orphic Dionysiac cult, where the priest in one extant liturgy declares to the neophyte, "A god hast thou become instead of mortal; a kid, thou didst fall into the milk." Was there some symbolic action, accompanying the phrase, to denote the bliss of the initiated? Did the neophyte identify himself with the kid's flesh which was plunged into the milk, as a sacrifice which would end in a triumphant resuscitation? Dionysus was the one Greek god known as "the Kid." Hence the initiate would be thus expressing his conviction that he would be saved from doom and entitled to bliss, by being identified with Dionysus. The Hebrew injunction would therefore be a prohibition of this idolatrous rite, if it could be shown that the cult of Dionysus reached Palestine before the Hebrew code was finally compiled.

EXEGETICA.

(a) IN *The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature* (January 1924, pp. 125-133), Mr. W. F. Albright defends the older identification of Shinar with Singara. The capital of this northern Mesopotamian province was Rasappa, i.e. the Rezeph mentioned by the Assyrian officer in Isaiah xxxvii. 12, 2 Kings xix. 12; the province itself "was bounded on the west and south-west by the Syrian Desert, so that it included all the towns on the middle Euphrates, south of the junction of the Euphrates and Hâbur." Dwellers in Palestine and Syria naturally called the whole of Babylonia and even Mesopotamia by this term, since it denoted the nearest Mesopotamian state to them. Such geographical extensions of a name are not uncommon.

(b) In the second series of his *Studies in Pharisaism* (pp. 94 f.) Dr. Abrahams repudiates the view, sometimes put forward by his fellow-religionists, that the Lord's Prayer is a mere cento of Jewish petitions, unoriginal and secondary. The Lord's Prayer, he observes, "was not in its primitive form a mosaic but a whole and fresh design." And he selects as a convincing proof of its originality the petition for the forgiveness of sins (Matt. vi. 12 = Luke xi. 4), in which "some sort of conditional connexion is established between man's forgiveness and God's. If this be so, we have in this clause of the Lord's Prayer a petition which is altogether without Jewish parallel."

(c) Three articles on Paul's letters and mission to Corinth offer fresh points. Dr. Hitchcock (*Journal of Theological Studies*, 1924, pp. 163-167) argues that "the people of Chloe" in 1 Corinthians i. 11] were not some members of a local Christian lady's household, as is commonly supposed, but votaries of Demeter, who had turned up at Ephesus. They were "disinterested critics" of the local church, with whose pure worship Paul felt he had something in common, and with whom therefore he might be in touch. "*Χλόη* was a well-known epithet of Demeter," and there was a shrine of Demeter at Corinth. E. Tobac, in *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* (1924, pp. 66-71), asks if the evidence for a visit of Paul to Corinth, between the two canonical epistles, is quite satisfactory. He is reviewing Dr. E. Golla's recent monograph on the subject (*Zwischen-Reise und Zwischenbrief*, 1922). Dr. Golla rejects the idea of any intermediate visit as a

fantastic imagination, but Tobac more shrewdly states the exegetical data ; these, he admits, make a deep impression on the mind by their number and combination, although they may not yield a conclusive result. The note is a quiet scholarly protest against the hasty rejection of the "intermediate visit" hypothesis, in the criticism of the Corinthian Epistles. W. Larfeld's article in *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift* (1923, pp. 638-647) concludes, from a study of the Delphi inscription, that Paul resided at Corinth between the autumn of 51 and the spring of 53.

(d) In *Songs of Sorrow and Praise* (pp. 121 f.), Rev. Duncan Cameron interprets the fifteenth psalm as a description of the true or ideal Temple servant, not as a general description of the godly worshipper. The man is described, among other things, as one who "putteth not out his money to usury" (verse 5), i.e. he is no moneylender. Now, as Mr. Cameron points out, "the moneylender is noted in the book of Isaiah as a recognised type in the land." He refers to Isaiah xxiv. 2. But what was permissible for a layman is forbidden to a Temple servant. Hence the words of the psalm are "just as if a writer of our own day were to speak against clergymen dealing in the Stock Exchange."

(e) In *Prophecy and Religion* (p. 162) Dr. Skinner thinks that Jeremiah's famous passage upon the potter and the clay (xviii. 1 f.) is the prototype of this figure. "The classical illustration of the divine sovereignty—the image of the potter and the clay—seems to have originated with Jeremiah ; and we naturally inquire what truth it conveyed to his mind," the truth being that "God wills the perfection of His creatures ; and though there is that in human nature which resists and retards the accomplishment of His purpose, and may seem to frustrate a long course of patient discipline, the Almighty worker does not forsake the work of His hands, but labours persistently, unceasingly, and in the end effectually, for the reconciliation of all things to Himself" (p. 164). Dr. Abrahams, in the second series of his *Studies in Pharisaism* (1924, p. 194) follows this up by showing that there is no literary precedent for this figure or metaphor, not even in the Babylonian hymns. Jeremiah is the originator. And "the point is even more interesting when we remember that pottery makes a comparatively late appearance among the Jews. The Jewish pottery is nearly all wheel-turned, and dates

from the later Jewish monarchy (650–500 B.C.). If Jeremiah spoke the first verse in chapter xviii. between 620 and 610 (Cornill), the potter's house was a novelty in Jeremiah's day. Hence his use of the art in parable had all the interest of a topical allusion."

SERMONS I HAVE NEVER HEARD.

SINCE I wrote my notes upon 1 Kings i. 6 in the May number (p. 397), about David never having checked the faults of young Adonijah, a friendly correspondent has sent me this illustration from Sir George Trevelyan's *Early History of Charles James Fox*. It is from the second chapter of the book, describing Lord Holland's indulgent behaviour to his son Charles, and the lack of any parental criticisms. "Of correction and reprimand he received little or none. . . . The impression left by the father's subservience to all the child's whims and fancies is preserved in many well-known anecdotes which for the most part are probably mythical. The shortest and best of these stories is to the effect that Charles declared his intention to destroy a watch. 'Well!' said Lord Holland, 'if you must, I suppose you must.'" Even when the time came for the boy to leave home and go to school, "this change in his circumstances was ordained, like everything else, by his own will and pleasure. Nothing can be more quaint and droll than the respectful delicacy with which the most headstrong and audacious man in England propounded the question of home or school for the consideration of his small lord and master." However, Fox was not ruined by this indulgence as poor Adonijah was.

With the editor's permission I shall mention yet another passage which might serve to start some preacher. Only the other day I listened to an Old Testament lesson being read, and read well, from the book of Daniel, the famous story in the third chapter about the golden image set up by Nebuchadnezzar in the plain of Dura, and the splendour of the worship, and the heroic refusal of the three Hebrews to kneel down. The preacher spoke afterwards from the words, "But if not." I had the feeling that he would, as he read the chapter, for a hearer comes to have premonitions of this sort. But it occurred to me that the superb English prose of the chapter supplied another text for anyone who decided to touch the conscience of our generation

—and how it needs to be touched here—upon the waste of music. Music, God's gift so often misapplied and degraded ! *Therefore at that time, when all the people heard the sound of the cornet, flute, harp, sackbut, psaltery, and all kinds of music, all the people fell down and worshipped the golden image that Nebuchadnezzar the king had set up.* Carlyle once declared, in a word on modern operas, that " the waste that is made in music is probably among the saddest of all our squanderings of God's gifts," and his sentence came into my mind as I read over this verse of Daniel. I feel sure that any thoughtful preacher could convey this timely warning to his congregation, though I have never heard a sermon upon music as a gift of God, even in services connected with choir festivals.

There is another text which has puzzled me, though it does not seem to have puzzled any preacher to whom I have listened, for they have never stopped to explain it ; I mean the last words of the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans (i. 32), where the apostle, after enumerating his black, long list of vices and vicious people, sums up by declaring that such people, though knowing *the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them.* Surely it is the climax of evil to do evil. Does it not seem that to *have pleasure in* vicious people is rather less heinous than to practise vice oneself ? The Revised Version adds to my difficulty, for it changes *have pleasure to consent with*, which sounds a feeble anti-climax. However, I seem to see some light in the modern versions, for Professor James Moffatt's translation is *not only do it themselves but applaud those who practise it*, and Professor Edgar Goodspeed, in his version for Americans, follows this lead by rendering *not only do it but applaud any who do.* If this be correct, I begin to see some force in the apostle's conclusion. Perhaps he means that bad as it is to do wrong by oneself, to be guilty of some sin in one's private life or maybe under some passing gust of temptation, it shows a hardened spirit when one openly justifies and praises people who are committing such sins, for this means that one is lost to any sense of shame. Bad enough to commit such sins, but worse still to have the effrontery to applaud all others who share the same conduct, as if they were doing what was natural and creditable !

The Editor informs me that some clergymen and ministers

have been mildly amused at my temerity in suggesting heads for sermons. I think, with all respect, that some of our younger preachers do not always realise what a help heads are to many of us laypeople. Heads may be artificial, but are they not worth the trouble of research? They do, it seems to me, aid us to remember what is said, if they are natural. So, at the risk of being criticised further, I shall venture to offer an outline of Psalm lxxxv. 8: "I will hear what God the Lord will speak: for He will speak peace unto His people and to His saints; but let them not turn again to folly." (1) The Resolve: "I will hear." (2) The Reason: "For He, etc." (3) The Responsibility: "But let them not." If some of my younger friends would be at pains to write a sermon under these heads, I feel confident that it would be a better sermon than any I have ever listened to upon that text.

A. R. M.

THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE APOCALYPSE.

IN an acute contribution to the *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses* (1924, pp. 1-31) Professor G. Baldensperger explains the four mounted Figures of Rev. vi. 1-8 along the lines of the astral and astrological theory which has been suggested by Dr. Franz Boll (*Aus der Offenbarung Johannis*, 1914) and some other scholars. According to this Hellenistic astral religion the twelve signs of the zodiac dominated the cycles of history; these signs were personified and viewed as deities of the sky, whose influence brought wars, diseases, and boons to men on earth. Thus, in the passage before us, the third mounted Figure bestrides a black horse and carries a pair of scales (verses 5-6); i.e. he represent the Scales. Now the current belief about the scales was:

ἔτος Ζυγοῦ ἔσται τοῦ σιτικοῦ κάρπου φθορά,
Διονυσιακοῦ δὲ εὐφορία.

The prophet John similarly makes the result of this Rider's mission to be dear grain, but no harm done to oil or to wine. In the order of the zodiac the sign of the Scales is followed by that of the Scorpion, which astrologically meant an epidemic. So in Rev. vi. 7-8 the fourth Rider on a livid horse is θάνατος, and a fourth of mankind are destroyed by war, plague, famine,

and wild beasts. The second Rider of the passage (verses 3-4), mounted on a red horse, carries a huge sword, and provokes men to kill one another; this is said to correspond to the sign of the Virgin in the zodiac, which precedes the Scales, because a star near the Virgin is called *ξωφήρης*. Finally the first Rider (verse 2), a crowned archer on a white charger, who rides out *νικῶν καὶ ἵνα νικήσῃ*, is identified with the sign of the Lion, for the bow is associated with the sign of the Dog (*τοξευτῆς, τοξεύων*) which is grouped with the Lion. The crown means that "la constellation du Lion est nommée royale. L'étoile royale (Regulus) fait partie de cette constellation et elle préside aux destinées des rois" (p. 25).

This theory obviously fails to account for all the characteristic details of the apocalyptic passage. It does not explain, e.g., why oil as well as wine is spared by the third Rider, nor why the woes that follow the fourth include more than a mere epidemic. The explanations of the first and second are also far-fetched. M. Baldensperger objects to the view that the first represents a Parthian raid, though this was dreaded by the Asiatic subjects of the empire. But the fear of the Parthians colours other references in the book (e.g. ix. 12, xvii. 14), and it seems prosaic to press *νικῶν καὶ ἵνα νικήσῃ* to mean a permanent triumph for which there had been no historical justification as yet. The apocalyptic traditions upon which the prophet John drew had no doubt been coloured by astral ideas, which are in the background; but it is not possible to regard them as primary, to the entire exclusion of traits drawn from contemporary fears and feelings. It is indeed "arbitrary and jejune to suppose that this prophet's splendid free reading of providence was laboriously spelt out from details of more or less recent history" (*Expositor's Greek Testament*, vol. v. p. 389). But it is equally fanciful to imagine that he conveyed his divine oracles through a purely astrological adaptation of some earlier tradition about the signs of the zodiac. M. Baldensperger allows that "l'astrologie n'est plus que sous-jacente dans le livre de Jean." It may be argued against him that "elle soit en *sous-ordre* sous le rapport de la quantité des emprunts faits à cette science."

REVELATION XXII. 2.

THE Rev. D. H. McQueen's article (EXPOSITOR, September, pp. 220) on the New Jerusalem and Town Planning is of great interest. May I offer two suggestions?

(i) Is it not possible that *ἐν μέσῳ* (Rev. xxii. 2) is used in the same way as *ἐν μέσῳ* (bis) in v. 6, and that it really means "between"? It seems to be a clumsy and inadequate attempt to translate the preposition מֵעַל. A clearer sense is thus gained in both passages. No one would plant trees in the middle of a river.

(ii) I fancy that *ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἐκείθεν* means "on one side and the other," that is, "in an avenue"—trees planted either regularly or diagonally opposite to each other. I would translate, "Between its Broadway and the river was an avenue of the trees of life." I do not understand Westcott and Hort's punctuation *αὐτῆς. καὶ κ.τ.λ.* and prefer the more usual one.

T. HERBERT BINDLEY.

REVIEWS.

Die Literarische Gattung der prophetischen Literatur. Eine literargeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Alten Testament. Von Joh. Lindborn. Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln. 1924. Pp. 122. Price 4 kr.

The recent interest in the original forms of the evangelical tradition, as it took literary shape, which is a feature of synoptic criticism in the field of New Testament research, re-appears in Professor Lindborn's pamphlet. His thesis is that the prophetic literature is essentially the literature of revelation, and that the nearest analogy is to be found in the writings of mediæval mystics like the Swedish Brigitta, Mechthild of Magdeburg, Hildegard of Bingen, Juliana of Norwich, and Catherine of Siena, i.e. in literature produced by ecstatic souls who were conscious of God speaking directly to them and through them. This literature is full of the Voice of God. It takes many forms, narrative, speech, dialogue, prayer and vision. But it is invariably the expression of a mystical communion with the Deity. After stating this (pp. 1-37), the Scandinavian scholar proceeds,

in his third chapter, to discuss the Old Testament prophets from such a point of view, and adds a special chapter on the book of Amos (pp. 66-96), with an appendix on the formulæ "thus saith Yahweh" and "the word of Yahweh" (pp. 97 f.).

Professor Lindborn admits that the prophetic literature is not entirely the product of ecstasy or trance; he feels the force of the arguments adduced by Hänel against Hölscher's theory. But he maintains that the prophets believed they saw and heard, with the organs of their souls, something really objective. "This feeling of objectivity distinguishes the prophets from the poets, and connects them with the mediæval mystics. One ought not to try to explain Old Testament prophecy by means of Geibel or Goethe, but by means of Brigitta and Mechthild, not through poetical literature but through the literature of revelation" (p. 44). Yet surely poetry may imply such a sense of inspiration. Ancient poetry often did, and even a later poet may write,

It is not every day that I
Fitted am to prophesy;

the sense that what one writes is being dictated by some overpowering impulse is not uncommon. To oppose Geibel and Goethe as representatives of poetry to mediæval women mystics is therefore unfair; Dr. Lindborn is pressing his analogy unduly. Besides, (i.) these mystics did not produce "literature" in the sense that the Old Testament prophets did, and (ii.) it may be asked whether these mediæval writers were not, consciously or unconsciously, more or less influenced by the Old Testament itself.

Still, though Dr. Lindborn's thesis requires to be modified, he has brought forward some interesting material for the study of the prophetic psychology. The insistence upon the prophet's belief in an objective revelation is particularly significant at the present day, when the new German school of theology is bringing this out, as a reaction against the tendency of recent psychology to reduce the religious experience to a series of brilliant illusions.

According to Dr. Lindborn, the main literary forms of the prophets were the oracular saying and the speech or address. But some so-called "oracular" passages, i.e. those introduced by *thus saith Yahweh*, etc., are not strictly oracles, while some addresses, beginning with *listen*, etc., are not really addresses which

were ever delivered. He illustrates this from the book of Amos, which he regards as a collection of fifteen short revelations. The first (in i.-ii.) contains five oracles, which show the "oracle" form becoming merely a stylistic form; the second (in iii. 1-11) is only an address in form, being originally a revelation sermon received by the prophet in ecstasy. The formula, *thus saith Yahweh*, was taken over by the literary prophets from the older seers, and goes back not only to the oracles of the ancient East but to the style of royal proclamations and epistles (pp. 102 f.). It suited the conviction of inspiration. But when Dr. Lindborn proceeds to group everything under this category, he becomes less convincing. Thus the biographical section in Amos vii. 10 f. cannot fairly be called a "revelation" in the sense that this may be applied to the visions of viii. 1 f. There is a revelation in the threat of verses 16 f., but the kernel of the section is as much in verses 10-15 as in verses 16 f., even although it may be impracticable to change the position of vii. 10 f. to an earlier or a later part of the collection. Had the emphasis lain on verses 16 f., the story would surely have been told in the first person singular, for example, as in viii. 1 f.

The monograph has many items of importance for the exegesis of the prophets, however, whatever may be thought of its main thesis. There is an acute discussion, e.g., of Jeremiah xiii. 1-11 (pp. 51 f.), and a vigorous challenge thrown down to the common opinion that, because the prophets were popular teachers and preachers, the extant prophetic literature is no more than a transcript of their addresses (pp. 56 f.). As for the question, how did these private revelations ever come to be published? the suggestion is that the prophets were intensely conscious of being the spokesmen of Yahweh to the people, and therefore, as in the case of Jeremiah especially, would even sacrifice their most personal experiences on the altar of publicity (p. 53).

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Lettre à M. Dacier. Paris : Paul Geuthner, Libraire, Rue Jacob, 13. 1922.

This is a centenary edition of Champollion's famous letter to the secretary of the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* upon the deciphering of Egyptian hieroglyphics. The hieroglyphics were deciphered slowly, like the Assyrian cuneiform inscriptions, and in both cases the study had its romantic side.

It was the genius of young J. F. Champollion which found the clue to a puzzle that had hitherto baffled scholars. He was a pioneer who had to encounter violent opposition, for his view seemed too simple to some who were determined to discover abstruse meanings in the newly found Egyptian texts which had been published since Napoleon's expedition to Egypt. But his principles, as expounded in this communication, proved to be correct. On matters of detail he was open to criticism; fundamentally he was sound. He had already written on the subject, notably a monograph in 1821; but his letter to M. Dacier in the following year sums up, for the first time, the essential features of the method. It forms, in his own words, "a real introduction to the general study of the system of writing practised by the Egyptians." M. Sottas, the Egyptologist, has edited the letter with care, and added a long introduction which discusses the question historically and critically. It was a pious duty to recall Champollion's services, especially since recent discoveries have attracted fresh attention to the archæology of ancient Egypt. Chateaubriand declared that Champollion's works were as durable as the monuments which they explained. This is a generous tribute, and it is not undeserved. The present edition enshrines one of these works in a convenient and scholarly setting; it is of more than historical value, for it offers a lucid introduction to the principles and methods of the subject. Also, it pays a tribute to Champollion for his combination of three indispensable qualities: "curiosité toujours en éveil, imagination féconde et créatrice, esprit critique empêchant cette dernière faculté de se dévoyer." M. Sottas avoids any discussion of the international jealousy roused by the competing claims of Dr. Thomas Young, the British investigator. Champollion might have perhaps acknowledged Young's services more than he did. As Professor R. A. S. Macalister puts it, "a little more generosity to his fellow-labourers would not have diminished" the lasting fame which he deserved and gained.

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Jesu Bergpredigt: rabbinische Texte zum Verständnis der Bergpredigt. Von Paul Fiebig. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1924. Pp. 152, 82.

The issue of Strack and Billerbeck's edition of Matthew's gospel might have seemed to render any monograph like this

superfluous. But Dr. Fiebig had prepared it in 1914, and he justly points out that his work has this independent value, even after K. Bornhäuser's book on the Sermon last year, that it not only translates the texts with notes but gives them in the original. The first part of the essay takes up the successive sections of the sermon, giving rich, rabbinical parallels in a German translation with some explanatory notes; the second part supplies the original texts. The illustrative passages are not entirely taken from the rabbis, for sometimes Old Testament sections are cited. For example, the illustrations of Matthew v. 6 open with Amos viii. 11, 12, and Matthew vii. 13-27 is compared with Job viii. 11-16. But the large majority are rabbinical. They are not always particularly apposite. Thus, on vii. 1, 2, a mass of citations is printed, beginning with this from the tractate *Sanhedrin*: "Civil cases are tried by three judges. Each party chooses one judge, and then the two parties choose a third. So rabbi Meir. But other experts hold that the two judges select the third." As a rule, however, the citations bear more closely upon the thought of the sermon, especially on the questions of oaths, almsgiving, and prayer, on all of which a quantity of Jewish opinion is provided. It is convenient to have this material gathered together in so scholarly a form. One impression it all leaves upon the mind is that of the real originality of Jesus; his words rise from this soil, "quantum lenta solent inter viburna cupressi."

The monograph appears in the well-known series of *Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments*. It is another welcome contribution from an author who has done much already to throw light upon the Jewish background of the parables and miracles of our Lord.

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Introduction au Nouveau Testament. Par Maurice Goguel.

Tome II. : Le quatrième évangile. Paris : Editions Ernest Leroux, 1924. Pp. 564.

This is a compact, comprehensive manual to the Fourth Gospel. Professor Goguel leaves over the epistles and the apocalypse, and concentrates his attention on the Johannine Gospel itself. The first six chapters cover familiar ground, the history of the problem, the personality of the apostle, the gospel in the second century, the traditions about John and John the Presbyter, and

the literary and textual questions. He believes that the apostle was martyred early, in 43 or 44 A.D. In the remainder of the book he discusses in detail the various problems of the text. As for the beloved disciple, he disagrees with those who regard this as an ideal figure ; the fact that he is required (in xiii. 21-30) to corroborate a question of fact tells against such an hypothesis (p. 332). The whole problem is handled with admirable freedom from dogmatism. Professor Goguel concludes that by the time the editor of the Gospel wrote the last chapter at any rate, "*le Bien-Aimé, après avoir été une personnalité historique, n'était plus conçu que comme une figure plus ou moins idéale*" (p. 350) ; the original Gospel (i.e. i.-xx.) was written from recollections of the beloved disciple, but the final editor desired, among other things, to make him the author. The editor also added some passages like xiii. 21-30, xix. 26-27 (unhistorical), 24b-25, but, curiously enough, not 37. The deletion of these, with a few editorial additions like i. 15, leaves the Gospel as it was originally written. But behind it Professor Goguel sees a more primitive work still (pp. 365 f.). It is at this point of his work that we would like to have seen him comparing the reconstruction recently proposed by Dr. Garvie, but, wide as his knowledge of foreign literature is, he has not come across that book. Professor Goguel regards xiii. 31-xiv., and xv.-xvii., as parallels, v. 34-35, 37-38, 41-44, as added by the evangelist, also perhaps vii. 37-44, ix. 18-24, and xi. 1-54. After a long, analytic chapter (xi.) on the sources of the Gospel he concludes that there is not sufficient evidence to show any "*Grundschrift*" behind the Fourth Gospel ; the author drew upon a number of sources besides the synoptic tradition, but they elude any enquiry as to their origin, and the unity and homogeneity of the Gospel as a whole is more important than anything else. Professor Goguel evidently hesitates about attributing very much influence to the Presbyter John ; he is more sure that the Gospel was written between 90 and 110, possibly at Antioch to begin with, and then finally compiled at Ephesus.

The excellent features of this study are its wide acquaintance with the details of the problem and its breadth of judgment. Whether or not Professor Goguel commands assent, he impresses the reader with his candour and with his deep sense of the complexity of the problem. He is wisely content to present certain

uncertainties, upon occasion. He has made a notable contribution to the subject, and confirmed the good impression produced by the two previous volumes of his Introduction. These are up-to-date pages, clearly written, and well fitted to put the case of liberal criticism persuasively before the reader's mind.

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L'Histoire des Idées Théosophiques dans l'Inde : La Théosophie Bouddhique. Par Paul Oltramare. Paris : Paul Geuthner. Pp. xv., 542.

This is a sequel to *La Théosophie brahmanique*, which the well-known professor of the History of Religions in the University of Geneva published about seventeen years ago. It is a strictly historical study of the complex religion of Buddhism, based on the Sanskrit and Pali documents. Professor Oltramare is aware of the neo-Buddhistic movement in Europe and America, and at the close he points out how impossible it is for us to commit ourselves to a doctrine which proposes "comme but à l'humanité l'apaisement intellectuel et spirituel, et comme idéal une sagesse qui s'isole et qui regarde de loin l'humanité active et lutteuse." The Buddhist ideal, he adds in a last word, "est une cruelle mutilation de l'homme." But the monograph is a dispassionate survey, one of the valuable contributions to the study of comparative religion which the French and Swiss school continue to provide.

The first book describes the character of Buddha and the rise of the Buddhist church and canonical literature (pp. 1-85). The second book is wider in scope and more original ; it discusses with masterly thoroughness the ideas of suffering and salvation (pp. 87-459). The third book summarises what may be held with regard to the position of Buddhism in the currents of Indian theosophy (pp. 461-525).

It is important to realise what he means by calling Buddhism a theosophical system, a theosophy "qui s'est faite religion." How is a religious man distinguished from a theosophist ? By his attitude, Professor Oltramare insists. "The former hopes by means of fear, reverence and adoration, to determine in favour of himself the powers on which his life depends, while the latter counts upon himself pre-eminently, upon the unlimited extension of his own knowledge and strength." Religion is humble, theosophy is proud. This is worked out,

as English readers will recollect, in his article on "theosophy" contributed to the last volume of Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. In the present work it underlies the whole exposition. One of the fascinating features of the book is the analysis of Buddhism as a religion still retaining its theosophical elements. The author indeed is disposed to think that the theosophy in Buddhism has more than held its own; he refers in this connexion to the prohibition of hate, which is ego-centric, based on the belief that hate is hurtful to oneself rather than to the person hated.

Professor Oltramare suggests here and there the parallels between the course of Buddhism and the career of Christianity. These are sometimes striking from the point of view of comparative religion. It has been held, for example, that Buddhism would be what it is, even if there had been no Buddha, just as some have argued that Christianity does not require belief in the historical Jesus. So far as the doctrine of Buddhism is concerned, this is true, we are told, for none of the primitive articles of faith is directly connected with the person of the founder. But it would not be true of the Buddhist church or religion (pp. 9 f.).

Another feature of the book is the valuable analysis of the metaphysical and moral schools in Buddhism, in the light of the contention that Buddha intended to teach "*non pas une éthique, mais une thérapeutique morale, non pas une science, mais une thérapeutique intellectuelle.*" It is significant that the former only requires about thirty-five pages, while the latter occupies about two hundred and seventy-five. The intricate metaphysical and doctrinal developments, according to Professor Oltramare, tended to approximate Buddhism in certain directions to some schools of classical Brahmanism, and this was what weakened Buddhism in India. A process of assimilation was set up which compromised its characteristic appeal. There is a sound account of the enigmatic term "*nirvâna*" (pp. 441-460), which ends with the caustic remark that "*les admirateurs occidentaux du bouddhisme dénaturent complètement la notion du nirvâna, quand ils y voient on ne sait quel apaisement que la mort assurerait à tous les hommes.*" He agrees with those who doubt whether the term implies anything like what modern thinkers would call an ontological annihilation of the existing

personality. In discussing this idea, as indeed throughout the entire argument, Professor Oltramare avoids anything like cut and dry antitheses. Buddhism, he recognises, is far too complex and plastic to be run into a logical mould of exposition. This is one of the excellent qualities which make his book a fair and appreciative guide to the subject.

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Origène : sa Vie, son Oeuvre, sa Pensée. Par Eugène de Faye.
Paris. Éditions Ernest Leroux. 1923. Pp. x, 243.

It is eighteen years since the second edition of M. de Faye's monograph on Clement of Alexandria appeared. Now he has followed it up with a larger book upon Clement's successor and pupil Origen, without whom, as he remarks, the thought of Clement "eût été sans action et sans retentissement." A study like this is particularly welcome, for there has been much more attention paid to Clement than to Origen of late, especially in this country. Dr. Patrick's and Mr. R. B. Tollington's estimates of Clement in 1914 have not been followed by any detailed study of the thought of Origen. The late Sir A. W. Dale was working on Origen's theology, but since his death there has been no word of any posthumous edition of his papers on the subject, and the probability is that he left the work unfinished. M. de Faye has therefore a fairly clear field. The present volume is to be followed by a second, dealing with the ideas; meantime we have in this book an account of the Alexandrian thinker's life, character, and writings, written in lucid French and out of a complete mastery of the material.

The first four chapters are biographical; chapters five to thirteen discuss the writings, chapter fourteen sums up the available data for an estimate of his erudition and culture, and there is a bibliographical appendix upon recent criticism. The writer attaches high importance to the *De Principiis* as a source of knowledge about the religious philosophy of Origen. This is right, for it alone provides us with a full exposition of some of his characteristic ideas about the universe. The Homilies, on the other hand, are pronounced to be "une sorte de simplification de l'origénisme intégral." But it is the treatise against Celsus which requires most careful treatment at the present day, and M. de Faye's two chapters are an admirable introduction to the subject. He points out the mistake made by Renan in com-

paring Celsus to Voltaire. Voltaire was a rationalist, while Celsus criticised the gospel from the point of view of the Platonic philosophy. Nevertheless Celsus was a most disquieting critic in the second century, a man of extraordinary penetration, and Origen did excellent service when he wrote his reply. Like Tertullian, he won the gratitude of the later Church for his apologetic work, even when his general orthodoxy was under suspicion.

In the appendix M. de Faye criticises Harnack's recent work upon the homilies and commentaries for unduly relying upon the translation by Rufinus. M. de Faye is sceptical about Rufinus as a translator, much more sceptical than even M. Bardy.

We await with real interest the publication of the second volume. Meantime this furnishes a handy, clear outline of the unique work done for early Christianity by Origen. There is barely sufficient recognition of the influence of Philo, however, and, great as were the services rendered by Origen and his school, there is no need to depreciate the Latin school of theologians. This is one of the temptations of most writers who admire the Alexandrians. M. de Faye avoids it on the whole, but he does drop the remark in passing that Tertullian was "trop latin, trop indifférent aux problèmes de la pensée, surtout trop ignorant pour imposer comme docteur à la pensée chrétienne." A glance at the treatise against Praxeas or the refutation of Marcion is surely sufficient to show that the great African father could write like a thinker and a theologian when he chose. "Ignorant" is one of the last adjectives to be applied to Tertullian.

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L'Epanouissement de la Pensée Religieuse de Luther. Par Henri Strohl. Libraire Istra, Strasbourg, 15 rue de Juifs. 1924. Pp. 424. Prix: 18 francs.

Professor Strohl's previous volume, *L'évolution religieuse de Luther jusqu'en 1515*, traced the development of Luther's thought and theology down to the eve of his commentary upon the epistle to the Romans, with which this volume opens. Then follows an analysis of his thought, down to the three treatises of 1520, that on Christian Liberty, that on the Babylonish Captivity of the Church, and the Address to the German Nobles. The ability of Professor Strohl has been recognised freely. What he writes on Luther is a real contribution to the subject, and it is all the

more impressive because, in a field where *parti pris* has often deflected the judgment of scholars, he is studiously objective. Not that he conceals his opinions. He maintains, more vigorously than some Protestant scholars would do, the essential unity of Luther's thought, and declines to find that it was substantially modified by Melancthon's influence. Also, he insists that Luther's ideas are unintelligible apart from a sense of his personal religion; they are misconstrued if they are criticised as a variation of scholasticism. "Le principe de la scolastique franciscaine *affectus praecedit intellectum*, selon lequel il faut aimer pour comprendre, n'est jamais plus vrai qu'en face d'une personnalité de ce genre." For this reason, he adds, one has often to pardon the misconceptions of ecclesiastical opponents—he is alluding to savants like Grisar and Denifle. It is a merit of his own book that it combines a rigorous analysis with a live appreciation of the religious spirit which dominated the great reformer.

Dr. Strohl's useful method is to give a catena of the relevant passages, and then to discuss them. The excerpts from the Romans Commentary—which shows Luther at a much more mature stage than the earlier commentary on the Psalms—bear on justification by faith. Luther's conception of the Christian's position as a justified man is less ardent and hopeful than Paul's. Why? Because Luther lived in a decadent era of Christianity, because he had a more tragic personal experience than Paul had to undergo, and because his view was too individualistic. This last reason is frankly urged by Dr. Strohl. Luther "s'est trop désintéressé de l'église, il a trop peu accentué l'importance de la communauté et de l'échange fraternel de forces spirituelles dans son sein" (p. 110).

Men develop by means of crises in their lives, however, and it was the struggle over the scandal of Indulgences which did as much as anything to render Luther more conscious of his real principles at this period. The second part of the book (pp. 155-414) covers this well-known ground. Luther had to be not merely a professor of theology and a preacher but a protagonist in ecclesiastical debates. These raised fundamental issues, e.g., of the essence of the Church and of the sacraments. The interesting thing is to watch how Luther's thought took shape, partly by developing ideas already expressed or implicit in his earlier

works, partly by a more resolute purging of inherited scholasticism. Obviously he was slow to move. One impression, corroborated by Dr. Strohl's pages, is that he was far from an eager speculative theologian or practical reformer. He took questions as they came, and yet without any facile opportunism. Generally, as in the case of the controversy over indulgences, his view turned out to be a further application of his fundamental belief about justification.

Towards the close, Dr. Strohl sums up against Troeltsch, and in agreement with Sohm, that Luther's idea of the Church was incompatible with anything like divine right or organised authority; he exalted the lay authority here, as he did the individual in questions of personal religion. The argument is subtle (pp. 366 f.), but hardly convincing. However, the main value of his book lies in its objective exposition of the subject, and in the close attention which it pays to the gradual, organic development of Luther's religious principles.

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Symbolæ Osloenses. Auspiciis Societatis Græco-Latinæ.

Ediderunt S. Eitrem et Gunnar Rudberg. Fasciculus II.

1924. Christianæ, in ædibus Some et Sociorum. Pp. 74.

Part of this Scandinavian journal, which is written in French and German, is devoted to classical philology and archæology, including a study by Rudberg of the relations between Isocrates and Plato. The main contribution to New Testament research is a very careful article by Anton Fridrichsen upon ἄγιος ἐπιούσιος in the Lord's Prayer. Fridrichsen agrees with those who derive the adjective from ἐπιέναι. Wimmerer's proofs in *Glotta* (1922, pp. 68-92) have convinced him that the attempt to derive the term from εἶναι or οὐσία is a failure. Neither is he satisfied with any of the attempts to find a Hebrew or Aramaic equivalent. But the further question remains, what is meant by ἐπιούσιος. Does it mean, "for the coming day," in the sense of to-morrow, or for the coming day, as a morning prayer? Either is possible. He admits that there may have been an elasticity in the term, but thinks that originally, as used in the group of disciples, it denoted a morning prayer that they might get their food during the day which had now dawned. Then, as the prayer became used in a wider connexion by the Church, it denoted "for to-morrow"; the faithful could lie down to sleep in the serene

consciousness that God would provide for them next day. That is, to pray for to-morrow's bread was the best way to overcome worry about to-morrow. It is satisfactory to have this corroboration of what seems the one adequate meaning of the term, and, in a note to the article Rudberg agrees that the derivation from *ἐπιέναι* must be given up, furnishing fresh proofs of this. Fridrichsen's article may be had in a separate reprint; it is a valuable survey, short and scholarly, of the linguistic problem.

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Die Versuchung Christi. Von S. Eitrem. Grondahl & Sons: Boktrykkeri, 1924. Pp. 37.

Does the story of the devil tempting Jesus to throw himself down from the pinnacle of the temple mean that our Lord was, or was supposed to be, tempted to act like an ancient magician or priest of some pagan cult, who would claim to act like his deity and command even the air? This is the theory ingeniously urged by the Scandinavian scholar. He recalls evidence for the ritual leap, from the Leucadian cult and elsewhere in Greek religion. The magical papyri tell us of magicians who were *κηρυμβόμορες*. But when Eitrem claims that this was suggested by the ninety-first Psalm, his inference does not seem to follow. That psalm may originally have been directed against reliance on false magic or intended to encourage the faithful against evil powers, but it is only quoted loosely by the devil to encourage a presumptuous reliance on God's providence; to strike the foot against a stone did not mean protection in falling from a height but safe-keeping on a rough road. The usual explanation is that the impulse occurred to Jesus on the pinnacle of the temple, and that he repelled it as an unworthy experiment, a tempting of God, which would be false to his mission. Eitrem dismisses this as "eine ganz rationalistische oder euhemeristische Auslegung." But he has chosen his adjectives wrongly. His parallels to the third temptation are equally interesting and, I think, unconvincing; it is quite intelligible without requiring any background of Seth-Typhon. Besides, some of the magical literature upon which Eitrem draws is too late; papyri from the fourth or fifth century A.D. can hardly represent ideas which were current in the age of Jesus, even supposing that it were possible to understand how he, or the primitive Christians, had access to them. Eitrem argues that the miracles of Jesus were astounding prodigies

of a magician acquainted with the methods of the craft. But this is not an adequate estimate. And it is no satisfactory account of the temptation-narrative to say that it originated among early Christians who were determined to show that their Master's magic was not inspired by satanic power, but by the higher Name of God his Father. Anton Fridrichsen contributes a postscript to this ingenious essay in comparative mythology; he is inclined to see an apologetic motive in the composition of the story, connecting it with the charge against Jesus of collusion with Beelzebub (Mark iii. 23-30).

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The Bible in Scots Literature. By James Moffatt. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924. Pp. 294. Price 10s. 6d.

He who depends for his dinner on gleaning after Dr. Moffatt will go hungry to bed. He has written a unique book, dealing very clearly and fully with a subject that required to be dealt with, and if it were not that his learning and width of reading are found on these pages as naturally as the grass and flowers and trees are in the woodland, we should wonder at the richness of it all. This is the true test of consummate art, that at every page the reader says, "Yes, of course! It is so!"—and feels that he himself has known it all the while. It is so clearly put before one, that for the moment one is not conscious of the wealth of reading which, some time or other, has gone to the making of it. It is a book that has an abiding place among books not only of Scots literature but of Scots history, and no man will ever deal with the subject without of necessity taking this from its shelf and carefully noting every page it holds.

It is a most business-like piece of work, tackling the subject from the foundation. Especially right was it to begin with the explanation of what "Scottish" meant, with reference to Scottish literature. It is very marvellous to see how ignorant people, who ought to know better, can be in regard to their own country. For example, Dr. Moffatt quotes Sir Thomas Craig, writing in the year 1605 about the union of the Kingdoms. Sir Thomas was a distinguished lawyer, who became Justice-Depute to the Earl of Argyle, and advocated the claims of Scotland to be independent of England. He should have known his native land well. Yet he speaks of remembering the time when

Gaelic was spoken in the counties of Stirling and Dumbarton, though now, he is thankful to say, it is rarely heard except in the Orkneys and Argyllshire! And at that moment a wall of Gaelic stretched from Dumbarton up through Stirlingshire, Perthshire, Forfarshire, and Aberdeenshire, north of which, to the vast majority of the people, English was unknown, while if anybody heard it spoken in Orkney it was by a wandered Gael. Gaelic is still spoken in Stirlingshire and Dumbartonshire. Sir Thomas was a striking example of the hidebound who never take the trouble to know what is outside their own ignorance.

Professor Moffatt omits consideration of the Gaelic or real Scots tongue; but he does it on knowledge, adopting the usage which from the time of Gawain Douglas speaks of the form of English used in Scotland as being the "Scottish" vernacular. It was in reality, till some two or three hundred years since, the vernacular of only about half of the land. Douglas is the first non-Gaelic writer in Scotland who speaks regularly of himself as writing in the "Scottish" tongue, though de Ayala, the Spanish visitor to the court of James the Fourth, so called the language used there. Until the fifteenth century the ancient tongue of the native folk was styled in Latin "*Lingua Scotica*," signifying the Gaelic language. Fordoun states that in Scotland there were the Scotie and Teutonic tongues, the former being spoken by the mountain people and those of the islands, the latter by the people of the coasts and the plains. Wyntoun, Dunbar, Blind Harry, and Sir David Lyndsay, all spoke of themselves as writing in English, the last-named referring to Douglas himself as "in our Inglische rethorick the rose"—a fact which made Dr. Farmer, in his famous essay, express his astonishment. The Lowland writers knew they were speaking and writing in a dialect of English, though they were Scottish. The fact remains till to-day, when to the Gaelic speaker even a song of Burns in the Doric is spoken of as an "English song."

The passionate nationalism, deepening every year till the sixteenth century and later, made the Lowlanders desire to claim the word "Scottish" for their language as well as for their folk-name. "Irish" was therefore applied to the language of the indigenous race, and was the constant usage till 1816 in the Edicts of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, when Gaelic was substituted. The epitaph—1692—on the grave of

Kirk, the minister of Aberfoyle, who translated the Psalms into Gaelic, states that he was “*Linguae Hiberniæ lumen.*”

Though those who knew nothing about it considered the old tongue rude, Douglas himself was not quite certain about his own, for in the prologue to the first book of his translation of the *Æneid*, he calls his language “bad, harsk speche, and lewit barbour tong,” comparing it, as with Virgil’s, to the difference between

Mydday and nycht, myrkness and lycht.

He also styles it “rural, vulgar, gros” and evidently hesitated about its use.

Dr. Moffatt rightly says that a lean gathering is found in Gaelic poems, and gives the reason why. He refers to *The Book of the Dean of Lismore*, as having in it collected Gaelic verses from the sixteenth century, but Dean Macgregor died in 1551. Though in its pages there may be no direct reference to a Biblical quotation, yet Biblical doctrine is not absent. Thus, in the long poem attributed by name to Caolte MacRoran (which Eugene O’Curry, printing an Irish translation in the *Dublin University Magazine* of 1854, dates about the middle of the ninth century, on the basis of obsolete words and phrases) we find the writer declaring, “I believe in Christ.” And in the wonderful poem on the grave of Alexander the Great we find him compared to Sion hill among the mountains and Jordan beside other streams. Dougal MacGilleglas, writing in 1498, appeals for protection to the King of heaven and Mary the Virgin :

Keep me as I ought,
Till I be brought
Fearless
To that great city peerless—
Do ye me bring
Where dwells the Father of the King.

The fact referred to by Dr Moffatt that the lament on the death of Alexander the Third has come down to us in English, and that there is no Gaelic threnody known, does not prove that none was made. It would have been wonderful if not. For he was our last Celtic king, and at his coronation a Gaelic bard is said to have recited in Gaelic his genealogy, by right of which he ascended the throne. But the conflict and quarrel within

the Highland line might well make such a thing forgotten, and people outside did not care because they did not know what became of it. In 1507 the Gaels were not "a mere minority on the fringes of the realm." Even in 1846 the population of the Highland counties was over 324,000, mostly Gaelic speaking, the majority of whom had no English or very little indeed, In 1891 there were 231,000 Gaelic speaking. It was not so much that "the educated in 1507" despised Gaelic, as that it was the English-speaking people who did so, knowing nothing about it, and acting on the principle—not yet dead—that "what I do not know is not worth knowing."

Further, though the first Gaelic New Testament came to the Highlands only in 1767, and the Old Testament was not completed till 1801, yet the Scottish Highlands used Irish versions, and in 1690 the Privy Council distributed 3,000 Bibles, 100 New Testaments, and 3,000 Catechisms from London. The initial difficulty in regard to the Highlands was that John Knox had no Gaelic-speaking preachers, and so the Reformation in general took a long time to reach the glens with the Scriptures in its mouth if not in its hands.

To say that the Gaelic proverbs are destitute of references to the doctrines of the Christian religion is true enough. Of course, proverbs are the condensed quintessence of practical popular wisdom. But one finds such sayings as these—"His share of Paradise to him," "He that is barest runs best," "None trusted God unthriven," "Counsel for the wise man, a rod for the back of the fool," and others. These can easily be fathered on their scriptural sources. The Gael had too much reverence, carried even to the length of awe, to bring into popular proverbs the sacred rites and beliefs of the Church; but his proverbs have very frequently an echo of the ethical portions of Scripture. He kept his songs and his religion separate. Hence in these there is little to be got, unless in his hymns and such poems as Dugald Buchanan's.

But in the Teutonic section of Scots literature there is ample field for reaping. And naturally so. For the Bible was the Scotsman's library. In it he found sanction for his fight for freedom, for the growth of his national life, and for his mere village or parochial conflicts. His familiarity with Scripture gave him a ready arsenal from which to gather material for that

cynical sardonic humour which is his peculiar gift. It gave him the wonderful vocabulary in which his mother-wit is clothed. And less than half of that gets into printed pages. He used it, too, in tenderness. And it comforted him when the world weighed heavily on him. I have a Genevan Bible which evidently was with some exile for the faith in Holland, and it is pathetic to see how the Book of Psalms has been fingered till many of its edges are worn away, and how many of the verses that have promise of victory over the persecutors of the soul, and the hope of return to the dispersed, are marked.

We repeat—this is a book done candidly, faithfully, with discriminating scholarship and knowledge. And it will abide scrutiny, keeping its place in its department of literary history and research.

LAUCHLAN MACLEAN WATT.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR A. T. ROBERTSON, of Louisville, Kentucky, has published a fifth and enlarged edition of his *Syllabus for New Testament Study* (Hodder & Stoughton, 7s. 6d.), which has gained a public of its own already in his own country. It gives in succinct outline the historical background of the New Testament, the life of Christ as told in the Gospels, and the literature of the apostolic age, with ample references to the bibliography of the subject. The author is familiar with the needs of students who are entering on this field, and his pages form a lucid, reliable introduction, which will put many on the right lines.

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More of the Bright Side of Things. By the late C. J. T. Merrylees, M.A. Paisley: Alexander Gardner. 5s. net.

The author of this volume was a minister in Falkirk, Glasgow, and Paisley, who had singular powers of attractive, evangelistic preaching. During his lifetime he published a small book of children's addresses, called *The Bright Side of Things*. This posthumous volume is a second series, characterised by the same qualities of sunny, bright Christianity. Mr. Merrylees had a gift for this difficult kind of work. He could talk to children without being childish; he had a wide knowledge of

life, and eager sympathies. The result is a book of remarkably fresh addresses, which may be commended unreservedly to all preachers who desire to follow this line. A biographical sketch of the author recalls him to a wide circle of friends. But the sermonettes themselves deserve to be read and used by a larger circle still.

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Subject Index to Periodicals (1921): *A. Theology and Philosophy* (including *Folk Lore*). London: The Library Association, 1924. Price 6s. net.

This is an invaluable production, one of the yearly issues which every library ought to possess. And individual students, who are working at any subject, will be immensely helped by having it at their elbow for purposes of reference. So much good work is hidden away in periodicals, that some clue to their contents is necessary for a well-equipped worker. There are 1,780 entries in this section alone, taken from 220 periodicals, and the periodicals include newspapers like the *Church Times* and the *Times Literary Supplement*. Foreign as well as English work is chronicled, that is, journals like the *Mercure de France* and the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Prussian Academy. It would not be easy to devise a more serviceable scheme than that followed in this Subject Index; it is clearly printed and the materials are accurately tabulated.

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The Bible for Youth. London: T. C. and E. C. Jack. Pp. xv., 1003. Price 6s. net.

Like the Children's Bible recently issued by the Cambridge Press, this is an attempt to give young readers the contents of the Bible in an intelligible form. Dr. R. C. Gillie and Rev. James Reid edit the selections and supply brief introductions, putting the modern point of view before the reader's mind. A few notes are added to the sections, explaining some difficulties, and some maps are added at the end. The book is clearly printed, as might be expected. What is more important, it is lucidly arranged. The selections from the Old Testament precede those from the New; the prophetic passages are placed as far as possible in their historical setting, while extracts from the Psalms and Proverbs close the Old Testament section, just as a few—rather few—extracts from the epistles close the New

Testament section. Except in the case of the Psalms and Proverbs, the text is printed as prose. The explanatory pages by the editors show a frank and reverent criticism, which ought to meet the difficulties of the young for whom the book is intended. Thus, to take only a single instance, the fall of Jericho is explained as follows : "The walls of Jericho may not literally have fallen down flat, as of themselves. What did happen was that the people of Jericho gave up without a struggle when they heard and saw the dauntless people of Israel marching confidently round their town in the night of their faith in God. If we keep in mind the fact of God's wonderful guidance and care the story is trying to picture, we shall not be greatly troubled about what may seem to us to be mysterious. We shall see in these things at least the graphic symbols of God's amazing power and love." There is a growing need for books of this kind, and the present volume deserves to be circulated widely. It is an excellent specimen of an abbreviated Bible, sound in method and most attractive in form.

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In *The Epistle to the Galatians* (Pickering and Inglis : 6s. net) Messrs. C. F. Hogg and W. E. Vine continue the line of popular exposition which they followed in their edition of the epistles to the Thessalonians. It is a simple word-by-word exposition of the text, from the evangelical standpoint. The Greek terms are transliterated into English, and the plain reader is carried from point to point without undue technical apparatus. A painstaking study, the object of which may be understood from these words in the preface. "In modern days there are no advocates of the circumcision of Gentile believes indeed, but there are those who preach salvation through sacraments, baptism and the holy eucharist, through membership in some religious community, through keeping the law, generally, or the fourth commandment, specifically, or through following an inner light, which may or may not coincide with the light of the Holy Scriptures. But in no case is faith in Christ, as essential to salvation, repudiated. There must be faith in Christ indeed, but there must be something besides. And that something invariably implies merit on the part of him who has it, or who does it. This, affirms the Apostle, is to make the Cross of Christ of none effect."

CURRENT ISSUES.

It is a hundred years ago, on the tenth of December, since Dr. George Macdonald was born. Dr. Macdonald was not an expositor, in the strict sense of the term, although he preached and published sermons. His real contribution lay along other lines. But there is no doubt that he exercised a strong influence during the latter half of the nineteenth century upon religious thought, especially by his interpretation of the Fatherhood of God. This was parallel to the emancipating movement fostered by the higher criticism of the Bible, and Macdonald's theological views are therefore to be acknowledged with gratitude ; whatever may be thought of their implications, they were high and noble in aim, like the character of the man himself.

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Macdonald was a preacher. That is, he had the instinctive desire to communicate the truths he believed. Whether he wrote verse or novels, he had a purpose ; even in self-revelations, like *The Diary of an Old Soul*, he was eager to show the world how much dearer and grander God was than could be imagined within Calvinism. He made his best characters in fiction live and move under a sense of God's gracious love, just at the time when the newer study of the gospels was insisting upon this as a vital element in the teaching of our Lord. He made everything depend on the idea of God, God the Father, "not an inventor of schemes or the upholder of a court etiquette, for whose use He has chosen to desecrate the name of justice."

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In the stress upon this, he was apt to be one-sided sometimes. One of his friendly critics protested that the school of thought which he represented was "not quite candid in its New Testament exegesis," and the criticism was partly just. Macdonald used the New Testament to illustrate his intuitions. He was never uncandid, but he failed sometimes to appreciate elements

even in the teaching of Jesus which were not quite consonant with his cherished opinions. Nevertheless, though sin is a more serious factor than he would have allowed, he drew the attention of his age to the divine Love in a singularly winning manner.

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It is his verse which appeals most to the majority of readers to-day ; our taste in fiction has swung away from the interest which made his novels a delight to the public in last century. But now and again he puts into his prose one or two choice expressions of truth. Here is one, for example, about the Bible, from his *Unspoken Sermons*. "Let us hold the Bible dear as the moon of our darkness, by which we travel towards the East ; not dear as the sun whence her light cometh, and towards which we haste, that, walking in the sun himself, we may no more need the mirror that reflected his absent brightness." One of the most characteristic of all his utterances is in Robert Falconer's prayer, where he makes his hero cry : "Lord, let me help those that are wretched because they do not know Thee. Let me tell them that Thou, the Life, must needs suffer for and with them, that they may be partakers of thy ineffable peace. My life is hid in Thine ; take me in Thy hand as Gideon bore the pitcher to the battle. Let me be broken if need be, that Thy light may shine upon the lies which men tell them in Thy name, and which eat away their hearts." This exactly represents Macdonald's aim in life, and he lived as he taught and wrote, in the desire to communicate what he believed to be God's truth, at any personal cost.

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The Bishop of Manchester has published a sequel to his *Mens Creatrix*. He calls it *Christus Veritas* (Macmillan). It is an essay which begins by positing a theory of reality, upon which, or rather, in terms of which, he endeavours to elaborate a philosophy of the Christian religion. The book is written out of a conviction that one of the reasons for the deficiency of cultured men in the ranks of candidates for the ministry is "that the intellectual atmosphere is dominated by a philosophy which leaves no room for a specific Incarnation," i.e. by an idea of God which precludes "His ever doing anything in particular in any other sense than that in which He does everything in

general." Dr. Temple believes that it is possible to state the philosophical ideas of existence and knowledge in such a way as to leave room for a genuinely Christian belief in the Incarnation.

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After he has elucidated his theory, he comes to its bearings upon theology. Let us assume, he argues, that "every grade in Reality finds its own fulfilment only when it is possessed by a higher grade, and that each higher grade uses those which are lower than itself for its expression." Now apply this to the supreme revelation, in which God uses human life in order to express His mind and nature. Jesus Christ is the perfect presentation of man as well as of God. He truly expresses what is man's real nature, for God in the Son shows how man is meant to be the self-expression of God. But how? Dr. Temple faces the problem of Christology and its varied solutions, and he rejects one of these solutions emphatically, the solution offered by the Kenotic theory.

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To Dr. Temple the attractions of the theory are obvious. He states them in the words used by Professor H. R. Mackintosh. But the difficulties seem to the bishop intolerable. He asks himself and his readers, "What was happening to the rest of the universe during the period of our Lord's earthly life? To say that the Infant Jesus was from His cradle exercising providential care over it all is certainly monstrous; but to deny this, and yet to say that the Creative Word was so self-emptied as to have no being except in the Infant Jesus, is to assert that for a certain period the history of the world was let loose from the control of the Creative Word."

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What then is the outlet from this apparent *impasse*? Dr. Temple is content to say that "God the Son did indeed most truly live the life recorded in the Gospel, but added this to the other work of God." He seems to believe, however, that the External Son in the Incarnate life did not exercise some of the divine functions, these being incompatible with humanity. That is, there were certain limitations; only, these limitations were God's means of self-expression through the Son.

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Later in the volume Dr. Temple has to meet the question of

life after death. Is it possible for a human soul to persist finally in refusing God's revelation ? He thinks that it is possible, and agrees that the only course left open to the Almighty in such a case is to bring that soul to an end. This is one of the points at which he is in agreement with Dr. Gore. If it be argued that annihilation means a failure on the part of God, he answers candidly that "to deny the possibility of failure in God is also to deny the freedom of man to repudiate God." Why should we hesitate to say that perdition is impossible ? Is it not because we entertain too abstract an idea of God's omnipotence ? And also because we forget that "the doctrine of the Church has suffered at this point from the introduction of a belief in the inherent indestructibility of every individual soul, which has its origin in Greek rather than in Palestinian sources." Dr. Temple rejects dogmatic universalism.

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With this number of the EXPOSITOR the year's programme ends. It is gratifying to acknowledge the wide response of readers during the year, and we hope to cater more than ever, next year, for the requirements of those who desire to study the Bible practically and intelligently, in the light of the best available criticism. Among the features which it is proposed to introduce, for the first time, is a section called "Questions and Answers." The Editor finds that this is the only way to satisfy the numerous correspondents who write for information upon biblical data. It is hoped that every month's issue will contain this feature, and correspondents who write privately to the Editor are referred respectfully to it for answers to their queries.

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The series entitled "The Ten Best Books" has been so much appreciated that, in response to repeated demands, it will be continued for another year. The new series opens in January with an article by the Rev. Dr. G. W. Wade, of St. David's, Lampeter, on "The Ten Best Books on the Apostolic Age." Other contributions in the series will include articles by Dr. Sydney Cave upon the Atonement, Dr. J. P. Naish on the Book of Proverbs, Professor H. T. Andrews upon Christian Mysticism, Professor H. R. Mackintosh on the Holy Spirit, as well as discussions of Prayer, the Parables of Jesus, etc. These will

continue to offer guidance to students who are interested in knowing the most reliable and important works to be consulted.

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In the expository line, we shall publish some fresh articles upon the Sermon on the Mount, from the pen of our accomplished contributor, Dr. T. H. Robinson; also, some expositions of passages in the Gospels, and studies of the Pauline epistles. The criticism of the Old Testament in next year's issue will be notable for a series of five articles by Canon Battersby-Harford, who has been kind enough to prepare a survey of recent work upon the Pentateuch, which will enable readers to understand the present position of research. The movements in this department of study have been so numerous and intricate that it is invaluable to have them surveyed by a scholar who can speak with authority. In addition to this, we shall have another study from Mr. W. W. Cannon, this time upon the prophet Nahum, and also a fresh study of the Book of Job by Dr. J. P. Naish, of Mansfield College, Oxford, as well as essays from Professor Gressmann and Professor Gunkel.

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These are merely one or two items in the programme for 1925. There are others, but an Editor wishes to keep some surprises for his readers. No pains will be spared to make the EXPOSITOR more than ever a monthly source of inspiration and direction to all readers who desire to understand the spirit as well as the text of the Bible. As George Herbert once wrote,

"There is fruit,
And thou hast hands."

The aim of the EXPOSITOR is to point out the fruit upon the boughs of modern criticism of the Bible, and to bring it within reach of many hands.

THE TEN BEST BOOKS ON MIRACLE.

It is perhaps worth observing at the start that when we describe a book as "good," we may intend either of two different things, the difference between which is apt to be overlooked. In the first place, we may, and in the majority of cases do, mean that the book commends itself to us as an able and more or less convincing and satisfactory treatment of its subject ; either it confirms the views of the subject we had held before perusal, deepening our belief in their soundness, or it has persuaded us to change our views and to adopt new ones. Anyhow, the book is one with which we agree. Or we may call the book "good" because in our judgment it contains a powerful and lucid statement of theories which we regard as mistaken, but which it is for the advantage of everybody should be expounded in their most impressive form. Both usages appear to me legitimate, and I shall try not to forget them in the succeeding pages.

The argument *against* miracle, in the modern period, tends to swing between two points, any particular volume usually giving more prominence to one of the two interests, though occasionally both may be stressed. On the one hand, there is the intrinsic impossibility of miracle ; on the other, the lack of sufficient evidence for belief. The first has been classically treated by Spinoza, the second by Hume. If we wish to know the case against miracle at its strongest, their presentations of it are the best.

Spinoza's argument is contained in Chapter VI. of his *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*, published in 1670. The permanently formidable part of what he has written there does not consist in his rejection of the idea that God's existence is shown most clearly of all by breaches of natural law, or even his contention that "many things are narrated

in Scripture as miracles of which the causes could easily be explained by reference to ascertained workings of nature ” ; for various Christian thinkers during the last fifty years have inclined to agree with him. He is also right in protesting against the common scholastic idea that the power of God and the power of nature are quite separate things—than which there could be no more unbiblical idea. What chiefly counts in Spinoza’s argument is his pantheistic identification of the order of nature and the will or providence of God. “ By the government of God,” are his words, “ I understand the fixed and unalterable order of nature or the connexion of natural things.” The general laws of nature are “ nothing but God’s eternal decrees,” and from the Divine decrees everything follows with an absolute and mathematical necessity. It is easy to recognise here a general view which has become axiomatic for some types of modern intelligence. Causality, a category of the mind, has been deified and put in charge of all existence, life, and history. God and the uniformity of being are but two names for one thing, the inside and outside of the same fabric. What actually happens is a perfect expression of the Divine nature. The *moral* faith in God to which alone the conception of miracle as Christians construe it is relevant, the conviction that He is Father as well as Upholder of the world, is here totally ignored and has nothing to say. But the mechanical determinism which forms the starting-point of so many present-day arguments about the supernatural has never been stated in principle with greater force, one had almost said sublimity, than by Spinoza.

Hume accepted this deterministic axiom in his famous essay “ On Miracles.” “ A miracle,” he says, “ is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument

from experience can possibly be imagined.” Plainly enough the phrase “*unalterable* experience ” is an assumption of the very point to be proved ; and it is doubtful whether any one trained intelligently in the methods of science could now imagine that such things exist to be violated as independent and autocratic laws of nature. But this is not the important part of Hume’s essay. That comes when he goes on to argue, in effect, that the more a statement of fact conflicts with previous experience, the more complete must be the evidence which is to justify us in believing it. We must demand from those who solicit our faith, evidence of a cogency proportionate to the miracle’s departure from probability. As he sums up in a famous sentence : “ The consequence is that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish.” This is the operative thought to-day in the minds of plain men to whom miracle is unbelievable. Upon it we may venture these remarks. We ought to accept the suggestion that what is called the science of history (though in fact there can be no such thing as a *science* of history, the material of study not being subject to set laws) cannot be forced to recognise miracle. At most, the historian as such will be agnostic about it. You will never compel a belief in the resurrection which has any religious power by piling up external evidences. On the other hand, Hume’s argument loses even the semblance of conclusiveness if we bring in the reality of God as Jesus made Him known. Mill took this point with his usual justice. “ Once admit a God,” he wrote, “ and the production by His direct volition of an effect which in any case owed its origin to His creative will is no longer a purely arbitrary hypothesis to account for the fact, but must be reckoned with as a serious possibility.”

It is doubtful whether anything of substance has been added to the negative arguments of Spinoza or Hume, since they wrote ; though of course their positions have been set forth more modernly or elaborately or clumsily by others. Amongst the best statements of this kind are J. S. Mill, *Three Essays on Religion*, Matthew Arnold's *Literature and Dogma* and *God and the Bible*, F. C. Baur's *Church History* (Eng. Tr. chap. i.), and Lecky's *Rationalism in Europe* (chaps. i. and ii.). The most detailed recent study of the evidence in the case of primitive Christian records is that of J. M. Thompson's *Miracles in the New Testament* (1911). Mr. Thompson's conclusions are in great measure of a negative sort, but it must not be forgotten that he is firmly convinced that to reject miracles is not to reject the supernatural, and that the old belief in miracles ought to give way to the belief that a supernatural power works in and through natural events.

Turning now to the positive side, we shall do well to start with an article published in the *Harvard Theological Review* for 1915 from the pen of Professor W. Adams Brown, and entitled "The Permanent Significance of Miracle for Religion." This is an unusually fine piece of work—wise, careful, balanced, and rightly concerned to put and keep first things first. In the main it is a psychological study, but considerations of objective truth and value break in at times, as they were bound to do. The writer asks three questions : how men have come to believe in miracle at all, what issue is at stake in the belief, and what place it is likely to hold in the religion of the future. He defines miracle as "an exceptional event, or quality in an event, in nature or in human life, the significance of which religious faith finds in the self-revealing activity of Deity. It is a strange fact with a divine meaning—a luminous surprise." Always in the mind of one who beholds miracle there is

this combination of awe and enlightenment, the sense of wonder and the sense of meaning. We rightly apply the term miraculous to an event by which men are constrained to say : " This is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes." In this sense the thing is as old as religion and as universal ; it lives on persistently, despite repeated announcements of its death. So long as the world is full of surprises through which God may speak, the possibility of miracle is present, both as a marvel and as a sign. But more, in miracle there comes to man a new access of vitality and power, repeating the marvel of creation in his own experience. " It is here only that we reach the heart of the miracle-belief. Miracle is the way in which man confesses his faith in a God who can do things, and is doing them. . . . Is God, or is He not, alive and free, able to meet present needs as well as the needs of the past, to act here and act to-day ? Miracle answers this question in the affirmative." The centre of interest becomes inward more than outward ; it lies in conversion more than in deliverance from famine. And in Judaism and Christianity special importance accrues to the historical deeds of God—events possessed of crucial meaning not merely for this or that individual believer but for the life of the whole race. But whether inward or outward, miracle " brings us face to face with God in so direct and first-hand a fashion that there is no possibility of our being mistaken as to His identity." " The final proof of the right of the great miracles to hold their central place on the stage of history is the fact that they have been and continue still to be the parents of an innumerable progeny." So long as faith in a personal God exists miracle will remain, " for miracle is the way in which the personal God communicates His will to man."

For the man who is tempted to say that the question of miracle is settled, and that theology has more important

problems on its hands, Dr. Adams Brown's article will make educative reading. It shows with rare insight why the problem is incessantly rising up anew.

The best general book on the whole subject, in my judgment, is Wendland's *Miracles and Christianity*. As was justly said by a reviewer when the English translation of this book appeared, "miracle is its proper subject, not miracles." No attempt is made to study in a detailed way the supernatural events of the Bible or even of the New Testament. Throughout, in the name of faith, it is argued that a world characterised solely or supremely by the rigid causal nexus of physics or necessitarian history is a world too dead to make room either for the living God or the living soul. Religion is essentially miraculous, and its experiences can only be explained by the entrance into the life of man of a God who is perpetually present and perpetually at work. As it has been put: "The look at life which religion gives us is not only the legitimate, but the supreme and final one." So far from being an inert mass in the grip of blind mechanical necessity, the world is shot through with freedom, human and Divine. This emphatic reiteration that faith in miracle is faith in a living God is one of the striking features of Wendland's book; others are his insistence that there are no "immutable laws of nature" which miracle has to violate; and that we cannot limit miracle to the past or to the human soul, ignoring the incessant new departures to be found in the spheres both of nature and of redemption. Discussion of the subject has been so frequently spoiled by premature controversies about some particular miraculous incident in the Bible, that we are specially grateful to the man who tries to give us one or two sound principles, such as spring from the very nature of faith. We want to know whether we are living in a supernaturally constituted universe, or whether naturalistic

monism has the last word. And it is our wisdom to ask whether in the experience of God and His living relations to us which we actually have as Christian believers, there may not be all the materials we need for an answer to this crucial question.

In the course of this appeal for belief in miracle of the kind which religious men still experience and still perform, Wendland offers wise and stimulating discussions of miracle in relation to development, revelation, providence, and prayer ; he vindicates the metaphysical possibility of special miracle ; and he gives in the first three chapters a valuable sketch of the form taken by this faith in Biblical times as well as a brief history of the conception of miracle in the Christian centuries. The most important point at which Wendland may fail to carry even friendly readers with him is this. The immutable laws of nature reappear under the new name of the "analogies of experience," and out of respect to them he denies, e.g., the physical resurrection of Christ. Whatever we may think of this on other grounds, it appears to me an inconsistency in his argument. If, as he tells us, faith when confronted by miracle has the perception "that there is a working of God, immediate and personal, *not merely in the life of spirit but in that of sense*,"¹ then it is not for faith to put inexorable limits to what the Father may do, in nature as in the soul. There is only one universe after all, and to split this single system into two halves, the physical and the spiritual, is equally bad philosophy and bad religion. But apart from this, there is no book on the subject more acute and exhilarating. When God comes into man's life as Redeemer, Wendland protests, the one thing he is sure of is that determinism is false.

Mozley's volume of Bampton Lectures *On Miracles* (1865)

¹ The italics are mine.

is, like all his work, too strong and firm in intellectual texture ever to become quite obsolete. He characteristically points out that apart from belief in God, belief in miracle is of no account. "It requires a great religious assumption in our minds to begin with, without which no testimony in the case can avail." This is a truth on which it is impossible to insist too often. A few hours since I read two seriously-meant discussions of miracle which, although written by Christians, nowhere referred to the being or character of God, but proceeded as if the matter could be quite satisfactorily debated from below in terms of nature, law, evolution and the like. But Mozley knew better. The precise form given by him to his general contention that if spirit be regarded as above matter and capable of moving it, then miracle is possible, is however somewhat unacceptable now. We do not feel it necessary any longer to hold that miracle is essential to a revelation, as an accrediting seal, nor is his distinction between the laws of nature (which may be suspended) and the laws of the universe (a suspension of which would be a contradiction) either luminous or helpful. But we still need his reminder that to believe in cosmic order and to cherish a mechanical expectation of recurrence are not the same thing.

Parallels between the thought of Bushnell and of Ritschl have attracted some notice, and the similarity touches their ideas of the supernatural. Both challenged the view of miracles for which they are breaches of natural law; to Ritschl they are events recognised by faith as acts of God, to Bushnell, in his *Nature and the Supernatural as together constituting the one System of God* (1858), they are exceptional instances of the continuous activity of God present in the world. Miracles belong to the revelation of the higher order opened to us in Christ. They fit into the world's constitution, for the world was made to receive Christianity.

Bushnell would have echoed Kirn's dictum that "freedom is the miracle of man, miracle the freedom of God," for he brought the supernatural in God's redeeming action into the closest connexion and analogy with the supernatural in a free moral act of man. Man can produce effects in nature not producible by nature as left to itself ; the universe is plastic to will ; it is so for us, *a fortiori* it is so for God. A famous passage in Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* touches the same point with extraordinary imaginative power. He scouts the petty notion that "the miraculous, by simple repetition, ceases to be miraculous," and proceeds thus : "Were it not miraculous, could I stretch forth my hand and clutch the Sun ? Yet thou seest me dally stretch forth my hand and therewith clutch many a thing, and swing it hither and thither. Art thou a grown baby, then, to fancy that the miracle lies in miles of distance, or in pounds avoirdupois of weight ; and not to see that the true inexplicable God-revealing miracle lies in this, that I can stretch forth my hand at all ; that I have Free Force to clutch aught therewith ? " Bushnell, of course, gives a specifically religious application of this basal principle, urging that our need has been made desperate by sin. "There is no hope for man or human society, under sin, save in the supernatural interposition of God."

By much the ablest and most penetrating defence of miracle on the philosophical side which has become available in recent years is Professor A. G. Hogg's *Redemption from this World* (1922).¹ The writer sets about his task in a spirit of infectious confidence. "Among the Christian verities," he writes, "the supernatural or miraculous is so far from being the most difficult of philosophical defence that, on the contrary, it is one of the easiest to construe in a

¹ As Professor Hogg's line of reasoning is difficult, and even highly intricate, I have for the most part kept closely to his own language.

philosophically unexceptionable manner.”¹ And he speaks with just severity of the theory which accepts the wonderful events recorded in the New Testament but will hear nothing of marvels happening, under God, here and now. “The only ‘supernatural’ worth defending, the only ‘supernatural’ that will be not a burden on faith, but its inspiration, is the supernatural as a permanent factor in that life of spiritual adventure which is practical Christianity.” This has a look of being read off the lives of great missionaries to whom real religion is life on a plane of boundless new possibilities in loyalty to the promise of the Father. Hogg puts his argument in the most intimate relation to the apocalyptic elements in the Gospels, but from this we may abstract for the moment.

The message of Jesus, in its essence, is that for faith God’s redemptive or supernatural interposition is and has always been available. Faith brings into our limited familiar world an irruption of energies from a wider cosmic order, enabling us, as it did Jesus in His higher way, to accomplish seeming impossibilities. God does not act according to rules or natural laws; His will is always individual; and what passes for the order of nature, and is rightly treated as such by science in its schematic fashion, is far from being coincident with the greater order hidden in God’s will. The wonder is that the two should approximate as closely as they do. We have no right to assume that “the Divine Mind in nature cannot be orderly or rational unless God directs the course of things in accordance with fixed rules which He decided upon from the beginning and maintains intact;” each new event, rather, “He must decree on the individual merits of the situation out of which it springs.” There is a higher orderliness, in short, than that of acting solely by rule. Hence “it is in no degree surprising that

¹ See note, page 414.

contraventions of what we take to be a system of rules or natural laws imposed by God upon Himself should sometimes occur." On ordinary levels, the levels of natural phenomena with the control of which men in general may well be entrusted, science with its exact tests is supremely in place, yet "surely the subtle texture of the cosmic order must be shot through with potencies which only the touch of filial fingers can evoke, and which only a spirit of confiding trust and eager loyalty is competent to direct." If by "natural events" we mean events as we scientifically construe them, the "special providences" are acts of God in a more eminent sense. Miracles are preternatural special providences. By their preternaturalness they render perceptibly evident the infinity of God, and by their character as special providences they render perceptibly manifest the individuality of His wisdom and grace.

As I have said, this massive and vigilant account of miracle in its specifically religious sense appears to me one which every student of the subject ought to read and master. I do not myself feel that it needs to be accepted out and out, as if we must choose between all of it and nothing. In particular, his distinction between special providence and miracle appears to me more than doubtful. But at least the writer brings us back irresistibly to the mind of Jesus. The suggestion that Jesus would not have ventured His daring thoughts regarding miracle had He had before Him the modern scientific view of the world, is one at which faith only needs to look twice to reject it utterly. What Jesus lived by was not a world view, scientific or other, for that is something which is constantly being re-modelled; He lived by communion with the living God, who does not change. And it is as we regain Jesus' thought of the Father and His absolute liberty to help us, that we become sure of both things: first, that miracle is

an idea of permanent religious worth, secondly that those who have met God in Jesus and been changed by the meeting know themselves to be living in a world whose constitution is not at variance with those new departures initiated by God's love to which the name "miracle" is rightly given. My own impression, for what it is worth, is that every deeply Christian man believes in miracle, whatever he may say. Harnack, for instance, argues strenuously for the position that "as an interruption of the order of Nature, there can be no such thing as 'miracles.'" But Harnack is a believer. Turn the page, therefore, and you will find him closing on a different note. "The question on which everything turns," he there writes, "is whether we are helplessly yoked to an inexorable necessity, or whether a God exists who rules and governs, and *whose power to compel Nature we can move by prayer.*"¹ Could a more suggestive phrase be found?

We have seen that a fairly general disposition prevails among present-day theologians to depart from the older view of miracle as a breach or violation of the laws of nature. This tendency, however, was sharply challenged in 1908 by the late Professor Herrmann, of Marburg, in his *Offenbarung und Wunder*. Previously, he owns, he had shared the opinion of those who contended that an event may be genuinely miraculous and yet also an integral part of the system of natural causation; but he had changed his mind. We have only to apply the newer view to some supernatural experience in our own lives to find it breaking down hopelessly. Faith insists that miracle is a real exception to the uniformity of things. On the other hand, there is nothing to be gained by casting discredit on the inviolable regularity of nature. Christians can no more dispense with it than other people. If faith needs miracle,

¹ *What is Christianity?* p. 30. The italics are mine.

life and work need unvarying laws ; and our wisdom is to admit that minds like ours cannot really combine these two *prima facie* certainties in a consistent whole. There is here an intellectual burden, a cross, which the Christian simply has to bear. Herrmann prolongs his argument in a strain with which his readers are more familiar. He can accept no miracles from tradition ; to believe in miracle, we must experience it. Nothing can be called revelation in the strict sense but the fact of Jesus' inner life—that objectively given fact or power which transforms us supernaturally by winning the free assent of conscience and heart. “ This religious experience alone,” he declares, “ is, in the Christian point of view, sheerly miraculous.” Many will feel that the earlier part of this argument is slightly perverse. Before Herrmann (on one side of his mind, so to say) hauled down the flag before uniform laws of nature, it might have been worth while to spend more time in asking what exactly uniformity means in a non-mechanical world, a world inclusive not of life merely, but of history. His case for ultimate dualism fails, as I think, when confronted with the sounder contention that “ in miracle the natural order is supplemented, not cancelled ; the issue in this case need not contradict that order, though it would not be such as the natural order could of itself produce.” ¹

On the general lines of Wendland's book, but showing the effect of Herrmann's intervention, is Hunzinger's brief but solid work, *Das Wunder* (1912). Miracle is present, he holds, wherever God's purpose to save takes concrete form at a definite point in the space-time world. This is the authentically religious view ; and older thought missed it, by treating the problem as one in rational cosmology. We

¹ This sentence is taken from Principal Galloway's suggestive paper on the Supernatural in his recent volume, *Religion and Modern Thought* (1922).

have to choose—either miracle is of interest solely for the theological antiquarian, or it is vital to the Gospel. Three points emerge at which experience shows miracle: the creation of faith by God's word, the felt providential action of God in life, and the hearing of prayer.¹ But miracle is only *contra naturam* if by that unlucky phrase, which has always been misleading, we mean contrary to man's "natural" life in sin. As regards the exact truth of particular Gospel narratives every Christian man must judge for himself; no general principle can be imposed by dogma. Natural science in any case cannot veto miracle; the mechanical view of the cosmos is radically unsound. There is a good closing chapter on miracle and historical research, in the course of which Hunzinger rejects *in toto* the fantastic and mythological idea of "laws of history."² But to say that the scientific historian can know nothing of miracle is not to say that they cannot happen. They may quite well happen, though by the rules of his limited science the historian is debarred from acknowledging their presence. He is bound to leave a blank in his construction rather than bring in what for him is an illegitimately transcendent factor.

The good books on the miracles of the New Testament, treating of them in detail and from an exegetical and homiletic standpoint, are comparatively few in number, so far as I know. Bruce's *Miraculous Element in the Gospels* (1886) is best, but it ought to be supplemented by Dr. A. C. Headlam's *Miracles of the New Testament* (1914), as well as Mr. E. R. Micklem's fresh and careful *Miracles and the New*

¹ H. E. Fosdick's *Meaning of Prayer* contains much excellent material on this.

² Ed. Meyer writes in his *Zur Theorie und Methodik der Geschichte*: "During a long course of historical inquiry I have never myself discovered a law of history, nor have I ever met with one in the mind of any other. It may be taken or agreed that laws of history have, so far, no existence save as postulates." (Quoted by Wendland, p. 289.)

Psychology (1922). Mr. Micklem treats only of the healing miracles of the New Testament, asking whether it is possible to explain them psychologically. Jesus, he suggests, may have been possessed of psychical power superior to that of His contemporaries or of ourselves. On the prior question, whether cases of this sort as recorded by the Evangelists were actually wrought by Jesus, the writer, especially in the case of demon-possession, reaches positive conclusions, all the more impressive that the note is never forced.

Our list may now be made up as follows :—

(a) Against Miracle :

(1) Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*.

(2) Hume's *Essay on Miracles*.

(b) In defence and exposition of Miracle :

(3) W. Adams Brown's article in the *Harvard Theological Review* for 1915.

(4) Wendland's *Miracles and Christianity*.

(5) Mozley's Bampton Lectures, *On Miracles*.

(6) Bushnell's *Nature and the Supernatural*.

(7) Hogg's *Redemption from this World*.

(8) Herrmann's *Offenbarung und Wunder*.

(9) Hunzinger's *Das Wunder*.

(10) Bruce's *Miraculous Element in the Gospels*.

H. R. MACKINTOSH.

THE SECOND COMMANDMENT.

II

THE sin against which this commandment is directed is a very natural one. No one, not even the most degraded idolater, one would suppose, thinks that the piece of wood or stone that he has carved out with his own hand is the real God. If he be a Christian, praying before the image of

the Virgin or bowing the knee to the Crucifix, everyone knows that he is not worshipping the image or praying to the cross. Those objects are nothing but material objects which, by their very form, centralise his thoughts, capture his wandering imagination and appeal to his æsthetic sense. He does not worship them : they do no more than aid him in the worship of the Christ whom they symbolise. They are aids to worship, not the objects of worship. And the savage idolater rarely calls the wood or stone—God. God is a spirit who dwells within the image : the image is but a home in which the spirit dwells. The primitive mind, and even the cultured mind, has great difficulty in understanding how any spirit can be worshipped unless it can be localised. It must, so to speak, be in a set place, housed by a definite material object, before you can pray to it or expect help from it. Some men think their God dwells in a piece of wood, and others think of Him as dwelling in a physical heaven, and it is hard to say which form of idolatry is the worse. And, after all, in a sense, nearly all worship is idolatrous. We say that we are made in the image of God, but what we really do is to worship a God who is the image of ourselves. God, to most of us, is man writ large, and our grasp of Him is greatly spoiled by our intellectual finitude and moral weakness. Some people worship a God in stone ; others worship a God who exists nowhere else but in their own deluded minds.

It may be said, as indeed it is said by all Roman Catholics, who have obviously to justify themselves in the face of this prohibition and the attitude of Jesus, that through the influence of pictures and images and the cult of the saints, the ignorant are helped in their worship. This attitude is an essentially pragmatic one. It does people good to worship. They ought to worship. But as it is almost impossible for millions of people to worship an unseen and

utterly formless deity, and as, in any case, they would probably make images for themselves or else cease to have any form of worship, it is the duty of the Church to supply the images and the pictures as an aid to worshippers. Their hearts are touched, their spirits are uplifted, they feel they have been in the very presence of the divine, and so the method is justified. Image-worship is right, it may be said, because, in many thousands of cases, it most undoubtedly works.

And then again, it may be said, God is willing to take the humblest offering that men and women can give. He will not refuse the idol-worship of the heathen or the lisping of the child, just because they do not come up to the lofty forms of spiritual worship that He has the right to command. In centuries past, until the fullness of the times, He has been willing to wink at ignorance, and has allowed men to address Him in imperfect ways until they were fully enlightened. How can it be said that He refuses a worship by means of images, which is so dear to and so ingrained in the human heart ?

All that may sound very plausible, but it is the plausibility of utter nonsense. We need only to examine it by a few tests which are open to us all. It may be true that idolatry is natural to the human heart. So is dressing dolls. But because we are all born as babies, there is no reason in the world why we should all die as babies. A religion which sanctions image-worship is a religion which condemns its worshippers to a life of perpetual childhood. A religion which can make idolatrous children into men and women who are spiritually alive is a fine religion. But a religion which allows men and women to live always as idolatrous children is nothing but a nuisance.

Then again, experience shows conclusively that the use of material representations of any form whatever as an

aid to worship tends in the long run, almost inevitably, to demoralise the worshipper and to degrade the conception of God. That it degrades the conception of God is easily understood. By laws of the mind, which we all have to obey, we are in the habit of associating ideas and objects and images, until they appear to us to be identical with each other, and not merely similar to each other. It would be a gross exaggeration to say that any and every veneration of images is idolatry. It helps many of us to have copies of G. F. Watts or Holman Hunt on our walls, to have pictorial Bibles, and even to have a crucifix over our bed. In fact, it might be a good thing for some people if these objects were circulated more frequently than they are, for they would remind them of a fact that we are beginning to forget in this twentieth century, which thinks it has no need of repentance, and that is that the Son of Man did not die in His bed. But it is remarkably easy for the image to cease to be to the mind a mere thing of wood and stone, and to become invested with properties which can belong only to the living person. It is easy to forget that a picture is only a picture, and to regard it as having a personality of its own. There are thousands of people who find a crucifix an aid to their devotions. It kindles their imagination, and brings contrition to their spirit, and a feeling of repentance to their heart, to have the sufferings that Christ endured for sin brought as vividly before them as they are by the crucifix. It is one thing to know the story of the Passion, but it is quite another thing to see with the physical eye an image of Christ upon the Cross, with the crown of thorns on the head, and the sword thrust in the side, and the nails through the hands and feet. We all know that the crucifix is not Christ. But the human mind is peculiarly made. At first, we can quite easily distinguish the deity from the wood and stone which represent Him. But

by constantly using the image of Christ to remind us of Him, by constantly looking upon the presence of Christ as confined to one particular spot, the image ceases to be a mere thing of wood and stone, and becomes for us an object of worship in itself. If I pray so long and so often before the crucifix that I begin to lose the power of praying without it, then it has become for me no longer an aid, but a positive hindrance, to my religious life, and I am getting dangerously near to idolatry.

And once we have set our feet on that downward path, they will go down for ever. It is almost impossible to have a material conception of God and Christ without it becoming daily more material. A man with a spiritual conception can advance from step to step. His mind can be improved, and his spiritual insight can become more intense. No limits can be set to his possibilities of growth. But a man who constantly uses some material object to centralise his thoughts about Christ runs the danger of thinking that Christ is somehow to be found in that object, and all possibility of spiritual growth is killed at the very start.

It certainly seems as if, in any case, the use of the crucifix is dangerous. It is dangerous for many reasons. For one thing, it gives us a wrong view of Christ. It is useless praying to a dead Christ or having the idea of a dead Christ in our minds. The symbol is wrong. The Cross ought always to be central in the message of Christianity ; it is only as the Cross has been put first that Christian preaching has been virile or Christian theology has been redeeming. But what the crucifix does is to perpetuate the memory of a crucified Lord ; it does not win the devotion of men to a living redeemer. The symbol of Christianity, if we have one at all, should not be a cross, but a heavenly throne.

The great contribution of modern times to Christian thought has been the reality of the picture of the historical Jesus. Any amount of labour and research, any expenditure of time and skill, is amply worth while, if it serves in the very least degree to show us Jesus as He actually lived in Palestine. But it is all dust and less than the dust, and modern scholarship had better never have been, if it makes us forget that Christ is still alive, our Lord and King, with us every moment, redeeming us by His blood. Art and poetry and preaching may have gained a great deal from the constant portrayal of Christ in His death agonies, but religious life has suffered incalculably because of it. God forbid that we should be ashamed of the cross. But we shall be making a tragic mistake, and shall be showing disloyalty to the Christ who died for us, if we think so much of His death that we forget that He triumphed over it. Our Lord is living, not dead. He is no longer on a cross, but on a throne, ruling us all, ready to judge us all.

It is so easy to have our attention too much occupied with the details of the passion. It is not only the Roman Catholic Church which endeavours to fill the minds of men with thoughts of Gethsemane, the scourging, the stopping-places on the way to Calvary, the blood, the sword thrust, and the agonising thirst, although the crucifix and the prayers to the Sacred Heart create an interest in lurid details which is anything but good for the sanity and religious balance of worshippers. Morbid imagination and religious zeal can easily be mistaken for each other. But many of our Protestant hymns which we sing with a fine gusto concentrate to such an extent upon the physical details connected with the crucifixion, that many are moved to an agony of physical sympathy without having their conscience touched in the very least. It was not the nails and the sword and the cross and the crown of thorns, it was

not the physical agony and the shedding of physical blood which redeemed mankind. The power that saved men was beyond all those physical actions, the power of a great love which endured to the very end. The cross and the blood and the precise form of the death are accidents, due to the fact that Christ was a Jew in the first century. If He had been the citizen of another country at another time (although, from some points of view, this was impossible), He might have died on the block or by the hand of the hangman. To forget the love of Christ and His commands as they come to our own conscience, to forget the cross which is eternal in the heart of God, and to take a morbid interest in the precise details of the death is, again, to get very dangerously near to idolatry.

But reverence is wrongly paid, not only to Christ upon the crucifix, but also to the Virgin and the Child. We know very little about the early life of Jesus, but what we do know is of such exquisite beauty that it ought to put a stop to any grumbling at the paucity of our materials. When we have so much, it is rather ungracious to complain because we have so little. We have the few wonderful stories in connexion with the birth, the humble dwelling in Bethlehem, the visit of the Magi ; we have the story of the circumcision and the recognition by Simeon, and the thanksgiving of Anna ; and then we have the story of the visit of the Holy Family to Jerusalem, and the bewildering intelligence displayed by Jesus in the presence of the Rabbis in the Temple. And that is about all.

But where the Gospels have been silent, others have tried their prentice hands, and have exercised their imagination in order to remove the veil. Many apocryphal Gospels attempt to tell us of the early life of Jesus, and surprise us by the irrelevance of the details and disgust us by their absurdity. After reading their ridiculous stories, we can

indeed express gratitude that our Evangelists tell us so little, and had a too high regard for Jesus to strain their imaginations too far about Him. And it would have been a good thing if many modern authors of so-called "Lives of Christ" had shown the same reticence, and had made their fervid imagination give way to exact learning and careful research. Artists also have attempted to bring the boyhood of Jesus before us. I am not at all sure whether this kind of art, especially that concerning the Virgin and the Child, has done good or harm. It may have kindled the imagination and fired the devotion of many men and women, but it has certainly contributed a great deal towards the adoration of the Virgin which has undermined to such an extent the purity of Christian worship and the thought of the uniqueness of Christ. Mary has received respect, not only because of a natural feeling which is displayed by all of us towards the mother of Him who was to be the Saviour of the world. Much more has come from a tendency inborn apparently in a certain type of mind to have intermediaries between man and God. Then also it has been thought that, if the virgin birth of Jesus was to be taken as a fact, it demanded that Mary also should have been immaculately conceived, in order to safeguard Jesus from the taint of original sin. These, together with many other reasons, have contributed to the veneration, and even, in many cases, the idolatry, paid to the Virgin and the Child.

There is another reason that makes us chary about accepting this Christian art, and that is that it is not pure Christian worship to worship the Child Jesus. If we are to trust the Gospels, and if we are to follow the dictates of Christian decency, then we have to believe that Jesus as a baby was very much like other babies, a fit object of our interested attention, but by no means a fit recipient for our worship

and prayers. Adoration to the child Jesus is fraught with the greatest dangers to our religious life. The person who saved the world, and gave commands to it, and a message of love, was a man and not a baby. The thought shared by more people than we are apt sometimes to imagine, the thought, namely, that while Jesus was a babe at His mother's breast, he was also God over all the earth, is as revolting to our intellect as it is against the plain teaching of Scripture. We celebrate Christmas because of a natural tendency to regard as sacred the day upon which the Saviour of men was born. We are distorting a festival into a day of idol worship, if we go beyond the mere act of commemorating the birth and begin to adore the child.

The philosophy at the back of this commandment is plain. Israel had no need to make Gods of wood and stone, because they had for worship a God who had been clearly revealed in the facts of their national life, and who had spoken to them through the mouths of all the pioneers of the faith. They had a God who had appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who ruled the heavens and had created the earth, who sat a king on high, who had rescued them from Pharaoh and superstition, who had given them promises, and had worked miracles on their behalf. For centuries He had been hammering certain facts home to them, that He was Eternal, Invisible, Immortal, the Creator of the ends of the earth ; that He had no form that men could see, that He ruled over all things, and therefore could not be confined to one spot ; that He was spiritual, and therefore it was degrading to represent Him in the form of wood and stone ; that He was Holy, and therefore could not be enshrined in any visible thing ; that His house was not made with hands, but was rather the human heart ; that He could grasp the whole world and yet could delight in the companionship of a child ; that He was a God of eternal

majesty, and was therefore jealous of the purity of His worship.

The principle of this commandment is still sound. Even in the twentieth century, when perhaps no educated man dreams of worshipping a God whom he can confine to an idol, it still needs to be emphasised that any worship of a God less than the one who has revealed Himself in Christ and in the history of the race means that we are idolatrous. The whole history of the Christian Church is a proof of the inevitable peril that awaits any man who attempts to move away from Jesus Christ, or to add to or take away from what we see in Him.

The commandment is enforced by the statement that it comes from the Lord God, who is a jealous God. The jealousy of God is the offshoot of His love, nay, is a necessary part of it. We do not rightly know God until we know Him as a jealous God. What modern theology has discovered is the fatherhood of God, but in the discovery, it has lost, to a very great extent, the sense of His eternity and sovereignty. The writers of the Bible lived in the fear of God. They believed that He could come into the lives of men and nations and bring all their work to nought. There is an intensity about God which makes Him alive to all the doings of men, so that He gives all His help to some, and sets Himself in uncompromising opposition to others. When we all face the God of the ages, and it is revealed that we have been worshipping Gods of lust and power, of vanity and hate, we shall discover that there is a jealousy in Him which is nothing less than a consuming fire. The gentle father taught by some modern teachers is as near the actual facts as the pale-eyed Galilean of Renan is near to the actual Jesus of Nazareth. There is no wrath like the wrath of the Lamb, no jealousy like that of love. When we are content with the worship of any

God less than Him who became man in Christ, we have turned our backs upon the greatest, the noblest, the most sacrificial, the most forgiving, love that has ever been made known to men.

H. J. FLOWERS.

*THE ANCIENT PHYSIOLOGICAL NOTIONS
UNDERLYING JOHN I. 13 AND HEBREWS XI. 11.*

THE notions of the ancients about embryology were varied, often somewhat vague, and divergent from the findings of modern science. Such notions as they had they were wont to express with directness without euphemism and false delicacy even in untechnical writing, as in poetry and religious literature. The modern reader and commentator is likely to overlook these references because of his different opinion of the facts and of his different sense of propriety.

All the above statements seem to be illustrated in the two passages of the New Testament considered in this paper. The solutions suggested are not entirely new,¹ but they have failed to hold a place in exegetical tradition and are not to be found in the more accessible commentaries. Even if they do not commend themselves as certain they are sufficiently probable to deserve mention and attention.

I²

John i. 12f. ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτὸν ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, οἱ

¹ Theophylact (in the eleventh century) may be quoted in support of both of them, and sundry obscure commentaries for each of them separately.

² Evidently the interpretation suggested in this note underlies the discussion by F. R. Montgomery Hitchcock of *αιμάτων* (pp. 303 ff.) in an article, just received, in the *EXPOSITOR* for October on "The Virgin Birth in the Fourth Gospel."

οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων, οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκός, οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν.

What is the meaning of αἱμάτων, *blood*, in this passage? Evidently the reference to sons of God has led the writer to contrast divine birth with human. The casual reader of an English translation, thinking of other Biblical passages in which man and God are contrasted, will find no difficulty with the passage. He will be reminded of Matthew xvi. 17: "Flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father who is in heaven"; Galatians i. 1: "Paul, an apostle, not from men, neither through man, but through Jesus Christ and God the Father," with the more usual "Paul, an apostle of Christ Jesus through the will of God." A more careful examination, however, shows that we have here no vague collective reference to mankind. Flesh and blood are not mentioned in the usual Jewish formula, and the word for man is ἀνήρ, which John used of males, not ἄνθρωπος, which he everywhere employs for mankind in contrast with God. The "man" is therefore the human father. This is not infrequently recognised by the commentaries, but about blood they are not so clear. They account it a more general principle. "αἷμα was commonly used to denote descent" (Dods); "nicht nur des Mannes, sondern überhaupt des Menschen" (Bauer); "das Blut als Sitz und Continens des physischen Lebens, welches durch die Zeugung fortgepflanzt wird, betrachtet" (Meyer?), etc. The commentators thus understand it not of the material out of which man is made at the start, but of a constituent element of the human body, "the element out of which in various measures the body is framed" (Westcott), whether of the child, or the parent, or transmitted from parents to children, or as indicating in a mystical sense the succession of human descent, "Träger des sich fortpflanzenden Lebens der Gattung, als Einheitsband

unter den Genossen eines Geschlechts" (Zahn⁵ und ⁶). For this thought reference is usually made to Acts xvii. 26 as read by the Textus Receptus; for blood as the seat of physical life to Leviticus xvii. 11 and sometimes xvii. 14, Genesis ix. 4. Sometimes the reference to racial descent is believed to be directed here against the Jewish claims (cf. John viii. 41). Since Luther at least Luke iii. 8 has been thought to illustrate this underlying animus. Scott Holland (*The Fourth Gospel*, 1923, p. 139) evidently had this passage in mind when he said of Christian rebirth: "they could not discover its origin in the human life which was theirs by blood; nor was it in any sense the outcome of that forceful purpose which was pushing its way upward through the elect and sacred Jewish birth," etc.

What I believe is the true explanation was suggested to me by coming upon the description of Solomon's human birth, in Wisdom of Solomon vii. 1 f.: ἐν κοιλίᾳ μητρὸς ἐγλύφην σὰρξ δεκαμηνιαίῳ χρόνῳ παγείς ἐν αἵματι ἐκ σπέρματος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἡδονῆς ὕπνω συνελθούσης. The last three clauses correspond roughly with the three negations of the verse in John, and παγείς ἐν αἵματι suggests the explanation of the corresponding ἐξ αἱμάτων.³ There can be no doubt what the apocryphal writer means. He is referring to the creation of a human embryo in the terms of ancient thought. According to one view among the Greek doctors and other writers the human being (like other

³ The passage in Wisdom is not mentioned in any prominent commentary, though some of the older ones referred to it. And John i. 13 is not mentioned in the commentaries on Wisdom *ad loc.* An exception is J. A. F. Gregg, *Wisdom of Solomon in the Cambridge Bible*, 1909: "Cp. Job x. 10, 11; 4 Maccabees xiii. 19 and St John i. 13, 'born, not of blood.'" Shall we add this to the evidence of Rendel Harris (*Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel*, 1917; cf. R. Bultmann, *Der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund des Prologs zum Johannes-Evangelium*, 1923) as another argument for the dependence of the Prologue of John on the Wisdom books? The ἐγλύφην σὰρξ may also be compared with the next clause in John: σὰρξ ἐγένετο.

animals) is made from σπέρμα supplied by the father and blood supplied by the mother. The blood coagulates—πήγνυμι is the verb used elsewhere also—and is the basis of the solid flesh. The evidence for the currency of this idea of conception was briefly stated by Grimm (*Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zu den Apokryphen*, 1860) in his note on the passage with quotations from Philo, Aristotle and Pliny. His citation from Hesychius expresses the view simply (s.v. αἷμα): τὸ καταμήνιον αἷμα τῇ καταβολῇ τῆς γονῆς παρὲν καὶ σὰρξ γερόμενον διαπλάττεται ὑπὸ φύσεως. The views of the ancients are expressed most fully in Aristotle (*De animalium generatione* and *Historia animalium*), and in Galen, *De semine* (in Kuhn, *Medicorum Graecorum Opera*, Vol. IV.). Their history is reviewed at length by Bruno Bloch, "Die geschichtliche Grundlagen der Embryologie bis auf Harvey," in *Abhandlungen der Kaiserl. Leopold. Carol. Deutschen Akademie der Naturforscher*, Band LXXXII., Halle, 1904. The curious reader may consult these for himself.

It was not necessary for the evangelist to be a doctor or to know the scientific discussions of the Greeks for him to embody this idea in his works, nor was the same recondite knowledge necessary for his commentator in order that he might discover its meaning and illustrate it. More accessible evidence was at hand. Beside the passage in Wisdom and Philo, *De opificio mundi*, 45, § 132 (p. 31M) a third Hellenistic Jewish allusion may be found in 4 Maccabees xiii. 19 ff., where it is said of the martyr brothers that they "dwelt an equal period [in the mother's womb] and in the same period were moulded, and grew from the same blood (ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἵματος ἀνξηθέντες), and were brought to completion through the same life, and were born after equal intervals, and drink milk from the same springs," etc. Again, the same blood may appear in the description in

Enoch xv. 4 of the sin of the angels in Genesis vi. 4, ἐν τῷ αἵματι τῶν γυναικῶν ἐμίανθητε, καὶ ἐν αἵματι-σαρκὸς⁴ ἐγεννήσατε, καὶ ἐν αἵματι ἀνθρώπων ἐπεθυμήσατε. Even the primitive Hebrew view as expressed in Job x. 10 was similar: "Didst thou not pour me out like milk, and curdle me like cheese?" Here again we have the solidification of liquid, though whether of semen or of blood is not stated.⁵

The passage in John, therefore, is meant to contrast birth from God with the literal human birth. In the prologue the author cannot introduce the prosaic literal misunderstanding of his phrases in the mouth of an interlocutor as he does later in the gospel (ii. 20; iii. 4; iv. 11; iv. 33; vi. 52, etc.), but he expresses it by a triple negative.⁶ The thought is similar to Nicodemus' suggestion iii. 4: "How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter a second time into his mother's womb, and be born?" It is this birth out of blood rather than the metonymy by which blood represents the human organism as a whole or the mysticism by which it means human descent that appears to be the thought denied in John i. 13.

II.

There are two other interesting questions in this verse with which the proposed interpretation must be brought into connexion. One is the use of the plural αἱμάτων,

⁴ Cf. Jude 7 (another connexion of this epistle with Enoch?).

⁵ G. B. Gray in the *International Critical Commentary*, 1921, *ad loc.*, thinks the former, but he quotes not only Wisdom vii. 2, but even John i. 13; also Pirke Aboth 3, 1, "Know whence thou camest: from a fetid drop." What other rabbinic passages confirm this idea of human generation have not been shown in Strack-Billerbeck, N.T. Commentary, *ad loc.*

⁶ This meets the argument of Zahn, *ad loc.*, that this triple negation, if applied to the origin of the τέκνα θεοῦ, would be "eine arge Trivialität," and hence it must have been intended as a reference to Jesus and to his miraculous birth. For a list of such literal misunderstandings see J. M. Thompson, *Miracles in the New Testament*, 1911, p. 98.

which has long attracted attention. It has been set down as a Semitism by some—Maldonatus and Hebraists of the older time, and more recently by Montgomery (*The Origin of the Gospel according to St. John*, 1923, p. 16).⁷ Others, including many who did not share the prejudices of the Purists, found it sufficiently explained by Greek parallels. But neither the Semitic nor the Greek use of the plural gives any parallel to the use mostly attributed to it here of human descent. In Josephus, *Ant.* xx. 10. 1. § 226, τὸν ἐξ αἵματος τοῦ Ἀαρῶνος, in *P. Lips.* I. 28¹⁶ (A.D. 381), υἱὸν γνήσιον καὶ πρωτότοκον ὡς ἐξ ἰδίου αἵματος γεννηθέντα, and in the other parallels, which the *Observationes* collected here and for Acts xvii. 26, the singular is invariably used.⁸ Crönert-Passow's *Wörterbuch* gives illustrations of the plural for the blood of the wounded and slain, or for bloody slaughter, but none except John i. 13 for the metonymy of descent. A favourite explanation has been (since Augustine, *Tract.* II. 14) that the plural was due to the fact that two parents were involved. This, however, is wisely rejected by modern commentators. Though the plural is perhaps in any case a little unusual, it suits the idea of literal material blood better than any other interpretation—*Blut* not *Geblut*. In Hebrew Leviticus xii. or xv. (*damim*) is a better parallel than the oft-quoted Leviticus xvii. 11, 14 (*dam*); and in Greek perhaps such passages as Euripides, *Io* 693: ἄλλων τραφεῖς ἀφ' αἱμάτων, and Plato, *Laws*, p. 887D, ἔτι ἐν γάλαξι τρεφόμενοι sufficiently illustrate the plural of a substance considered as a literal material (cf. the grammars of Kühn-

⁷ Burney, *The Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel*, 1922, does not claim it as an Aramaism and represents it in his retroversion (p. 34) by the singular ܕܡܝܐ in Aramaic. A. H. McNeile, *New Testament Teaching in the Light of St. Paul's*, 1923, p. 278, finds in this plural a difficulty for the hypothesis of translation, since "in Aramaic the plural can mean only shed blood."

⁸ An otherwise perfect parallel in Latin was provided by Livy, xxxviii. 58, *non sanguine humano sed stirpe divina satum*.

ner-Gerth, § 348. 2; Brugmann-Thumb, § 433. 5; Blass-Debrunner, § 141. 6).

III.

Even more famous is the variant reading in John i. 13, which makes the whole relative clause singular and thus refers it not to the τέκνα θεοῦ but to Christ (αὐτοῦ). This reading (*qui . . . natus est* in Tertullian, *De Carne Christi* (*bis*), Codex Veronensis, Liber comicus of Toledo) is too little attested to be considered original,⁹ but it was inevitable that after the four gospels were associated a clause in many respects so appropriate in its expression for the doctrine of the Virgin Birth and located just before the classic text on the incarnation should be associated with it. The οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων, if it denies especially the human mother, as has been here argued, would not, however, suit the story of Matthew and the orthodox doctrine. It is perhaps some confirmation of our interpretation that Irenæus, the earliest and the only early Greek witness¹⁰ for the application of these clauses to Christ, omits this first clause every time he makes the application: III. 16, 2, *non enim ex voluntate*

⁹ The fullest collection of the evidence and the strongest argument for the originality of this variant may be found in Zahn's commentary in Excurs. II. Cf. R. Seeberg in *Festgabe für A. von Harnack*, Tübingen, 1921, pp. 267 ff.

¹⁰ Though Justin Martyr is sometimes claimed as supporting this reading, it does not seem to me at all probable that in his repeated discussion (1 *Apol.* 32, 9, 11; *Dial.* 54, 2; 63, 2; 76, 2) of ἐν αἵματι σταφυλῆς, Genesis xlix. 11, he has in mind John i. 13. Even Irenæus is not preserved in Greek in any of his quotations, nor does he anywhere quote the verb of this clause (either *natus est* or *nati sunt*). There appears to be no Greek evidence either in MS. or in patristic citation for ἐγεννήθη, and it is doubtful whether the *natus est* of Irenæus III. 19, 2; Augustine *Conf.* vii. 9, 14; Ambrosius on Psalm xxxvi. (passages quoted by Zahn) should be included in the citation from John. Perhaps the earliest form of this variant omitted not only the relative, οἱ (ὅς) as Zahn thinks, but also the ἐγεννήθησαν (-θην) καί, as Irenæus III. 16, 2 does, though elsewhere Irenæus clearly quotes καί with the following ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. See *Novum Testamentum Sancti Irenæi* (Old-Latin Biblical Texts, No. VII.), 1923, pp. 77, 219, for all the citations.

carnis, neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex voluntate dei verbum caro factum est; 19, 2 *is, qui non ex voluntate carnis, neque ex voluntate viri natus est filius hominis, hic est Christus filius dei*; 21, 5, *non ex voluntate viri erat qui nascebatur*; 21, 7, *ut non ex voluntate viri sed ex voluntate dei adventum eius qui secundum hominem est intelligamus*. So of Adam, V. 1, 3, *non ex voluntate carnis, neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex placito patris manus eius vivum perfecerunt hominem*. It is perhaps further confirmation that the principal Latin authorities who not only applied the words as Irenæus did but even seem to have read in their Latin Version *qui . . . natus est* instead of *qui . . . nati sunt* (Tertullian, *de Carne Christi*, Codex Veronensis), also read *non ex sanguine*, which, being in the singular, could now be taken more readily as denying normal fatherhood.¹¹

IV.

Hebrews xi. 11, *πίστει καὶ αὐτὴ Σάρρα δύναμιν εἰς καταβολὴν σπέρματος ἔλαβεν καὶ παρὰ καιρὸν ἡλικίας*.

This passage has caused the commentators difficulty, since they believe *καταβολὴ σπέρματος* applies only to the father. Hence they have usually adopted one of several expedients:

1. *σπέρμα* has been understood to mean "progeny" or "family" and *καταβολή* is taken of the "founding" of a family, like the *καταβολὴ κόσμον* elsewhere in the New Testament. In this sense it can be applied to the mother quite as well as to the father, but there seems to be no

¹¹ The singular occurs also in Syr. Sin. Augustine noted (*loc. cit.*) the awkwardness of the literal Latin rendering *sanguinibus*. I may add that it seems to me probable that the singular *natus est* was facilitated in the Latin as it was not in the Greek by the ambiguous number of *qui*, which a scribe would naturally take as singular (after *eius*). He would not be aware that he was wrong until the very end of the sentence, which he might correct, quite without conscious dogmatic intent, to suit what he expected to find. The variant once created would become popular.

support for the combination in this sense, while it is stereotyped in connexion with the conception of a child (see Wettstein *ad loc.*).

2. *καταβολή σπέρματος* is understood to refer to the father, and Abraham is made the subject of *δύναμιν ἔλαβεν* and *ἡγήσατο* in the sequel as of the preceding verbs, while *αὐτῇ Σάρρα* is pointed as a dative (so W.H. mg.) construed loosely as a dative of association. Against this interpretation is not only the awkwardness of the dative, but the fact that in the anaphora of *πίστε*, in this chapter of instances the principal person is named next. Here, after mention of Abraham, the *καὶ αὐτῇ* calls attention to the change of subject, "Sarah herself also" as well as her husband. It is quite perverse, therefore, to try to refer the sentence to Abraham.

3. A kind of ellipsis is suggested by which Sarah is kept the subject of the verb *ἔλαβεν*, but Abraham is supplied as the subject of *καταβολή*: "Sarah received power for Abraham to deposit seed." The improbability of such an interpretation needs no comment.

4. A fourth solution is offered by Windisch *ad loc.* He cuts the Gordian knot by excision: "Was nun neu hervorgehoben wird (*δύναμιν εἰς καταβολὴν σπέρματος ἔλαβεν*), kann in dem vorliegenden Wortlaut nur von dem Manne gelten (von der Frau sagt man *εἰς ὑποδοχὴν*), auch nimmt die Fortsetzung nur auf Abraham Bezug (*ἀφ' ἐνὸς . . . νενεκρωμένον*); also ist doch wohl der Text verderbt. Das Einfachste ist, man fasst (*καὶ αὐτῇ Σαρρα*) als Glosse, die versehentliche in den Text geraten ist."

But another alternative is suggested when one considers the ancient differences of viewpoint as presented, for example, in T. C. Allbutt's *Greek Medicine in Rome*, 1921, Chapter XIV. "Doctrines of Generation." From this it is clear that "the idea of the deposit of the embryo by the male to be

nourished by the female, as in a nest," or as seed sown in the soil, which we find both in Aristotle and in other writings both before and after, did not hold undisputed sway. Hippocrates and Galen attributed seed to both female and male. The female seed is called not merely αἷμα, but σπέρμα,¹² e.g. in Galen, *De semine*, Book II., and has an active formative function (δύναμις) beyond the receptive function attributed generally to the female to whose catamenia even Aristotle conceded a generative substance (γονή). A single quotation will suffice—from Firmianus Lactantius, *De opificio dei*, xii. 6 (C.S.E.L. XXVII., p. 45): "*Conceptum igitur Varro et Aristoteles sic fieri arbitrantur. aiunt non tantum maribus inesse semen, verum etiam feminis, et inde plerumque matribus similes procreari, sed earum semen sanguinem esse purgatum : quod si recte cum virili mixtum sit, utraque concreta et simul coagulata informari.*" It is doubtful whether Aristotle really went so far, but evidently other authorities did. When doctors disagree laymen may be excused for some laxity of expression. Accordingly it may be left as at least one possibility that the author of Hebrews meant what he seems to say, that "Sarah also herself by faith received power to deposit seed."

HENRY J. CADBURY.

"WORK OUT YOUR OWN SALVATION."

WHEN Paul says to the Philippians : τὴν ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίαν κατεργάζεσθε (ii. 12), what exactly does he mean? The words are commonly taken to be an injunction addressed to the members of the Church at Philippi, charging each one

¹² Conversely the male σπέρμα is said sometimes to be called by metonymy αἷμα. So a few commentators actually explain the αἱμάτων in John i. 13. It is usual to quote in support of the equation Eustathius on *Iliad* vi. 211, ὡς τοῦ σπέρματος ὕλην τοῦ αἵματος ἔχοντ.

to work out his or her own individual salvation. Ellicott, for example, in his comment on the words, remarks that "their salvation was something essentially individual, something between each man and his God;" and Kennedy says that "each of them is responsible for his own salvation before God." But is this the primary meaning of the injunction? Some interpreters at any rate have seen in the words something other than this—or something in addition to this. "It may be contended," says Jordan, "that the exclusive application of these texts (i.e. i. 6 and ii. 12, 13) to the inner processes of individual sanctification is a divergence from their original meaning;"¹ and Dr. J. H. Burn, in a recent Note² on Philippians ii. 12, after giving the meaning assigned to the phrase *μετὰ φόβον καὶ τρόμον* by three old writers (Thomas Belsham, Edward Harwood and J. Pierce), subjoins the following remark: "For the concluding clause of the verse all three concur in some such rendering as 'promote earnestly the welfare of each other.' Their observations on this clause and its connexion with the next verse deserve more attention than they seem to have received from later commentators." The view thus favoured by Dr. Burn is rejected by Ellicott in summary fashion: "The unsatisfactory interpretation *ἐαυτῶν* = *ἀλλήλων*," he says, "is fairly refuted by Van Hengel *in loc.*" Ellicott's comment on *ἐν ὑμῖν* in verse 13 is in harmony with this; it runs: "*in you*, i.e. in your minds, not among you; this being alike precluded by the prevailing use of the verb and the nature of the context." But these reasons are not convincing; the context (as we hope to show) is decidedly in favour of some such interpretation as that which Ellicott rejects, whilst the prevailing use of *ἐνεργέω* in the New Testament is no proof that it

¹ *The Philippian Gospel*, p. 123.

² In the *Expository Times* for September, 1923, p. 562.

does not here describe the working of God in the community rather than in the individual. Plummer is heart and soul with Ellicott in his insistence on the individual interpretation, for he says : “ The reciprocal force of *ἐαυτῶν*, ‘ one another’s salvation,’ is certainly not the meaning here.”

Now it is the purpose of this paper to argue for the primary application of Paul’s words in verses 12 and 13 to the Philippian community as a whole rather than to the individual members. Let me, however, make it clear at this point that the view which I am advocating is not quite the same as that which Ellicott and Plummer so decisively reject ; for I do not think that *ἐαυτῶν* in verse 12 is the exact equivalent of *ἀλλήλων*. *Ἐαυτοῦς*, no doubt, is sometimes used as an alternative for *ἀλλήλους* in the New Testament, as well as in the Papyri. It is clearly so used in Luke xxiii. 12, and 1 Corinthians vi. 7. But it is also frequently used, of course, of a crowd or a community without any reciprocal force. Sometimes when *ἐαυτοῦς* is used in the second person it is almost impossible to determine whether we should translate by “ yourselves ” or “ one another.” Which rendering should one adopt, for example, in the well-known second-century letter of consolation, P. Oxy. 115—it is No. 38 in Milligan’s *Selections*—where we read ἀλλ’ ὁμῶς οὐδὲν δύνатаί τις πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα. Παρηγορεῖτε οἶν ἑαυτούς ? “ But for all that there is nothing one can do in the face of such calamities. So comfort yourselves ”—or should we say “ one another ” ? More than once in the Pauline Epistles *ἐαυτοῦς* and *ἀλλήλους* are used in the same sentence. Robertson remarks that Paul uses the two words “ as if by way of variety.”¹ But surely it is natural to expect some difference of meaning. Ellicott sees a difference, for in his note on ἀνεχόμενοι ἀλλήλων καὶ χαριζόμενοι ἑαυτοῖς, Colossians iii. 13, he says : “ The

¹ *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament*, p. 690.

change to the reflexive pronoun in two members so *perfectly* similar is *perhaps* not accidental ; while ἀλλήλων marks an act to be done by one Christian to his fellow-Christian, ἑαυτοῖς may suggest the performance of an act faintly resembling that of Christ's, namely, of each one towards all, —yea even to themselves included ('vobis ipsis,' Vulg.), Christians being members of one another." Peake, in his comment on the same passage, is of opinion that the variation is "probably intentional," and with regard to ἑαυτοῖς holds that "the thought that Christians are members of one another may underlie the choice of expression." Salmond, on Ephesians iv. 32, and Westcott, on Hebrews iii. 13, write in the same strain. All this will help us, I think, to appreciate the exact force of ἑαυτῶν in Philippians ii. 12. Paul is urging upon the Philippians a duty which they owe to their community, and he had every reason—as we shall see in a moment—for choosing the word that would help to emphasise the real unity of that community. The meaning of τὴν ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίαν καταργάεσθε is—not "Work out your own individual salvation," but—"Work out your corporate salvation—your salvation as a community." We now proceed to give the reasons which appear to us to make this interpretation inevitable.

First of all, the whole context demands this interpretation. De Wette, Kennedy and others find the exhortation of ii. 12 to be organically connected with all that has been said from i. 27 on ; and surely the whole passage from i. 27 to ii. 18 is a closely-woven unit in which the Apostle is endeavouring to impress upon the Philippians the duty of their forming one compact, harmonious body free from all disputes and dissensions, each member sacrificing personal desires and ambitions in order to promote the good of the whole. Indeed the members of the Church at Philippi as they listened to the opening sentences of the letter when it was read in their

assembly might well have suspected that the Apostle would have something to say on the lack of unity that characterised their community ; for we may be sure that the frequent repetition of the word “ all ” in i. 1-8 is not due to mere chance. Paul is already making it clear that he does not mean to countenance their divisions. “ It is impossible,” says Lightfoot, “ not to connect this recurrence of the word with the strong and repeated exhortations to unity which the epistle contains. The Apostle seems to say, ‘ I make no difference between man and man, or between party and party : my heart is open to all ; my prayers, my thanksgivings, my hopes, my obligations, extend to all.’ ”

From i. 27 to ii. 18 Paul speaks plainly on the duty of being united. It is evident that he is concerned about the state of the Philippian Church as a whole and not primarily about the condition of the individual members. The health of the whole body is unsatisfactory. The word *πολιτεύεσθε* in i. 27 at once reveals the direction in which the Apostle's thoughts are running. He is anxious that the Philippians should “ stand fast in one spirit, with one soul striving for the faith of the gospel ” (i. 27). It is most significant for us in our effort to discover the exact meaning of *τὴν ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίαν* in ii. 12 that in i. 28 Paul speaks of the *σωτηρία* of the Christian community at Philippi as a whole, contrasting it with the *ἀπώλεια* of their adversaries ; and this contrast with the surrounding heathen population reappears in ii. 15, just after the reference to *σωτηρία* in ii. 12. In ii. 1-4 obviously it is the corporate unity about which Paul is concerned ; and the lesson inculcated by the great passage ii. 5-11 is that concern for self should be swallowed up in concern for others. Then in ii. 15, as we have just seen, Paul is thinking of the Philippian Christians as a unit in contrast with the crooked and perverse generation in whose midst they are placed. Note also how in ii. 17 the word “ all ”

recurs ! From the beginning to the end of this section of the Epistle Paul is instructing and exhorting the Philippians with regard to their common life, and it would be strangely incongruous to introduce into the heart of the passage an injunction bearing upon the personal salvation of the individual members. And this is precisely what the Apostle does if the common interpretation of ii. 12 is correct.

Singularly inappropriate would be an exhortation to work out one's own personal salvation coming immediately after the great passage in which is set forth the self-sacrifice of Christ Jesus. The *ὥστε* shows that the injunction in verse 12 is one that proceeds naturally out of verses 5-11, but surely that cannot be said of any exhortation—however appropriate it might be under different circumstances—to be solicitous concerning one's own spiritual welfare. Bishop Moule is clearly conscious that the usual interpretation of verse 12—the interpretation which he adopts—breaks the sequence of the Apostle's thought, for he says : " He has still in his heart the risks of friction at Philippi. . . . But the line of appeal, though continuous, is now somewhat altered in its direction. The divine greatness of the love of the Incarnation has, during his treatment of it, filled him with an intense and profound recollection of the greatness of the Christian's connexion with his God, and of the sacred awfulness of his responsibility, and of the fulness of his resources. So the appeal now is not merely to be like-minded, and to be watchful for unity. He asks them now to use fully for a life of holiness the mighty fact of their possession of an indwelling God in Christ." ¹ But why should we find any break in the continuity of Paul's appeal when the Greek may quite easily and naturally be construed in a way that makes it unnecessary to postulate any such break ? The interpretation for which we are contending

¹ *Philippian Studies*, pp. 109, 110.

comes naturally after ii. 5-11, and we are reminded again of the words of Ellicott, already quoted, in which he states that the use of *ἑαυτοῖς* in Colossians iii. 13 “*may suggest the performance of an act faintly resembling that of Christ’s, namely, of each one towards all.*” It is to the performance of an act resembling that of Christ’s—resembling the self-renunciation described in the preceding verses—that Paul urges the Philippians when he says: *τὴν ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίαν κατεργάζεσθε.*

Moreover, just as the words which precede verses 12 and 13 point to the social interpretation of these verses as the correct one, so the words which immediately follow point in the same direction. Verse 14 says: *πάντα ποιεῖτε χωρὶς γογγυσμῶν καὶ διαλογισμῶν.* The abrupt way in which this command is introduced, without the slightest hint of any change in the course of the writer’s thought, clearly suggests that he is expanding the injunction given in verse 12. Westcott and Hort are justified in placing a colon after verse 13, as against Lightfoot, Ellicott, Nestle, Souter and Soden, all of whom have a full stop. By doing all things *χωρὶς γογγυσμῶν καὶ διαλογισμῶν* the Philippians would be working out their salvation. Now *διαλογισμοί* most naturally refers to disputes in the community. But what of *γογγυσμοί*? The word in the present context is commonly understood of murmurings against God. But if the meaning of the word in its other New Testament occurrences is anything to go by, it stands here also for grumblings against men. Alford maintains, rightly as it seems to me, that in all its four occurrences in the New Testament (John vii. 12, Acts vi. 1, Phil. ii. 14, 1 Peter iv. 9) the word refers to murmurings against men. Maurice Jones, though he prefers to take the words *γογγυσμοί* and *διαλογισμοί* here of “murmuring against God and dissatisfaction with His decrees,” yet admits that “the contemporary usage of both

these words favours the idea that the Apostle is referring here to social weaknesses in the life of the Philippian community and that it is the mutual relations of the brethren towards each other that are in question." This view, which Jones rejects, is to my mind much the more natural and probable, and verse 14 seems to me to give decided support to the social interpretation of the injunction in verse 12.

Neither is there anything in the phraseology of verses 12 and 13 themselves that tells against the interpretation for which we are contending. On the contrary, everything would seem to support it. We have already considered the word *ἐαυτῶν*. Let us now look at the phrase *μετὰ φόβον καὶ τρόμον*. It is now generally agreed, I think, that these words are not to be taken at their face value. The phrase seems to have acquired an idiomatic meaning—a meaning less forcible than one would expect from the words of which it is composed. The exact phrase occurs twice elsewhere in the New Testament, in 2 Corinthians vii. 15 and Ephesians vi. 5, and in neither of these contexts, as has often been remarked, is the meaning "with fear and trembling" suitable. It should also be noted that in these passages the words are used to describe an attitude towards *men*. The phrase doubtless bears some such meaning as is given to it by the three old interpreters quoted by Dr. Burn whose renderings are as follows: "With respect and reverence" (Belsham); "with the most submissive deference and solicitude" (Harwood); "with humility and concern" (Pierce). The three are unanimous—so Dr. Burn tells us—in taking the phrase in connexion with *ὑπακούσατε*, possibly because they felt that in Philippians, as is the case in 2 Corinthians and Ephesians, it should describe respect felt towards a *man*, for two at least of the three take the obedience spoken of in the opening clause of verse 12 to be obedience to the Apostle himself. But the words must certainly go with

κατεργάζεσθε, for, as Ellicott points out, everything from *μὴ ὡς ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ μου* is to be taken with the imperative, as otherwise *οὐ* would have been used, and not *μὴ*. As we interpret the words *τὴν ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίαν κατεργάζεσθε*, however, the phrase *μετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόμου* describes, not the attitude towards God in which the individual Philippian should seek to work out his own personal salvation, but rather the spirit that should characterise the behaviour of each member towards the rest of the community. This brings the use of the phrase in our passage into line with the other Pauline occurrences.

Our interpretation, too, enables us to give to the expression *ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐδοκίας* in verse 13 its most natural meaning. The *εὐδοκία* is here commonly referred to God, the phrase being taken to mean “to carry out that with which He is pleased.” I cannot but feel, however, that this is not a perfectly satisfactory rendering of the Greek in the present context; and if this be the meaning would not *αὐτοῦ* have been added, as in Ephesians i. 9? Some of the ancient versions, followed by Zahn and others in modern times, refer *εὐδοκία* in our passage to the goodwill of the Christian community at Philippi; and this beyond all doubt is the most natural interpretation: “for it is God who is working among you both the willing and the working to promote goodwill.” Ellicott, following Meyer, regards this explanation of *ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐδοκίας*, though “grammatically plausible,” as exegetically unsatisfactory “owing to the preceding *θέλειν*.” But is there anything unnatural in speaking of the Philippians as “willing and working to promote the goodwill of the community”?

There is one thing more to be added, as it has some bearing, slender and indirect it may be, upon the position taken up in this paper. The suggestion here offered is introduced not merely because of its bearing—admittedly

slight—upon the question at issue, but also because, if the case is made out, it sheds a fresh ray of light on Paul's thoughts about himself in his last days. The suggestion is that the Apostle in this section of our Epistle is comparing and contrasting himself with Moses when he was giving to the children of Israel his parting injunctions as described in the closing chapters of the book of Deuteronomy. Moses, of course, addresses his words to Israel as a community, and if it can be established that Paul has in mind the analogy between the prophet and himself some support is given to the view that he is concerned about the welfare of the Philippians as a body and not primarily about the personal salvation of the individual members of the Philippian Church.

Now Philippians ii. 15 contains an obvious reference to Deuteronomy xxxii. 5, the Apostle deftly applying the words of the "Song of Moses" to the Philippian Christians and their heathen adversaries. But is this the only point of contact between Philippians and Deuteronomy? Is it possible that when Paul wrote that God would perfect the good work which He had begun in, or among, the Philippians (i. 6) he had in mind the words, "The Rock, his work is perfect" which come in the immediately preceding verse of the Song (Deut. xxxii. 4)? It is difficult, again, not to see a connexion between the words *καὶ μὴ πτυρόμενοι ἐν μηδενὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων* (i. 28), and the injunction of Moses in Deuteronomy xxxi. 6: "nor be affrighted at them"; for the choice of the uncommon verb *πτύρομαι*, which is properly used of shying horses, may well have been due to the fact that Deuteronomy has *וְאַל-תַּעֲרָצוּ* which means "Do not tremble or quiver." In Deuteronomy xxxi. 27 Moses charges the children of Israel with having been rebellious against the Lord while he was yet alive with them. "And," he adds, "how much more

after my death ? ” May we not think that these words are in Paul’s mind in Philippians ii. 12 ? Unlike the children of Israel in their rebellious mood, the Philippians have always been obedient. It matters not whether Paul has in mind obedience to himself or to God, for in either case he means obedience *Dei præceptis ab Apostolis traditis*, as Estius puts it.¹ And does not all this suggest that when the Apostle speaks of his *παρουσία* and *ἀπουσία* he does not mean his presence in, and his absence from, Philippi ? Indeed the *νῦν* implies—though it does not demonstrate—that the change from presence to absence had either just taken place or was just about to take place at the time when he was writing ; but four or five years had passed by in all probability since he was last at Philippi. Paul is speaking of his presence in this life, and of his impending departure therefrom. Note especially the *πολλῷ μᾶλλον*, reminiscent of the words of Moses just quoted : “ And how much more after my death ? ” Moses sorrowfully adds : “ For I know that after my death ye will utterly corrupt yourselves, and turn aside from the way which I have commanded you ” (Deut. xxxi. 29). Paul, on the contrary, with a confidence springing from his experience of the unbroken obedience of the Philippians in the past, urges them all the more strenuously after his death to work out their own salvation. The *ἐαυτῶν* is not without emphasis. Now they must act for themselves. Hitherto though separated from them he has been able to guide and encourage them by letter or by spoken message entrusted to some travelling friend. Soon he will be gone beyond their reach. True, he once or twice speaks in our Epistle as if he entertained some hope of seeing his beloved Philippians again ; but ii. 23 plainly shows that he does not know how things will go with him ; and the impression left upon us by the Epistle as a whole is that the Apostle

¹ Quoted by Ellicott *in loc.*

(as Bacon puts it) is preparing his friends for news of his execution.¹ The significant order of the two words *εἰ καὶ* in ii. 17 shows that he entertains no strong hope of release. But if he is taken away, God will be with them. God is ever working among them. Time and again Moses tells the children of Israel that, whereas he is not permitted to remain with them, Jahveh will be with them. "And the Lord," we read in Deuteronomy xxxi. 8, for example, "he it is that doth go before thee; he will be with thee, he will not fail thee, neither forsake thee." Are we mistaken in believing that there is some connexion between the promises made by Moses, and the declaration of Paul that God is working among the Philippians? And has not enough been said to justify the view that the words *τὴν ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίαν κατεργάσεσθε*, in their primary reference, have to do, not with the personal salvation of the individual members of the Church at Philippi, but with the welfare of the Christian community as a whole?

J. HUGH MICHAEL.

SIMPLICITY TOWARD CHRIST.

IN 2 Corinthians xi. 3, as given in the Revised Version of the New Testament, St. Paul writes as follows to his Corinthian converts: "I fear, lest by any means, as the serpent beguiled Eve in his craftiness, your minds should be corrupted from the simplicity and the purity that is toward Christ." The Authorised Version, which omits "purity," reads: "From the simplicity that is in Christ." This latter rendering, which makes the "simplicity" a quality of Christ, calls for *ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ*, not *εἰς τὸν Χριστόν*, and is evidently wrong. But the point with which we are at present concerned is the meaning of "Simplicity," if indeed

¹ *Introduction to the New Testament*, p. 123.

we allow it to continue as a fair equivalent for the Greek term ἀπλότης. A late distinguished visitor to our shores, the Dean of New York Cathedral, preaching in St. Margaret's, Westminster, took "the simplicity which is towards Christ" as the text for an eloquent sermon, in which he explained "simplicity" as signifying "sincerity and directness," and drew from thence some instructive counsels bearing on the Christian character. None who heard them could help being benefited by the counsels, the only question was whether the text or word on which they were based was rightly interpreted. As my belief is that it was not, I feel it obligatory to give my reasons why, and so to apply myself to the discovery of the correct import of the term.

Before, however, coming to this point, it might be well to notice some other meanings of ἀπλότης, which is by no means constricted in its sense. (1) Its literal and technical signification is "singleness," as being uncompounded, and so it appears from a moral point of view in *Test. XII. Patr.* (Benj. 6): "The works of Beliar are double (διπλᾶ)," i.e. compound of duplicity, "and have no singleness (ἀπλότητα) in them." (2) It denotes "simplicity." Thus, in Plato, *Rep.* (304 E), it is opposed to ποικιλία, "variety." See too Joseph, *B.J.* ii. 8, 10: "They are long-lived, owing to the simplicity (ἀπλότητα), as it seems to me, and the regularity of their living." (3) It stands for "openhandedness, liberality, generosity." So Romans xii. 8: "He who imparts (let him do it) with liberality (ἐν ἀπλότητι)." 2 Corinthians viii. 2: "Their deep poverty overflowed into the wealth of their liberality (ἀπλότητος)." (4) It signifies "openness, frankness, unsuspiciousness." Thus Arist., *Virt. Vit.* 5, 7: "The magnanimous is . . . open (ἀπλοῦς) in character and noble. . . . And magnanimity is followed by openness (ἀπλότης) and truth." Philo, *De Mund. Opif.* 55 (cf. 61): "This conduct (eating the forbidden fruit)

suddenly changed both from innocence and openness of character (ἀπλότητος ἡθῶν) into deceitfulness." Joseph., *B.J.* v. 7, 4: "Titus trusting out of unsuspectingness (ἐξ ἀπλότητος)." Plut., *Anton.* 24: "He was ignorant of many things that went on, not so much from indolence as from trusting through unsuspectingness (δι' ἀπλότητα) those about him; for he was endued with an unsuspecting nature (ἀπλότης) and a slow perception (*or* apprehension)."

(5) A frequent meaning of the term, at least in Scripture, is "singleness of affection or devotion, undivided loyalty, devotedness, constancy." Cf. 1 Chronicles xxix. 17: "With single-heartedness (ἐν ἀπλότητι καρδίας) have I bestirred myself about all these things." Wisdom i. 1: "With single-heartedness (ἐν ἀπλότητι καρδίας) seek ye Him (the Lord)." 1 Maccabees ii. 60: "Daniel by his constancy *or* loyalty (ἐν τῇ ἀπλότητι αὐτοῦ) was rescued from the lion's mouth." *Test. XII. Patr.* (Reub. 4): "Walk with singleness of heart (ἐν ἀπλότητι καρδίας) in the fear of the Lord." (Levi 13): "Fear the Lord your God with all your heart, and walk with singleness *or* devotion (ἐν ἀπλότητι) after all His Law." And, especially, Ephesians vi. 5, Colossians iii. 22: "Servants, obey your masters in the flesh . . . with singleheartedness *or* single-heartedly (ἐν ἀπλότητι τῆς καρδίας ὑμῶν)," where the loyalty and devotion which a servant ought to concentrate upon his master is impressively set out. The very opposite to this from a spiritual point of view is the attempt to serve both God and Mammon.

Here then we have, I think, undoubtedly the meaning of ἀπλότης in the passage before us. It is singleness of affection or devotion, undivided loyalty, constancy towards Christ. The relation of the Church, to which St. Paul is writing, has just been presented under the figure of the betrothal of a chaste virgin to her lover (cf. Eph. v. 25-27).

The Apostle is only afraid lest her thoughts should be corrupted from their singleness (of aim and direction) and their chastity in regard to Him. And we may observe that two contextual points confirm our interpretation: (α) The coupling of ἀγνότης or "chastity, purity" (according to the true and received reading) with ἀπλότης. (β) The words which directly follow (ver. 4): "If he who comes preaches another Jesus whom we did not preach." Here a double or divided attraction is at once suggested, and the contingent force of "singleness, constancy," is plainly seen. The thoughts and feelings of a bride should be turned undeviatingly to her destined bridegroom and to him alone. So should the Church love Christ and repay with unwavering devotion His self-sacrificing love for her.

I would therefore suggest as an adequate rendering of the passage: "But I fear lest by some means or other, as the serpent deluded Eve by his cunning your thoughts should be corrupted from their singleness (of devotion) or constancy and their chastity toward Christ."

W. SPICER WOOD.

THE DIATESSARON AND THE TESTIMONY BOOK.

WHEN Justin Martyr wrote his *Apology* to be presented to the Roman Emperor and the Senate, he based his argument for the Christian Religion to a large extent on the evidence which was furnished by the agreement between the Christian history and the ancient Hebrew prophecies. Everything that happened had been foretold and everything that had been foretold had happened. Such was the working formula of the early defenders of the Faith, and we know now that Justin's method was not his own invention, the prophecies which he quoted were not of his own collecting; he was employing before the Roman Senate the same argu-

ments that he would have employed against the Sanhedrin at Jerusalem. The text from which he was briefed was the *Testimonia adversus Judaeos*, in a form not unlike that which was employed by Tertullian and Cyprian, and which is the base of the series of Dialogues, for the most part now non-extant, in which a typical Christian and a representative Jew discuss the validity of the new faith from an Old Testament standpoint. In working over his *Testimonies* Justin finds it necessary to explain to the Court that prophecies have to be looked at from various points of view: "when you hear the utterances of the prophets spoken personally, you are not to assume that they come from the inspired men themselves, but from the inspiring divine Word; sometimes this Word speaks predictively of things that are to come to pass, but sometimes the utterance is in the person of Christ, and sometimes the prophet speaks in the person of the people who make answer to the Lord." When we read through the *Apology* of Justin, or the *Dialogue with Trypho*, in which the same methods of interpretation are applied, we find abundant illustrations of this doctrine of the variable personality of the prophet: e.g., "It was through Isaiah, speaking *in the person of the Father of all* and the Lord God, that these words were uttered,

'Wash you, make you clean, etc.' " I. *Ap.* 36.

"The Holy Spirit cries out through Isaiah, as *in the person of these*, and says,

'Return and look down from heaven,' etc." *Dial.* 25.

A number of similar cases might be quoted, and one's first temptation might be to say that this method of exegesis, even if it should be dealing with the *Testimonies* from the prophets, is Justin's own, both in invention and in application.

Closer examination, however, shows that it is characteristic of nearly all those who collect and employ testimonies from the Jewish Scriptures. It is found in most of the extant Dialogues, and certainly cannot be Justin's except by tradition, any more than the passages of Scripture which he quotes are his own collection. Of this we shall have abundant illustration. For instance, in Cyprian's *Testimonies* (II. 14) we have a section to prove that

He (sc. Christ) is the just one whom the Jews were going to kill. The proof text is then given,

In the Wisdom of Solomon :

"Circumveniamus justum," etc.

Now let us turn to the Dialogue known as the *Altercation of Simon and Theophilus*, which is itself descended from the lost Dialogue of Jason and Papiscus, and we find :

c. 25. "This is Christ, the Son of God, the just one, concerning whom Solomon prophesied in the person of the Jews, saying,

"Circumveniamus justum," etc."

Here the community of material in Cyprian and the *Altercatio* is evident, and the only question which arises is as to the relative priority of

In Sapientia Solomonis

or

Solomon in persona Judaeorum.

Cyprian has the Jews in his headline ; but he has a shorter sub-title.

Suppose we turn next to the *Dialogue of Athanasius and Zacchæus*, where the passage in Proverbs is quoted (viii. 22), which is perhaps the greatest of all the *Testimonies*. We find—

P. 13. "This is she (sc. the Divine Sophia) which speaks through Solomon and says :

"When he was preparing the heaven, I was with him," etc."

Compare this with Gregory of Nyssa's *Testimonies* (ed. Zacagni, p. 289), where we find

"In the person of Wisdom, that is of the Son :

'When he was preparing the heaven, I was with him,' etc."

The two passages are equivalent, but there is a difference in the manner of expressing the Testimony ; one says,

"Sophia through Solomon" ;

the other

"Solomon, in the person of Wisdom."

Here is another example : in the *Dialogue of Athanasius and Zacchæus*, par. 60 :

"That which Isaiah said (sc. lxi. 1), he said *in the person of Christ*."

Listen therefore to his entire prophecy, that thou mayest know that the prophecy suits no one else, except Christ alone. For it says as follows :

"The Spirit of the Lord is upon me," etc.

In the *Altercatio* this becomes merely,

"Esaias *de Christo* dicit :

'Spiritus domini super me,' etc."

The *Dialogue* seems to have the more correct form, that

"Isaiah was speaking in the person of Christ."

It is clear that all these writings use the same method of quotation that we find in Justin, even if they do not use it always or consistently. Suppose we examine that famous anti-Judaic testimony from Isaiah, which is embedded in the Epistle to the Romans (x. 19), according to which

"Israel doth not know, my people doth not consider." (Isaiah i. 3.)

In Justin Martyr it is introduced as follows :

"But that this also may be clear to you, these were spoken *from the person of the Father*. by Isaiah, the forementioned prophet,

'The ox knoweth his owner,' etc."

In Cyprian the introductory formula is simply,

"Apud Esaiam prophetam."

Has Justin expanded the conventional form of introducing a *Testimony* or has Cyprian contracted it ?

As we said above, it will be easy to find many similar expressions in Justin, but we have proved that they are not limited to Justin, and that he did not invent them.

If we have clearly proved that Justin uses the method of quotation in which special emphasis is laid upon the involved personality of the speaker, and if there is some reason to believe that Justin found this method of quotation in his *Book of Testimonies*, we can now search further for similar forms of quotation elsewhere ; and especially we are entitled to ask whether it occurs in Justin's disciple Tatian, and in his disciple's great work, the *Diatessaron*.

Dr Plooij in his recent and valuable book, which he calls *A Primitive Text of the Diatessaron*, in which he shows that a Dutch Harmony at Liège has behind it an earlier Latin form of the *Diatessaron* than has yet been recovered, has followed a hint which I gave him on the method of introducing Testimonies, and writes as follows :

"Dr. Rendel Harris drew my attention to c. 88 (of the Liège Harmony) where in Matthew xii. 17 the quotation from Isaiah is given in this remarkable way : ' Om de profecie te vervulne die Ysaïas wilen profeteerde van hem ende sprac aldus *in den personen des vaders*.' The same formula is found in c. 91, Matthew xiii. 35, ' Omme te vervulne die prophecie die David wilen profeteerde van hem doe hi sprac *in sinen persone*.' (Notice that here the quotation from the Psalm is given as spoken by David, not by Isaiah, as in δ 2*, δ 48, 050, 351, and other Greek MSS., also Ps. Clem.)."

Dr. Plooij continues and observes that "the technical use of it (sc. this method of quotation) is explained by Justin in his First Apology c. 36, where he says that sometimes the words of the prophets must be understood as

spoken, not by the inspired men themselves, but by the Divine Logos who prompts them. In that case, says Justin, the formula, *ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου τινός* is used, sometimes the future is predicted as *ἀπὸ προσώπου* of the Father, sometimes *ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου* of the Christ, sometimes *ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου* of people answering our Lord or His Father. In the following chapter Justin gives some examples of the use of the formula, and he and others use it in Matthew xii. 17; the addition is asterisked by the scribe (of the Liège MS.) as being an *addicio glose*. It belongs, beyond doubt, to the primitive form of the Latin Diatessaron, and accordingly this is one of the passages where the glosses, even when marked by the scribe as an *addicio*, belong to the original form of the text."

The foregoing is a valuable statement of an interesting problem; and the New Testament scholars who have begun to realise the importance of *Testimonies* in the early Christian tradition will be interested to examine further into the way in which the writings of the Old Covenant are employed in the propagation of the New. One or two illustrations may be welcome.

In Romans x. the Apostle Paul, who is certainly working from *Testimonies* throughout this and the neighbouring chapters, finds a prediction of the mission of the twelve Apostles in the opening verse of Isaiah liii., and in the fourth verse of Psalm xix.

The same conjunction, but in the inverse order, is in Justin, *Dial.* c. 42, where the verses are introduced by the formulæ, "David says," and

"Isaiah says, in the person of the Apostles."

These testimonies are immediately followed in Romans by an interruption on the part of a Jewish defender, who objects to a testimony from Isaiah i. 3, in which it is said that "Israel doth not know Me" (so in Justin 1 *Ap.* c. 37),

“My people doth not understand.” When we look closely at the way in which Justin introduces the quotation, we find that it is stated that “these words were spoken by the aforesaid Isaiah *in the person of the Father*.”

A few lines lower in the Epistle, St. Paul introduces a testimony from Isaiah lxx. 2 against a disobedient and gainsaying people, an indisputable *testimonium adversus Judaeos*, and here again we find Justin in 1 *Ap.* c. 38 introducing the same passage in the words :

“When the prophetic Spirit speaks *in the person of Christ*, it voices thus, ‘I have spread out my hands all the day,’ etc.”

Many similar instances can be given, both from Justin and the writers who are in the habit of using Testimonies, and it must be admitted that the explanations as to the personality of the speakers who use the quotations are primitive or that they are a very early accretion to the collected and anti-Judaic proof-texts.

Here is another curious instance of the same kind ; the Psalm, which is quoted in Acts ii. 25–28, is undoubtedly a part of the primitive deposit of *Testimonies*. It is introduced in the Acts by the words

“David says in reference to Him” ;

but if we look at Bede’s *Retractation on the Acts*, we shall find as follows :

“*David dicit in eum, id est, in personam (read persona) ejus,*” where the same explanation of the Testimony is given that we detected in Justin and elsewhere.

We have, of course, something of the same kind in the New Testament itself, where prophecy comes *ὑπὸ τινός* and *διὰ τινος*, e.g., in Matthew i. 22.

“Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by (*ὑπὸ*) the Lord by (*διὰ*) the prophet,” and perhaps it is a similar explanation that will help to rectify the confused text in Acts iv. 25.

We may also compare Acts i. 16 ("the Holy Spirit foretold by the mouth of David concerning Judas"). It is not difficult to see the genesis of these forms of introducing a quotation. In Semitic speech, we have a poverty of prepositions as compared with Greek, which makes it necessary to resort to an expansion or periphrasis, if we are to bring out the difference in meaning between *ὑπὸ* and *διὰ*. One way is to use the instrumental term "by the hand of," but there is no trace of this in early Biblical quotations. It is common, however, to use the expression *διὰ στόματος*, as in Acts i. 16 above, or in Luke i. 70, *ἐλάλησεν διὰ στόματος τῶν ἁγίων προφητῶν*.

In all such cases, the formula indicates the instrument of the inspired speech. The same result would have been attained by underlining the personality of the original speaker, to whom the prophet is a sounding-board. This is what was done by the early collectors of *Testimonies*, who distinguish between primary and secondary speakers by saying, "A, in the person of B, prophesied." For example, Athanasius, when he quotes Genesis ii. 16, "of the trees in the garden, etc.," introduces it in the words, "Holy Scripture speaks in the person of God (*ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ*) and foretells, etc."

Now let us see if we can check the hypothesis which is involved in the foregoing statements. It is suggested that Tatian's original *Harmony of the Gospels* contained explanatory notes as to the persons involved in the Biblical quotations that were made, and that these notes were already, in Tatian's day, extant in the primitive collections of *Testimonia adversus Judaeos*. We may test the matter by examining Tatian's descendants, to see if they make similar explanations and expansions.

One of the great Harmonies of the Middle Ages (all of which have their parentage in Tatian) is that which bears

the name of Zacharias of Chrysopolis, (Zacharias of Besançon). Let us see how he will deal with Old Testament quotations in the New Testament. We take the prophecy of Isaiah, which is quoted in Matthew xii. 17. After transcribing the Vulgate text,

“Et praecepit eis ne manifestum eum faceret, ut adimpleretur quod dictum est per Isaiam prophetam, dicentem, Ecce puer meus, etc.,”

Zachary copies some sentences from Hilary, with regard to our Lord's injunctions to secrecy, and then adds :

“Ex persona Patris dicit Isaias, Ecce puer meus.”

It is the same explanation that we found in the Liège Harmony, and elsewhere ; may we not say that it has been transferred from the original text of the Harmony to the commentary ? Here is another example, in Matthew xiii. 35 Zachary harmonises Matthew's text with Mark iv. 33 as follows :

“(Matt.) Haec omnia locutus est Jesus in parabolis ad turbas ; (Mark) et talibus multis parabolis loquebatur eis verbum, prout poterant audire.”

“(Matt.) Et sine parabolis non loquebatur eis, ut impleretur quod dictum est per Prophetam dicentem : *Aperiam in parabolis os meum*, etc.”

Now look at the commentary. After a short explanation as to the importance of parables in our Lord's teaching, we have :

“*Ex persona Domini* dicitur in psalmo septuagesimo septimo : *Aperiam in parabolis os meum*.”

This is parallel to the statement in the Liège Harmony, where David is said to have prophesied of him, when he spake in his person. The two statements are connected, and apparently have a common origin. The Liège Harmony shows that the explanation as to the personality of the speaker was originally a part of the text, though in Zachary it only survives in the commentary. So we register the

interpretation and credit it to the primitive Diatessaron.

At this point an objection may be made to the effect that if Zachary can be shown to have removed statements from the text of the Harmony which he was re-editing, and that these statements are contained, more or less exactly, in the Liège Harmony, we do not really add anything to the existing evidence for the readings in question, since the text on which Zachary worked may have been a duplicate of that from which the Liège Harmony was translated. We will therefore give a further specimen of the concurrence suggested, which is both instructive and illuminating.

One of the most striking readings in the whole of the Liège Harmony is in John viii. 58, where Jesus says :

“eer Abraham was *so was ic*” :

which the later Dutch Harmonies change to “*so ben ic.*” That Zachary knew the peculiar reading and discarded it, seems clear from his commentary :

“non ait, *fwī*, sed, *sum*, quia divinitas tempus non habet.”

On the other hand, it is certain that the reading cannot have initiated with the Liège MS., nor its immediate Latin ancestor, for it is the reading of the Lewis Syriac, which is almost our oldest authority. The text which Zachary removes and which Liège conserves is, at the lowest estimate for antiquity, a Tatianism. It does not then seem likely, that in either the one Harmony or the other we are dealing with mediæval matter.

Here is another illustration of the way that Zachary and the Liège Harmony depend upon a common tradition. In John vii. 34 our Lord tells the Jews, who are disputing with Him, that “where I am, thither ye cannot come” (“*ubi sum ego, vos non potestis venire*”). Upon this, Zachary, who has the ordinary Vulgate text, remarks, in a

note by way of commentary, that the Lord did not say, "Where I *shall be*," but "Where I *am*"; and He did not say "*Ye will not be able to come.*"

"Non dixit, *ubi ero*, sed *ubi sum* : quia sic venit divinitas ad nos, ut de caelo non recederet. . . . non dixit, *non poteritis*, ne desperarent : sed, *non potestis*, dum tales estis."

The natural suggestion arises, that Zachary has a text before him which has been emended to conformity with the Vulgate, and has conserved an explanation of the changes in his commentary. We turn now to the Liège Harmony, to see how it presents the matter. Here it is :

"daer ic syn sal daer en seldi nit mogen comen,"

with both the expressions which Zachary wishes to obliterate,

"ubi ego ero, ibi non poteritis venire."

These instances suggest to us, that the agreement between the two Harmonies is not confined to the order in which they present the single Gospel, with occasional divergences, but that it extends to the texts which underlie them. Evidently Zachary's text and commentary will have to be scrutinised with great care for variations from the Vulgate which may be significant of antiquity.

J. RENDEL HARRIS.

NOTES AND NOTICES OF RECENT CRITICISM.

ORIENTALISM AND EXPOSITION.

(a) A SIDE-LIGHT from geography, as seen by a traveller, is thrown upon the song of Deborah (Judges v. 19 f.) in the pages of *Under the Syrian Sun* (vol ii. pp. 312 f.), one of Messrs. Hutchinson and Co's exquisite colour-books. It was published in 1906, the letterpress being the work of A. C. Inchbold. The traveller reached the traditional site of Sisera's stronghold, on the wild knoll of Harosheth at the base of Carmel. "The Kishon purled placidly enough now through the narrow gorge by which it passes out into the plain, but in the winter rains, or sudden

storm at any time, it swells so rapidly as to be utterly unfordable in less than half-an-hour. Below the tell of Harosheth the pass is so narrow that the river, in bending, splashes at one part against the base of Carmel, leaving no room even for a foot-track. In one of the storms that spring up with no more warning than the cloud the size of a man's hand, accompanied by strong wind and tropical rain, swelling the brooks and rushing madly down the slopes of the hills, the Kishon, overburdened with their redundant waters, rages through the contracting walls of Carmel and Harithiyeh with a fury that spreads flood and disaster over the lowlands, to-day, as in the day of the battle of Barak with Sisera, when—

The earth trembled and the heavens dropped,
the clouds also dropped water. . .
the river of Kishon swept them away,
that ancient river, the river Kishon . . .
Then were the horsehoofs broken
by the means of the prancings,
the prancings of their mighty ones."

(b) Amos vii. 15 : *And the Lord took me as I followed the flock, and the Lord said to me, Go, prophesy unto my people Israel.*

What did the call of Amos involve ? A real sacrifice, according to Professor Kennett (in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. vii. p. 444). "There is much likelihood in the suggestion that for the disposal of the wool which his flocks produced he must have attended great markets, where he would learn the news of the world," in this particular case the threat to the Palestinian states which the rising force of Assyria conveyed, and which Amos interpreted as an indication of the divine wrath against Israel. "The greatness of the man is shown by the fact that, when he realised his people's danger, he gave up all, that he might bring them to a sense of their position." For, according to Professor Kennett, these words of Amos "imply the permanent giving up of the lucrative occupation of a sheep-farmer for the precarious livelihood of a prophet."

(c) Rom. i. 14 : *I am debtor both to the Greeks and to the barbarians, both to the wise and to the unwise.*

These words are explained by Dr. William Ewing, in his book on *Arab and Druze at Home* (T. C. and E. C. Jack, 1907, pp. 135,

136), from the Arab tradition of open-handed hospitality. "When in the slant beams of dying day the weary traveller draws near, the Bedawy sees in him a guest sent by God, and so he is called Daif Ullah—'guest of God,' who for the sake of God must be bountifully dealt with. For, are not all men 'guests of God,' spending the brief hours of life's fleeting day under the blue canopy of this great tent, sharing together His hospitality? . . . How might two guests sit together in the great Host's tent, one eating and the other hungry? Hence we have the Arab proverbs: 'Loaf for loaf, and your neighbour dies not of hunger,' and 'He who has bread is debtor to him who has none.' Thus do we find, in the nobler phases of desert life, a fine reflection of the Christian principle, so well realised by the Apostle Paul, who felt himself debtor to everyone who knew not the light and joy of the Gospel as he did. The bread of life must be received and dispensed in the generous spirit of Oriental hospitality." This is bound up with the view, shared by Dr. Ewing (p. 44), that when the Apostle [Paul, after his conversion, at once "went into Arabia" (Gal. i. 17), it was into the wild country west of the Jordan, not far south into the desert of the Exodus.

(d) In the vision of Revelation xix. 11 f. the seer describes the Lord Jesus as a stern, militant figure, acting against the rebellious in the latter days. He is called *faithful and true*, as He loyally carries out the purpose of God on earth, thus proving Himself true to the interests of the faithful. He is supported in this career and pageant of victory by the troops of heaven, who are described with Oriental picturesqueness in verse 14: *the armies which were in heaven followed him upon white horses* (typifying a royal triumph), *clothed in fine linen, white and clean* (denoting their moral purity). It is an Oriental picture, whose meaning for us may be interpreted as the need for active zeal in those who would share the truly saintly life. How it may be used in this connexion may be seen from Professor Dowden's sketch of the character of King Henry VI., as drawn by Shakespeare. Henry (*Shakespeare, His Mind and Art*, p. 174) "is cold in great affairs; his supreme concern is to remain blameless. Free from all greeds and ambitions, he yet is possessed by egoism, the egoism of timid saintliness. His virtue is negative, because there is no vigorous basis of manhood within him, out of which

heroic saintliness might develop itself. For fear of what is wrong, he shrinks from what is right. This is not the virtue ascribed to the nearest followers of the 'Faithful and True,' who in his righteousness doth judge and make war. Henry is passive in the presence of evil, and weeps. He would keep his garments clean ; but the garments of God's soldier-saints, who do not fear the soils of struggle, gleam with a higher, intenser purity. 'His eyes were as a flame of fire, and on his head were many crowns . . . And the armies which were in heaven followed him upon white horses, clothed in fine linen, white and clean.' These soldiers in heaven have their representatives in earth ; and Henry was not one of these." Dowden then refers to Newman's astringent verses on zeal and love.

And wouldst thou reach, rash scholar mine,
 Love's high, unruffled state ?
 Awake ! thy easy dreams resign,
 First learn thee how to hate :—
 Hatred of sin, and zeal, and fear,
 Lead up the holy hill ;
 Track them, till charity appear
 A self-denial still.

Now Henry VI., Dowden adds, " knows nothing of zeal ; and he is amiable, not charitable."

(e) In the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures* (April, pp. 153-185) the Rev. A. Cohen, of Birmingham, uses rabbinical literature to throw light on Hebrew lexicography. Some of his suggestions which bear on the translation of the Old Testament are as follows : (i.) In Jer. li. 32 render "and the thickets (צִיָּה neither a pool of water nor a rush) they have burned with fire." (ii.) In Cant. v. 13 render "his cheeks are as a bed of spices, as boxes of perfumes," since נֶרֶךְ means a box, not a tower, here. "How the herb-box came to be called 'tower' may be readily seen from the shape of the spice-box commonly used by Jews during the *Habdalah* service, at the termination of the Sabbath" (p. 167). (iii.) The verb סָרָה is taken in its rabbinic sense of being sterile, and Jeremiah xlix. 7 is rendered, "Is their wisdom become sterile, impotent ?" (iv.) In Job iv. 12, xxvi. 14, *shemetz* is rendered not "whisper" (for which "there is no firm etymological basis") but "tiny trace."

THE MEANING OF JEHOVAH.

THE Rev. D. Th. James, M.A., Llangadwaladr Vicarage, Oswestry, sends this communication upon Exodus iii. 14 (אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה) :

" 'This expression can hardly signify 'I am *that* I am' or even 'I will become *what* I will become,' because the emphasis is not on the relative *asher* or its implications but on the verb *ehyeh* (I will come sc. to be with), which alone corresponds to, or is intended to explain, the name (tetragrammaton). Hence the abbreviation—' *Ehyeh* hath sent me unto you.' These or similar considerations must have been apparent to the LXX translators, or they would not have rendered the expression ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ὢν, by which *asher* becomes subject, not predicate. We are not here concerned with the significance of ὁ ὢν, which may be partly influenced by Greek thought ; but the above considerations certainly lead to the conclusion that in *ehyeh asher ehyeh* we have an instance of emphatical, identical statement = 'I will come and make my abode' (sc. with you ; see iii. 12). My contention will be further illustrated and confirmed by what appears to be nothing more or less than a variation of the expression (יְהוָה יְהוָה) in the well-known passage, 'The Lord, the Lord (repeated, emphatic), a God full of compassion and mercy' (Exod. xxxiv. 6)."

REVIEWS.

The Cambridge Ancient History. Edited by J. B. Bury, M.A., F.B.A., S. A. Cook, Litt.D. and F. E. Adcock, M.A. Vol. II., The Egyptian and Hittite Empires to c. 1000 B.C. Pp. xxv. + 751. Cambridge University Press. Price 35s.

The publication of the first volume of this work in 1923 marked an epoch in the study of ancient history. It was the beginning of an attempt to lay before the student a comprehensive view of the past, in which the various nations should no longer be treated as independent and isolated units, but as elements whose interrelation was at least as important as their separate existence. Under the skilful guidance of the editors and contributors we are able to follow the story of the earliest

forms of civilisation known to the western world, and to see how different peoples and lands contributed not merely to one another, but also to that whole from which our modern culture has sprung.

The editors have been fortunate in securing the services of the most distinguished scholars in the English-speaking world, and a mere list of their names would be an adequate guarantee of the excellence of the work. The reader will probably be struck by two features which indicate that peculiar difficulties have been overcome. The first is that although over a dozen scholars have shared in the preparation of this volume, there is no lack of continuity or of a common perspective. This is the more remarkable when it is remembered that different periods and aspects of the history of the same people have sometimes been assigned to different hands. Thus whilst in Vol. I. the sections which dealt with Egypt were the work of Dr. Hall and Professor Peet, in Vol. II. the latter contributes one chapter and the remainder of this subject has been done by Professor Breasted. Yet they have all succeeded in so adjusting their work that the reader will be entirely unconscious of any change in outlook. The whole will read continuously.

The second important feature is the way in which the archaeologist and the literary student have worked together. It has so often happened that the former has misunderstood the latter and has believed that his discoveries have overthrown theories of past history which the critic has suggested. At times the archaeologist has himself reconstructed history on the basis of what he has found, and has produced a picture which seems to the philologist a product of pure imagination. Men who are equally competent in both directions are rare, and it has been the good fortune of the Cambridge editors to secure them.

In Vol. I., as was natural, the greater part of the space had to be devoted to archaeology. This branch of study is by no means absent from Vol. II., but the authors of some of the sections are able to rely far more on documents more or less contemporary with the events which they describe. This is, of course, more true of Egypt and Mesopotamia than of other countries, for the languages of both are fairly well known and considerable periods in the second millennium B.C. are well documented. But, in spite of the labours of scholars like Hrozny and Cowley,

even the cuneiform Hittite is only beginning to be understood, and the hieroglyphic is still sealed. And even Homer, the earliest literary witness we have for the life of Greece, writes of events which occurred centuries before his time, and of a civilisation which preceded his own.

The period as a whole is of the greatest importance to the student of the Old Testament. Just as it is necessary for any one who would understand the modern world to be familiar with that ancient Græco-Roman culture in which Modern Europe has its roots, so he who would rightly appreciate the life and thought of Israel must see her against the background of the earlier and sometimes contemporary peoples whose civilisation contributed so much to her own. From this point of view the study of Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria and pre-Hebrew Palestine is indispensable, and it is only when we place the people of the Old Testament in right relation to these nations and their history that we are able to appraise alike their debt to others and their own unique qualities.

But it is to Dr. S. A. Cook's two chapters that the Biblical student will turn with most eagerness. The writer is both archaeologist and critic, and stands high in each class. No more capable scholar for the present purpose could have been found, and every word he says must be given careful consideration. As becomes his position his views are marked by caution, and he is not afraid to put forward suggestions as suggestions and not as conclusions. This attitude is the more valuable because in Israelite history before David archaeological discoveries have done singularly little to confirm the details of the Biblical narrative. The names of the patriarchs have been found only in connexions which suggest that they were worshipped as gods. If the statement that the Israelites built Ramses and Pithom (Exod. i. 11) is to be accepted, the only possible date for the oppression is the reign of Ramses II., and for the Exodus (following the Biblical narrative) that of his son Merneptah. Yet the earliest mention of "Israel" in any Egyptian monument records a victory won by Merneptah over them and other Palestinian tribes, and by this time they are recognised as a people well settled in Canaan. The tribe of Asher is already in north Palestine in the days of Ramses II. The nearest approach to any mention of Moses is to be seen in the somewhat obscure

records left in the Sinai mines by a polytheistic overseer who had won the favour of queen Hatshepsut, two centuries at least before the time of Ramses II. All this may support the general impression of the conditions which we gather from the Bible, but it can hardly be said to confirm the Pentateuchal narrative, nor is the matter helped by the identification of the Hebrews with the Habiru of the Tell-el-Amarna tablets. The names of the Egyptian characters in the Joseph story have as yet only appeared on monuments contemporary with the later Jewish monarchy, and seem to be comparatively late formations. Under these circumstances Dr. Cook (and others) do well to be cautious.

In the first of his two chapters (pre-Hebrew Syria and Palestine) Dr. Cook is able to be fairly dogmatic, because he can rely on contemporary documents such as the Tell-el-Amarna tablets and those recently discovered at Boghaz Keui in Asia Minor, and we cannot but admire the skilful way in which he unravels the tangled thread of Palestinian politics under the Egyptian 19th dynasty. It is enough to say that this is probably the most coherent and straightforward reconstruction of the history of Palestine in that period that we have yet had.

But in writing on "The Rise of Israel" Dr. Cook has had an even more difficult task. His method has been to take first of all the Biblical narrative which deals with the section of the period under immediate review. He then points out such difficulties as arise within the story itself, and compares the whole with the evidence, if any, which may be gathered from outside sources. He has comparatively little to say of higher criticism, though he would admit the ordinary analysis of the Hexateuch, because he believes that it is of slight importance compared with historical criticism, and he believes that even the earliest elements in the narrative seem to have reached their present form some centuries after the events which they narrate. He then attempts, with the help of the various tendencies which he notices in the narratives, to build up as much as possible of the actual history and endeavours to give as much weight as possible to tradition. He expresses no doubts as to the historicity of the main characters in the story, and seems to hold that the early narratives embody traditions rather than legends or myths. His method is, in fact, very similar to that which

is normally employed (and in this volume very effectively employed) in reconstructing the story of early Greece.

Many of Dr. Cook's readers will find only one thing to regret or criticise. They will wish that he had given more space to David. Most higher critics agree (though Dr. Cook does not) that the compilers of the Books of Samuel had at their disposal a certain amount of material coming from a date so early as to be practically contemporary with David or Solomon. Dr. Cook alludes to the normal method, namely the isolation of this material and the rejection of all else as "unhistorical," but does not see his way to follow it. The result is that his reconstruction seems to be unnecessarily brief, and a number of his readers will feel less uncertain about the course of events. At the same time we cannot lightly throw on one side even Dr. Cook's caution, for he was an undoubted right to an opinion, and we may well hope that on this subject he has yet more to say to us.

As becomes such a production the volume is fully indexed and provided with a Bibliography and an ample supply of maps. Perhaps in a future edition some of these might contain a little more detail. Map 10, for instance, facing p. 480, would be even more useful if the rivers were named and all the places mentioned in the neighbouring pages were indicated. But these are minor details, and the volume will probably be for a couple of generations the most useful introduction to the history of its period.

T. H. ROBINSON.

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Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres. Edidit Ernestus Diehl. Fasc. I. (pp. 1-80). Berlin, Weidmann, 1924. Subscription-price M.3.75.

THIS is a very commendable enterprise, which will be warmly welcomed. Diehl's selection of Vulgar Latin Inscriptions in the *Kleine Texte* is useful, but naturally limited in range; those who have consulted the vast *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* know how much time is taken up, in spite of the excellent indices, in searching through its masses of material. Dessau's *Inscriptiones . . . Selectae* provided a good model; Diehl has followed it and arranged his selection of 4,700 Christian inscriptions (covering down to the beginning of the seventh century and calculated to run to some 800 pages of text with other 400 of indices)

according to subject—a plan whose advantages are evident. He has drawn on the large collections of De Rossi, the *Corpus*, Le Blant,¹ Marucchi, Huebner and others, besides giving material which has been published only in what are, to most of us, inaccessible periodicals. There will be two divisions in the work: *Tituli Christiani ad res Romanas pertinentes*, and *Tituli Christiani ad res Christianas pertinentes*; the present fascicule gives 360 inscriptions, the first three chapters of part I, referring to emperors, members of the senatorial and equestrian orders, and other nobles. It is a selection of considerable interest and value, though probably those which refer to the Christian cult will be most generally welcomed, when they appear.

Each inscription receives several lines of annotation and commentary, historical and linguistic; these notes are practically always neat, compressed, and to the point; the only exception noticeable in this part is the reference given at line 2 of No. 176: *clara genus et pulcra genas*, where the editor cites Vulg. cant. I. 9, *pulchræ sunt genæ tuæ*; most of us will agree that the phrase is neither so recondite nor unusual as to require a literary parallel. No. 168*b* line 5, *patre quoque orbatos*, will not pass as the beginning of a hexameter; the *a* of *pater* may be lengthened in late Latin verse (as in 201*b* line 4), but as an emendation it is better avoided. These are but minute and perhaps cavilling points; what is important is to emphasise the exceptional value of this collection, its carefulness and orderliness and comparative fulness. No library, especially theological, can afford to miss a work which will fill so great a gap so efficiently.

J. H. BAXTER.

¹ Whose name is wrongly run into one word. I have noticed no reference to Gsell's *Inscr. latines de l'Algérie*, Paris, 1922, but it is perhaps too early to judge of omissions. At No. 229*a* reference should have been made to Christian use of the phoenix (in allegory of the resurrection) rather than to Ovid, Seneca and Tacitus; it is found from Tertullian onward.

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